1 Some Problems of Identity and Education: A Comparative Examination of Multicultural Education Author(s): Nigel Grant Source: Comparative Education, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: Accessed: 18/02/ :19 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Comparative Education.
2 Comparative Education Volume 33 No pp CARFAX Some Problems of Identity and Education: a comparative examination of multicultural education NIGEL GRANT ABSTRACT This article considers the education of minorities and offers the concept of markers of identity; currently the most notable are nationality and citizenship but these may change, particularly during periods of crisis. Cultures can use minimal markers. Individuals may switch cultures and adopt conspicuous characteristics as a symbol, but culture switching may be incomplete and many are intermediates or have multiple identity. A plural society can be an opportunity rather than a problem for the majority as well as minority groups. If majority populations are to be members of an international community they have to learn how to relate to other cultures. An education system will reflect the norms of the host society and minorities need to learn the language and mores; the harder question is the degree of adaptation required and the compatibility of their own culture. Policies range from assimilation, through limited assimilation and pseudo-pluralism to pluralism. There has been some shift to pluralism but much work remains to be done. This article seeks to consider issues concerning the education of minorities, in Europe and elsewhere, by examining the vexed question of the nature of identity. It offers the concept of markers of identity-nationality, citizenship, religion, tribe, language, culture and other important characteristics from the cluster with which to interrogate these issues. Individuals have many markers, primary and secondary. Markers change their prominence with surroundings and circumstance; the primary marker at present tends to be nationality, but others come to the fore from time to time (such as allegiance or religion), given that all individuals have a multiple identity. This article considers minorities in Europe, both indigenous and adventitious and some of the difficulties of the criteria (such as language and religion) that are used to define them. The article explores the notion of culture and the various ways it influences curriculum and school organisation, particularly those situations when differences in the relative prestige of cultures lead to domination and the imposition of control. It is argued that cultural contact influences the prominence of particular markers and may lead to culture shifting, marker selection or cultural intermediacy. Multicultural education and policy usually tend to concentrate on specific problems, such as racism or linguistic development, rather than on the wider questions of which they form a part. It is argued here that multiculturalism and pluralism are not just matters for minorities, but for everyone, particularly when in Europe and elsewhere majorities are themselves minorities overall and are increasingly in contact. The issue of power also cannot be neglected, as this Correspondence Scotland, UK. to: Nigel Grant, Department of Education Studies, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, /97/ Carfax Publishing Ltd
3 10 N. Grant is frequently linked with education and identity. It is argued that comparative education has an important role to play in relation to these international issues in helping to determine the basic principles which need to be agreed in order to guide what is deemed to be acceptable in education and law. Minorities in Europe As the European Union (EU) tries hesitantly to move towards a fuller 'European identity' (Budd, 1987, passim), the realisation is growing that it has a large number of minorities, without it being clear what these are. As a glance at a passport will show, it has accepted that Europe has many languages, though there have been some controversies over the extent of use. There is an extremely widespread use of English and, to an extent, French; a colleague remarked recently that everyone would soon have a second language, except the English. Linguistically, European pluralism appears to embrace those two languages, plus German, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Danish, Swedish, Finnish, Greek and, up to a point, Irish . However, the EU recognises that there are other languages in use as well. Some languages, such as Italian and Swiss German, are widely spoken in dialectal form, but are used officially, taught and broadcast, only in the standard form. However, others are sufficiently distinctive to be considered separate languages, some of which pale into the 'standard' language. They are known officially as the 'lesser used languages', which appears to mean that they are minority languages without being used by any state (Corner, 1984, ch. 1). They include Catalan, Galician, Basque, Breton, Occitan, Corsican, Welsh, Gaelic, Frisian, Sorbian, Friulan, Ladin, Slovene, Letzeburgesch, Saami and several others, but not Plattdeutsch, Neapolitan, Sicilian or the Scots language. Their sizes and conditions and relationships to other languages are extremely varied, with from over 6 million for Catalan speakers to just over 65,000 for Gaelic speakers and fewer