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1 Table of contents 1.Introduction Motivation Project design page Introduction to theoretical framework page Regional Security Complex Theory page Major approaches within international society page Securitization page Regional Security Complex page Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa page The societal sector page The military sector page The political sector page Sovereignty page The nature of sovereignty page Colonization page Decolonization page Racial sovereignty page Positive sovereignty page Negative sovereignty page Conclusion of theory page Methodology page Method for analysis page Delimitations page Contemporary Study page Actors page Geography page Theoretical page Introduction to the security complex of Mali page Introduction to West Africa page Introduction to the Malian conflict page Historical context page The current conflict page

2 5.4 The government of Mali page Political turmoil and structure page Coup 2012 page Structure of the military page Ansar Dine page Origin of Ansar Dine page Affiliation of Ansar Dine page Military and economic structure page Movement for National Liberation of Azawad page Azawad ethnicity page Girevance with Mali page Strucutre page Liberation struggle of Azawad page MNLA present situation page ECOWAS page Structure of ECOWAS page Future intervention by ECOWAS page Challenges for ECOWAS page Negative sovereignty in Mali page Introduction page Territorial integrity page MNLA and Ansar Dine page International recognition page The Tuaregs page Interim conclusion page Securitization page Security dynamics following the coup d etat page The territorial integrity and unity of Mali page Azawad and the various actors page New threats and positions page Interim conclusion pag Regional Security Complex analysis page Durable patterns page Close geographical proximity and the reach of the superpower page Mali as an insulator state page Interim conclusion page Conclusion of analysis page Disussion page Negative sovereignty page Regional security complex page Conclusion page Bibliography page

3 1-Introduction Mali has since the first democratic election in 1992 been seen as an unique country in West Africa by the international community. In a sub-region marked by famine and drought, and where civil-wars, coup d états and military interventions are recurrent events; Mali has experienced a certain degree of governmental stability, including democratically fair elections recognized by the international community. This understanding of Mali is often prevalent, but when looking further into the national political dynamics it quickly becomes obvious that Mali has had its share of internal turmoil. Historically, this is evident in the various secessionist rebellions by Tuareg groups in northern Mali. The Tuaregs are traditionally nomadic and have been moving across in the western part of the Sahel belt. They have been fighting for independence from Mali and the creation of the sovereign nation of Azawad since the 1960 s when Mali became independent (Kisangani, 2012). The Tuaregs populate vast areas in the Sahel belt, predominately in Mali and Niger but also in Algeria, Burkina Faso and Libya. The Sahel belt is characterized as a vast area south of the Sahara Desert with hardly any control of borders, which has made it attractive for drug traffickers to use it in transporting drugs from West Africa into Europe: northern Mali has now become a dangerous crossroads of drugs, crime, terrorism and rebellion (Abderrahmane, 2012, August 6). Economic income from the drug trade have been said to sponsor terrorist activity in the area, this has mainly been linked to the al-qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and to a lesser degree to Ansar Dine and the Movement National pour Libération de l Azawad(MNLA) (Perry, 2012, October 22). The recent Tuareg rebellion in early 2012 has given rise to a meltdown of the political system and the national army in Mali. The lack of the state s ability to protect its territory has made the northern part of Mali into a warzone with different actors competing on the scene. The different regional rebel and terrorist groups are using the security vacuum to pursue their own interests, which varies from implementation of Sharia-law to liberation of Azawad to economic activity based on drug trade. Additionally the conflict has drawn in the regional body of ECOWAS and international actors including US, UN and France, who are planning military intervention, but also have their own interest in the conflict. If the conflict escalates the international society is worried that it could have dire consequences for Mali and for the entire region. Consequences such as flows of refugees, hunger and ethnic conflicts are already apparent in the current conflict. But in further perspectives the international society fears that northern Mali could become a safe haven for terrorist organizations such as AQIM and MUJAO. Many of the Tuareg fighters have served under Gaddafi during the Libyan Civil War of Upon Gaddafi s fall the Tuareg fighters returned to northern Mali heavily armed with sophisticated firepower from Gaddafi s army and better trained than previously. This resulted in an igniting of the secessionist Tuareg movement MNLA. The group and the Malian army clashed in northern Mali in January 2012 resulting in MNLA seizing the major cities of Timbuktu and Gao, along with several other minor cities in the north. The Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré s response to the rebellion was deemed too slow and insufficient by a division of the military under the command of Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who led a coup against the government on March 22nd, However, the rebellion in the north continued to conquer territory and by the 6th of April the MNLA rebellion declared the region of Azawad, an area twice the size of Germany, an independent state with its southern border just north of Mopti, cutting the country in two and leaving the southern government with one-third of the country (BBC, 2012, April 13). Meanwhile, in the wake of the coup, other rebel groups emerged on the scene. Most notable is the radical Islamic salafist group Ansar Dine, consisting primarily of Tuaregs. Opposite to MNLA, Ansar Dine does not fight to divide Mali, but to implement Sharia. Ansar Dine has on many accounts been fighting alongside the MNLA in northern Mali, but their different agendas eventually led to a cession of their cooperation. Ansar Dine has been heavily linked to AQIM and its leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, is being accused of having ties to terrorist organizations. Ansar Dine has already enforced a radical Sharia-law in cities under their control. Its Islamic ideology has put further pressure from the international community for the issue to be dealt with (Hirsch, 2012, October 22; Al-Jazeera, 2012, July 10; Al- Jazeera, 2012, November 29). Due to international and regional pressure Sanogo appointed Diouncounda Traore as interim president in April Traore task is primarily committed to stop the rebel groups and dismantle Azawad. The United Nations has put the pressure on the African Union (AU), The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the government of Mali to act against what the UN calls a terror organization occupying territory in Northern Mali. 4 5

4 On the 11th December 2012, the internal political situation escalated further, when Sanogo arrested the Prime Minister, Cheick Diarra, accusing him of pursuing personal interest and not keen on solving he conflict in the north (Al-Jazeera, 2012, December 11). The former Prime Minister is an accomplished astrophysicist who worked on five NASA missions before becoming an American citizen. The circumstance under which Cheick Diarra was arrested and resigned is unclear (Al Jazeera, 2012, December 11). The past events in Mali have fragilized the political situation and the political climate seems ever changing as a result of the dynamics in Regional Security Complex of Mali. 1.2-Motivation Our project departs from a curiosity of how Mali, an otherwise relativity stable country in West Africa, has been divided in two by what seems to be a traditional secessionist group and an armed insurgent group with links to al-qaeda. However, the UN, AU and ECOWAS often articulate the group as one, either the Tuaregs or Ansar Dine, even though internal skirmish has been reported and the origin of the two groups seems entirely separate. Thus the international level and understanding of the situation seems contradictory to the local situation on the ground in Mali, which is increasingly complicated by the coup in March, when Sanogo overthrew the democratic elected government. ECOWAS has given amnesty to the coup leaders, even though their protocol of 1999 should safeguard the democratic institutions of its member countries. The national level of the conflict is also a contradiction which nurses a muddy picture of relations between actors, due the government s public opinion of the Tuaregs being part of the problem even though most are citizens of Mali and have lived in Mali for decades. assessment of different actors. In order to broaden our understanding of the region s dynamic and relationship between the different actors we make use of analytical tools provided by the framework of Regional Security Complex theory, defined by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (1998; 2003). Our problem definition is rooted in our curiosity, the conflict and the theory chosen for analysis: - How can we understand negative sovereignty in Mali and what consequences does it have for how the different actors securitize each other in the potential regional security complex of Mali? Our premise is that the Malian government is ot capable to perform the tasks, which are usually are associated with a Westphalian state in control of its territory. The weak position of the Malian state allows non-state actors to emerge on Mali s sovereign territory, and compete for power on the same level as the central government. Hence we have accordingly applied Robert Jackson s theory of Negative Sovereignty (1986; 1987) to our analysis of the conflict. We find Jackson s theory applicable as it can give a more clear understanding of sovereignty in Mali. The emergence of non-state actors challenging the recognized state, gives us the understanding of viewing Mali as a region itself, where the central government is just one of many actors. We strive to further our understanding, by 6 7

