1 NEW FOREWORD READING KHAMENEI: THE WORLD VIEW OF IRAN S MOST POWERFUL LEADER BY KARIM SADJADPOUR
2 Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran s Most Powerful Leader Karim Sadjadpour
3 2009 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment. The Carnegie Endowment normally does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or its trustees. For electronic copies of this report, visit Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC Phone: Fax: Cover design by Design Army Composition by Oakland Street Publishing ii
4 Contents Acknowledgments Foreword iv v The Importance of Khamenei 1 Humble Beginnings to Great Power 4 Becoming Supreme Leader 6 The Virtues of the Revolution 9 Revolutionary Virtues and Foreign Policy 14 Challenges to His Leadership and Iran s Post-Khamenei Future 27 Conclusions and Policy Implications 30 Notes 32 About the Author 34 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 35 iii
5 Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank Thomas Carothers, Afshin Molavi, Mohsen Milani, Mila Mincy, Marina Ottaway, Ilonka Oszvald, George Perkovich, Peter Reid, and Shangol Shahriari for their most helpful comments. Special thanks are in order to three highly talented Carnegie junior fellows Mike Grosack, Andrew Ng, and Zach Davis whose research and editorial contributions were indispensable. iv
6 Foreword A mong the numerous casualties of Iran s tainted 2009 presidential elections was the legitimacy of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. While for two decades Khamenei had attempted to cultivate an image of an impartial and magnanimous guide staying above the political fray, his defiant public support for hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad amid massive popular uprisings and unprecedented fissures among the country s political elites exposed him as a petty, partisan autocrat. At a popular level, previously sacred taboos were shattered as hundreds of thousands of Iranians defied Khamenei s unveiled threats against protesters by taking to the streets chanting death to the dictator and even death to Khamenei. Widely seen images of government-sanctioned brutality against civilians such as the horrific murder of 27-year-old Neda agha Soltan as well as persistent allegations of torture, rape, and forced confessions in prison have undermined Khamenei s image as a just spiritual leader among Iran s pious classes. Widespread allegations of the growing role of his son Mojtaba considered a key Ahmadinejad ally in Iran s repressive security apparatus have further tarnished Khamenei s public image. At a political level, once respectful subordinates including reformist leaders Mohammed Khatami, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mir Hossein Mousavi now openly defy Khamenei, refusing to renounce claims of electoral fraud and brutality. Previously restrained critics have turned vociferous. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, Iran s most senior cleric (currently under house arrest) and once the heir apparent to Ayatollah Khomeini, denounced Khamenei as an unqualified and illegitimate leader. Abdul Karim Soroush, Iran s most prominent religious intellectual (currently in exile), lambasted Khamenei as a cheating, treacherous murderer cursed with doom. Unprecedented dissent even came from within the Assembly of Experts, the 86-cleric body headed by Khamenei rival Hashemi Rafsanjani that has the constitutional authority to anoint and remove the Supreme Leader. Despite the damage to his reputation, Khamenei s vast and potent network remains for the moment intact. The country s most powerful institutions the Revolutionary Guards, presidency, Parliament, Guardian Council, and judiciary continue to be led by individuals either directly appointed by Khamenei or deeply loyal to him. Khamenei also retains enormous influence over the Iranian economy. He has more say than anyone over how the country s vast oil revenue (nearly $300 billion during Ahmadinejad s first term) is spent and has jurisdiction over the country s bonyads state-controlled religious foundations with billions of dollars in assets in addition to the millions more his office receives in charitable donations offered to Iran s holy shrines. Given his deep mistrust of both foreign powers and his own population, Khamenei, despite his clerical garb, has grown to rely on the support of the intelligence, security, and military apparatus far more than the clergy. As commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guards, he handpicks the organization s senior command and shuffles them regularly; he also oversaw the Guards rapid rise to become Iran s most powerful political and economic institution. v
7 With the seemingly firm support of the country s security apparatus, Khamenei has refused to cede any political ground since the election, long believing that compromise projects weakness and invites further pressure. His defiance is not cost free, however. For the last two decades, his modus operandi had been to wield power without accountability. Despite having the lion s share of Iran s constitutional authority, because of the high profile of the Iranian president both at home and abroad, Khamenei has never borne proper responsibility for Iran s economic malaise, political repression, and social restrictions. After the June elections, however, Khamenei no longer enjoys this immunity. In addition to his domestic travails, Khamenei is facing unprecedented international scrutiny. In the conclusion of this paper, I suggested that after three