for others. Catalan is strong in education and government, in literature and scholarship and in conversation and is used widely on television and in advertising, while Gaelic is extremely limited in its range of use (apart from literature and conversation), as are some others. Catalan is easily learned by the French and Spanish, Friulan and Corsican by Italians, Scots by English speakers and Letzebuirgesch by Germans; however, Basque, Gaelic and Welsh are far less easily accessible. The total number of speakers of the 'lesser spoken languages' may be something like a total of 45 million in the EU. However, in Europe the picture on minorities is untidy and discouraging. Scandinavia seems quite active, but there is little action in Germany and even less in France, where the problems are obvious enough. In Italy, the common view appears to be that 'racism does not exist', even at a multicultural conference . There is little activity in The Netherlands, a little in the UK and very little in Spain. There, the policy on education relates almost entirely to the indigenous minorities, not to anyone else and in the UK, few if any education authorities address the whole issue consistently across the whole curriculum on cultural pluralism-language, race, religion, history, literature, mathematics, science and school organisation. Although there are courses in comparative education and multicultural education, in European studies and in anti-racism the tendency is to keep them separate . Education for pluralism needs both, but there is little evidence that national governments or the EU have done much more than address particular issues rather than the whole question. The Bureau of Lesser-Used Languages is often seen as an extra. Anti-racist
4 Some Problems of Identity and Education 11 initiatives are also often seen as extras, a 'bolt-on' part that can then be put to one side. ERASMUS has been set up to try to develop a 'European curriculum' , but the non-european populations also have their needs in education as in much else. The needs in education go far beyond the 'lesser spoken languages', as there are now Asian, West Indian, Arab, African, Chinese and other 'immigrant' minorities in Europe, all with their own identities, linguistic, national, religious and even tribal and many of them are for example, French, German, British (and English, Welsh or Scots), Danish and Swedish as well. In this sense, the majorities are also now minorities within Europe. Thus, education for pluralism is not just a matter for the Scots and Catalans, the Basques and the Welsh, the Bretons and the Sorbs; nor can it be a matter just for the West Indians in Britain, the Turks in Germany or the Algerians in France. It is a matter for the English and French, the Germans and Italians, that is for everybody. Europe is a multicultural entity by definition. Unless we can educate children and adults to value their own cultures and those of others and sensitise them to the unavoidable pluralism that we all live in now-a fearsomely difficult task-the alternative is terrifying to contemplate. We can see some indications of it in Bosnia and Burundi. In language, there is a problem with numbers, in the EU and elsewhere. In France, the figures for speakers of Breton, Catalan, Basque, Occitan, Corsican and, of course, German and Dutch, are all estimates, usually those of the promoters of the various languages and may well be subjective, for there are no official figures at all (Serant, 1965). But even when census figures do exist, as in the UK, there are other problems. In Scotland, in 1981, there were approximately 80,000 speakers of Gaelic. These figures depended entirely on self-reporting and did not ask about competence. According to the census of 1991, the figure had dropped to 65,000 in 10 years, which suggests either an unusually high mortality among the Gaels or that individuals had changed their minds or both. There were four questions on the census form: tick here if you can speak Scottish Gaelic, tick here if you can read it, tick here if you can write it and tick here if you do not know it. What is one to put if one knows some but is not fluent? Any is more than none and the responses varied enormously; similarly, many had lived in Glasgow or elsewhere in the Lowlands and had got out of practice of speaking Gaelic (though some of them still know more than the learners). This is leaving aside distortions by individuals according to their perceptions of prestige from knowing the language, either way (Census, 1981, Scotland, 1983). The same is true of Welsh. Census findings are at best rough estimates, with distortions both ways. There are no figures for the Scots language at all. The same kind of problem used to arise with the Census of the Soviet Union (see, for example, the All-Union Census of 1979 in the USSR, 1980; Grant, 1983, pp ). People were asked what their nationality was, what was their mother tongue and whether they were fluent in Russian or any other Soviet language. This, too, was entirely based on selfreporting-for nationality, mother tongue and fluency in Russian. There were no tests; there was also the opportunity for the enumerators to slant the results, as certainly must have happened in Uzbekistan, where Rashidov, the Party Secretary, was known to favour big increases in Russian fluency and obtained them to an extent that defied credibility . Even the most careful census data are open to vast dangers of distortion; one does not need necessarily to suppose fraudulent intent. We cannot confine ourselves to Europe, for this is a worldwide phenomenon. Minorities are common in the East as well. In the former Soviet Union, even the independence of Russia has left dozens of minorities and some 40 million Russians live in some of the successor states, such as the Ukraine, Byelarus, Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan . In Eastern Europe, inevitably, there are minorities in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and of course in the former