5 2. -Project design This section presents the project design. Section 3.-Theoretical Framework explores two theoretical approaches to understanding the conflict in Mali: Regional Security Complex Theory and Negative Sovereignty which are both summed up in the final part of the section. Section 4.-Methodology covers the methodological orientation of the project and introduces source criticism, the method for analysis and delimitation, to grasp the scope of the project. 5.-Regional Security Complex of Mali introduces and exhibits the historical context of the West Africa including an introduction to the chosen actors. In chapter 6-analysis we use the theories as a framework to analyze how the selected actors securitize each other and further, what consequences it has for Mali. The implications and contradictions between our case and theory is discussed in section 7.-Discussion. 8.-Conclusion briefly concludes the findings of the analysis and the discussion Introduction to theoretical framework In our approach we are focusing on three theoretical approaches: Regional Security Complex Theory, Securitization (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998; Buzan & Wæver: 2003) and Negative Sovereignty (Jackson, 1986; 1987). Jackson s notion on negative sovereignty allows us to examine the historical perspective of how colonization and decolonization has constructed the states in Africa and how this construction has affected the present states. This serves a clearer understanding of the dynamics and foundation of the current- and ongoing conflict in Mali. The second theory presented is Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). As outlined in 1.-Introduction the conflict is mostly evident in a regional context. RSCT allows us to understand the conflict in this regional perspective, by emphasizing the regional dynamic. The third theory introduced is Securitization. This functions as a tool to understand and examine the intersubjective dynamics of the regional security complex (RSC). An understanding of how the actors securitize each other, further illuminates the relations between the actors and how they chose to handle a certain security threat. Securitization is a tool incorporated into the theory of RSCT and should be understood in relations to a RSC. 3.2-Regional Security Complex Theory This section explores and elaborates on the framework for analysis defined by Buzan, de Wilde and Wæver (1998), in terms of concepts, terminology and use of the framework. Buzan and Wæver incorporate this analytical framework into their Regional Security Complex Theory-RSCT (2003), which is introduced in this section and in the project to analyze the Conflict in Mali. The section s first task is to outline two perspectives on international security namely neorealist and globalist, for there next to use the two perspectives to frame the regionalist perspective preferred by Buzan and Wæver (Ibid.). The third part contains an elaboration 8 9

6 on the terminology of Buzan, de Wilde and Wæver (1998), which provides the underlying analytical tools used in the analytical section. Their regionalist perspective is in the fourth part, used to explain the level of actors, and their definition, in the analysis and their relevance for the analytical work. The fifth part introduces the four sectors for analysis, and the final part of this section accounts for RSCT s take on Sub Saharan-Africa (from here on written as Africa) in general and West Africa in specific Major approaches within international security Traditionally post-cold war theoretical perspectives on structures of international security are divided in three: the neorealist, globalist and regionalist. Each contains a distinct focus on the level of analysis and thereby an embedded understanding of the structure of international security. The structure is in a theoretical context is understood as levels of structure and how they are differentiated from each other. Neorealists understand the international system as structured by state-actors and concerned with their material power. The material power of the state-actor is reflected in its hierarchical position in the international system, which is further conditioned by the balance-of-power logic. Power in the system is a zero-sum game where external power cannot be added. The international institutions of the world, being the UN, the IMF, the Word Bank etc. are in a neorealist perspective not a result of globalization, but merely an internationalization of the predominate powers. Globalists understand the international system as consisting of both non-state actors and state-actors, and are mainly concerned with the actors on a supranational level. The system of states, as understood by the neorealist, needs to be redefined for the benefit of non-state actors and supranational institutions. Hence, pointing towards a non-territorial bound power, which exists by the premises of technology and social advances mainly in terms of innovation in communication and transportation. These advances make it possible for actors across the structural levels to interact, empower and cooperate. It should be noted that states often play a large role in these networks but are not the sole actor or main power center. The actors who interact on these levels, both the sub national and supranational, are mainly NGO s, corporations and social movements, who in a globalist perspective can outplay the states due to their mobility across borders. The regionalist perspective understood by Buzan and Wæver (2003) draws on neorealist and globalist perspectives. The perspective agrees with the globalist premise that allows the significant actors to be both non-state and state, by agreeing that globalization is an issue in security studies. However, it does not override territoriality within the security paradigm. In terms of territoriality, the regionalist perspective borrows from both by addressing the interplay between territoriality and deterritorialitization, hence allowing regional structures to act in a transnational manner and to be initiated in a response to globalization. However, the neorealists emphasize that the international levels of structure is still bound to territorially, which Buzan and Wæver agree to but add another regional level. Buzan and Wæver argue that threats travel more efficiently across short distances than long but this obstacle can be crossed if the mode of threat is not territorially bound (e.g. an economic threat or in the case of international terrorist threat) or if actors capabilities rise to a level where distance is no longer an issue. They are hereby suggesting that certain elements of globalist perspectives can be incorporated if development in regards to these elements allows it (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 9-14). In order to conceptualize the regionalist view Buzan and Wæver introduces a theoretical understanding they call: Regional security complex theory (RSCT). Regional security complex (RSC) is defined as: A set of units whose processes of securitization, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. (Buzan et al. 1998: 201) RSC is not a concept which can only be applied to some situations and security issues but rather a way of viewing security issues in general. The argument is that security analyzed solely through a national perspective does not make sense since security dynamics are always relational. In order to understand the analytical components of RSC s Buzan and Wæver state that RSC s are characterized by durable patterns of amity and enmity. They go on to specify that this relation, in terms of security, is more often found between states with a close geographical proximity and that this interaction is most noticeable in the military, political, societal, and environmental sectors (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 45). The military, political, societal sectors are explained further on in this section and will frame the analysis as well. The environmental sector is however not explained further and will not be a focal point in the analysis. (See: Delimitation) Security should be understood as a term that can be used across the sectors, but varies in 10 11

