1 f Studies and Comments 3 Klaus Lange / Leonid L. Fituni (eds) Integrating Regional and Global Security Cooperation Hanns Seidel Stiftung Academy for Politics and Current Affairs
2 Studies and Comments 3 Klaus Lange / Leonid L. Fituni (eds) Integrating Regional and Global Security Cooperation
3 ISBN Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung e.v., Munich Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen Editor-in-Chief: Dr. Reinhard C. Meier-Walser Editorial-Office: Wolfgang D. Eltrich M.A. (Editorial Manager) Barbara Fürbeth M.A. (Deputy Editorial Manager) Anna Pomian M.A. (Editorial Staff) Christa Frankenhauser (Assistant Editor) No part of this document may be reproduced in any way, shape or form (by photocopying, microfilm or any other process), or edited, duplicated, or distributed by means of electronic systems without the prior written authorization of the Editorial Office.
4 3 Contents Klaus Lange / Leonid L. Fituni Introduction...5 Victor I. Danilov-Danilyan, Valeri G. Draganov, et al. Opening comments at the conference "Integrating Regional and Global Security Cooperation", Moscow, 5-6 December I. Towards a Safer World: Unipolarity versus Multipolarity? Fritz W. Ermarth Unipolarity versus Multipolarity: An American View...13 Alexandr G. Dugin Philosophy of Globalization Philosophy of Counter-Globalization...17 François Mermet Towards a Safer World: Unipolarity versus Multipolarity European View...25 Yang Xiyu Unipolarity versus Multipolarity from Chinese Perspectives...37 II. Future Security Structures: Possible Scenarios Hanspeter Neuhold Europe, the USA and Russia. Towards a Triangular Partnership?...43 Vassiliy S. Safronchuk Globalization and the Struggle for Raw Material Supplies...61 III.Post-Cold War Security Oleg Arin The Evolution of the Concept of Security after the End of the Cold War...67 Reiner K. Huber Interdependence of Regional and Global Security: Evidence from Analytical Models...77 Leonid I. Shershnev Evolution of the Concept of Security since the End of the Cold War...95 V. P. Volynskiy Economic and Social Processes in the Post-Soviet Area under Globalization...101
5 4 IV. Crisis Areas: Selected Case Studies Johannes Grotzky The Balkans Contradictions and Expectations A. Ross Johnson Security and Insecurity in the Balkans Mahmoud Kassem The Middle East Ivan L. Lileev Global, Regional and National Aspects of Security in Africa V. Ecology as a Security Factor: the Russian Experience Victor I. Danilov-Danilyan Ecological Aspects of International Security G. P. Serov Aspects of Ecological Safety in Russia V. P. Vinogradov Maintenance of Environmental Security by Means of Public Prosecution VI.Aspects of Ballistic Missile Defence Joachim Krause Ballistic Missile Defence and Relations between Russia and NATO V. N. Spector Attempts at Soviet-American Cooperation in Strategic Weapons List of Authors...157
6 5 Introduction Klaus Lange / Leonid L. Fituni This volume is a collection of papers presented by distinguished experts and academics from the EU, Russia, USA, China, other countries of Europe, Asia and Africa at the international conference "Integrating Regional and Global Security Cooperation", held in Moscow on 5-6 December The collection covers a broad agenda of security-related issues, ranging from topics as diverse as nuclear anti-missile defence and environmental hazards to different geographical areas such as the Balkans, the Middle East or Africa. This publication covers the trends in the global and regional security environment that have developed during the last decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unfortunately, contrary to wide-spread expectations, the end of the Cold War has resulted in a higher level of international insecurity. On the one hand, the threat of nuclear confrontation diminished significantly at the global level; on the other hand, regional security came under unprecedented threats. In fact, in Europe a series of full-scale wars broke out for the first time since the end of World War II. When viewed from the standpoint of peace and stability, the situation in the majority of other regions of the world was not much better. Even in those areas which had been relatively peaceful, the situation remained unpredictable due to the abundance of factors of uncertainty and ongoing profound changes. In those circumstances the group of international analysts found it both challenging and rewarding to assess the inter-relationship between regional and global security. The task has become even more compelling in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA and the subsequent warfare in Central Asia. To ascertain whether the international environment will really change its direction towards one that is conducive to bringing about stability is of vital importance in building peace in the world. The Hanns Seidel Foundation, the International Independent University of Ecological and Political Science, the Centre for Strategic and Global Studies, and the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences took the initiative of conducting