decades of immersion in the death to America culture of 1979, it may not be possible for Khamenei to reinvent himself at age 70. Even one former Iranian president once confided that Khamenei had told him that Iran needs enmity with the United States. Nonetheless, if engagement is to have any chance of success, I argued, Washington must take into account Khamenei s central role in Iran s decision-making process and his deeply held suspicions. Beginning with his inauguration speech on January 21, 2009, Barack Obama has followed this path more than any previous American president. In addition to numerous rhetorical overtures to the Islamic Republic of Iran the first U.S. president to acknowledge Iran s post-revolutionary name Obama sent two private letters to Khamenei reiterating Washington s desire to overcome past mistrust and build confidence with Tehran. Obama also trod carefully during Iran s post-election uprising, resisting calls to support the opposition. Yet Khamenei s responses to U.S. overtures have been at best noncommittal, if not downright cynical. In his public messages he has mocked Obama s mantra of change as merely a tactical shift, saying Washington must first change its actions by lifting sanctions, unfreezing Iranian assets, diluting support for Israel, and ceasing criticism of Iran to show its seriousness. In his private communications U.S. officials claim that Khamenei s delayed response to President Obama s letter received in Washington one month later offered nothing concrete to act upon. Behind closed doors, senior Iranian officials concede that Obama s overtures have been unsettling for Khamenei, putting pressure on him to justify Tehran s continued animosity toward the United States. If we can t make nice with Barack Hussein Obama, said one Iranian official, who is preaching mutual respect on a weekly basis and sending us Nowruz greetings, it s going to be pretty obvious that the problem lies in Tehran, not Washington. While before the presidential elections it appeared that Khamenei would remain Supreme Leader for life, his fate is far less certain today. Aside from nagging questions about his allegedly poor health, Khamenei has never commanded the same loyalty and respect of his peers afforded to his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini. His chief rival, Rafsanjani, publicly humiliated as a corrupt traitor by Ahmadinejad, waits in the wings for an opportunity to pounce. In a nation whose largest political affiliation is jokingly referred to as the hezb-i baad i.e., the wind party Khamenei s current supporters could quickly abandon ranks if they felt stronger political winds blowing elsewhere. vi
8 Still, no matter the depth of popular discontent and outrage, it is difficult to imagine a scenario whereby Khamenei would one day peacefully abdicate power or go into exile, as the Shah did 30 years ago. Indeed, one important lesson that Khamenei learned while revolting against the Shah is never to compromise under pressure. For when the Shah attempted to mollify demonstrators by admitting to past transgressions on state television in late 1978 famously declaring that he d heard the voice of the revolution he unwittingly emboldened them. What s more, whereas much of the Shah s political, military, and intelligence elite including the Shah himself were educated in the United States and Europe and had other options when the Pahlavi monarchy began to crumble, the Islamic Republic s elite including Khamenei himself spent their formative years in the seminaries of Qom and on the battlefield against Iraq. Since they lack options abroad, it has always been assumed that they will not relinquish power without a bloody fight. Khamenei s Iran is no longer an Islamic Republic, but a tight-knit cartel of hardline clergymen and nouveau riche Revolutionary Guardsmen. Indeed, despite his pretensions as a religious leader, today Khamenei s future rests largely in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards. While growing fissures and dissent among top ayatollahs in Qom are certainly worrisome for Khamenei, fissures and dissent among top Revolutionary Guard commanders would be fatal for him. Though at the moment they seemingly remain loyal to him, as the economic situation continues to deteriorate and popular outrage persists, Khamenei himself must know that his position as Supreme Leader looks less supreme than ever before. vii
10 The Importance of Khamenei T here is perhaps no leader in the world more important to current world affairs but less known and understood than Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. Neither a dictator nor a democrat but with traits of both Khamenei is the single most powerful individual in a highly factionalized, autocratic regime. Though he does not make national decisions on his own, neither can any major decisions be taken without his consent. He has ruled the country by consensus rather than decree, with his own survival and that of the theocratic system as his top priorities. Despite his three decades in public life, Iranian political insiders continue to offer differing narratives of Khamenei. Lacking the popular support, charisma, and theological qualifications of the father of the 1979 revolution, his mentor Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, Khamenei is sometimes dismissed as a weak and indecisive individual in a powerful post. Others see him as an insecure despot who micromanages the country. Still others describe him as an ailing cleric insulated from reality and manipulated by a small team who act as