1 DMZ Virtualization Using VMware vsphere 4 and the Cisco Nexus 1000V Virtual Switch What You Will Learn A demilitarized zone (DMZ) is a separate network located in the neutral zone between a private (inside) network and a public (outside) network. A DMZ environment consists of numerous service and infrastructure devices depending on the business model of the organization. Often, servers, firewalls, network intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), host IPSs, switches, routers, application firewalls, and server load balancers are used in various combinations within a DMZ (Figure 1). The use of virtualization is becoming increasingly commonplace throughout IT departments and these platforms. This document discusses DMZ virtualization and security. Figure 1. Traditional DMZ 2009 Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 1
2 DMZ Virtualization The virtualized DMZ takes advantage of virtualization technologies to reduce the DMZ footprint, thereby freeing valuable rack space, which in turn reduces power consumption and overall operating costs. Server and infrastructure virtualization are two main components of the virtualized DMZ. Through the use of server virtualization, applications residing in the DMZ are moved to virtual machines, many of which can reside on the same physical server (Figure 2). Figure 2. Server Virtualization in the DMZ Security requirements for the physical DMZ design remain applicable in the virtual design. Firewalls, network intrusion prevention systems, web application firewalls, and endpoint security are all recommended components of the virtual DMZ design. In addition, some virtualization-specific considerations need to be taken into account. In the traditional DMZ model, each physical server is connected to an access port, and any communication to and from a particular server or between servers goes through a physical access switch and any associated appliances such as a firewall or a load balancer. In a virtualized server environment, applications can reside on virtual machines, and multiple virtual machines may reside within the same physical server. Traffic may not need to leave the physical server and pass through a physical access switch for one virtual machine to communicate with another. In this environment, a virtual network (vnet) is created within each server. Multiple VLANs, IP subnets, and access ports can all reside within the server as part of a virtual network. The virtual switch is configured to provide connectivity for all virtual machines. The virtual network policies and port mappings are all configured on the virtual switching component. Although this new virtual access layer resides within the server, it shares the same role and basic concepts as the traditional physical access layer. Figure 3 shows an example of a virtual network Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 2
3 Figure 3. VMware ESX The virtual access layer does create some challenges for both the network and server teams. The creation of a virtual infrastructure within the server environment can place increased networking responsibilities on the server team. The network team can be challenged to maintain the visibility and enforce the policies that are implemented at the physical access layer. Traditional methods for gaining visibility into server and application traffic flows may not function for inter-virtual machine traffic that resides within a physical server, and enforcement of network policies can become difficult if the enforcement is performed through different methods and by different teams in the virtual environment, leading to possible misconfiguration and resulting in improper implementation of policies. The Cisco Nexus 1000V Series Switches address these concerns by allowing network and server teams to maintain their traditional roles and responsibilities in a virtual networking environment through features and functions comparable to those in today s physical network switches (Figure 4). Figure 4. Migration from Physical to Virtual Access 2009 Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 3
4 Cisco Nexus 1000V Series Virtual Switch The Cisco Nexus 1000V Series is a virtual network distributed switch (vds) platform supported by the VMware vsphere product. The Cisco Nexus 1000V Series consists of two components: the virtual supervisor module (VSM) and the virtual Ethernet module (VEM). The VSM acts in a similar fashion to a traditional Cisco supervisor module. The networking and policy configurations are performed on the VSM and applied to the ports on each VEM. The VEM is similar to a traditional Cisco line card and provides the ports for host (virtual machine) connectivity. The VEM resides in the physical server as the virtual switching component. Many of the same physical access switch capabilities are maintained by the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series in a virtual switching footprint (Figure 5). Some of the main features are: VLANs Private VLANs Port mirroring (Switched Port Analyzer [SPAN] and Encapsulated Remote SPAN [ERSPAN]) Access control lists (ACLs) Anti-spoofing features Quality of service (QoS) NetFlow Version 9 Port profiles Port profiles are used to map features and policies to specific virtual ports. Port profiles are discussed later in this document. Figure 5. Nexus 1000V Feature Overview 2009 Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 4