a multi-faceted analysis of factors that may serve to enhance international cooperation efforts in the interests of integrating the regional and global aspects of security. This volume presents the findings of an analysis of the strategic environment which the conference participants made from such perspectives. The starting-point of the debate was the perception of the evolution of the concept of "security" since the end of the Cold War. In order to provide a fresh and scientific answer the participants had to address such previously neglected or less researched issues as the changing nature of regional crises and emerging non-state actors. Among the latter special attention was given to business and political players, problems connected with the financing of instability, in particular the economics of warlordism. Naturally the discussants did not ignore such factors contributing to global and regional instability as religious conflicts, sectarian violence, and terrorism. Some of the analysis of the participants proved to be of exceptional relevance in the current circumstances. Among other issues transatlantic security structures, a European defence identity, the concept of the common Eurasian "home" generated animated discussion about possible future scenarios of cooperation and conflict. Authors from different countries gave their recipe for ways to achieve a safer world. The American, Russian, French and Chinese scholars were
7 6 particularly interested in examining the situation from the perspective of the unipolarity versus multipolarity dichotomy. There was less agreement, however, in the examination of individual crisis areas and the determinants of instability there, the research into the socio-cultural dynamics of the hotbeds of conflict, the evaluation of principal actors, and proposals concerning the possibility of and limits to de-escalation. The discussion was focused on case studies which included the Balkans, the Middle East and sub-saharan Africa. Environmental security as an aspect of local, national and international security is a subject of growing concern which is challenging some of the conventional notions of unlimited growth and expansion. The conference examined the global implications of various ecological trends and illustrated these new security concerns by an analysis of Russian experiences and initiatives in the area of environmental protection. "Ballistic missile defence: end or beginning of cooperation?" was the title of a special discussion panel. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and their related technologies has posed a serious problem to the security of the international community after the Cold War. Amid such developments, there has emerged the possibility that some countries (e.g. North Korea, Iran and Iraq) hostile to the United States may in the near future deploy long-range ballistic missiles that could strike targets in the US mainland. To defend the United States from such a threat, the Clinton Administration pressed ahead with a small-scale national missile defence (NMD). The NMD programme allegedly limits its mission to coping with the threat from ballistic missiles posed by several states of proliferation concern. That was the tone of some western speakers at the conference. Russian, Chinese and Indian participants argued that since this ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme is designed to defend the US homeland, it might upset the relationships of mutual deterrence traditionally built on retaliatory capabilities. It is on this score that Russia and China have been denouncing the United States for planning the NMD system. Concerned about the adverse effect the NMD programme might have on US-Russia relations and the security environment of Europe, some US allies in Europe have also adopted a negative attitude towards it. In view of the importance of those issues, all the speakers emphasized the importance of increased international cooperation in the security area. They suggested that the time is ripe to go beyond established forms of security cooperation and towards harmonizing global and regional cooperative stabilization. Between the Moscow conference in December 2000 and the publication date of this volume nearly two years later there was 11 September September 11 again fostered an international alliance against terrorism, constituted in part by Russia as well as the USA, Europe, and many others. Against this background many divergent opinions as expressed in this publication have since lost their sharp edges. Yet this is not to say that the volume at hand has become obsolete. On the contrary: most of the problems discussed have even become more topical; what might have changed is the belief today that international security cooperation can indeed turn into a positive-sum game rather than remaining a zero-sum game. Among the many persons we would like to thank for making the conference and the publication possible, mention should be made explicitly of Anna Pomian who with neverending patience and energy made this volume a readable one.