7 form across these sectors, essentially security means survival in the face of an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). However, this needs to be seen in respect to securitization processes and how various actors securitize each other Securitization Securitization is, according to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), a process where an actor securitizes a threat by proclaiming it as a threat. This process is important to follow when conducting security analysis, because it will allow the researcher to understand the power-relation between actors and the nature of the threat. A threat is seen as a continuum ranging from non politicized, politicized to securitized - any issue can be placed in this continuum, where the status of securitized is acquired when a security move is successful. A security move is a speech act where an actor tries to securitize a threat, by speaking about it as a threat. They draw on Bourdieu to establish that a speech act is not only speech but an action in itself, which is dependent on social position of the enunciator and thus in a wider sense is inscribed in a social field (op. cit.:46). The securitization is thus becoming intersubjective and thereby reliant on the acceptance of the audience to become legitimate, or in other words; if a certain threat is not accepted as such by the audience it will not gain the status of securitized. By stating this, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) also state that studying and understanding securitization is to study discourses. The underlying aspect of this refers to an actor s understanding of threat as something real, it does not however matter if the threat is real or not, but to what extent it is constructed as a real threat. The threat becomes real if it is fully securitized e.g. the relevant actors accept it as a real threat. By being fully securitized it becomes legitimate to break the common rules and procedures in order to deal with the discursive established existential threat (op. cit.: 25). E.g. the war in Iraq was initiated on the premise that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, which was an existential threat to the US. The US securitized it by speaking about it as a threat in order to gain support for the pending war. Within certain securitization, rhetoric of survival is often prevalent - if we do not eliminate the threat, we will not be here to eliminate it later. The speech act element drawn from Bourdieu emphasizes that the speech act itself is an action in the sense that it holds an active component relating to a social field (op. cit.: 26). Threats will at times arise and the securitization will happen ad hoc, however if the threat is persistent the securitization can become institutionalized. This is seen mostly with threats regarding the military sector, where the armed forces of other nations or non-state actors have posse threats for centuries. A defense system will in such situations have been built as an answer to the threat. This institutionalization is often based on an ad hoc measurement taken in by the actor and as the ad hoc threat becomes persistent, the security aspect becomes institutionalized (op. cit.: 27). The speech act s approach to security analysis includes three types of actors. Referent objects, Securitizing actors and Functional actors. Referent objects are the objects, which are referred to in the act of securitizing. The object that is threatened and has a legitimate right for survival are almost always collectives as states or nations, but could also be organizations or communities. The success of securitizing an object will often rely on the size of the object. This can be seen as a continuum with individual or small groups at one end and large systems at the other end. It is very rare for individuals to achieve legitimacy as securitized objects; however it is also difficult for large systems such as humankind to constitute a securitized object. From this it becomes evident that the legitimate securitized object needs to be a graspable entity: The referent object is that to which on can point (op. cit.: 36). Securitizing actors are the actors who securitize certain threats. By performing the speech act they refer to the referent object. These actors are often political leaders, pressure groups, international agencies or governments. The distinction between the referent actor and the securitizing actor lies in that a securitizing actor cannot usually securitize itself e.g. a governmental regime will usually not securitize itself but the state or the nation. It is however not impossible for the referent object and the securitizing actor to be the same. Rarely will we see an individual being the securitizing actor because he/she will be the representative of a collective and therefore be bound to a certain role (op. cit.: 42). Functional actors are usually influential in the field of security but are not the referent objects or the securitizing actors. The influence has a say in whether the securitization of the securitizing actors is legitimate or not, it furthermore affects the general dynamics and decisions of the field of security (op. cit.: 36)

8 The key question in security analysis is, who can do security in the name of what? (Op. cit.: 45) Regional Security Complex Security issues are more prevalent in states with close geographical proximity; this point is used on two levels. Firstly, it is used as a way to argue and legitimize the use of the regional perspective and RSCT as an approach to the analysis on security, and secondly it is applied as an analytical tool to distinguish between actors inside of the security cluster or RSC and actors outside of it and their possible role within it Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa The dynamics of Buzan and Wæver s RSCT in terms of actors, levels, securitization and power enables its use across a range of geographical locations. It helps to an understanding of how a particular location is linked to a sub-national, a national, a regional and a global security complex, and furthermore it tells how these are interlinked. Buzan and Wæver suggest that a number of regional security complexes exist in the world and that these are analytical entities, discursive constructed to the extent of the actors security practices. However, the case of Africa in general and explicitly West Africa challenges the theory s emphasis on regional complexes, due to the rather unique case of African politics and the structure of states in Africa. The continent generally poses challenges to IR theory and RSCT is not an exception. This section of the chapter elaborates on the features of RSCT in relations to African security theory and furthermore on the specific case of West Africa where, of course, Mali and Azawad is located (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 219). Africa currently consists of 54 recognized states, which, with the exception of a few, have been colonized by European states, as mentioned in the section on context. Buzan and Wæver identify the root of the African problem for IR and RSCT, as being the postcolonial state. The postcolonial state was superficially reflective of the European states and was never able or enabled to reach the state level of this mirror. Post-independent states do and did miss the central features of political, social and economic functionality, a deficiency affluent throughout the state apparatus. Though, one feature is consistent across the continent, the mutual and international recognition of the already established states. All members of the African Union have agreed to this recognition and to uphold the current borders, however certain cases are exceptional as seen with the independence of South Sudan in The general lack of features associated with the European state resorts in weak states that historically have been acting predatorily towards their populations to the extent that it functions more as personal regimes, based on neo-patrimonialism where enrichment of elites are a top priority, and not the welfare of citizens. The weak states have given room for non-state actors to relatively easily gain territorial, cultural, material and political power. Some of these non-state actors are based on ethnicity and can to some extent be credited to pre-colonial times, however this postulate should be taken with a constructivist s nerve (op.cit.: 220). The weakness of most states makes them militarily compete on the same level as the non-state actors, and some of the regimes come into being by insurgents occupying capital cities. Buzan and Wæver argue that the strength of the non-state actor and the weakness of the official state, forces the security focus to be national and not interstate. At the same time the weakness of state on especially its neopatrimonial feature makes it increasingly possible for outside actors to interferer on a sub national level, altering the power structures within (op.cit.: 229). The regional level of security in Africa is marked by spillovers, especially in terms of refugee flows, expulsions of foreigners and civil wars. The regional aspect becomes mainly a spillover of domestic conflicts, with little interstate warfare. The interstate warfare comes mostly in the form of regimes supporting non-state actors in other states territories, in the form of personalized 14 15