5 DMZ Virtualization with Cisco Nexus 1000V Series In the virtualized DMZ, the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series provides virtual access switching in a VMware vsphere server environment. The virtual switch provides connectivity between the virtual machine virtual network interface cards (NICs) and the physical NICs of the server. The physical NICs are configured as uplink ports on the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series. Figure 6 shows a DMZ using both Cisco and VMware virtual infrastructure. Figure 6. Virtualized DMZ with Nexus 1000V In this design, traditional networking policies can be enforced while still maintaining a separation of duties for the network and server teams. Virtual machine isolation can be enforced and port mirroring features can increase visibility for virtual machine traffic flows. By using separate interfaces and applying the appropriate ACLs, separation is maintained between the physical production network and the out-of-band management network. The out-of-band network is accessed through the VMware vsphere service console and the associated physical server NICs Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 5
6 The following sections describe some of the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series features and how they can be applied to the virtual infrastructure. Mapping Roles and Responsibilities Port Profiles and Port Groups The use of server virtualization has increased some of the responsibilities of the server administration team. Traditionally the network and security teams are responsible for configuring all network components for server connectivity; server administrators simply connect the server to the preconfigured access port. In a virtual environment, some of the network functions now reside in the virtual server platform. VLAN assignment, port mapping, and inter-virtual machine communication can all be configured within the virtual server. VMware vcenter Server enables server administrators to configure the virtual networking components. This approach often brings some contention as to who is responsible for the networking and security policies and this virtualized layer. Miscommunication or a simple configuration mistake can subsequently lead to assignment of the wrong VLAN and policy to a virtual machine. In most cases, the server teams have no desire to become network engineers and would rather save time and work by simply applying a predefined network policy to their servers. The Cisco Nexus 1000V Series offers a significant administration benefit. When a network policy is defined on the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series, it is updated in VMware vcenter and displayed as an option on the Port Group drop-down list. This updating is achieved through the use of an API for communication between the virtual supervisor module and the VMware vcenter Server. The network teams can configured a predefined server policy and make it available for selection (through VMware vcenter) to the server administrators in the same manner as is used to apply policies today through port groups. The Cisco Nexus 1000V Series policies are defined through a feature called port profiles. Port profiles allow you to configure network and security features in a single profile, which can be applied to multiple switch interfaces. After you define a port profile, you can apply that profile and any settings defined to one or more interfaces. Multiple profiles can be defined and assigned to individual interfaces to provide specific policies based on the type of server and application connecting to the port. Figure 7 shows an example of a port profile Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 6
7 Figure 7. Port Profile Configuration Example After a profile is configured on the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series, it can be applied to a specific virtual machine as a port group in VMware vcenter (Figure 8). Figure 8. Port Profile Displayed as a Port Group in vcenter This feature also provides multiple security benefits. First, network security policies are still defined by the network and security administrators and are applied to the virtual switch the same way they are on physical access switches today. Second, after the features are defined in a port profile and assigned to an interface, the server administrator needs only choose an available port group and assign it to the virtual machine, reducing the possibility of misconfiguration or application of overlapping, noncompliant security policies Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 7
8 Maintaining Isolation and Protection VLANs, Private VLANs, ACLs, Anti-Spoofing The methods used today to provide isolation and protection in the server farm are available to apply in the virtual infrastructure as well. The use of VLANs, private VLANs, ACLs, and the application of anti-spoofing features to protect against man-in-the-middle attacks and maintain separation is supported on the virtual infrastructure. VLANs with applied ACLs can be used to control traffic to different virtual machines and applications. VLANs provide a reliable and proven method for segmenting traffic flows in the network. A study detailing VLAN security was conducted several years ago and is available at VLAN security best practices and recommendations are still valid and should be used in the virtual environment. Dozens of documents describing VLAN best practices are available. A white paper highlighting VLAN security considerations and recommendations is available at Just as in a physical environment, servers residing in the same VLAN can still directly access one another, which can pose a problem if one of the servers is compromised. Attacks could be launched from the compromised server to other servers in the VLAN or broadcast domain. These could be application-specific attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, or network-based attacks targeted at compromising systems and capturing data. Private VLANs provide a means for isolation of machines within the same VLAN (see Figure 9). Originally developed for service providers as a means of scaling IP addresses in a hosting environment, this feature is very useful in the virtual switching environment Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 8