8 7 Opening comments at the conference "Integrating Regional and Global Security Cooperation", Moscow, 5-6 December 2000 Victor I. Danilov-Danilyan Let me open the international conference "Integrating Regional and Global Security Cooperation". First of all, I would like to thank the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the International Independent University of Ecological and Political Science and the Centre for Strategic and Global Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences for their assistance in the organization and realization of this conference. It is not necessary to explain the urgency of the subject of our conference to the audience which has gathered here in Moscow in the great hall of the International Independent University of Ecological and Political Science. An analysis of the development of our civilization, especially in the last hundred years, will clearly show that the stability of human existence and of our life is to our greatest regret not increasing but decreasing. The world has not only failed to learn how to cope with the majority of the dangers which had been known earlier, but it has also created new dangers which seriously threaten the actual survival of mankind and our confidence in the survival of any individual, organization, country, region, and civilization as a whole. Security has many various aspects. Traditional aspects of security are connected with the problems of power and, regrettably, very few security experts have examined this sphere of problems so as to provide a wider understanding of security. So as a result, the questions of global, regional and ecological security remain completely unelaborated. The role of economic, social, scientific and technical, cultural, confessional and other factors that determine the shape of modern civilization with all its advantages and, unfortunately, disadvantages has been totally underestimated. The complexity of the security issue is so many-sided that whichever factor we consider, it is impossible to state completely unequivocally if it promotes security or weakens it. Every factor, achievement, invention, and institute has certain negative aspects which mean that it should be examined as a whole in order to take into consideration both the benefits which it brings and the dangers to which it can lead. It is to be hoped that the conference will promote a system to understand security and its multilateral interdisciplinary analyses, and review the basic realities of the modern world: political, economic, scientific and technical, environmental and others. There is no doubt that an audience capable of progressing towards decisions in this area has been assembled here precisely such a group of experts present here has the status to achieve important positive results. It is my firm conviction that our conference will reach its goal.
9 8 Valeri G. Draganov As Chairman of the Sub-Committee in the budget committee on Foreign Trade and Customs tariff regulation of the State Duma, I am very pleased with this position for it is a business which I understand. I have already once had the pleasure of standing in this university building for deputy of the State Duma from this district, which has a total of 1,100,000 inhabitants. Here from this platform the breakthrough of the election assembly happened, and I eventually won, as the debate was held here, and the mass media helped me objectively to estimate my opportunities and abilities. So these walls are especially very dear to me. It is a twofold honour and joy to welcome this distinguished assembly and I am very grateful to the International Independent University of Ecological and Political Science, the Centre for Strategic and Global Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and of course to the Hanns Seidel Foundation. I express my special gratitude to Professor Klaus Lange and Mr. Danilov- Danilyan, with whom we are connected by an old romantic story in our joint work during the first government of Gaidar. It was ten years ago but in my opinion it seems like a hundred years ago. I am most grateful to Mr. Stepanov, who has given me much attention in my leadership position and today we have very pleasant, friendly contacts and creative projects with the University. I am in solidarity with those who are able to distinguish their own security from global security. I am very much saddened that some politicians, in our country in particular, reduce the problem of security to an elementary domestic security, although this too is of great urgency to our society and people. In my constituency it is the number one problem as we are not without some distortions at this juncture of political epochs, but at the same time, it is of great urgency that we speak about global security today in our country, in modern Russia. Today Russia is once more in the grip of a difficult transition period. It so happens that the transition from one president to another every time marks the transition from one epoch to another. This is very bad, but that is how it is. I hope that a time will come when we shall not notice a change of president because the epoch will be one and the same. In my opinion, the ideology that has won in the current century is the ideology of a democratic capitalism and I very much hope that the problems of universal security in today's Russia will attract the serious attention of all branches of power and certainly of the president of the country. We place much hope in him as coordinator of all the branches of power, and as the man who in my opinion wants to preserve liberal values and at the same time to strengthen the position of Russia. But in my opinion Russia must first consolidate her position at home, and only then enter the international arena on equal conditions and on the basis of the potential which fortunately still remains, and compete mainly in the economic sphere. I am very happy that during the working hours of the conference tomorrow, I shall be honoured to welcome the conference delegation in the premises of the State Duma. I would like to tell you that despite certain problems and cataclysms that have accompanied the activity of the State Duma for ten years, I still consider that the State Duma remains one of the centres of democracy in Russia, the centre of parliamentarianism and the centre of professional work on legislation. In my position as a deputy of the State Duma, I devote very serious attention to the activity of making laws, as I consider that the causes and conditions of our economics, politics, law and morals underlie the problems of global and international security. And I am very glad that tomorrow we can talk in more detail on this subject. I wish the conference success. And as I am on the territory of my constituency and partly because