advisers and gatekeepers. Those who knew Khamenei before he became Supreme Leader insist he is a closet moderate, forced to project a stern public persona to keep the radical clergy at bay. They cite the fact that he was once a music and poetry aficionado and wears a wristwatch, avant- garde behavior for a traditional cleric. Others who know him take him at face value: a deeply religious, ideologically rigid, anti- American cleric whose politics are stuck in the anti- imperialist euphoria of the 1979 revolution. For the majority of Iran s youthful population two- thirds of the country is under 33 Khamenei is a political fixture, having been either president ( ) or Supreme Leader (1989 present) most of their lives. His likeness black turban, oversized glasses, Palestinian kaffiyeh, and unkempt gray beard is as ubiquitous in shops and billboards in Iran as images of autocrats and monarchs in the Arab world. Yet despite his constant presence on television and in public space, he does not inspire strong feelings among Iranians, whether of support or derision. While Iranians outside of government rarely sing his praises, he does not inspire the same resentment many feel toward political clerics like Hashemi Rafsanjani. Whatever his shortcomings and lack of charm, Khamenei is not considered financially corrupt. Although the constitutional authority of the Supreme Leader dwarfs that of the president, Khamenei s profile outside of Iran, whether unintentional or by design, has always been overshadowed by Iran s president. When the wily Rafsanjani was president ( ), foreign governments and the international media perceived him as Iran s most powerful official, not Khamenei. The reform- minded Mohammed Khatami ( ) upstaged Khamenei from the left with his hopeful calls for a dialogue of civilizations, while former Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005 present) has outflanked him from the right with his diatribes against Israel and Holocaust revisionism. A Google search for Ahmadinejad yields ten times as many hits as one for Khamenei. 1
11 2 karim sadjadpour Khamenei s penchant for staying out of the limelight and avoiding notoriety at home has contributed to his resilience, undoubtedly his most effective political asset. Expectations of him were low when he succeeded Khomeini as Supreme Leader in After the landslide 1997 election of the inspiring and congenial Khatami appeared to mark the beginnings of a more liberal Iran, the acerbic Khamenei s political future appeared dim. Today, however, a confluence of factors, both domestic and international, has made him more powerful than he has ever been. Externally, soaring oil prices together with U.S. difficulties and Iranian leverage in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine have given the Islamic Republic unprecedented power vis- à- vis the United States, offering Khamenei and Iran s hardliners a newfound confidence. At the same time, the Bush administration s efforts to promote democracy and threats of military action against Iran made more vivid by the presence of tens of thousands of American troops in neighboring countries have given Tehran s hardliners a pretext to silence dissent and reverse political and social freedoms secured during the Khatami era. Domestically, several factors have helped Khamenei consolidate power: (1) A vast network of commissars stationed in strategic posts throughout government bureaucracies, dedicated to enforcing his authority; (2) the weak, conservative- dominated parliament, headed by Khamenei loyalist Gholam Ali Haddad- Adel (whose daughter is married to the Leader s son); (3) the rapidly rising political and economic influence of the Revolutionary Guards, whose top leaders are directly appointed by Khamenei and have always been publicly deferential to him; (4) the political disengagement of Iran s young population, prompted by the unfulfilled expectations of the reformist era; and (5) most significant, the 2005 presidential election, which saw hardliner Ahmadinejad trounce Khamenei s chief rival Hashemi Rafsanjani in a second round run- off. While these factors are dynamic oil prices may drop, the state of Iraq may improve, and pragmatists may replace hardliners in the Iranian parliamentary and presidential elections for the foreseeable future Iran will remain a vital influence on major U.S. interests, and Khamenei will continue to be the most critical figure in Iran. For this reason, it behooves us to take a closer look at Khamenei, his track record as Leader, and his vision for Iran. Iran scholars and first- hand observers who look retrospectively at the 1979 revolution often remark that the austere Islamic route that the revolution took should not have surprised anyone: Khomeini had long made plain his vision for Islamic governance in his writings and lectures. The problem was that few people had bothered to read them. Since Khomeini s death, Iran watchers have turned their attention to various individuals, groups, and trends in trying to determine the country s future trajectory: From 1989 to 1997 the individual focus was on President Rafsanjani, the group focus was Islamic technocrats, and the theme was post Iran Iraq war reconstruction. From 1997 to 2005 the individual focus was on reformist President Mohammed Khatami, the group focus was the student movement, and the theme was democracy and civil society. From 2005 to present, the individual focus has been on hardline President Ahmadinejad, the group focus has been on the Revolutionary Guards, and the theme a return to revolutionary radicalism.
