Piracy and Network Externality An Analysis for the Monopolized Software Industry

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Piracy and Network Externality An Analysis for the Monopolized Software Industry"

Transcription

1 Piracy and Network Externality An Analysis for the Monoolized Software Industry Ming Chung Chang Deartment of Economics and Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics Chiu Fen Lin Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics Dachrahn Wu Deartment of Economics and Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics Abstract In this aer, we roose a model to analyze a monoolized software industry. In articular, the model considers the software with the roerty of ositive network externality and consumers income distribution. By analyzing the monooly s otimal rice decision, we find that the software users enjoy the maximal network externality in such a monoolistic market structure. We then roceed with comarative statics analysis and obtain the following results: (1) Increasing the size of enalty has no effects on the monooly rice, the demand of the authorized software and the demand of the irated software. () The demand of the authorized software decreases and the demand of the irated software increases as the robability of iracy arresting increases. (3) The demand of the authorized software increases and the demand of the irated software decreases as the iracy cost increases. Keyword: network externality, iracy, income distribution. 1. Introduction According to Eighth Annual BSA (Business Software Alliance) Global Software Piracy Study, the average iracy rate of software is 39% in. It is estimated that the legal software firms revenue was declined by U.S.$ 13.8 billions due to these global software iracies. Convention wisdom suggests that legal software firms and government need to take severe actions on software iracy. Early theoretical researches such as Novos & Waldman (1984), Johnson (1985), and Liebowitz (1985)) suort this oinion by showing that unauthorized coies are harmful to intellectual roerty right holders 89

2 whenever the demand for originals does not reflect the demand for coies. Later, a grou of economists (including Conner & Rumelt (1991), Takeyama (1994), Slive and Bernhardt (1998), and Shy & Thisse (1999)) argue that in some situation it is rofitable for the original software develoer to allow limit iracy. The key factor behind such an unconventional result is the effect of network externality, a very revalent feature in the software market. Nonetheless, Poddar () roosed another model to show that even in the resence of the intense effect of network externality, rotection as oosed to allowing iracy is always otimal for the original software develoer. Although the role of network effects has been discussed extensively, the analysis for government olicy to software iracy is almost neglected. Banerjee (3) thus offers a formal analysis on government s role in controlling iracy through its choice of olicy instruments (including monitoring and enalizing the irate s illegal oeration). He found that welfare maximization may or may not result in monitoring as the socially otimal outcome. The outcome deends on the monitoring technology reflected in the monitoring cost, which is a deadweight loss, and other arameters such as the size of the market and the reliability of the irated software. So the social-welfare maximizing objective determines the government s aggressiveness or assiveness toward iracy, which in turn determines the otimal market structure. This aer rooses a model to analyze a monoolized software industry. Following the main thread of revious researches, we incororate effects of network externality in the model. To delineate the risks of using irates, we further assume that consumers are differentiated in their incomes so that they have different attitudes (risks) to obtaining the irated software. From analyzing the monooly s otimal rice decision, we find that the software users enjoy the maximal network externality in such a monoolistic market structure. By comarative statics analysis, we further obtain the following results: (1) Increasing the size of enalty has no effects on the monooly rice, the demand of the authorized software and the demand of the irated software. () The demand of the authorized software decreases and the demand of the irated software increases as the robability of iracy arresting increases. (3) The demand of the authorized software increases and the demand of the irated software decreases as the iracy cost increases. Note that the ublic oinion tends to ush government to raise the size of enalty or the ossibility of iracy arresting to curb software iracy. Conversely, our analysis suggests that the first olicy is ineffective, and that the second olicy obtains a reverse outcome (i.e., the quantity of iracy is increased). These results that clarify 9

3 our knowledge to functions of these olicy instruments toward iracies should be noticed in future researches on the role of government in dealing with software iracies. The rest of the aer is organized as follows. In section, we introduce the model. Section 3 derives the market demands of the authorized software and irated software, and then analyzes the monooly s otimal ricing. The comarative statics analysis and conclusion are in Section 4 and 5 resectively.. The Model Consider a monoolized software market in which the monooly roduces the software without roduction costs. There is a continuum of consumers that are uniformly distributed on the interval [, M] with density 1. The locations of consumers reresent their incomes. Each consumer consumes at most one unit of the software, either from buying the authorized software at the rice, or irating the software at the cost c. Suose that each consumer has the same utility function, U = x + y where x and y denote the utilities obtained from using the software and other goods resectively. Let N denote the number of software users that includes the authorized software buyers and irates. To delineate the roerty of network externality of the software, we assume that x = f ( N ) and f ' ( N ) >. Let β ( β 1) and b ( c b M ) denote the robability of iracy arresting and the corresonding fine. A consumer located at m thus has the following exected utility function. m EU = + f ( N ), ( 1 β ) m + β max[, m b] c + f ( N ), m, We assume that consumers are risk aversive. if he buys the authorized software, if he irates, if he does not use the software. Hence, a consumer will buy the authorized software when his exected utility of buying the authorized software equals that of irating the software are equal. Note that consumers have no incentive to irate when β is (relatively) too large. To avoid such a trivial case, we need to restrict β to satisfy β < 1 c. b 3. The Software Demands and the Monooly Price 91

4 In this section, we will derive the market demands of the authorized software and the irated software by analyzing consumers urchase decisions. Basing on the market demands, we then study the monoolistic firm s ricing behavior. 3.1 The market demand of the authorized software Note that the strength of network externality affects consumers urchase decisions (also the market demands). We thus analyze firstly the case of relatively small network externality (i.e, β b + c ) and then the case of relatively large network externality (i.e. > β b + c ). Case I: β b + c : The market demand of the authorized software is 1 c M, if D( ) = β, if > f ( N ), f ( N ). The demand curve is lotted in the following diagram. Diagram 1 β M + c β b + c f (N) q c M β Note that the demand function has a jum at = f (N). This imlies that the monooly rice cannot exceed the exected cost of irating the software, i.e., 1 See Aendix 1 and for the derivation of the demand function in Case I. 9