9 regimes adding to proxy wars across borders. The low account of actual interstate wars and the spillovers present, suggest that each state interacts only with the states in its immediate proximity, leaving more empirical evidence for a regional security complex, RSC, consisting of all (sub Saharan) Africa. However, Buzan and Wæver find signs of emergent RSCs, labeled Proto RSC, mainly Southern and West Africa separately, and to a lesser extent the Horn, Eastern and central Africa (op. cit.: 233). The illustration shown above defines the West African RSC as a proto complex and Mali as an insulator state. Due to the project s focus on Mali, a definition of an insulator state and an account of the proto RSC are accounted for below. West African States, ECOWAS, was formed in 1975 and consisted of sixteen countries, as it does today. Nigeria being the main entrepreneur behind the community, the economic powerhouse of the region and the possessor of the largest standing army is the pole of the Unipolar system. In 1990, ECOWAS formed ECOMOG a peace-keeping structure mainly based on Nigerian troops, which underlined the system s unipolarity and the position of power held by Nigeria. ECOMOG has however not been able to contain and stop the spillover of domestic issues in West Africa. Nigeria s role in the regional power relations is the main argument for Buzan and Wæver case of a proto RSC in West Africa (op. cit.: ) The insulator is defined as a state located in the border region between two RSC's. The insulator is both subject to the regional security dynamics of its own RSC but also the neighboring one. It is to weak in nature to be able to define the security agenda to lift the boundary of the two RSC's and merging them. (op. cit.: 41) The proto RSC of West Africa is marked by domestic security issues ever since independence which, with the exception of a few, occurred in the early 1960 ties: a state of regional peace but internal war. Most war where civil wars or insurgent wars, on one side often backed by other states in Africa or the previous metropolitan states; the former colonizers. Economic Community of The interregional level of security issues in Africa is minimal with the AU and the OAU being strong rhetorical and symbolical actors but not with any real punch. Few cases of interregional interaction are seen, mostly in the form of refugee flows and political figures exiling in and out of region states (op. cit.: ). On a global level, the weakness of African states allows for international intervention to have large impacts on domestic issues. But it is hard to find accounts of global actors initiating conflicts in Africa, their roles have mostly been adding fuel to an already burning fire. African leaders have often proclaimed that it is their role on the periphery of the world capitalist system that led to the despair of their nations; ironically these are the very same leaders who more than often have created huge fortunes on the trade to the core states. This deviation, Buzan and Wæver claims, have often drawn attention away from the domestic issues on the continent. The international focus on Africa has often securitized other issues than the issues securitized by Africans leaders themselves, an example is AIDS, which until recently and still to some extent is a taboo across the continent but have been securitized by the international community (op. cit.: ). The RSCT provides a framework for analysis, which can be applied on regions where securitization takes place, in our case the contemporary conflict in Mali. In order to see how the different actors securitize each other a presentation of each sector is necessary, since it provides ground to understand the actors interrelationship

10 3.2.5-The societal sector This sector is concerned with the societal security of a given societal unit. The organizing concept of this sector is identity. In brief societal security concerns the sustainability within acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious and national identity. (op. cit.: 119). Societal insecurity appears when societal units of whatever kind define a potential threat to their society. Societal units are structured around identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community. Therefore a societal unit may exist across borders and states, as for instance with the case of the Kurdish people. A state may consist of several societal units (Ibid.). It is a personal choice taken by the individual that defines whether one wishes to identify with a certain community and thereby belong to that societal sector. Factors such as language, culture, history and location may have a large role in the idea of identity. (op. cit.: 120). The most common threats to societal security are highlighted in the theory as migration, Horizontal competition and Vertical competition. 1) Migration is a threat to societal security as the increase of foreign population may interfere with the existing identity in a given community. 2) Horizontal competition is when a neighboring culture is influencing the existing identity in a societal sector. that they pose a threat to the we of a society. In order to cause insecurity for the societal sector, that we must be threatened by a factor challenging the collective identity of a given society. Integration projects In some societies the state may attempt to shape a common culture to control some or all of the machineries of cultural reproduction, such as the schools, religious institutions etc. In repressive societies the minorities may lose the ability to reproduce their culture because the majority uses the state to structure educational, media and other systems to favor the majority culture (op. cit.: 122). Therefore some types of societal security threats are fought in the minds of individuals whereas others are more tangible matters influencing identity. In the first case the security threat is about conversion, where people start to think of themselves as something else. The second case of societal security threat is a result of political decisions that may have an impact on identity and hinder the reproduction of a certain culture in favor of another. Societies within the societal sector threatened by such, can respond in two ways. Either through activities carried out by the community itself or by trying to move the issue to the political sector by having the threat placed on state agenda (Ibid.). If the security issue is placed in the state agenda, the threat will fall into the political sector instead of the societal. In essence, the differentiation can be seen as whether a societal unit strives for statehood or wishes to be incorporated within an existing state structure. Separate statehood for the unit will usually have a greater impact on the regional dynamic (Ibid.). Security Actors and Referent Objects 3) Vertical competition is when the existing identity is being challenged by an integrating project or secessionist regionalist project that pulls them toward either narrower or wider identities. Examples are the European Union, Catalonia and former Yugoslavia (op. cit.: 121). A possible fourth issue, which may threat the societal security, could be depopulation. Famine, war, plague and natural catastrophes may lead to a decrease in population and thereby threaten the existing identity of a given community. Equal for all security threats is The referent objects in the societal sector are whatever large groups carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form that can create a socially powerful argument that this we is threatened (op. cit.: 123). In this case, it becomes the identity of the referent object being threatened. Through history the referent object have been narrowly defined; For most people they have been local or family based either in the village, clan, region or city state. The most important referent objects in the societal sector of today are tribes, clans, nations, civilizations, religions and races (Ibid.). The nation is seen as a referent object in the societal sector quite often. Persons in positions of state power often express the emotion of 18 19