9 Figure 9. Virtual Machine Isolation Using Private VLANs Two types of VLANs are used in private VLANs: primary and secondary. The primary VLAN is usually the current VLAN being used for access and is the VLAN carried throughout the infrastructure. The secondary VLAN is known only within the physical or virtual switch in which it is configured. Each secondary VLAN is associated with a primary VLAN. Multiple secondary VLANs can be associated with a single primary VLAN. Each primary VLAN is usually allocated a single IP subnet. In private VLANs, multiple secondary VLANs can be associated with the same IP subnet. Three types of ports are available when configuring private VLANs: promiscuous, isolated, and community. A promiscuous port is the aggregation point for access to and from each of the secondary VLANs. The promiscuous port is usually the uplink port for the switch and carries the primary VLAN. The secondary VLAN can be configured as either an isolated port or a community port. Isolated ports can communicate only with the promiscuous port and cannot communicate directly with other isolated ports on the switch. This feature is useful when you need to maintain isolation between virtual machines within the virtual infrastructure. Community ports can communicate with other ports in the same community and the promiscuous port. If direct virtual machine-to-virtual machine communication is required or if server clustering is being used, a community VLAN can be a valuable feature. Cisco private VLANs are supported on many of the Cisco Catalyst switches and security devices (such as the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Firewall Services Module) and the Cisco Nexus switches. This support allows private VLANs to be configured and carried throughout the virtual and physical infrastructures Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 9
10 Access Control Lists ACLs can be applied to communications between virtual machines and to isolate production and management interfaces. The example in Figure 10 shows two virtual machines ( and ) on the same server. No direct communication should be allowed between virtual machines and In this case, an ACL is applied to the virtual port for on the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series Switch. To also block traffic from to , a mirror of this ACL could be created and applied to the virtual port. Because the server-to-server traffic never leaves the physical server, this configuration provides an excellent way to segment this traffic. Figure 10. Controlling Virtual Machine Traffic with Access Lists In the example in Figure 11, an ACL is created to block traffic from the production virtual machine to prevent it from directly accessing the out-of-band management network through the service console. The use of separate production and management VLANs and application of the necessary ACLs can provide secure segmentation between the networks Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 10
11 Figure 11. Using Access Lists to Limit Access to Management Console Anti-Spoofing Man-in-the-middle attacks spoof a device s default gateway. In a successful attack, all traffic may be diverted to a machine posing as the default gateway and can then be captured on the attacker s machine. Usually the attacker passes the traffic after mirroring it to the spoofing machine, which means that the attack may not be detected. The attack can be used to capture credit card information (through the use of mock websites), passwords, and any other desired traffic. Several anti-spoofing features are available today on the Cisco Catalyst switching platform. The following anti-spoofing features are also being implemented on the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series. Dynamic Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) inspection IP source guard Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) snooping In the example in Figure 12, ARP inspection is being used to map each default gateway to the associated MAC address. This mapping helps ensure that the default gateway IP address is always associated with the correct MAC address. This example assumes that static IP addressing (no DHCP) is being used on the servers Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 11
12 Figure 12. Dynamic ARP Inspection Anti-Spoofing Feature Increasing Visibility SPAN, ERSPAN, and NetFlow Server virtualization creates new challenges for administrators trying to gain visibility into what is occurring at the virtual network level. Traffic flows can now occur within the server between virtual machines without needing to traverse a physical access switch. Administrators may have a more difficult time identifying a virtual machine that is infected or compromised without the forwarding of traffic through security appliances. SPAN and ERSPAN are very useful tools for gaining visibility into network traffic flows. For example, ERSPAN can be enabled on the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series, and traffic flows can be exported from the server to external devices (Figure 13) Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 12