5 β b + c. Case II: > β b + c, The market demand of the authorized software is D ( ) M =, c, β if if β b + c, > β b + c. The demand curve is lotted in the following diagram. Diagram β M + c f (N) β b + c M b M + c β q As the demand function has a jum at = β b + c, the monooly rice cannot exceed the exected cost of irating the software in this case. Also note that in both cases, given an authorized software rice, the market demand of the authorized software increases as the iracy cost increases and also increases as the robability of iracy arresting increases. 3. The market demand of the irated software Since the irated software does not have its own rice, we thus define the market demand of the irated software D ( ) is a function of the rice of the authorized See Aendix 1 and for the derivation of the demand function in Case II. 93

6 software. Similar to the above subsection, we analyze firstly the case of relatively small network externality and then the case of relatively large network externality. Case I: β b + c The market demand of the irated software is D ( ) ( 1 + β ) β = f ( N ) β c, if ( 1 + β ) c, if The demand curve is lotted in the following diagram. > f ( N ), f ( N ). Diagram 3 β b + c f (N) ( 1 + β )c ( 1 ) β + β c q By the market demands of the authorized software and the irated software, we find that, given the network externality is relatively small (Case I), if the rice of the authorized software is too high (i.e., > f(n) ), there are no demand for the authorized 1+ β c software and a constant demand for the irated software (i.e., ). ( ) β Case II: > β b + c The market demand of the irated software is 94

7 D ( ) = β M c, ( 1+ β ) c, if if β b + c, > β b + c. The demand curve is lotted in the following diagram. Diagram 4 f (N) β b + c ( 1 + β )c M c q Note that, given the network externality is relatively large (Case II), if the rice of the authorized software is too high (i.e. > β b + c ), there is no demand for the authorized software. Moreover, the consumers that can afford the irate cost (i.e., M c consumers) irate the software. By contrast, in Case I some of the consumers who can afford the irate cost choose not to irate when the rice of the authorized software is too high (such that there is no demand for the authorized software). 3.3 The rofit function and the monooly rice Given the demand functions of the authorized software and the irated software, the monooly sets a rice to maximize its rofit, π = D( ). The rofit functions in both cases are lotted in the following diagrams. 95

8 Diagram 5: (Case I: β b + c ) π ( β M + c) 4β c β β M + c f (N ) β b + c Diagram 6: (Case II: > β b + c ) 96

9 π ( β M + c) 4β ( β b + c) ( M b) β M + c β b + c f (N ) Proosition 1: In both cases, the monooly rice M + = β ; the otimal * c * M c market demand of the authorized software D = + ; the otimal demand of the β irated software * D M 1 = 1 + c ; the firm s otimal rofit β ( β M + ) * * * β M + c M c c π = D = + =. β 4β Proof: See Aendix 3. Note that, under the monooly rice, the number of software users is * * N = D + D = M c. This means that excet those consumers who are too oor to afford the iracy cost, the other consumers use the software. The software users thus enjoy the maximal network externality in such a monoolistic market structure. 4. Comarative Statics Analysis In this section, we will analyze the effects of changes of the enalty b, iracy 97

10 cost c, and the robability of iracy arresting β on the monooly rice, the otimal demand of authorized software and the otimal demand of irated software. 4.1 Effects of the size of enalty Proosition : Increasing the size of enalty has no effects on the monooly rice, the demand of the authorized software and the demand of the irated software. * Proof: = b and D * * * D D = = =. b b b 4. Effects of the robability of iracy arresting Proosition 3: The demand of the authorized software decreases and the demand of the irated software increases as the robability of iracy arresting increases. D Proof: = c β β < D, = c β β >. Proosition 3 indicates that raising the robability of iracy arresting obtains a reverse effect on iracy reduction. Such a eculiar result is caused by a higher monooly rice due to the increase of the robability of iracy arresting * M ( = > ). As the effect of a higher monooly rice dominates the effect of β the exected iracy cost increasing, we then have the outcome. Proosition 4: If β M > c, the monooly rofit increases as the robability of iracy arresting increases. If β M < c, the monooly rofit decreases as the robability of iracy arresting increases. Proof: * π = β ( β M + c)( β M c) 4β. 4.3 Effects of iracy cost Proosition 5: The demand of the authorized software increases and the demand of the irated software decreases as the iracy cost increases. 98

11 D 1 D Proof: = >, o ( ) 1 = 1 + <. c β c β 5. Conclusion In this aer, we roose a model to analyze a monoolized software industry. In articular, the model considers the software with the roerty of ositive network externality and consumers income distribution. Through the derivations of the market demands of the authorized software and the irated software, we then analyze the monooly s otimal rice decision and find that the software users enjoy the maximal network externality in such a monoolistic market structure. Finally, by comarative statics analysis, we obtain the following results: (1) Increasing the size of enalty has no effects on the monooly rice, the demand of the authorized software and the demand of the irated software. () The demand of the authorized software decreases and the demand of the irated software increases as the robability of iracy arresting increases. (3) The demand of the authorized software increases and the demand of the irated software decreases as the iracy cost increases. Note that the ublic oinion tends to ush government to raise the size of enalty or the ossibility of iracy arresting to curb software iracy. Conversely, our analysis suggests that the first olicy is ineffective, and that the second olicy obtains a reverse outcome (i.e., the quantity of iracy is increased). References: Banerjee, D.S. (3), Software Piracy: A Strategic Analysis and Policy Instruments, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1, Besen, S.M. (1986), Private Coying, Reroduction Costs, and The Suly of Intellectual Proerty, Information Economics and Policy, 5(), 5-. Besen, S.M. and S.N. Kirby (1989), Private Coying, Aroriability and Otimal Coying Royalties, Journal of Law & Economics, 3, Business Software Alliance (BSA).(3), Eighth Annual BSA Global Software Piracy Study. Washington, DC: US. Chou, C.H. & D. Wu (), the rotecting decision on intellectual roerty right for monooly software firm, SCU economics worksho (in Chinese.) Chou, C. and O. Shy (1993), Partial Comatibility and Suorting Services, Economics Letters, 41, Conner, K. and R. Rumelt (1991), Software iracy: an analysis of rotection strategies, Management Science, 37,