11 identity. In some cases state leaders use references to state and sovereignty and other leaders use references to nation and identity. Oppositional political forces who are bidding for political power use references more to nation than to power. On the other hand the defense of state and sovereignty will tend to benefit those in power. The logic of state security will tend to privilege the security of the state, whereas oppositional political actors will tend to argue that the nation is under threat, as a means to gain power (Ibid.). Africa In Africa, the main societal referent objects are a mix of the extended family, village, clan, tribe and the nation state. Apart from the Horn of Africa and Maghreb, very little of Africa has the typical security complex type of threats in which one state threatens another; this is elaborated on in Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa. Military threats more often than not occur within states rather than between them. This happens over competition for state power. Thus in the societal sector the African states tend to be less concerned with threats from other states, but more concerned with competing societal sectors such as other tribes, villages etc. (op. cit.: 128) Military Sector The historical contemporary condition shows, that the military sector is most likely to be highly institutionalized, even though it is not necessarily so. Furthermore, the military sector does not have to be about security in contrast to a traditionalist position because for some states, the increase of military capacity does not necessarily have anything to do with internal security but is instead used for political and economic relations in foreign countries cementing the state s role in international relations. Many European countries serve as an example of this. Since they do not have to fear external threats, the military activities are less about internal security and more about the political sphere. In the military sector the state and the ruling elite is the most important actors, but not the only ones (op. cit.: 49). The modern state is defined by the idea of sovereignty the claim of exclusive right to self- Government over a specified territory and its population. (Ibid.) This quote underlines that the fundamental nature of the state and how it is acquired is by force. Use of force is also a way of upholding and asserting sovereignty (Ibid.). This is why the agenda of the military security is mainly focused around the state. A focus on other objects and securitizing actors will follow later in this section. The exception to the quote is when a state disintegrates and or cannot find root, this will lead to anarchy such as it is seen in several African countries. The military security agenda is mostly about governments effort to maintain and protect themselves from internal and external threats, not only military ones but also non-military threats - for instance ideologies and migrants. This is also how the military and political sector is linked together. The normal domestic functions of the government are administration and law, which upholds the peace and thereby civil order. Beyond that it can uphold the territorial integrity, but this is not always securitized as a threat since governments, in theory, are free to negotiate reorganization of their borders. However, if it is perceived as an international threat the territorial integrity is of big importance (op. cit.: 50). In respect to governments as focusing on self-preservation, it can be understood that if the government however see nonmilitary threats to their authority, they can securitize it to use force against it. This can be seen in relations to the modern Westphalian states who disarm their citizens and wish to be seen as the only legitimate providers of force. In contrast are the feudal and classical states where use of force is divided between the state and citizens because of the rights of citizens to bear arms and use force - not against the government but for self-protection. (op. cit.: 51) Referent Objects and Security Actors Many governments cannot incorporate all civil societies within their nations and this leaves a room for non-state units as referent objects for military security. If those non-state units acquire statehood with success, the international society will see them as just that - nonstate referent objects, without widespread recognition to their claim (op. cit.: 52-53). There are several groups of people who challenge the nation state from within. These groups can be: secessionists, unionists, revolutionaries etc. The international society often securitizes 20 21

12 these would-be states because they are seen as a threat to the sovereignty. In such a case, the existing state might be motivated... to use military force to secure its monopoly over legitimate violence. (op. cit.: 53) A security agenda does not necessarily mean the involvement of the military. An example of this can be if a group of would-be states do not comply with law and order, the government can utilize the security agenda of law and order to a point where they threat human rights by countercrime (op. cit.: 54). Some democratic governments can for their own survival securitize threats to national sovereignty to keep themselves as the authorized securitizing actor for the state. That can be by both democratic and non-democratic governments and in such cases it can be hard to define whether the securitization is used for the good of the state or the government (op. cit.: 56-57) The Political Sector The political sector is primarily about nonmilitary threats to sovereignty. Political security is therefore concerned with the organizational stability of social order(s). The political sector is the most widespread sector there is, often overlapping the other sectors for example, political-societal, military-political etc. you can argue that all military is political (op. cit.: 141). The political threats will vary in degree and have different goals. Since the main objective for a state is organizing ideology and thereby form a national identity, the political threats can be feared on the same level as military threats because they aim is to destabilize the organizational stability of the state. The political threat arises from its aim at overthrowing the government and to pressure a particular policy to weaken the state as a power (op. cit.: 142). The political threats come from both internal and external actors: The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities Different societies will see and respond differently to the same objective threat so securitization is an inter subjective process which is socially constructed (op. cit.: 57). As an example, the threats and vulnerabilities between two states in the international system, is both defined through their respective military capabilities but also their amity and enmity interplay which is historical and socially constructed (op. cit.: 58-59). Political threats are thus made to (1) the internal legitimacy of the political unit, which relates primarily to ideologies and other constitutional ideas and issues defining the state: and (2) the external recognition of the state, its external legitimacy. (op. cit.: 144) As stated in the quote, typically the threats will relate to, the external recognition, and internal legitimacy (op. cit.: 145). Security Actors and Referent Objects After World War 2 a new attitude prevailed where states and individuals were equal. This shift included the different ideologies of states as equally legitimate. Although it does not imply that there are no strong or weak states in the international society. Problems of a state to assert its sovereignty domestically will thus still harm recognition and legitimacy internationally (op. cit.: 60). The main referent object of the political sector is the state, where other unit-level objects too can serve as referent objects for a political organization such as emerging superstate structures, self-organized, stateless societal groups and transnational movements (Ibid.). The government of the state will often be the securitizing actor, and as mentioned in the military sector section, it can be hard to tell if securitization is done to protect the government itself or the state, also in regards to internal and external threats (op. cit.: 56-57/146). The internal threats will occur more in weak states, because there will be distrust from the population towards the government using the state as a securitizing factor, to protect themselves (op. cit.: 146)

13 The Logic of Threats and Vulnerabilities Threats to sovereignty are a threat to the state, because sovereignty is what defines a state as a state, so even minor threats to sovereignty can be seen as a security problem (op. cit.: 158). The political sector is defined and connected along principle lines. These principles are often mediated by international organizations, on both regional and global levels. The two levels can in many instances contradict one another, implying that the power balance between these super-state structures are important to look at and analyze in order to assess the external and internal threats. Recent development has shown that global structures play a larger role than before. This can be seen in UN laws, which are implemented and followed on a larger regional scale than before (op. cit.: 160) Both the sectors and RSC revolves around a state and the how the state acts in terms of different threats from other actors, both weak and strong. The construction of the state is of great importance when it comes to how the state fares in a security complex. The construction usually revolves around the acquisition of sovereignty. The Westphalia state is by far the most popular notion on statehood The nature of sovereignty As a consequence of the peace negotiations in Westphalia, in the year 1648, new standards were introduced and defined for the European states. The Thirty Years War was the reason for peace negotiations and the European states were recognized as sovereign independent nation states. The thought was that you could secure peace in the future between the now sovereign European states. But what does sovereignty exactly entail? Sovereignty is regarded as a key principle within the international society and it has played a huge role in defining modern nation states. Basically sovereign statehood is constitutional independence of other states. This implies a few different aspects such as a right to selfdetermination, ruling over a defined territory and non-interference policy in the interests of another states domain (Jackson,1987:522). Although sovereignty was more or less based in Europe it has been implemented in systems throughout the world, not at least in the African colonies. The term in itself has been changed throughout time since factors such as technology, globalization, conflict, and colonization and de-colonization have challenged how sovereignty is perceived. The general discourse of sovereignty, according to Jackson, primarily revolves around legal theory, international law and international institutions. Jackson emphasizes that the legality of the state is important in terms of sovereignty: it is a game constituted and regulated by rules (Ibid.). 3.3-Sovereignty The following section relies on Robert H. Jackson s article from 1987: "Quasi-States, dual regimes and neo-classical theory" and his article from 1986: Negative Sovereignty in Sub- Saharan Africa, and aims to explain the concept of sovereignty and how it applies to a post-colonial African context. This section offers an outline of the primary aspects of sovereignty focusing on sovereignty in post-colonial Africa including the implications racial sovereignty and negative sovereignty has had and continues to have to the African state. In order to understand sovereignty in Africa one has to understand what sovereignty is, where it came from and how it has developed throughout history. This constituted game is defined by two major rules: constitutive rules (civil) and instrumental rules (organizational). The constitute set of rules are guidelines of how states are to act in the international society. In the international society sovereignty implies the following: equality of states, mutual recognition, non-intervention policy, treaty making, diplomacy and other civil international duties (Ibid.). Instrumental rules, are slightly more "realist" in essence and if sovereignty in fact is a game, the instrumental rules is how you win it. The instrumental set of rules, represent the interest of the state and is often apparent in a state s foreign policy. Jackson goes on to reflect upon the importance of sovereignty and what consequences it entails. The political value that sovereignty entails cannot be underrated, but also other 24 25