5 12 N. Grant Yugoslavia . As the EU comes to consider the possible membership of some former members of the Eastern bloc, not only will the languages multiply yet further; so will the 'lesser spoken languages'. It is not just in the East that linguistic minorities complicate the situation, it is worldwide. In Canada and the USA, there are conflicts between speakers of adventitious languages, English and French in one case and English and Spanish in the other (Joy, 1972). These are long-settled immigrants and their descendants, but there are also large populations of Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, Italians and others. There are also populations, some of them growing, of Crees, Chippewa, Dakota, Navajo, Hopi and dozens of other native American peoples, some of whose languages flourish but some of whose are on the verge of extinction (Laird, 1972). In South America and Mexico (and Central America), there are millions of speakers of Nahuatl (Aztec), Quechua, Tupi and Aymara and Guarani is recognised as a co-official language with Spanish in Uruguay; however there are also languages spoken by fewer than a hundred people. In Asia, there are a considerable number of peoples who have no states or who hold 'autonomous' status, genuine or otherwise, in China, Russia, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Laos and elsewhere. There are millions of Kurds who have no state at all, having been sundered among the post-ottoman countries. They live in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and the Caucasus and in Turkey are not allowed even to be called 'Kurds'. Only just recently have they been permitted to keep books or cassettes and to speak their language among themselves; this was but no longer is an offence (Bulloch & Harvey, 1983). In China, there are more Mongols in the Mongol Autonomous Region than in Mongolia itself and in Tibet there are now more Chinese immigrants than Tibetans. India has minorities bigger than many sovereign states (United Nations, 1995); the main division is between the Indo-Europeans of the North and the quite unrelated Dravidians of the South, plus millions who speak the hundreds of languages and associated dialects which are not recognised as one of the 14 languages specified in the Constitution. The Indian Government decided to select Hindi as the national language in the 1950s and certainly it is spoken by more people than any other vernacular as a mother tongue (just over 30%); there was no alternative claimant. However, Hindi is still spoken by a minority and being so variable is far from being universally comprehensible to all 'Hindi' speakers (Census of India, 1992). There is also a problem with speakers of other languages. The Tamils and other Dravidians object, of course, but many of the other Indo-European speakers also object to the primacy of Hindi; the Bengalis and the Gujaratis do not accept that the languages of Tagore and Gandhi should be devalued to exalt Hindi . English is still used as an 'unofficial' official language for the time being, but only an educated minority speak it. India is and remains a country of minorities. The situation in Africa is even more complex (Dakin et al., 1968; Alexandre, 1972). In sub-saharan Africa, nearly all the countries are still emerging from colonial rule, but all of them are made up of minorities, as the grab for Africa in the nineteenth century took no account of demographic realities when establishing the colonies or protectorates. There was only exceptionally an available African vernacular to replace English, French or Portuguese as a national medium (except in Tanzania and Burundi), let alone one for international use; consequently, the former imperial language remained in use, because of its neutrality and international currency. In Nigeria, where there are over a hundred vernaculars, approximately half the population speak either Ibo or Yoruba in the South or Hausa in the North and the rest speak something else. Some of the vernaculars can be used for education, but the official language (and the language of higher education) is English. French and Portuguese survived into the post-colonial age for the same reason. Even in Tanzania, where there is no