12 Givon, M., V. Mahajan and E. Muller (1995), Software iracy: estimation of lost sales and the imact on software diffusion, Journal of Marketing, 59, Johnson, W.R.(1985), The Economics of Coying, Journal of Political Economy, 93(1), Liebowitz, S.J. (1985), Coying and indirect aroriability: hotocoying of journals, Journal of Political Economy, 93(5), Lin, Y.J. (1991), Price, rofits & iracy in the PC software industry, Taiwan Economic Review, 19(3), Novos, I.E. and M. Waldman (1984), The effects of increased coyright rotection: an analytic aroach, Journal of Political Economy, 9(), Poddar, S. (), Network Externality and Software Piracy, working aer, Deartment of Economics, National University of Singaore. Slive, J. and D. Bernhardt (1998), Pirated for Profit, Canadian Journal of Economics, 31(4), Shy, O. and J. Thisse (1999), A Strategic Aroach to Software Protection, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 8, Shy, O. (1), The Economics of Network Industries, Cambridge University Press. Smith, E., and Wright, R. Why Is Automobile Insurance in Philadelhia So Damn Exensive? The American Economic Review, 8(4), (199), Takayama, L. (1994), The Welfare Imlications of unauthorized Reroduction of Intellectual Proerty in the Present of Demand Network Externalities, Journal of Industrial Economics, 4(),

On Software Piracy when Piracy is Costly

On Software Piracy when Piracy is Costly Deartment of Economics Working aer No. 0309 htt://nt.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/ub/w/w0309.df n Software iracy when iracy is Costly Sougata oddar August 003 Abstract: The ervasiveness of the illegal coying of

More information

A Simple Model of Pricing, Markups and Market. Power Under Demand Fluctuations

A Simple Model of Pricing, Markups and Market. Power Under Demand Fluctuations A Simle Model of Pricing, Markus and Market Power Under Demand Fluctuations Stanley S. Reynolds Deartment of Economics; University of Arizona; Tucson, AZ 85721 Bart J. Wilson Economic Science Laboratory;

More information

THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF COSTLY MONITORING IN THE CREDIT MARKET: A NOTE

THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF COSTLY MONITORING IN THE CREDIT MARKET: A NOTE The Economic Journal, 110 (Aril ), 576±580.. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 50 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF COSTLY MONITORING

More information

Large firms and heterogeneity: the structure of trade and industry under oligopoly

Large firms and heterogeneity: the structure of trade and industry under oligopoly Large firms and heterogeneity: the structure of trade and industry under oligooly Eddy Bekkers University of Linz Joseh Francois University of Linz & CEPR (London) ABSTRACT: We develo a model of trade

More information

Multiperiod Portfolio Optimization with General Transaction Costs

Multiperiod Portfolio Optimization with General Transaction Costs Multieriod Portfolio Otimization with General Transaction Costs Victor DeMiguel Deartment of Management Science and Oerations, London Business School, London NW1 4SA, UK, avmiguel@london.edu Xiaoling Mei

More information

Digital goods lend themselves to versioning but also suffer from piracy losses. This paper develops a pricing

Digital goods lend themselves to versioning but also suffer from piracy losses. This paper develops a pricing Information Systems Research Vol. 16, No. 4, December 2005,. 400 417 issn 1047-7047 eissn 1526-5536 05 1604 0400 informs doi 10.1287/isre.1050.0069 2005 INFORMS Managing Piracy: Pricing and Samling Strategies

More information

Jena Research Papers in Business and Economics

Jena Research Papers in Business and Economics Jena Research Paers in Business and Economics A newsvendor model with service and loss constraints Werner Jammernegg und Peter Kischka 21/2008 Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft Working and Discussion

More information

Working paper No: 23/2011 May 2011 LSE Health. Sotiris Vandoros, Katherine Grace Carman. Demand and Pricing of Preventative Health Care

Working paper No: 23/2011 May 2011 LSE Health. Sotiris Vandoros, Katherine Grace Carman. Demand and Pricing of Preventative Health Care Working aer o: 3/0 May 0 LSE Health Sotiris Vandoros, Katherine Grace Carman Demand and Pricing of Preventative Health Care Demand and Pricing of Preventative Healthcare Sotiris Vandoros, Katherine Grace

More information

On Software Piracy when Piracy is Costly

On Software Piracy when Piracy is Costly n Software iracy when iracy is Costly Sougata oddar Department of Economics National University of Singapore (NUS 10 Kent Ridge Crescent Singapore 11960 E-mail: ecssp@nus.edu.sg January 004 Abstract The

More information

Stochastic Derivation of an Integral Equation for Probability Generating Functions

Stochastic Derivation of an Integral Equation for Probability Generating Functions Journal of Informatics and Mathematical Sciences Volume 5 (2013), Number 3,. 157 163 RGN Publications htt://www.rgnublications.com Stochastic Derivation of an Integral Equation for Probability Generating

More information

Interbank Market and Central Bank Policy

Interbank Market and Central Bank Policy Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reorts Interbank Market and Central Bank Policy Jung-Hyun Ahn Vincent Bignon Régis Breton Antoine Martin Staff Reort No. 763 January 206 This aer resents reliminary

More information

Asymmetric Information, Transaction Cost, and. Externalities in Competitive Insurance Markets *

Asymmetric Information, Transaction Cost, and. Externalities in Competitive Insurance Markets * Asymmetric Information, Transaction Cost, and Externalities in Cometitive Insurance Markets * Jerry W. iu Deartment of Finance, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646 wliu@nd.edu Mark J. Browne

More information

Risk in Revenue Management and Dynamic Pricing

Risk in Revenue Management and Dynamic Pricing OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 56, No. 2, March Aril 2008,. 326 343 issn 0030-364X eissn 1526-5463 08 5602 0326 informs doi 10.1287/ore.1070.0438 2008 INFORMS Risk in Revenue Management and Dynamic Pricing Yuri

More information

On Multicast Capacity and Delay in Cognitive Radio Mobile Ad-hoc Networks

On Multicast Capacity and Delay in Cognitive Radio Mobile Ad-hoc Networks On Multicast Caacity and Delay in Cognitive Radio Mobile Ad-hoc Networks Jinbei Zhang, Yixuan Li, Zhuotao Liu, Fan Wu, Feng Yang, Xinbing Wang Det of Electronic Engineering Det of Comuter Science and Engineering

More information

X How to Schedule a Cascade in an Arbitrary Graph

X How to Schedule a Cascade in an Arbitrary Graph X How to Schedule a Cascade in an Arbitrary Grah Flavio Chierichetti, Cornell University Jon Kleinberg, Cornell University Alessandro Panconesi, Saienza University When individuals in a social network