14 factors arise when sovereignty is achieved both on a domestic and international level. These intended consequences are among others: order, justice and economic welfare. A part from intended consequences, Jackson also presents the possibility for unintended consequences of sovereignty. In an African context some of the unintended consequences have been surprising civil and socioeconomic adversities (op.cit.:523) This is in many ways the consequence of negative sovereignty which will be looked at later on in the section Colonization African states' way to sovereignty has indeed been crumpled by the somewhat turbulent history. Jackson draws on the 1885 Law of Constitution, where European established powers defined the territorial borders of Africa. Jackson points out that in such a context the African states would not be able to attain sovereignty, because they did not posses certain conditions. There were two reasons why sovereignty was unattainable for the African states: The first reason relies on the conditions of attaining sovereignty which were fundamentally different than today. The ideology of the international society, cultural, economic and political conditions were, at the time, nowhere near attainable for sovereignty. The second reason is connected to the difficult situation the African colonized states found themselves in during the late 1880 s. They were embedded in the colonial system (and ideology) and did not qualify for recognition by the international society and they were so to speak owned by their colonizing nations who did not have an interest in promoting sovereignty and independence in the same way as the nation-states in Europe. Not until after World War II, when the colonists left, would African states be able to formulate their constitutive rules and acquire sovereignty. The conditions in the African states had changed and Jackson points to the prevailing international moralities and ideologies (Ibid.) as key factors in the change that the African states went through where the year 1960 marks the change in regimes, also referred to as the wind of change (Ibid.). The ideological change in the international society is reflected in the acceptance of peoples right to control their territory and self-determination. The fact that colonization had a huge impact on the constitutive rules of sovereignty in the African states cannot be underrated. Jackson argues that there has been a regime shift in which new rules and principles changed and in fact are antipoles in terms of prevailing ideology before and after colonization. Since colonization no more is legitimate in the international society, the rules and principles are defined from a de-colonial way of thinking: Colonization is no longer considered internationally legitimate, and current norms of international behavior prescribe decolonization just as emphatically as earlier norms prescribed it. (op.cit.:524) Decolonization The years after World War II decolonization were slowly emerging in the Sub-Saharan states. In states were independent, in the year 1960 all the ex-french colonies became independent and by 1980 all the African states were independent, except Namibia (Ibid.). This era of rapid decolonization represented a new set of values in the international system where statehood independence, was a prevailing attitude. It was now a right of the colonial states to have self-determination. In the creation of post colonial Africa the immediate task was to create international legitimacy. Jackson points to two frameworks of the nation in a European context as possible models for the new African nation states; the territorial nation and the cultural nation. Because the states in Africa were culturally diverse most of them containing numerous ethnnonations, international legitimacy through the idea of a cultural nation would be an extensive project which was politically ruled out. Instead, the framework of the African nation states was decided around the territorial concept which would not only shape the identity of each state but ultimately be the factor that would gain it international legitimacy (Jackson,1986:250). To contextualize the concept of the territorial nation, and why this model was deemed more suitable than the idea of the cultural nation, Jackson uses Nigeria as an example. Nigeria consists of many different tribes and different religions and territorial boundaries were not defined in the pre-colonial times. The borders of Nigeria have thus been created in colonial times by the British, and Jackson notes, that Nigeria culturally resembled Britain rather than Italy, meaning that the common culture of Nigeria at the time of independence was defined through its colonizer. The idea is that the common culture implemented by the Colonizing States could not be sustained after independence since Britain was no longer present in 26 27

15 Nigeria which then left the territorial nation as the main claim to international legitimacy (Ibid.) Racial sovereignty When it comes to international legitimacy and looking beyond the confines of the territorial nation Jackson sees an emerging discourse in post-colonial Africa: The concept of selfgoverning, which rests upon a variation of majority rule excluding racial minority governments especially European descendants. To simplify it further Only indigenous Africans can govern the new African states. (op.cit.:252) International legitimacy through the lens of the territorial nation and indigenous self governing has implications according to Jackson. Positive sovereignty can be described through the following quote regarding the empirical foundation of new statehood. A new state comes into existence when a community acquires not momentarily but with a reasonable probability of performance, the essential characteristics of a state, namely, an organized government, a defined territory, and such a degree of independence of control by any other state as to be capable of conducting its own international relations (op.cit.:254) This quote describes what is behind positive sovereignty. Especially the part of the statement referring to an organized government being capable of conducting its own international relations is a sign of positive sovereignty Negative sovereignty Firstly, the focus on legitimacy and sovereignty through the territorial perspective creates problems because the African states are multi national in nature. The problem Jackson points out is that many people live in one state in Africa while ethnically being from a neighboring country, and if Somali s living in Kenya do not wish to adopt A Kenyan nationality, they can emigrate. In fact, in some cases African states have forced people to flee to neighboring countries. This is a part of why Africa has the highest amount of political refugees of any world region. Secondly, the discourse that African states must have African governments and that international legitimacy in this perspective does not include how the government exercises its power or how it came to power is problematic. The only overriding factor is that the ruler or government must respect the territorial aspect, meaning that only black native Nigerians can rule over Nigeria (Ibid.). Further more, Jackson points out that the ethnonations of any African state might not have any influence on it. The principle of racial sovereignty is blind to ethnonationalism and Africa s numerous ethnonations have no legal or moral standing either internationally or even, in most cases, internally. (op.cit.:253) Positive sovereignty Where positive sovereignty is defined through the capability to self-govern ones state and conduct international relations, negative sovereignty can be defined as having a government not capable of the aspects of governing. In the context of sub-saharan Africa, Jackson notes that pressure from the international society in the aftermath of the Second World War to decolonize the colonies was so great, and perceived as a moral obligation that the actual process itself happened very quickly and did not give the newly formed African states a good foundation to govern from a position of positive sovereignty. It was the far more demanding and constructive obligation of leaving behind a viable successor state within the artificial boundaries of each colony by somehow fostering a capable and internally legitimate indigenous ruling élite. (op.cit.:255) This demanding and constructive obligation takes time time the decolonization process did not have and thus Jackson s argument is that one of the defining reasons for negative sovereignty in sub-saharan Africa is found in the way the empires transferred the power over to the African states. In the of the former British colonies in Africa the pressure from the international society made the empire move away from long-term policy of development in the colonies. Instead, the democratic parliamentary system known as the Westminster model was implemented rather quickly so elections could be held and the transfer of power could be done. Likewise, 28 29