6 Some Problems of Identity and Education 13 danger of any tribe dominating and Kiswahili has the advantage of being both tribally neutral and African, English is still widely used (Fuller, 1967). In North Africa, where French has survived in spite of the viability and greater 'political correctness' of Arabic, there are complications because of the great differences between the varieties of Arabic. There is classical Arabic, used in the Qur'dn, educated colloquial and at least one spoken variety. The last two amount to separate languages, from the Maghrib to Khuzestan in Iran. In Algeria, for example, the continuing strength of French is somewhat limited by the attempts to replace it with English for scientific work, so that it is advisable to learn both, as well as at least two kinds of Arabic . Classical Arabic, of course, is the language of religion as well as culture. In Algeria, too, approximately 40% speak Tamazight of one kind or another and there are largely successful pressures to have that recognised for educational and other uses (Dahmani, 1988). There are also further complications with religious fundamentalism, which for many overrules any linguistic or even national loyalty. Back in Europe, there are other adventitious groups, immigrants who have come into Northern European countries (often recruited to do the work that the Germans, French or British were unwilling to do). In Britain, they came from Ireland and Italy in the nineteenth century, from Poland in the twentieth century and from the West Indies, China (or at least Hong Kong) and India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in the mid-twentieth century. In France they came from North and West Africa, in Germany from Turkey, Southern Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia, in The Netherlands from Indonesia and the Moluccas, in Denmark and Sweden from Greenland, Turkey, China and the Middle East and so on (see Steedman, 1979). They are often known by the German term Gastarbeiter or 'guest workers', on the assumption that they would do the unpopular work and then go home. (German documents are now more inclined to call them Ausldnder or foreigners, even if they were born there, as most of them now are .) This development has greatly added to the multicultural composition of the countries affected and has been the reason for much racism and xenophobia, personally and politically. It has also raised problems for education in all the countries. These populations-the incomers and their children-are permanent settlers, but are having to adjust to life in France, Germany, Britain or wherever, while continuing to be themselves rather than copies of someone else. It is also relevant that the settled population are often recognisably physically different from the 'host' society and entered mainly for economic or security reasons. The essential point about the relationships between minorities and the dominant population even in the past, is that it is about power and affects many aspects of identitylinguistic, religious, national and educational self-respect. With such a proliferation of minorities-large, small, linguistic or other-there is a need to enquire into the nature of minorities and, indeed, the nature of identity, for this will need to be addressed in Europe, both at the EU level and that of member states, since the issue of minorities is likely to be a major priority for education and social policy in general. Markers of Identity Peoples' ways of defining themselves vary in time and place. We are all composites; it is perfectly feasible to be simultaneously (say) a Lewisman, a Gael, Scottish, British, European, a Free Presbyterian, a Nationalist, a primary school teacher, an ornithologist and any other role definition, as well as the partner, relation, friend and neighbour of identifiable individuals. Such a list could be prolonged almost indefinitely for any one of us, embracing all our group identifications, class and occupational memberships, all the things that define who we
7 14 N. Grant are, whether we have chosen them or not. The particular ones that we emphasise (or which others emphasise for us, correctly or not) may change according to circumstance. Our hypothetical example might well be particularly conscious of being a Lewisman on Skye, a Gael when in Glasgow, a Scot when in England, a Free Presbyterian when in Catholic company or a Nationalist at election times. These categories may be termed markers of identity (Smolicz, 1991) . They may sometimes conflict, but this is not a necessary feature of multiple identity, except when the forces behind any of these markers demand complete and unconditional loyalty, as states, churches, families and parties have often done. Sorting out the order of priorities is not usually a common preoccupation with majority populations, but it does arise more often with minority groups. Nowadays, the principal markers tend to concentrate on nationality and citizenship. The two are usually held to be synonymous, as they often are, at least in the case of majorities with their own nation states. For most of the French, Danes, Italians or English the equation is quite easy, even automatic-although in the last case it is constitutionally quite incorrect. (England has not been an independent state since its union with Scotland in 1707, but the fact that it is by far the largest nation in the UK tends to obscure this .) Minorities within nation states (like the non-english nations of the British Isles) have a problem in this respect; their perceived nationality may well correspond to a people and to a country, but not to a state (a sovereign political entity with the symbols and often the reality of power over that country and people). The absence of statehood does not, of course, negate the existence of a nationality or there would have been no Germans or Italians until the late nineteenth century and no Kurds, Basques, Catalans, Frisians, Scots