More information

Joint Production and Financing Decisions: Modeling and Analysis

Joint Production and Financing Decisions: Modeling and Analysis Joint Production and Financing Decisions: Modeling and Analysis Xiaodong Xu John R. Birge Deartment of Industrial Engineering and Management Sciences, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208,

More information

An inventory control system for spare parts at a refinery: An empirical comparison of different reorder point methods

An inventory control system for spare parts at a refinery: An empirical comparison of different reorder point methods An inventory control system for sare arts at a refinery: An emirical comarison of different reorder oint methods Eric Porras a*, Rommert Dekker b a Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Sueriores de Monterrey,

More information

Capital, Systemic Risk, Insurance Prices and Regulation

Capital, Systemic Risk, Insurance Prices and Regulation Caital, Systemic Risk, Insurance Prices and Regulation Ajay Subramanian J. Mack Robinson College of Business Georgia State University asubramanian@gsu.edu Jinjing Wang J. Mack Robinson College of Business

More information

An important observation in supply chain management, known as the bullwhip effect,

An important observation in supply chain management, known as the bullwhip effect, Quantifying the Bullwhi Effect in a Simle Suly Chain: The Imact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information Frank Chen Zvi Drezner Jennifer K. Ryan David Simchi-Levi Decision Sciences Deartment, National

More information

Service Network Design with Asset Management: Formulations and Comparative Analyzes

Service Network Design with Asset Management: Formulations and Comparative Analyzes Service Network Design with Asset Management: Formulations and Comarative Analyzes Jardar Andersen Teodor Gabriel Crainic Marielle Christiansen October 2007 CIRRELT-2007-40 Service Network Design with

More information

Discussion Paper No. 2002/115 Network Externality and Software Piracy. Sougata Poddar *

Discussion Paper No. 2002/115 Network Externality and Software Piracy. Sougata Poddar * Discussion Paper No. 00/5 Network Externality and Software Piracy Sougata Poddar * December 00 Abstract The pervasiveness of the illegal copying of software is a worldwide phenomenon. Software piracy implies

More information

Two-resource stochastic capacity planning employing a Bayesian methodology

Two-resource stochastic capacity planning employing a Bayesian methodology Journal of the Oerational Research Society (23) 54, 1198 128 r 23 Oerational Research Society Ltd. All rights reserved. 16-5682/3 $25. www.algrave-journals.com/jors Two-resource stochastic caacity lanning

More information

Penalty Interest Rates, Universal Default, and the Common Pool Problem of Credit Card Debt

Penalty Interest Rates, Universal Default, and the Common Pool Problem of Credit Card Debt Penalty Interest Rates, Universal Default, and the Common Pool Problem of Credit Card Debt Lawrence M. Ausubel and Amanda E. Dawsey * February 2009 Preliminary and Incomlete Introduction It is now reasonably

More information

What is Adverse Selection. Economics of Information and Contracts Adverse Selection. Lemons Problem. Lemons Problem

What is Adverse Selection. Economics of Information and Contracts Adverse Selection. Lemons Problem. Lemons Problem What is Adverse Selection Economics of Information and Contracts Adverse Selection Levent Koçkesen Koç University In markets with erfect information all rofitable trades (those in which the value to the

More information

1 Gambler s Ruin Problem

1 Gambler s Ruin Problem Coyright c 2009 by Karl Sigman 1 Gambler s Ruin Problem Let N 2 be an integer and let 1 i N 1. Consider a gambler who starts with an initial fortune of $i and then on each successive gamble either wins

More information

Monopoly vs. Compe22on. Theory of the Firm. Causes of Monopoly. Monopoly vs. Compe22on. Monopolis2c Markets P. Natural. Legal.

Monopoly vs. Compe22on. Theory of the Firm. Causes of Monopoly. Monopoly vs. Compe22on. Monopolis2c Markets P. Natural. Legal. Monooly vs. Comeon Monooly Perfect Come,,on Theory of the Firm P Monooly s demand = Market demand (ΔQ P) P Firm s demand = Horizontal line ( Δ P does not change) Monoolisc Markets P d Q Monooly vs. Comeon

More information

Time-Cost Trade-Offs in Resource-Constraint Project Scheduling Problems with Overlapping Modes

Time-Cost Trade-Offs in Resource-Constraint Project Scheduling Problems with Overlapping Modes Time-Cost Trade-Offs in Resource-Constraint Proect Scheduling Problems with Overlaing Modes François Berthaut Robert Pellerin Nathalie Perrier Adnène Hai February 2011 CIRRELT-2011-10 Bureaux de Montréal

More information

The Economics of the Cloud: Price Competition and Congestion

The Economics of the Cloud: Price Competition and Congestion Submitted to Oerations Research manuscrit The Economics of the Cloud: Price Cometition and Congestion Jonatha Anselmi Basque Center for Alied Mathematics, jonatha.anselmi@gmail.com Danilo Ardagna Di. di

More information

Software Anti-piracy and Pricing in a Competitive Environment: a Game Theoretic Analysis

Software Anti-piracy and Pricing in a Competitive Environment: a Game Theoretic Analysis Software Anti-piracy and Pricing in a Competitive Environment: a Game Theoretic Analysis We study a problem of two software firms competing on price in a market where consumers can choose between purchasing

More information

Why Software Piracy Rates Differ A Theoretical Analysis

Why Software Piracy Rates Differ A Theoretical Analysis Department of Economics Working aper No. 0515 http://nt.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/pub/wp/wp0515.pdf Why Software iracy Rates Differ A Theoretical Analysis by Sougata oddar 005 Sougata oddar. Views expressed herein

More information

Risk and Return. Sample chapter. e r t u i o p a s d f CHAPTER CONTENTS LEARNING OBJECTIVES. Chapter 7

Risk and Return. Sample chapter. e r t u i o p a s d f CHAPTER CONTENTS LEARNING OBJECTIVES. Chapter 7 Chater 7 Risk and Return LEARNING OBJECTIVES After studying this chater you should be able to: e r t u i o a s d f understand how return and risk are defined and measured understand the concet of risk