10 9 some of my voters are sitting here, I conclude the way I usually do: watch my political activity and if I behave incorrectly tell me about it. Sergei I. Shatalov It is an honour for me to speak at the conference which has brought together the representatives of 17 countries and which is devoted to a subject which has unfortunately not been given sufficient attention by international organizations, one of which I am representing here. For many years it has been typical for international financial organizations to have a technocratic approach to economic development. This approach is typical for the World Bank, which I represent though naturally my presentation should not be considered as a presentation of a representative of the World Bank. These are personal considerations which I would like to share with you. The World Bank and other international organizations as a rule try to practice a technocratic approach and to abstract themselves from non-economic aspects of development. In the last ten years this approach has shown itself to be completely futile both in the case of the developing world and in countries with transition economies. If we consider the problem, this painful process of self-analysis is now going on in the World Bank, in our partner organizations such as the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank, and in the International Monetary Fund. The process of reconsidering what sustainable development means, what do economics and social security mean, can ultimately lead to the long-term progress of societies. The actual results of the programmes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were often less than expected and were accompanied by a disregard for non-economic criteria of development, by a disregard for social stability and social security, by a disregard for the most serious problems, which can be described as environmental security (when the process of economic development was enforced contrary to the equilibrium of nature management, or probably even with damage to it), finally, with a disregard for the political and even strategic aspects of security. Also it must be said that this technocratic approach is understandable. International organizations do not have the right to interfere in the delicate and frequently painful processes which go on in the member countries of these organizations. But it has been necessary to update the programmes within the framework of which international organizations support economic reforms and economic stabilization in Russia, in other countries with a transition economy, and in the developing countries. These changes began in the World Bank about five years ago. A very powerful complex of departments has already been created to engage in questions of environmentally sustainable development. Each credit which the World Bank grants to any member country of the World Bank is tested for conformity to certain principles of sustainable environmental development and in the last two or three years since the Asian and Russian crises, special development initiatives have undergone similar testing for their ability to reach and to bring results to the poorest sections of the population. Unfortunately, the economic reforms in the post-socialist states have resulted in a rapid polarization of the population. International organizations are obliged to respond and they try to solve the problem which has arisen and which absolutely cannot be ignored. Those changes which are occurring in the policy of the international financial organizations can bring success
11 10 only in one particular case. The activity of these organizations in itself will not bring a successful solution to those problems which I have listed. The initiative should be taken by the member countries and by the governments, and primarily by the civil society of these countries. The central element of the current strategy of the campaign against poverty pursued by the World Bank is a programme aimed at eliminating poverty. I want to emphasize that these programmes, which actually support each of the numerous credits of the World Bank, are developed by the civil societies of the countries obtaining these credits and not by the Bank, and only such a situation can bring success. Therefore it is extremely important that this conference has assembled experts from the numerous disciplines which are so important for the sustainable development of society and for the economy of the countries of the transition period. I would like to wish the conference success, and I am sure that the exchange of opinions will be extremely fruitful and significant. Leonid L. Fituni Today my role is both that of an organizer and one of the conference participants who will deliver a paper. I would like to tell you in a few words how this conference started, why we have decided to hold it, and to express some of our attitudes and hopes for the future. Our university has been developing international relations. These relations grow stronger each year and our partners become sounder and more powerful in the international arena. One such significant partner in Germany is the Hanns Seidel Foundation. The Foundation is connected with a party orientation so to speak of the centre-right, and is closer to the centre than to the right flank of the political spectrum. For us, however, the Foundation is more important as an organizer of academic research and as a powerful German institute which supports educational processes worldwide. So as Director of the Centre for Strategic and Global Studies, I have already developed certain attitudes to this Foundation: we have organized more than one joint conference. But today marks the first significant step for the International Independent University of Ecological and Political Science in this connection. I hope that this step will lead to its further development. It is not a large step for our department, but a large step for all the University, if I can paraphrase a well-known phrase. We hope that similar conferences will become a regular event. I think that not only from the point of view of education but also from the practical point of view, the exchange of opinions between the leading experts and politicians will enable us to get to know each other more closely, and will enable us to go ahead with certain practical recommendations for our politicians and economists. Once again I want to cordially greet our colleagues from 17 countries who are present here, and to express the hope that we can establish regular relations not only with the German partner, but also with all of these 17 countries. We shall be always glad to see you within the walls of our University.