or Welsh now, but in a world of nation states, it does pose problems for stateless nations . However, the singling out of nationality as the principal marker of identity is relatively recent. It is linked with the post-mediaeval rise to supremacy of the modem nation state, a long process that reached its height in Europe in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries and in Asia and Africa well into the late twentieth century. (In the first case, a useful contrast could be made between the treaties which concluded Europe's major wars of the period. The Congress of Vienna (1815), which tried to create a settlement of Europe following the defeat of Napoleon, operated on the principle of 'legitimacy' not nationality and on this basis put Poles back under Russian, Prussian and Austrian rule, sundered the Italians amongst the Neapolitan Bourbons, the Austrians, the House of Savoy and the Papacy, reinforced the ramshackle Habsburg Empire and even propped up the decaying Ottoman rule over most of the Balkans, thus laying the basis for the nationalist risings that convulsed Europe for the rest of the century (Marriott, 1933).) By contrast, the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 tried to apply the principle of 'national self-determination', which turned many nations into states at last, but which met with huge problems in mixed areas, forcing choices which had not hitherto been required on the peoples of Silesia, Central Prussia, Transylvania, the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, the Dobrudja, Thrace, the Vojvodina, Istria and parts of Croatia and Bosnia. In areas like Transylvania, where there are approximately 2 million Magyar Szekelyi (Hungarians) almost in the middle of Romania, there was no option but to put either Hungarians or Romanians under someone else; both have been tried. In some cases, military action (or deportation, recently called 'ethnic cleansing' ) overruled or pre-empted plebiscites or treaty disposals, as in the disputed territory between Poland and the Soviet Union in 1920 or the former Greek area of Western Turkey and the German minorities left in Czechoslovakia and Poland proved to be the casus belli of the Second World War. The solutions imposed after 1946 held until approximately 1990, until the break up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the cauldron continues to seethe (Dorotich & Stephan, 1984; Avis, 1987).
8 Some Problems of Identity and Education 15 It is hardly remarkable that African states in the latter half of this century are having to go through similar traumas but in a much shorter time. Their boundaries, after all, correspond in most cases to those of the European-imposed divisions, rarely to demographic realities. Yet they are required by circumstance to create nationality from statehood, itself the inheritor of arbitrary territorial boundaries, such as The Gambia, which sticks like a finger into Senegal and where the up-river people and down-river people have far more in common with the neighbouring peoples of Senegal than they have with their Gambian 'compatriots' (Bums, 1965). In earlier times, allegiance carried more weight-this, rather than nationality, was the basis of the state. Allegiance indicated whose man you were and, hence, to a large extent who you were, language or birthplace being relatively unimportant. The Plantagenets, for example, were given to claiming suzerainty over France and Scotland, entirely on the basis of their notions of feudal superiority and exercised it whenever they had the opportunity . They were perhaps more ruthless and ferocious than most, but they did not function entirely alone; the principle of legitimate allegiance was not often challenged. Indeed, it lingered on in parts of Europe, such as the Habsburg Empire, into the present century and even has some faint echoes in the UK down to our own time . Rank was another determinant of identity that counted for more than nationality, however it was beginning to be defined. (Mediaeval notions of rank and allegiance were of course linked.) Bernard Shaw was making a serious historical point when he raised the matter of national identity in Saint Joan (Shaw, 1965, Scene IV.) The Earl of Warwick is represented as teasing his jingoistic chaplain, John de Stogumber, by asking him, '"Oh! You are an Englishman, are you?" The chaplain bristles, "Certainly not, my lord: I am a gentleman. Still, like your lordship, I was born in England, and it makes a difference".' One's station in society counted for far more than location; only serfs (as de Stogumber himself points out) were attached to the soil. Religion could serve as the principal marker, particularly if there was an external challenge. The claims of Pope and Caliph to exercise temporal power in Christendom or Islam were often challenged, but when the two were in conflict (as during the Crusades in the Middle East or the Spanish Reconquista), dynastic, local or personal loyalties still played a considerable part, but being a Christian or a Muslim (usually) overrode being a Frenchman or German and Arab or Turk. The same could be said of schisms between Catholic and Protestant and Sunni or Shi'a, even when these cut across the boundaries of growing national loyalties (Johnson, 1978). We are seeing something of this now in Afghanistan. There have been a few exceptions. In the early fourteenth