More information

Price Discrimination in the Digital Economy*

Price Discrimination in the Digital Economy* Price Discrimination in the Digital Economy Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University) J. Miguel Villas-Boas (University of California, Berkeley) May 2012 ABSTRACT With the develoments in information technology

More information

Separating Trading and Banking: Consequences for Financial Stability

Separating Trading and Banking: Consequences for Financial Stability Searating Trading and Banking: Consequences for Financial Stability Hendrik Hakenes University of Bonn, Max Planck Institute Bonn, and CEPR Isabel Schnabel Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Max Planck

More information

The fast Fourier transform method for the valuation of European style options in-the-money (ITM), at-the-money (ATM) and out-of-the-money (OTM)

The fast Fourier transform method for the valuation of European style options in-the-money (ITM), at-the-money (ATM) and out-of-the-money (OTM) Comutational and Alied Mathematics Journal 15; 1(1: 1-6 Published online January, 15 (htt://www.aascit.org/ournal/cam he fast Fourier transform method for the valuation of Euroean style otions in-the-money

More information

IEEM 101: Inventory control

IEEM 101: Inventory control IEEM 101: Inventory control Outline of this series of lectures: 1. Definition of inventory. Examles of where inventory can imrove things in a system 3. Deterministic Inventory Models 3.1. Continuous review:

More information

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES ISSN 1471-0498 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES MARGINAL COST PRICING VERSUS INSURANCE Simon Cowan Number 102 May 2002 Manor Road Building, Oxford OX1 3UQ Marginal cost ricing versus insurance

More information

Service Network Design with Asset Management: Formulations and Comparative Analyzes

Service Network Design with Asset Management: Formulations and Comparative Analyzes Service Network Design with Asset Management: Formulations and Comarative Analyzes Jardar Andersen Teodor Gabriel Crainic Marielle Christiansen October 2007 CIRRELT-2007-40 Service Network Design with

More information

Economics 431 Fall 2003 2nd midterm Answer Key

Economics 431 Fall 2003 2nd midterm Answer Key Economics 431 Fall 2003 2nd midterm Answer Key 1) (20 oints) Big C cable comany has a local monooly in cable TV (good 1) and fast Internet (good 2). Assume that the marginal cost of roducing either good

More information

European Journal of Operational Research

European Journal of Operational Research Euroean Journal of Oerational Research 15 (011) 730 739 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Euroean Journal of Oerational Research journal homeage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor Interfaces with Other

More information

The Economics of the Cloud: Price Competition and Congestion

The Economics of the Cloud: Price Competition and Congestion Submitted to Oerations Research manuscrit (Please, rovide the manuscrit number!) Authors are encouraged to submit new aers to INFORMS journals by means of a style file temlate, which includes the journal

More information

c 2009 Je rey A. Miron 3. Examples: Linear Demand Curves and Monopoly

c 2009 Je rey A. Miron 3. Examples: Linear Demand Curves and Monopoly Lecture 0: Monooly. c 009 Je rey A. Miron Outline. Introduction. Maximizing Pro ts. Examles: Linear Demand Curves and Monooly. The Ine ciency of Monooly. The Deadweight Loss of Monooly. Price Discrimination.

More information

Dynamics of Open Source Movements

Dynamics of Open Source Movements Dynamics of Oen Source Movements Susan Athey y and Glenn Ellison z January 2006 Abstract This aer considers a dynamic model of the evolution of oen source software rojects, focusing on the evolution of

More information

Managing specific risk in property portfolios

Managing specific risk in property portfolios Managing secific risk in roerty ortfolios Andrew Baum, PhD University of Reading, UK Peter Struemell OPC, London, UK Contact author: Andrew Baum Deartment of Real Estate and Planning University of Reading

More information

Monopoly. Monopoly. Causes of Monopolies. Profit Maximization. ECON 370: Microeconomic Theory. Summer 2004 Rice University Stanley Gilbert

Monopoly. Monopoly. Causes of Monopolies. Profit Maximization. ECON 370: Microeconomic Theory. Summer 2004 Rice University Stanley Gilbert Monool market with a single seller Monool ECON 370: Microeconomic Theor Firm demand = market demand Firm demand is downward sloing Monoolist can alter market rice b adjusting its own outut level Summer

More information

Corporate Compliance Policy

Corporate Compliance Policy Cororate Comliance Policy English Edition FOREWORD Dear Emloyees, The global nature of Bayer s oerations means that our activities are subject to a wide variety of statutory regulations and standards

More information

Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Bank Bailout Policy 1

Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Bank Bailout Policy 1 Cash-in-the-Maret Pricing and Otimal Ban Bailout Policy 1 Viral V. Acharya 2 London Business School and CEPR Tanju Yorulmazer 3 Ban of England J.E.L. Classification: G21, G28, G38, E58, D62. Keywords:

More information

Compensating Fund Managers for Risk-Adjusted Performance

Compensating Fund Managers for Risk-Adjusted Performance Comensating Fund Managers for Risk-Adjusted Performance Thomas S. Coleman Æquilibrium Investments, Ltd. Laurence B. Siegel The Ford Foundation Journal of Alternative Investments Winter 1999 In contrast

More information

CFRI 3,4. Zhengwei Wang PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China and SEBA, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China

CFRI 3,4. Zhengwei Wang PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China and SEBA, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/2044-1398.htm CFRI 3,4 322 constraints and cororate caital structure: a model Wuxiang Zhu School of Economics

More information

Reference Pricing with Endogenous Generic Entry

Reference Pricing with Endogenous Generic Entry Reference Pricing with Endogenous Generic Entry Kurt R. Brekke, Chiara Canta, Odd Rune Straume Aril 18, 2016 Abstract Reference ricing intends to reduce harmaceutical exenditures by increasing demand elasticity

More information

A Modified Measure of Covert Network Performance

A Modified Measure of Covert Network Performance A Modified Measure of Covert Network Performance LYNNE L DOTY Marist College Deartment of Mathematics Poughkeesie, NY UNITED STATES lynnedoty@maristedu Abstract: In a covert network the need for secrecy

More information

Machine Learning with Operational Costs

Machine Learning with Operational Costs Journal of Machine Learning Research 14 (2013) 1989-2028 Submitted 12/11; Revised 8/12; Published 7/13 Machine Learning with Oerational Costs Theja Tulabandhula Deartment of Electrical Engineering and