12 11 I. Towards a Safer World: Unipolarity versus Multipolarity?
14 13 Unipolarity versus Multipolarity: An American View Fritz W. Ermarth Let me begin by thanking our Russian and German organizers for inviting us all to this magnificent church to discuss a vital subject. I shall do my best to present an American view on our topic, although it is not the only American view. I shall not try to rebut or polemicize about other views we have already heard here. It should not surprise you that I, as an American and a long-time student of international relations, do not find the formula of unipolarity versus multipolarity very helpful to understanding or dealing with post-cold War international realities. Objectively, or analytically, it is not very accurate nor very relevant. I shall return to this theme in a moment. Subjectively, this formula is not very helpful to politics and diplomacy, in my view. At the same time, Americans and American statecraft must recognize that attitudes reflected in the debate about unipolarity versus multipolarity are important realities in themselves. These attitudes involve anxieties and resentments about the extent and the uses of America's avowedly great power in world affairs. We Americans must attempt patiently and openmindedly to understand and where possible to allay these anxieties and resentments. This is required of our values and also for us to play our role in the world constructively. At the same time, when other nations, societies and cultures demand our respectful attention, we have a right to ask for some fairness in addressing the true causes of the resentments we are talking about here. Take the matter of popular culture. America is often accused, in developing and also advanced societies, of seeking cultural hegemony, and of authoring and propagating the crass commercialism, the violence, the blatant eroticism found in much of mass popular culture throughout the world, especially in advertising and entertainment. Perhaps this is fair to some extent, but not entirely so. Take the blatant eroticism. When I was growing up as a teenager in the American Middle West, if one wanted to see steamy sex on the screen, one went to a nearby academic town to its art theatre and watched French and Italian films. When I first went to Europe in the mid-60s, I was startled by the explicit eroticism in the print media there, far more daring and provocative than anything in American magazines. The only airport shop I know of where you can buy sex toys and pornography is in Frankfurt; I know of none in the US. The most revolutionary phenomenon in modern popular music was a bunch of shaggy Brits called the Beatles. I have never been much of a fan of rock music. But when I first heard the Beatles, as something of an amateur musician myself, I could tell something dramatic was happening. While borrowing styles and themes from folk and popular music traditions, the Beatles were hanging all that on the classical architecture of Bach, whether they knew it or not. The homogenizing and hegemonizing phenomenon of modern popular culture around the world is also a function of technology, the technology of consumer electronics. Where does that come from? Most of it not from America but from Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. So, I only ask with regard to this and other important aspects of our topic that we get our facts straight. Objectively, or analytically, as I said earlier, there are serious flaws in viewing today's world as some sort of struggle between unipolarity, by which is meant American hegemony over all
15 14 others, and multipolarity, the existence or emergence of several poles or clusters of power that rival, contain, or counter American power. Admittedly, America is the most powerful sovereign country in the world today. But let us get some things straight and into perspective. Point one: America has been the most powerful single country in the world for a long, long time. Probably since At no point in the Cold War did the USSR truly match or rival the totality of American power, economically, culturally, technologically. Even in the military domain, where the USSR came closest, it never equalled the US in the global reach of its conventional forces. Ironically, American power during the Cold War was more amplified than balanced by the USSR in some ways. Because of threatening Soviet power and policies, other countries felt the need for US protection. I believe it fair to say that American power and the way it was exercised during the Cold War deserve some of the credit for our having got through this harrowing period of history without blowing ourselves to bits. Point two: especially as seen by Americans, American power is great but far from hegemonic. The globe is littered with problems and challenges whose solutions cannot be dictated by the United States. Ironically, again, the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Bloc has given many other countries, including the US allies and partners, new independence and freedom of manoeuvre. Point three: a subtext of our discussion at this conference has been the phenomenon of globalization. To some, this is a synonym for Americanization. But this is inaccurate and certainly an incomplete perception. Many Americans find the phenomenon of globalization, whose capital appears to be in Davos Switzerland, as disturbing as do others, and many gave vent to their anxieties recently in the American city of Seattle. This is because globalization is one aspect of a larger development that is leaching away the power of all nation states