16 in the former French and Belgium colonies the process of decolonization was quick even quicker than in the case of the British colonies as it happened in the span of just one year. Furthermore, the French and Belgium model of decolonization did not take into consideration the differences of the states in terms of their indigenous capacity of selfgovernment (op.cit.:256). The first issue regarding the time-span of the decolonization process ties back to the earlier statement that the foundation of positive sovereignty takes time to implement. The second issue refers to the fact that the different colonies under the same colonial ruler did not share the same capability to sustain the changes that independence created. This means that positive sovereignty for the weaker states would be harder to create and uphold since the model did not differentiate between them and the colonies seemingly more ready for independence. Another reason why the quick decolonization process has implications on sovereignty was that the colonies did not usually organize their colony as they would organize the government in their respective nations. Instead, the colonial governments and its officials were often few in numbers and their goal was often turned to what would benefit their nation of origin: they were not comparable not to states but, rather, to small provincial, county, or municipal governments in European countries. (Jackson, 1987:525) The lack of sovereignty in the colonies during the colonial period made it possible. The decolonization also implies that the former colonial officials would leave the control of the state to the indigenous people of the colonies. This had major consequences for the implementation of an independent state apparatus, since the indigenous population was simply lacking experience. Jackson again argues that the reason for this was that independence was not a carefully carried out plan by the colonial powers but was a consequence of a rapid change of norms and values in the international society after World War II. The local Africans in their respective, now independent states, had no experience whatsoever in government administration. The lack of experience and the newly formed self-determination led to the collapse of some of these new states (op.cit.:526). The issues involving the decolonization in the colonies, is not just an example of how the colonial powers used poor judgment in their decolonization models. Jackson points out that the root of the issue of negative sovereignty is found in the UN general assembly. The 1960 General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples states that all people have the right to self-determination and that inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. (Jackson, 1986:256) The concept of self-determination in the quote above refers back to a previous statement about the nature of racial sovereignty. Where self-determination and racial sovereignty might be supported here Jackson argues that it has little to do with empirical statehood which is an indicator of positive sovereignty. His point is that even though there is a historical relationship between empirical statehood and international legitimacy, the lack of empirical statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa has not resulted in a lack of international legitimacy. He further points out that many African states that do not have internal legitimacy, experience international legitimacy (op.cit.:257). This is a continuation of one of the issues with racial sovereignty focusing on who is ruling the African states as opposed to how they came to power and how they are in fact using that power. The international society is upholding international legitimacy through negative sovereignty and, according to Jackson, hesitant about intervening in conflicts in African states. International legitimacy has not been adversely affected even in cases of extremely abusive tyrannies Amin s and also probably Obote s Uganda; Macias Equatorial Guinea or in cases of ethnic oppression verging on genocide Kayibanda s Rwanda and Micombero s Burundi. Black African governments evidently enjoy a new kind of freedom. (op.cit.:258) To sum up Jackson s main points he argues that the moral obligation from the international society to decolonize Africa immediately in the aftermath of the Second World War did not give the newly formed African states a viable foundation to practice positive sovereignty. In general this was due to the fact that the colonial period had not fostered a ruling elite with the capabilities of continuing or creating the foundation of positive sovereignty postindependence. Furthermore, he sees a problem with the fact that the de-colonization process did not take into consideration the issues and needs of each African state but rather focused on the moral obligation of independence more so than the moral obligation of leaving behind a state actually able to govern on a long term scale. Jackson also sees another consequence involving the morality concerning the former colonies from an international perspective. Self-determination and self-governing has created a space in time where the African states receive international legitimacy through negative sovereignty because the international society and the African states see self-governing as the dominant 30 31

17 factor of legitimacy, which can overshadow more inherent problems with the governments. In some cases this can even cover up not just negative sovereignty by way of failure to be able to govern but also discard more severe cases of maltreatment of the populations of the African states. securitize each other in the Malian conflict gives us a good analytical foundation for approaching Mali as a regional complex in itself. 3.4-Conclusion of Theory Jackson s theory on negative sovereignty in Africa relies on a historical perspective where colonization and de-colonization has been shaping the present structure of African states, which according to Jackson caused that many African states currently has negative sovereignty. Jackson emphasizes that moral obligation, post second world war, created a foundation for international legitimacy, which enhanced the negative sovereignty of the African states. Because of a prevailing thought where the international society and African states perceives self-governing and racial sovereignty as the prevailing factor for legitimacy. This is evident throughout the state system of African states, from the colonial defined borders to the lack of governmental capacity to the internal legitimacy of the state. This gives the notion of African states only being states by name. RSCT provides a framework for analysis in relation to conflicts and dynamics in a given region. The argument builds on the premise that security issues are significantly more interrelated in a regional complex with close geographical proximity. RSC are constituted by the relation between amity and enmity, and it is within this spectra that securitization occurs. By dividing the speech acts into sectors the researcher forms a clearer picture of the power relations between the relevant actors and how they securitize each other. RSC contextualized in West Africa, has encouraged a securitization analysis based on state actors as well as non-state actors, which due to the weak structure of African states makes it difficult to constitute a permanent RSC. Buzan and Wæver underlines that most African states only have the capacity to interfere in the immediate proximity, making it difficult to suggest a regional security complex. They are thus only suggesting proto-complexes in the African context. This means that they only see tendencies that potentially could support the idea of a RSC. However, that does not eliminate the use of the theory in an African context. As briefly mentioned in 1.2-Motivation and further explained in 5.1-Introduction to the Regional Security Complex of Mali, the presence of multiple actors and their capacity to 32 33