More information

Private Label Positioning: Vertical vs. Horizontal Differentiation from the National Brand

Private Label Positioning: Vertical vs. Horizontal Differentiation from the National Brand Private Label Positioning: Vertical vs. Horizontal Differentiation from the National Brand By S. Chan Choi and Anne T. Coughlan May 004 Please do not uote or distribute without ermission. Marketing Deartment,

More information

NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM WITH PRICING: PROPERTIES, ALGORITHMS, AND SIMULATION

NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM WITH PRICING: PROPERTIES, ALGORITHMS, AND SIMULATION Proceedings of the 2005 Winter Simulation Conference M. E. Kuhl, N. M. Steiger, F. B. rmstrong, and J.. Joines, eds. NEWSVENDOR PROBLEM WITH PRICING: PROPERTIES, LGORITHMS, ND SIMULTION Roger L. Zhan ISE

More information

Re-Dispatch Approach for Congestion Relief in Deregulated Power Systems

Re-Dispatch Approach for Congestion Relief in Deregulated Power Systems Re-Disatch Aroach for Congestion Relief in Deregulated ower Systems Ch. Naga Raja Kumari #1, M. Anitha 2 #1, 2 Assistant rofessor, Det. of Electrical Engineering RVR & JC College of Engineering, Guntur-522019,

More information

Intellectual Property Right Protection in the Software Market

Intellectual Property Right Protection in the Software Market Intellectual Property Right Protection in the Software Market Yasuhiro Arai Aomori Public College 153-4, Yamazaki, Goushizawa, Aomori-city, Aomori 030-0196, Japan March 01 Abstract We discuss the software

More information

An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Credit Rating on Trade Credit

An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Credit Rating on Trade Credit 011 International Conference on Financial Management and Economics IPED vol.11 (011) (011) ICSIT Press, Singaore n Emirical nalysis of the Effect of Credit ating on Trade Credit Jian-Hsin Chou¹ Mei-Ching

More information

Presales, Leverage Decisions and Risk Shifting

Presales, Leverage Decisions and Risk Shifting Presales, Leverage Decisions and Risk Shifting Su Han Chan Professor Carey Business School Johns Hokins University, USA schan@jhu.edu Fang Fang AssociateProfessor School of Public Economics and Administration

More information

A joint initiative of Ludwig-Maximilians University s Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute for Economic Research

A joint initiative of Ludwig-Maximilians University s Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute for Economic Research A joint initiative of Ludwig-Maximilians University s Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute for Economic Research Area Conference on Alied Microeconomics - 2 March 20 CESifo Conference Centre,

More information

PIRACY OF DIGITAL PRODUCTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS LITERATURE

PIRACY OF DIGITAL PRODUCTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS LITERATURE PIRACY OF DIGITAL PRODUCTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS LITERATURE MARTIN PEITZ PATRICK WAELBROECK CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1071 CATEGORY 9: INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION NOVEMBER 2003 An electronic version

More information

Commercializing Open Source Software

Commercializing Open Source Software ommercializing Oen Source Software Byung ho Kim 1 bck@vt.edu Pamlin ollege of Business Virginia Tech Blacksburg, VA 4061 Tridas Mukhoadhyay tridas@cmu.edu Teer School of Business arnegie Mellon University

More information

Large-Scale IP Traceback in High-Speed Internet: Practical Techniques and Theoretical Foundation

Large-Scale IP Traceback in High-Speed Internet: Practical Techniques and Theoretical Foundation Large-Scale IP Traceback in High-Seed Internet: Practical Techniques and Theoretical Foundation Jun Li Minho Sung Jun (Jim) Xu College of Comuting Georgia Institute of Technology {junli,mhsung,jx}@cc.gatech.edu

More information

In recent years, the issue of copyright protection for intellectual properties such as computer software, music

In recent years, the issue of copyright protection for intellectual properties such as computer software, music Vol. 7, No. 4, July August 008, pp. 60 66 issn 073-399 eissn 56-548X 08 704 060 informs doi 0.87/mksc.070.033 008 INFORMS Digital Piracy: A Competitive Analysis Sanjay Jain Mays Business School, Texas

More information

Applications of Regret Theory to Asset Pricing

Applications of Regret Theory to Asset Pricing Alications of Regret Theory to Asset Pricing Anna Dodonova * Henry B. Tiie College of Business, University of Iowa Iowa City, Iowa 52242-1000 Tel.: +1-319-337-9958 E-mail address: anna-dodonova@uiowa.edu

More information

Chapter 9 Profit Maximization

Chapter 9 Profit Maximization Chater 9 Profit Maximization Economic theory normally uses the rofit maximization assumtion in studying the firm just as it uses the utility maximization assumtion for the individual consumer. This aroach

More information

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE AND THEIR EFFICIENCY EVALUATION SYSTEM IN THE YOTH AND SPORT OFFICES IN NORTH WEST OF IRAN

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE AND THEIR EFFICIENCY EVALUATION SYSTEM IN THE YOTH AND SPORT OFFICES IN NORTH WEST OF IRAN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE AND THEIR EFFICIENCY EVALUATION SYSTEM IN THE YOTH AND SPORT OFFICES IN NORTH WEST OF IRAN *Akbar Abdolhosenzadeh 1, Laya Mokhtari 2, Amineh Sahranavard Gargari

More information

Value based trading of real assets in shipping under stochastic freight rates

Value based trading of real assets in shipping under stochastic freight rates Value based trading of real assets in shiing under stochastic freight rates Sigbjørn Sødal Agder University College, School of Management Steen Koekebakker Agder University College, School of Management

More information

6.4 The Basic Scheme when the Agent is Risk Averse

6.4 The Basic Scheme when the Agent is Risk Averse 100 OPTIMAL COMPENSATION SCHEMES such that Further, effort is chosen so that ˆβ = ˆα = 0 e = δ The level of utility in equilibrium is strictly larger than the outside otion (which was normalized to zero

More information

Title: Stochastic models of resource allocation for services

Title: Stochastic models of resource allocation for services Title: Stochastic models of resource allocation for services Author: Ralh Badinelli,Professor, Virginia Tech, Deartment of BIT (235), Virginia Tech, Blacksburg VA 2461, USA, ralhb@vt.edu Phone : (54) 231-7688,

More information

DOES COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENCOURAGE PIRACY?