and their national governments to some extent. The processes of globalization bear the stamp of business practices born or widely applied in the United States. But they are driven by public and private institutions and organizations that are less and less uniquely American. Another irony perhaps: the sharp-edged commentary about globalization we have heard in this hall from many Russian speakers is echoed by many Americans who consider themselves true patriots, on both the left and the right. I think the whole polarity metaphor is wrong and wrong-headed. The world is not unipolar, i.e., an American empire in which all others are satellites or colonies. Neither is it multipolar, i.e., a multiplicity of power centres around which most huddle in fixed formation. Rather, I would suggest that what we see emerging is something that might be called a multi-communal world. This is a world of many, varied, and somewhat overlapping communities of nations and non-national bodies, each of which has some purpose or set of purposes behind its composition and actions. The UN, the EU, NATO, OSCE, the G7 or G8, OPEC, APEC, WTO, etc. etc. The United States is a member of many, but not all of these communities. The questions we should be debating are whether the emergent galaxy of communities has the right make-up, structure, and mission to promote global security and welfare. And are the policies of nations in them properly geared to those ends? Let me close my remarks with a brief comment on the agenda of one such community whose affairs have been my life-long preoccupation. It has little formal existence, but is very important. It is the community of declared nuclear powers. Within that community is a
16 15 community of two: Russia and America. We are the chief architects of the nuclear age; we have and as far as the eye can see shall continue to possess most of the nuclear weapons that exist in the world. We have a special responsibility to our own citizens and to the rest of mankind in how we manage this business of nuclear weapons. Sometime in the next year, the Bush Administration in Washington and the Putin Administration in Moscow will start an intense dialogue about nuclear strategy and security. This will be greatly focused on the question of National Missile Defence and whether we can agree on a scheme that permits deployment and even cooperation on limited defences against small-scale attacks by long-range missiles which may carry weapons of mass destruction. In this dialogue, Russia will be concerned to protect and, 1 can assure you, America will be concerned to respect Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. In another ironic consequence of the Cold War, the nuclear arms build-up of the two superpowers, one of history's most absurd developments in an existential sense, bequeathed Russia with a nuclear arsenal that has a unique meaning: it means that, for the first time in Russia's long history, it can transition through a period of revolutionary turmoil internally without fear that it will be invaded by another nation state. As fearsome and horrible as nuclear weapons may be, there is something healthy and positive about this. But we Russians and Americans, and then also Chinese, Britons, and Frenchmen, and then perhaps others, must ask where we are going with nuclear weapons in the long run. Are we ever going to get practical about abolishing them, as we are pledged in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to do? Or are we going to discard this pledge as chimerical and recognize nuclear weapons as a permanent part of reality? If the latter, then what are acceptable strategies, postures, and arsenals for responsible nuclear powers to have? Is it acceptable forever that any civilized nation rest its national security on arsenals and weapons that are essentially genocidal in character? Russian leaders lose no opportunity to accuse the United States of imperilling the existing strategic stability by what it is considering doing in the area of national missile defence. Yet Russia has apparently undertaken an initiative of its own, as I read in the open press, that in the eyes of many in the arms control community, may be, unlike limited NMD, truly destabilizing. And it has done so without any negotiations or consultations that I know of. Russia proposes to develop a new family of variable and low-yield nuclear weapons that can be safely used to make up for weaknesses in its conventional forces, including conceivably on its own territory. These would be smaller and cleaner than what we used to call tactical nuclear weapons, we are led to believe. And their strategic significance would be quite different from the role of tactical nuclear weapons during the Cold War, which were linked by almost inevitable dynamics of escalation to all-out nuclear war. Russia is proposing, in short, to take a big step in direct contravention of one of the most basic precepts of stability in the Cold War, that nuclear weapons should be regarded as unusable. Unlike many others, I do not jump to the conclusion that this Russian policy is necessarily dangerous or destabilizing or irresponsible. It depends a great deal upon what Russia actually does with respect to weapons, forces, strategies, command and control, etc. Clearly Russia is rethinking the place of nuclear weapons in its strategy and security. For a whole variety of reasons, the new Bush Administration is going to have to undertake such a comprehensive rethinking for America's part. We owe it to each other and to the rest of the world to do some of that rethinking together.