12 reading khamenei 3 Yet if there has been one anchor throughout these periods and today, it is Khamenei. Both his domestic vision for Iran (more Islamic than republican) and his foreign policy views (neither confrontation nor accommodation) have prevailed. He has resisted Rafsanjani s desire to reach a modus vivendi with Washington, Khatami s aspiration for a more democratic state, and Ahmadinejad s penchant for outright confrontation. Though known as a great balancer, he has consistently favored conservatives over reformists. Like Khomeini s, Khamenei s writings and speeches present arguably the most accurate reflection of Iranian domestic and foreign policy aims and actions. They depict a resolute Leader with a remarkably consistent and coherent though highly cynical and conspiratorial world view. Whether his audience is Iranian students or foreign dignitaries, or the topic of his speech is foreign policy or agriculture, he rarely misses an opportunity to invoke the professed virtues of the 1979 revolution justice, independence, self- sufficiency, and Islam and to express his deep disdain for Israel ( the Zionist entity ) and opposition to the ambitions of the United States ( global arrogance ). Based on this premise that Khamenei means what he says and his words broadly reflect the Islamic Republic s policies this study is a portrait of Ayatollah Khamenei in his own words, based on a careful reading of three decades of speeches and writings. To devise a more effective approach toward Iran, a better understanding of Khamenei is essential.
13 Humble Beginnings to Great Power Khamenei s humble, religious roots are typical of the Islamic Republic s clerical and political elite. The second of eight children, he was born in 1939 in the northeastern shrine town of Mashad to a clerical father of Azeri origin. He has often romanticized his poor but pious childhood, saying he frequently ate bread and raisins for dinner. From the age of five he was enrolled in religious education in Mashad s seminary, and it is there that he spent his formative years, with brief interludes in the more prestigious Shi i centers of higher learning, Najaf and Qom. He has noted he was an accomplished student but had to truncate his seminary training in Qom to return to Mashad to care for his ailing father; a disclaimer for the fact that he never attained the religious credentials of his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini. Khamenei had two major political role models. He recalls becoming politicized and entering the arena of jihad at a young age, inspired by a radical cleric called Navab Safavi, a fierce critic of both the shah s government and imperial powers. Safavi was an early advocate of Islamic revolution and Islamic government, and he was either directly or indirectly linked to the killings of several prominent secular intellectuals and government officials. The shah s government executed him in Several years later, while studying in Qom in his early twenties, Khamenei came under the tutelage of Khomeini, who became his lifelong political mentor. At the time Khomeini was largely unknown in Iran, but his stoicism and defiance of the shah made him popular with young seminarians. Khamenei was transfixed by the experience. When the shah exiled Khomeini to Iraq in 1963, Khamenei remained one of several loyal disciples in Iran who disseminated his mentor s unorthodox teachings about Islamic government. During this period Khamenei also formed tight bonds with like- minded revolutionary clerics who, like him, went on to senior posts in the Islamic Republic s government, among them Rafsanjani and the powerful rightwing cleric Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. Like many of the Islamic Republic s current political elite, Khamenei was arrested on six occasions by the shah s secret police (SAVAK) during the 1960s and 1970s as a result of his political activities. He spent several years in prison, endured torture and solitary confinement, and eventually was exiled to a remote area of the country (Sistan- Baluchistan) until the 1979 revolution. Those who know Khamenei have speculated that the roots of his enmity toward Israel and the United States go back to this period, since he was tortured by SAVAK, which was widely believed to have been trained by the CIA and the Mossad. Reaping the Rewards of the Revolution Khamenei s dogged opposition to the shah and longtime loyalty to Khomeini eventually paid great dividends. When the Pahlavi regime crumbled and Khomeini s vision for Iran emerged 4