13 Figure 13. Increasing Visibility with ERSPAN In the example in Figure 13, ERSPAN forwards copies of the virtual machine traffic to the intrusion detection system (IDS) appliance and the network analysis module (NAM). Both the IDS and the NAM are located at a centralized service layer. Using device virtualization, a new virtual IDS sensor has been created on the existing network IPS appliance to provide monitoring for only the ERSPAN session from the server. The sensor receives a copy of the virtual machine traffic over the ERSPAN session from the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series Switch. Use of a different ERSPAN ID for each session provides isolation. NetFlow NetFlow was developed by Cisco to provide greater insight into the IP traffic on the network. NetFlow defines flows as records and exports these records to collection devices. NetFlow provides information about the use of the applications in the data center network. The Cisco NetFlow Collector aggregates and assists network administrators and application owners in interpreting the performance of the data center environment. The use of NetFlow is well documented in a traditional network environment, but the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series provides this capability in a virtual network environment. NetFlow traffic can be 2009 Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 13
14 forwarded to collectors in both in-band and out-of-band scenarios. Figure 14 shows NetFlow use in the virtualized environment. Figure 14. Increasing Visibility with NetFlow The in-band NetFlow path shows a converged network adapter (CNA) using the physical access layer to forward the traffic to a Cisco NetFlow Collector. The NetFlow source interface defined on the virtual switch may also be on a dedicated out-of-band management network. This deployment model removes traffic from the CNA uplinks and takes a more traditional approach to NetFlow captures. The Cisco NetFlow Collector can generate reports to display details such as packets per second on the virtual Ethernet interfaces residing on the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series. Additionally, the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series can monitor flows from the physical interfaces associated with the platform and VMware VMkernel interfaces, including VMware VMotion traffic. Endpoint Security Host-Based and Network IPS Deployment of a host-based IPS is one of the most effective ways to protect an endpoint against exploitation attempts and malicious software. Cisco Security Agent is a behavior-based host-based 2009 Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 14
15 IPS solution. Cisco Security Agent can mitigate known attacks is also effective at thwarting zero-day attacks. By looking at the behavioral aspects of an attack, Cisco Security Agent can detect and stop new attacks without first needing installation of a signature before it can identify the particular attack (Figure 15). The use of host-based IPS and network IPS is common in most DMZ and server-farm environments. The Cisco Security Agent and network IPS solutions can integrate and share information for increased security and visibility for the virtual infrastructure. Figure 15. Protecting Virtual Machines with Cisco Security Agent (Host-Based IPS) This integration has several main benefits for the network IPS: Adds the capability to use Cisco Security Agent endpoint information to influence IPS actions. Using the endpoint contextual information, Cisco IPS can determine the appropriate severity of a network threat and provide instructions for the appropriate response action. Reduces false positives: Cisco Security Agent provides the OS type and other endpoint posture information that helps Cisco IPS determine the relevance of a threat, reducing the chances for false positives Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 15
16 Enhances attack mitigation: Cisco IPS can use the watch list maintained by Cisco Security Agent. The watch list helps Cisco IPS monitor systems identified by Cisco Security Agent as suspicious or malicious, and helps highlight any events associated with these systems. Enables dynamic host quarantine: Cisco IPS dynamically blocks hosts that have been identified by Cisco Security Agent as malicious. This feature extends the quarantine capabilities from Cisco Security Agent to the IPS. Consolidated DMZ Architecture Traditionally, DMZ designs make use of a separate infrastructure dedicated to maintaining isolation of DMZ services from the internal enterprise network. This separation requires the use of dedicated servers to host DMZ-based applications. This model is very secure, but it does not make the best use of server resources. Prior to server virtualization, this was the only model available that could meet most security requirements. Server virtualization is coming into the mainstream and bringing with it new design options to networks and server farms. Through integration of network-based security capabilities in the virtualized infrastructure, existing security policies can be maintained in many of these new designs, allowing organizations to explore the consolidation of server resources, including in DMZ environments. Consolidation of a mix of internal and DMZ virtual machines on the same physical server does support a better use of resources, but a strict security policy must be followed to maintain proper isolation of the two environments. In a traditional DMZ environment, different levels of security policies are assigned to the DMZ-based hosts than to those assigned to the internal enterprise hosts. Maintaining these