18 17 Philosophy of Globalization Philosophy of Counter-Globalization Alexandr G. Dugin The Russian State and the leaders of the Russians are paying enormous attention to the problem of globalization and of strategic thinking. In this respect, the new course of the new Russian leadership differs considerably and for the better from the utopian, mythological and in fact irresponsible thinking of the previous group of leading staff. The President and the Speaker of our Parliament are seriously concerned about the fate of this State, and about the role and place of Russia in the new world. The interest in geopolitical thinking among the first persons of the State is growing exponentially. I have given many years of my life to the cause of the development of geopolitical science in Russia, I have established the basis of the modern school of domestic geopolitics, I have initiated the new Euro-Asian movement which today is a powerful and continually growing force. For a long time the previous authority (the period of B. N. Yeltsin) ignored the geopolitical approach, refused to take into account the Euro-Asian character of the Russian State, neglected our civilization s specific character, and this in turn had a serious impact on the system of national security. In addition to the other problems, the problem of globalization, its considerable extent, its implication and principles, its geopolitical "foundation" all remained on the periphery of attention. Internal problems reduced vision; and the image of the external world and especially of western civilization became indistinct, blurred and unfocused. Even when making serious and fateful decisions the authorities operated with obsolete myths repeating (though this time with the opposite emphasis) inadequate concepts of the "Cold War". Today everything is different. The new leadership of Russia is seriously concerned about the rapidly developing structure of the "New World Order", about globalization, about the rise of the "new economy", and especially about the place of Russia in this new context, or more precisely, about the absence of a place for Russia if all these processes continue to develop at the current rate. 1. Some words about globalization itself First, whether we like it or not, globalization is an objective phenomenon of the modern world. It is perhaps the most comprehensive phenomenon, an encapsulating formula and the ultimate definition of all the basic processes taking place in international politics in the new century and the new millennium. Globalization is the trend and developmental vector of mankind with which we have to deal now and in the immediate future. Here it must be emphasized at the outset that this process of globalization could theoretically be a dual process. The first variant: the projects and theses encompassing the historical, cultural, economic, social, political, national, and religious experience of the various peoples and states are all brought together into a general fund of mankind. This model could be called a "council model" of globalization or "council globalization". This is only a theoretical possibility. The second variant: all of mankind chooses, either voluntarily or not quite voluntarily (under pressure), some civilizational model as a universal course of development which then
19 18 becomes the obligatory standard in politics, public structure, economics and culture. Some part of mankind, some nation or state elaborates a course for civilization and offers it as a universal model to all the rest. In contrast to "council globalization" the second variant could be called "particularistic globalization" or "unipolar globalization". Which globalization process is being discussed today in concrete life? Of course, the second one. The first variant of globalization has remained an opportunity which was not used or grasped. In the universal democratic rhetoric of the early re-organization (perestroika), Gorbachev and his supporters meant the convergence theories of the 1970s, their first model with certain nuances. As life has shown, it was a rather ephemeral process, nothing more than humanitarian verbalism. We see that the current globalization is especially a unipolar particularistic globalization. It represents the process of a uniform imposition upon all the peoples of the earth of a private, individual socio-economic paradigm connected with the western, and to be more exact, with the American civilizational model not simply the West European model but particularly the American, which has drifted far from its historical cradle. The imposition of the American way of life on all the other peoples of the earth can be vividly seen. In the process of this particularistic globalization, the account of national and historical peculiarity is reduced to only an adaptation of this model, which is taken as a base, and as normative to the concrete conditions of the concrete states and nations. The display of originality on the part of the local objects of globalization is only allowed to the extent to which they portray the universal paradigm in a local regional tone. There is no talk of any copartnership (even relatively equal in rights) in elaborating the paradigm itself. In other words, when we speak about that globalization which has been actively realized in practice in the modern world, we mean the imposition and establishment of civilizational models copied from American society and history, and the introduction