DOES COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENCOURAGE PIRACY? DOES COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENCOURAGE PIRACY? Rick Harbaugh Rahul Khemka Abstract When copyright enforcement is targeted at high-value buyers such as corporate and government users, the copyright holder

More information

Outsourcing and Technological Innovations: A Firm-Level Analysis

Outsourcing and Technological Innovations: A Firm-Level Analysis DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 3334 Outsourcing and Technological Innovations: A Firm-Level Analysis Ann Bartel Saul Lach Nachum Sicherman February 2008 Forschungsinstitut zur Zuunft der Arbeit Institute

More information

DAY-AHEAD ELECTRICITY PRICE FORECASTING BASED ON TIME SERIES MODELS: A COMPARISON

DAY-AHEAD ELECTRICITY PRICE FORECASTING BASED ON TIME SERIES MODELS: A COMPARISON DAY-AHEAD ELECTRICITY PRICE FORECASTING BASED ON TIME SERIES MODELS: A COMPARISON Rosario Esínola, Javier Contreras, Francisco J. Nogales and Antonio J. Conejo E.T.S. de Ingenieros Industriales, Universidad

More information

Comparing Dissimilarity Measures for Symbolic Data Analysis

Comparing Dissimilarity Measures for Symbolic Data Analysis Comaring Dissimilarity Measures for Symbolic Data Analysis Donato MALERBA, Floriana ESPOSITO, Vincenzo GIOVIALE and Valentina TAMMA Diartimento di Informatica, University of Bari Via Orabona 4 76 Bari,

More information

EFFECTS OF FEDERAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS ON INVESTMENT, PRODUCTION, AND CONTRACT DESIGN UNDER UNCERTAINTY. A Dissertation SANGTAEK SEO

EFFECTS OF FEDERAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS ON INVESTMENT, PRODUCTION, AND CONTRACT DESIGN UNDER UNCERTAINTY. A Dissertation SANGTAEK SEO EFFECTS OF FEDERAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS ON INVESTMENT, PRODUCTION, AND CONTRACT DESIGN UNDER UNCERTAINTY A Dissertation by SANGTAEK SEO Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University

More information

Buffer Capacity Allocation: A method to QoS support on MPLS networks**

Buffer Capacity Allocation: A method to QoS support on MPLS networks** Buffer Caacity Allocation: A method to QoS suort on MPLS networks** M. K. Huerta * J. J. Padilla X. Hesselbach ϒ R. Fabregat O. Ravelo Abstract This aer describes an otimized model to suort QoS by mean

More information

CRITICAL AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURES VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT TO TERRORIST THREATS

CRITICAL AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURES VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT TO TERRORIST THREATS Review of the Air Force Academy No (23) 203 CRITICAL AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURES VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT TO TERRORIST THREATS Cătălin CIOACĂ Henri Coandă Air Force Academy, Braşov, Romania Abstract: The

More information

Rejuvenating the Supply Chain by Benchmarking using Fuzzy Cross-Boundary Performance Evaluation Approach

Rejuvenating the Supply Chain by Benchmarking using Fuzzy Cross-Boundary Performance Evaluation Approach ICSI International Journal of Engineering and echnology, Vol.2, o.6, December 2 ISS: 793-8236 Rejuvenating the Suly Chain by Benchmarking using uzzy Cross-Boundary erformance Evaluation roach RU SUIL BIDU,

More information

Notes to the Accounts

Notes to the Accounts 1.Reorganisation and basis of resentation The Comany was incororated in Hong Kong on May 21, 1999 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wharf Communications Investments Limited ("Wharf Communications"), the

More information

Business Development Services and Small Business Growth in Bangladesh

Business Development Services and Small Business Growth in Bangladesh Universal Journal of Industrial and Business Management 1(2): 54-61, 2013 DOI: 10.13189/ujibm.2013.010206 htt://www.hrub.org Business Develoment Services and Small Business Growth in Bangladesh Md. Serazul

More information

Estimating the Gains from Liberalizing Services Trade: The Case of Passenger Aviation *

Estimating the Gains from Liberalizing Services Trade: The Case of Passenger Aviation * Estimating the Gains from Liberalizing Services Trade: The Case of Passenger Aviation * Anca Cristea, University of Oregon avid Hummels, Purdue University & NBER Brian Roberson, Purdue University March

More information

IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 29, NO. 4, APRIL 2011 757. Load-Balancing Spectrum Decision for Cognitive Radio Networks

IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 29, NO. 4, APRIL 2011 757. Load-Balancing Spectrum Decision for Cognitive Radio Networks IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 29, NO. 4, APRIL 20 757 Load-Balancing Sectrum Decision for Cognitive Radio Networks Li-Chun Wang, Fellow, IEEE, Chung-Wei Wang, Student Member, IEEE,

More information

A Third Generation Automated Teller Machine Using Universal Subscriber Module with Iris Recognition

A Third Generation Automated Teller Machine Using Universal Subscriber Module with Iris Recognition A Third Generation Automated Teller Machine Using Universal Subscriber Module with Iris Recognition B.Sundar Raj Assistant rofessor, Det of CSE, Bharath University, Chennai, TN, India. ABSTRACT: This aer

More information

TOWARDS REAL-TIME METADATA FOR SENSOR-BASED NETWORKS AND GEOGRAPHIC DATABASES

TOWARDS REAL-TIME METADATA FOR SENSOR-BASED NETWORKS AND GEOGRAPHIC DATABASES TOWARDS REAL-TIME METADATA FOR SENSOR-BASED NETWORKS AND GEOGRAPHIC DATABASES C. Gutiérrez, S. Servigne, R. Laurini LIRIS, INSA Lyon, Bât. Blaise Pascal, 20 av. Albert Einstein 69621 Villeurbanne, France

More information

COST CALCULATION IN COMPLEX TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

COST CALCULATION IN COMPLEX TRANSPORT SYSTEMS OST ALULATION IN OMLEX TRANSORT SYSTEMS Zoltán BOKOR 1 Introduction Determining the real oeration and service costs is essential if transort systems are to be lanned and controlled effectively. ost information