security policies for the consolidated virtual architectures is just as important, or more so. Isolation and segmentation of DMZ and internal hosts must be maintained, appropriate access rights must be enforced for DMZ and internal resources, and logging features to maintain visibility should be in place. In addition, isolation must be maintained between non-production (management) and production interfaces. The physical connections must be secured and assigned to the correct management and production ports of the network infrastructure. This isolation must be maintained within the virtual infrastructure as well. Virtual ports must be mapped to the correct physical ports and assigned the correct policies. Maintenance of detailed documentation about these environments is essential to enable network and server administrators to have a clear understanding of the infrastructure and to decrease the chance of misconfiguration. Ways to accomplish these objectives include use of: Physical network segmentation with firewalls to maintain stateful traffic inspection of production and non-production traffic Port profiles to maintain separation of duties and enforce policy Authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) to define access rights and maintain accurate logs VLAN and private VLANs for isolation of virtual machines and applications 2009 Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 16
17 ACLs to limit access between DMZ virtual machines, production network, and management networks Increased operational visibility in the virtual DMZ environment with ERSPAN and NetFlow Rate limiting to reduce the effect of malicious traffic from a compromised machine In the example in Figure 16, DMZ services are co-resident with intranet-based servers and applications. The separation is still maintained in the physical network between the DMZ, intranet, and management networks. By using the network security features available on the Cisco Nexus 1000V Series, the separation of applications and services can be maintained within the virtual server as well. Figure 16. Consolidated Virtual DMZ Numerous consolidation benefits are associated with this type of architecture. However, to establish a secure environment, strict adherence to security policies must be maintained. The roles and responsibilities of the network, security, and server teams must be clearly defined and must support ongoing communication to reduce the possibility of creating vulnerabilities in the environment Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 17
18 General Recommendations for Achieving a Secure Virtualized DMZ Maintain security as you would in a physical non-virtualized environment. Secure the hypervisor using VMware recommendations. Be aware of applications with different security affinities on the same server. Limit connectivity to both VMware VMkernel and VMotion segments. Use available tools to control virtual machine-to-virtual machine traffic flows. Use monitoring tools to increase the visibility of virtual machine activity and traffic flows. Maintain detailed documentation for virtual and physical network connections. Have a clear separation of roles and responsibilities. Enforce clearly defined change management controls. Perform ongoing auditing and monitoring. Conclusion Virtualization can reduce data center power consumption, required rack space, and the amount of idle and underused server resources. Virtualization and its accompanying benefits can be used in the DMZ just as they are in other areas of the network. By following server deployment and network design best practices a secure virtualized DMZ environment can be implemented. The Cisco Nexus 1000V Series bridges the gap between the physical and virtual infrastructure and allows traditional Cisco networking and security features to be enabled for the virtual infrastructure while maintaining the respective roles and responsibilities of the network, security, and server teams. For More Information More Information: VMware VMware Security Technology Center: Virtual Networking Technology Center: VMware Infrastructure 3 security hardening: Managing VMware VirtualCenter roles and permissions: DMZ virtualization with VMware infrastructure: More Information: Cisco Cisco Security homepage: Network security baseline: https://www.cisco.com/en/us/docs/solutions/enterprise/security/baseline_security/sec_chap 2.html Cisco SAFE recommendations: Cisco data center design: Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 18
19 Version: 1 Date: Cisco Systems, Inc. 170 West Tasman Drive San Jose, CA USA Tel: NETS (6387) Fax: VMware, Inc 3401 Hillview Ave Palo Alto, CA USA Tel: or Fax: Copyright VMware, Inc. All rights reserved. Protected by one or more U.S. Patent Nos. 6,397,242, 6,496,847, 6,704,925, 6,711,672, 6,725,289, 6,735,601, 6,785,886, 6,789,156, 6,795,966, 6,880,022, 6,944,699, 6,961,806, 6,961,941, 7,069,413, 7,082,598, 7,089,377, 7,111,086, 7,111,145, 7,117,481, 7,149, 843, 7,155,558, 7,222,221, 7,260,815, 7,260,820, 7,269,683, 7,275,136, 7,277,998,7,277,999, 7,278,030, 7,281,102, 7,290,253, 7,356,679 and patents pending. Cisco, the Cisco logo, and Cisco Systems are registered trademarks or trademarks of Cisco Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the United States and certain other countries. All other trademarks mentioned in this document or Website are the property of their respective owners. The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership relationship between Cisco and any other company. (0812R) XXX-XXXXXX-00 06/ Cisco VMware. All rights reserved. Page 19
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