of this private paradigm or model into specific states and nations with only superficial deviations which do not affect the essence of the process. The only "variety" allowed here consists not in the fact that each nation and each civilization introduces its own specificity into this global world, but in the fact that the overcoming of national and historical originality in the face of the obligatory stamp takes place differently in each concrete case, and that the process of standardization and unification has some differences. In other words, we mean that there is only one subject of globalization when we speak of that model of globalization which now exists without any alternative, and which is not the result of someone's malicious intention but is an objective process occurring in mankind. This subject of globalization is the one sole actor in international politics. It is the USA and the NATO bloc which it heads. What is therefore the function of the other participants in the globalization process: of Russia, the West European countries, India, the Oriental countries, the Islamic states? Only one role is being assigned to these formations of civilization, every one of which has a solid and centuries-old, multi-millennial history, specificity, mission, and special identity namely, the role of an object of globalization. The present order, the "New World Order" of the 21st century, is developing according to the following course: the interaction of the one subject of globalization with numerous and various objects of globalization.
20 19 It is necessary to consider those international events which are developing at the dawn of the 21st century in this system of coordinates. Those are the rules of the game with which we are dealing. In such conditions there is no point in speaking about any multipolarity, as what we are dealing with, namely that process which is generally developing today and which shows every tendency to become irreversible, represents the sole and extreme universalization of the unipolar system of the world. Here it is necessary to pay attention to the following aspect: what is this model of unipolar globalization and what kind of a philosophy is the subject of globalization trying to introduce? It must be noted straight away that this philosophy of globalization is not a vague and uncertain, casual, chaotic set of paradigms, values, theses, models, circuits and projects. It is a very concrete and quite distinct set of philosophical, ideological, strategic, economic and cultural installations. As a group all of them can be described as "Americanism". The USA and the NATO bloc which the USA controls emphasize in every possible way the value of "Americanism" in the most varied fields, ranging from culture, through to military conflicts. It is necessary to stress that in the case of the aggression against sovereign Yugoslavia, what was spoken about was not so much the acceptance of the military decision by the countries of NATO but the sole initiative of the USA behind the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. This aggressive behaviour was required once again to accent the subjectivity of the USA during the formation of the "New World Order" and the objectivity of all other states. So "Americanism" is the model which is the subject of globalization. Not simply West European culture, but that form of it in which were developed and were embodied the preconditions of West European culture, economics, social structure, political device, and which attained its most refined paradigmatic status in the USA. It is obvious that the USA is not a collateral product or any intermediate stage of the deve lopment of the West European culture of the new age. It is obvious that the USA is a summation of West European culture, and that within the political, civilizational, ideological, strategic, economic structure of the USA is embodied the purest, ultimate outcome which has lead to the schematic and crystalline expression of those tendencies which have appeared in mankind s new age in Western Europe and which prosper today across the Atlantic Ocean. In other words, in the process of globalization, all other peoples of the Earth who had been going their own way for millennia (India on its own; the Islamic countries on their own; Iran in general has a unique original multi-millennium history; Russia asserted its civilizational identity by way of highly complex bloody conflicts, World Wars, the recent "Cold War", etc.) have been presented today with the option of rejecting their own ideological installations and accepting that model which is the ultimate, refined conclusion of the extreme development of western civilization, together with the most radical consequences. The philosophy of globalization (the philosophy of unipolarity) stems from the liberalbourgeois outlook; it is based on a specific anthropology (on the notion of the primacy of the individual above the collective), on a specific economic doctrine (on trade freedom and the primacy of private business above other forms of economy, on defundamentalization of capital), on the notion of the optimality of the liberal political model (liberal-democracy), on the culture of the "melting-pot", on "tolerant syncretic humanitarian religiousness", on narcissism, on the exalting of the ephemeral and the de-ontologization of history both past and future, on cosmopolitanism and the new nomadism, on the virtualization of space, etc.