More information

Local Connectivity Tests to Identify Wormholes in Wireless Networks

Local Connectivity Tests to Identify Wormholes in Wireless Networks Local Connectivity Tests to Identify Wormholes in Wireless Networks Xiaomeng Ban Comuter Science Stony Brook University xban@cs.sunysb.edu Rik Sarkar Comuter Science Freie Universität Berlin sarkar@inf.fu-berlin.de

More information

Concurrent Program Synthesis Based on Supervisory Control

Concurrent Program Synthesis Based on Supervisory Control 010 American Control Conference Marriott Waterfront, Baltimore, MD, USA June 30-July 0, 010 ThB07.5 Concurrent Program Synthesis Based on Suervisory Control Marian V. Iordache and Panos J. Antsaklis Abstract

More information

Characterizing and Modeling Network Traffic Variability

Characterizing and Modeling Network Traffic Variability Characterizing and Modeling etwork Traffic Variability Sarat Pothuri, David W. Petr, Sohel Khan Information and Telecommunication Technology Center Electrical Engineering and Comuter Science Deartment,

More information

SQUARE GRID POINTS COVERAGED BY CONNECTED SOURCES WITH COVERAGE RADIUS OF ONE ON A TWO-DIMENSIONAL GRID

SQUARE GRID POINTS COVERAGED BY CONNECTED SOURCES WITH COVERAGE RADIUS OF ONE ON A TWO-DIMENSIONAL GRID International Journal of Comuter Science & Information Technology (IJCSIT) Vol 6, No 4, August 014 SQUARE GRID POINTS COVERAGED BY CONNECTED SOURCES WITH COVERAGE RADIUS OF ONE ON A TWO-DIMENSIONAL GRID

More information

PARAMETER CHOICE IN BANACH SPACE REGULARIZATION UNDER VARIATIONAL INEQUALITIES

PARAMETER CHOICE IN BANACH SPACE REGULARIZATION UNDER VARIATIONAL INEQUALITIES PARAMETER CHOICE IN BANACH SPACE REGULARIZATION UNDER VARIATIONAL INEQUALITIES BERND HOFMANN AND PETER MATHÉ Abstract. The authors study arameter choice strategies for Tikhonov regularization of nonlinear

More information

BUBBLES AND CRASHES. By Dilip Abreu and Markus K. Brunnermeier 1

BUBBLES AND CRASHES. By Dilip Abreu and Markus K. Brunnermeier 1 Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 1 (January, 23), 173 24 BUBBLES AND CRASHES By Dili Abreu and Markus K. Brunnermeier 1 We resent a model in which an asset bubble can ersist desite the resence of rational arbitrageurs.

More information

The Online Freeze-tag Problem

The Online Freeze-tag Problem The Online Freeze-tag Problem Mikael Hammar, Bengt J. Nilsson, and Mia Persson Atus Technologies AB, IDEON, SE-3 70 Lund, Sweden mikael.hammar@atus.com School of Technology and Society, Malmö University,

More information

Sage HRMS I Planning Guide. The HR Software Buyer s Guide and Checklist

Sage HRMS I Planning Guide. The HR Software Buyer s Guide and Checklist I Planning Guide The HR Software Buyer s Guide and Checklist Table of Contents Introduction... 1 Recent Trends in HR Technology... 1 Return on Emloyee Investment Paerless HR Workflows Business Intelligence

More information

The risk of using the Q heterogeneity estimator for software engineering experiments

The risk of using the Q heterogeneity estimator for software engineering experiments Dieste, O., Fernández, E., García-Martínez, R., Juristo, N. 11. The risk of using the Q heterogeneity estimator for software engineering exeriments. The risk of using the Q heterogeneity estimator for

More information

Storage Basics Architecting the Storage Supplemental Handout

Storage Basics Architecting the Storage Supplemental Handout Storage Basics Architecting the Storage Sulemental Handout INTRODUCTION With digital data growing at an exonential rate it has become a requirement for the modern business to store data and analyze it

More information

High Quality Offset Printing An Evolutionary Approach

High Quality Offset Printing An Evolutionary Approach High Quality Offset Printing An Evolutionary Aroach Ralf Joost Institute of Alied Microelectronics and omuter Engineering University of Rostock Rostock, 18051, Germany +49 381 498 7272 ralf.joost@uni-rostock.de

More information

Sang Hoo Bae Department of Economics Clark University 950 Main Street Worcester, MA 01610-1477 508.793.7101 sbae@clarku.edu

Sang Hoo Bae Department of Economics Clark University 950 Main Street Worcester, MA 01610-1477 508.793.7101 sbae@clarku.edu Outsourcing with Quality Cometition: Insights from a Three Stage Game Theoretic Model Sang Hoo ae Deartment of Economics Clark University 950 Main Street Worcester, M 01610-1477 508.793.7101 sbae@clarku.edu

More information

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION San Diego Gas & Electric Comany, ) EL00-95-075 Comlainant, ) ) v. ) ) ) Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Services ) Docket Nos. Into Markets

More information

An optimal batch size for a JIT manufacturing system

An optimal batch size for a JIT manufacturing system Comuters & Industrial Engineering 4 (00) 17±136 www.elsevier.com/locate/dsw n otimal batch size for a JIT manufacturing system Lutfar R. Khan a, *, Ruhul. Sarker b a School of Communications and Informatics,

More information

An actuarial approach to pricing Mortgage Insurance considering simultaneously mortgage default and prepayment

An actuarial approach to pricing Mortgage Insurance considering simultaneously mortgage default and prepayment An actuarial aroach to ricing Mortgage Insurance considering simultaneously mortgage default and reayment Jesús Alan Elizondo Flores Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores aelizondo@cnbv.gob.mx Valeria

More information

The Behavioral Economics of Insurance

The Behavioral Economics of Insurance DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS The Behavioral Economics of Insurance Ali al-nowaihi, University of Leicester, UK Sanjit Dhami, University of Leicester, UK Working Paer No. 0/2 Udated Aril 200 The Behavioral Economics

More information

A Multivariate Statistical Analysis of Stock Trends. Abstract

A Multivariate Statistical Analysis of Stock Trends. Abstract A Multivariate Statistical Analysis of Stock Trends Aril Kerby Alma College Alma, MI James Lawrence Miami University Oxford, OH Abstract Is there a method to redict the stock market? What factors determine

More information