century, what began as a standard feudal-dynastic conflict in Scotland transformed itself into something like a national liberation struggle. This national consciousness was most clearly expressed in a letter to the Pope (the Declaration of Arbroath) in 1320, some parts of which read almost like the American Declaration of Independence, with its appeal to the idea of liberty and popular sovereignty and the blunt statement that while this did not rule out allegiance it quite definitely took precedence (Ferguson, n.d.; Barrow, 1981). It seems quite reasonable to attribute this to the survival of the more 'democratic' pre-feudal Celtic polity than to an anticipation of eighteenth century political theory. Nationality as the prime marker of identity took a long time to displace allegiance, rank or faith but, once established, particularly when combined with citizenship, its roots struck deep. Attempts to assert some other factor (like an appeal to international working-class solidarity) have only occasionally been successful, as when the Soviet Union and most of the East European countries switched latterly to nationality after a period of playing it down. ('Socialist patriotism' and 'proletarian internationalism' were both held up as desirable
9 16 N. Grant values, but there could be little doubt which exercised the greater appeal (Avis, 1987).) This, of course, was never confined to the East, as can be seen from the assiduous pursuit of national interests by even the most committed 'European' adherents of the EU. Nationality may have come to be the most prominent marker, but it has rarely removed or replaced the others altogether. Within (usually) a national framework, people still define themselves by family, clan, tribe, birthplace, caste, class, religion, sect or political ideology. These are generally quite compatible with the larger identity, but in certain countries some of them, such as linguistic, tribal or religious affiliation or sometimes political ideology, may take precedence. This may be observed in many developing countries, where the 'tribe' and the state rarely coincide. The first is, in effect, the nation in most of its attributes, while the second is a fairly recent (and often quite artificial) political construct inherited from colonial rule. Political instability may shift the emphasis of identity to one or other of the other markers-particularly when, as in Africa, the nation state has rarely had time to develop as a coherent cultural entity as well as a political one (Le Page, 1964; Burns, 1965; Dakin et al., 1968). As we have seen, even the more established nation states in Europe are rarely homogeneous. In times of unrest, various markers may become banners for a dissident group, but what emerges on closer examination is that these markers are often convenient labels, selected (not necessarily consciously, however) from a much more complex set of characteristics of the group or community. (In Northern Ireland, for instance, the conflicts are often represented as between Protestants and Catholics. That is one aspect of the division between the two main communities in that still troubled country, but it is only part of the picture. It has been pointed out that neither side seems interested in converting the other. 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' are accurate markers, up to a point, but they were never total (they are sometimes referred to as 'Nationalist' and 'Loyalist' instead, but this is even less precise); they are the most obvious points of difference between two populations, descended from the indigenous and settler peoples, whose conflicts have been about power, the land and its ownership, the control of patronage and identification now with different sovereign states. There are other points of contention, but the label of religion is both conspicuous and affects a wide range of activities in both communities, including a divided school system. It is the main marker, in short, of two distinctive cultures.) Culture Anthropologically, a culture embraces anything characteristic of the way of life of a particular group. Our culture is how we do things, what things we do and how we think about them. It may include 'high' culture, in the more restricted sense of the word, in the case of groups that have such a thing or even the concept-art, poetry, music, drama, dance, etc.-a highly subjective catalogue. However, there is a great deal more: it includes language, religion, folklore and myths, beliefs, values, rituals and observances, family and kinship structures, history, political structures and conventions, etiquette and patterns of interpersonal behaviour, sexual norms and practices and attitudes to them, diet and food preparation, dress, economic activity and leisure. Alan Davies put it succinctly by saying that 'Belonging to a culture means not always having to think what to do, just as belonging to a language community means not always having to think what to say' . It is not just a question of numbers, but of the perceptions applied to them. Women, for example, are in a majority in all European countries, but nowhere does their status reach equality, though cultures vary enormously in the extent to which they are treated as if they
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A/47/277 - S/24111 17 June 1992 An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security