14 reading khamenei 5 victorious, the Ayatollah tasked Khamenei to serve in various important positions in the newly formed revolutionary government. He served briefly as minister of defense in 1980 and later as the supervisor of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards after the outbreak of the Iran Iraq war. Known for his oratorical skills, he eventually secured the influential post of Tehran s Friday prayer leader. The year 1981 would prove to be momentous for Khamenei. In June, he narrowly escaped an assassination attempt by the radical opposition group Mojahaedin- e Khalq (MKO) when a bomb concealed in a tape recorder at a press conference exploded beside him. He lost the use of his right arm and to this day suffers pain from the injuries sustained. Several months later the MKO struck again, carrying out a massive bombing attack that killed more than 100 high- ranking Iranian officials, including President Mohammed Ali Rajaii. The tumult provided an opportunity for the 42- year- old Khamenei. Shortly after Rajaii s death, he was asked by the revolutionary elites to run for president. Though at the time the constitutional authority of the Iranian president was minimal, Khamenei declined, explaining that his health was poor and he would not be able to spend a great deal of energy as president. That s why we are offering you the post, they supposedly told him. 1 With Khomeini s backing he won two non- competitive presidential elections overwhelmingly, serving as Iran s first clerical president from 1981 until Khomeini s death in Khamenei s inaugural address in which he vowed to stamp out deviation, liberalism, and American- influenced leftists set the general rhetorical tone of his presidency. He was content to play the role of Khomeini s trusted lieutenant, articulating his mentor s world view both at home and in his visits abroad. He also played a secondary role in shaping Iranian domestic policies and war strategies to then- Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi (the office was abolished in 1989), Speaker of the Parliament Rafsanjani, and Revolutionary Guards Chief Commander Mohsen Rezai. Though they are all his reluctant subordinates now, there was little indication then that he would one day emerge as the country s most powerful official.
15 Becoming Supreme Leader I am an individual with many faults and shortcomings and truly a minor seminarian. Khamenei s inaugural address as Supreme Leader, June 1989 How and why Khamenei became Supreme Leader (Vali- e Faqih) is instructive in understanding his leadership style. While the Islamic Republic s constitution called for the Leader to be a Grand Ayatollah (Ayatollah al- Ozma), Khomeini s falling out with his only designated heir Ayatollah Montazeri created a quandary for revolutionary elites: could they find someone who was an experienced bureaucratic manager and a well- respected, politicized Ayatollah who shared Khomeini s vision of Islamic government? Dissatisfied with the pool of senior clergy, in April 1989 three months before his death Khomeini had the constitution revised so that the Leader needed only be an expert on Islamic jurisprudence and possess the appropriate political and managerial skills. Khamenei, who did not know at that time that he would soon become Leader, argued that Khomeini s legitimacy derived not from the fact that he was an Ayatollah, but rather from his reputation as a courageous political leader and an expert on Islamic jurisprudence. 2 Rafsanjani then speaker of the parliament concurred, saying that by the time someone had become a Grand Ayatollah he was too old and too lacking in energy to manage the country. 3 Indeed, Rafsanjani is widely credited for being Khamenei s kingmaker, working behind the scenes to have his old friend and ally anointed Leader, which Rafsanjani claimed to be Khomeini s dying wish. Shortly after Khomeini s death in June 1989, the Assembly of Experts the clerical body which has the constitutional authority to anoint and remove the Supreme Leader approved of Khamenei s succession by a vote of 60 to 14. While there was no hiding the fact that Khamenei s religious credentials were inferior, and the decision raised the ire of the country s clerical elites in Qom, the Islamic Republic s political elites rallied behind Khamenei. The head of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Meshkini, declared that Khamenei s selection was based on the fact that he was close to Khomeini, had played an important role in both the revolution and the Iraq war, and was highly knowledgeable of the contemporary problems facing the Muslim world. 4 Khomeini s son Ahmad, once considered a potential successor to his father, wrote to Khamenei that the Imam [Khomeini] regarded you as the most qualified leader for the Islamic Republic. Khamenei s status was elevated overnight from Hojjat ol- Islam a title indicating middle rank to the prestigious rank of Ayatollah (i.e., sign of God ). Khamenei s inaugural address as Supreme Leader is revealing. He spends the vast majority of his speech praising Khomeini and reassuring his audience that he has every intention of following the Imam s path, even declaring that he used to pray to God that he would die before his mentor. The only time he refers to himself as the new Leader, he is strikingly selfeffacing: 6