18 4-Methodology Our analysis is theoretically based on two frameworks: Regional Security Complex Theory, including Securitization, and Sovereignty. Because there is substantial difference between the two, different methods are used when applying them to the case. Both are concerned with the different actors in the Mali conflict. ECOWAS, the Government of Mali, Ansar Dine, and MNLA are the actors the analysis revolves around, and the aspects of the analysis concerned with securitization are centered on how they securitize each other. First hand or primary sources are ideal when it comes to the securitization of the actors but it is not possible to only use primary sources as there, in the case of some of the actors, is limited first hand information to analyze. Secondary sources will also be relevant in the part of our analysis concerned with sovereignty and the regional security complex. Thus we are using a variation of sources some firsthand from the actors themselves, and also articles from external sources. This is partly done because of the lack of primary sources and partly to offer a more detailed and nuanced view on the conflict through the securitization of the actors and the conflict itself. Since this analysis is source-heavy it is important to have a point of departure in terms of how we handle the sources. We are aware of the possible implication of supplementing the primary sources with secondary sources in the aspects of our analysis concerned with securitization, but for the sake of a more detailed analysis we are using Vibeke Ankersborg's source criticism (2007) as a way of approaching our sources. We are aware that American sources might have an agenda of framing the conflict as one relating to international terror and though aspects of the conflict we are aware of potential American interests in making this conflict one of international terrorist threats. We are being critical of this framing but choose to treat all our sources in an equally critical way as is a theme in source criticism (Ankersborg, 2007: 132). The majority of our sources are news articles from the internet. There is of course a potential issue with a heavy use of internet articles in academic work, but since this conflict is new and very much in constant development, the focus has been on shedding a light on the conflict. Reports and analysis on the conflict are not to the same extent able to illuminate the day to day aspects of the conflict, and especially very recent development in the conflict are only found through news articles on the internet. 4.1-Method for analysis Initially we make use of Jackson s theory on negative sovereignty, in order to explain the present situation in Mali. By focusing on the historical background of African sovereign states, the theory elaborates on reasons as to why Malian sovereignty currently is being challenged. We apply concepts from Jackson s negative sovereignty theory to the context of Mali, and thereby seek to explain the present challenges facing the Malian state. The theory of Regional Security Complex provides us with a theoretical framework, which highlights the dynamics of a region threatened by issues of security. We wish to apply the theoretical perspective of such a region, to the context of Mali. Within the framework we make use of the theoretical tool such as the theory of securitization. The securitization theory helps us better our understanding of the involved actors and their interaction with each other. The securitization analysis is structured based upon central themes in the conflict of Mali. This will help us improve our overview of the conflict, as the involved actors constantly shift objectives and relationship with each other. As presented, our analysis is divided into three sections, which are a chapter on Sovereignty, a chapter on Securitization and a chapter on the Regional Security Complex. We have proposed a research question for each section in our project: Sovereignty: How do we see negative sovereignty applied to the context of Mali, and how does this influence the involved actors? Securitization: What does their securitization tell us about the relationship between MNLA, Ansar Dine, the Mali government and ECOWAS? Regional Security Complex: What constitutes Mali as a Regional Security Complex, and how does the dynamics in the wider region influence our understanding of this Regional Security Complex? 34 35

19 Each analytical section will be summed up by an interim conclusion. Based upon key findings from the analysis, we seek to answer our problem definition and outline a conclusion Delimitations Contemporary study We are aware that the situation is dynamic and that an intervention in Mali is highly likely, emphasizing that political development in Mali happens swiftly. This is exemplified by the coup in March and by the sudden change in power dynamics in Mali, it constituted. The project, in essence, offers a contemporary analysis of the conflict based on the literature available to us, and the three theoretical perspectives we have chosen Actors As evident in 5-Introduction to Mali as a Regional Security Complex and throughout the project, the conflict in Mali involves a multitude of actors, which stretches far beyond Mali. The UN, the EU, France, the US, Nigeria etc. are all involved in the conflict on some level. However, we have chosen to focus on the most directly involved actors: ECOWAS, the government of Mali, Ansar Dine and MLNA. We see these actors as the most involved and for whom the consequences are most significant. We are fully aware that actors such as AQIM and MUJAO are important players in the conflict, but due to lack of information and the fact that we see other actors as more bound to Mali as a nation. This delimitation is furthermore theoretical with relation to Buzan and Wæver s (2003) Regional Security Complex Theory where a focus on the regional security is emphasized on the background that security issues and securitization happens predominantly on a regional level (see 3.2- Regional Security Complex Theory). The regional choice is also based on a consideration of superficiality contra in-depth analysis; it is our opinion that the chosen format gives a sufficient balance of analysis for our purpose and in reference to the theory chosen Geography The geographical area is not as limited because we have chosen to involve ECOWAS and its role in the analysis, however the geography of the conflict is limited to the space in which the actors are located and operate, which is Mali and more specifically northern Mali. It is evident in northern Mali that the present actors operate with little to no regard for the national borders, exemplified by the traditional nomadic lifestyle of the Tuaregs and the international nationalities of the members in Ansar Dine Theoretical Theoretical we have chosen to work with the Regional Security Complex Theory and Positive/Negative sovereignty. This is a conscious choice due to our investigation of the complex conflict, where the concept of Securitization will enable us to understand the intersubjectivity of security and the relations between the actors. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) have chosen to emphasize five sectors in their work: Societal, Economic, Political, Military and Environmental, however due to our initial understanding of the conflict we have chosen to leave out the environmental sector and the economic sector which the involved actors do not articulate with the same frequency as the other sectors

20 5.1-Introduction to the security complex of Mali 5.2-Introduction to West Africa In contemporary Mali the dynamics of the conflict proves that Mali in itself can be perceived as a regional security complex. The reason being is the amount of actors with which are able to compete on the same level as the Malian government. The fact that the non-state actors are securitizing each other, and the Malian government, implies that we are able to see it as a security complex in itself. This is underlined in Regional Security Complex Theory in Africa. The historical context explains the current conflict in Mali and the emergence of the non-state actors Ansar Dine and MNLA. This security regional complex of Mali will be outlined in the following chapter on how the different actors, within Mali s borders, securitize each other. Moreover we will include Jackson s notion on negative sovereignty, which provides an explanation to how the conflict has evolved and the dynamics of Mali s regional security complex. The analysis will include an assessment of the securitization processes of the actors involved: Ansar Dine, MNLA, the Malian government and ECOWAS. Other actors such as AQIM and MUJAO also contribute to the dynamics of the Malian regional security complex, but they will not handled separately in the analysis. The project s Regional Security Complex of Mali 5.1 is situated in West Africa it is therefore important to outline the context of West Africa, in terms of major trends taken place in the political system with a focus on the conflicts in the countries. This is in order to conduct the following analysis in relations to the region making it more relevant for the subject matter. It furthermore builds on the theoretical framework of regionalism provided by Buzan and Wæver (2003) and allows us to compare the current situation in Mali to the region making it more relevant. It is beyond this section and the project to discuss or conclude on the reasons why Mali is in its present form, and here we are merely outlining the facts as soberly as possible. West Africa is inhabited by 238 million citizens spread across sixteen countries, the members of ECOWAS and Mauritania, who left ECOWAS in Just above half of the population lives in rural areas and the annual average income per person is 309 $, which is just below the Sub-Saharan average of 470$. Economic growth has within recent years been steady at 2.5%, however the population grows at 2.2% a year. Most of West Africa is located just below the Sahel belt, with some countries having territory above, into the Sahara (worldbank.org). Generally the countries of the region gained independence in the late 50 ties to the mid 60 ties, however Liberia gained independence in 1847 and Cap Verde in From 1955 to 2004 the region has experienced some turmoil including 44 successful military-led coups, 43 three often-bloody failed coups, at least 82 coup plots and at least 7 civil wars, depending on definition (McGowan, 2006: ). In this statistics we find one single country sticking out, Cap Verde has never experience a coup d état or civil war. However this does not change the fact that West Africa is the region in Africa most plagued by coup d état accounting for 45 percent of all coups in Africa, but only compelling 33 percent of the countries. In West Africa there is furthermore a relatively high success rate of coups at 50,6 percent, which could be a partial answer to the high amounts of coups. The statistics are from 1956 to 2001 (McGowan, 2005:5), which means that the Arab spring of 2011 and the 38 39