16 reading khamenei 7 I am an individual with many faults and shortcomings and truly a minor seminarian. However, a responsibility has been placed on my shoulders and I will use all my capabilities and all my faith in the almighty in order to be able to bear this heavy responsibility. 5 Fully aware that he lacked both the respect of the country s senior clergy and Khomeini s popularity, Khamenei initially moved slowly and cautiously to strengthen his position. He assured the regime s political and clerical elites that he did not intend to disrupt the status quo, but shrewdly set out to create what he lacked as president: an independent base of support and a personal network working as his eyes and ears. He quietly began cultivating this network of clerical commissars estimated at several thousand stationed in strategic posts in every important state ministry and institution, including the clerical establishment and military. Today these representatives form a diverse, countrywide, and international network dedicated to enforcing Khamenei s authority and are more powerful than other government functionaries, for they have the authority to intervene in any matter of state. 6 Meanwhile, after Khomeini s death, the Islamic Republic entered a thermidor phase of sorts. While consolidating, institutionalizing, and exporting the revolution remained important, reconstructing the war- ravaged country and its moribund economy became imperative. President Rafsanjani took the lead in these initiatives, which also entailed Iran s emergence from diplomatic isolation. Khamenei s rhetoric remained stern and revolutionary, but he was largely supportive of Rafsanjani s efforts to improve Iran s relations with its Arab neighbors and Europe. He remained rigid when it came to relations with the United States, however. The Power of the Leader As Supreme Leader, Khamenei s constitutional authority is unparalleled. He controls the main levers of state the courts, military, and media by appointing the heads of the judiciary, state radio and television, the regular armed forces, and the elite Revolutionary Guards. He also has effective control over Iran s second most powerful institution, the Guardian Council, a twelve- member body (all of whom are directly or indirectly appointed by Khamenei) that has the authority to vet electoral candidates and veto parliamentary decisions. His power also derives to a great extent from the opaque but vast state- controlled economic resources at his disposal. The Iranian economy is largely state controlled, and Khamenei has more say than anyone in how the country s oil revenue is spent. He has jurisdiction over the country s bonyads charitable foundations with billions of dollars in assets in addition to the millions more his office receives in charitable donations offered to Iran s holy shrines. Khamenei likes to project the image of a magnanimous grandfather, selflessly staying above the fray to guide the country in a virtuous direction:
17 8 karim sadjadpour The main task of the Leader is to safeguard the Islamic system and revolution. Administering the affairs of the country has been entrusted to government executives, but it is the responsibility of the Leader to supervise the performance of different government organs and make sure that they function in line with Islamic tenets and principles of the revolution. 7 In reality he is notoriously thin- skinned. Criticism of the Leader is one of the few remaining redlines in Iranian politics, almost a guarantee of a prison sentence. Not even his own family is above reproach. Bassij milita loyal to him brutally beat his younger brother, the reformist cleric Hadi Khamenei, after a sermon in which he criticized the powers of the Supreme Leader. Recently questions have arisen regarding the dynamic between Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards. The relationship is increasingly symbiotic, politically expedient for the Leader and economically expedient for the guards. He is their commander in chief and appoints their senior commanders, who, in turn, are publicly deferential to him and increasingly reap benefits by playing a more active role in political decision making and economic activity.
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