Observations écrites finales de Paula et Patrick Gibbons. Written Closing Remarks from Paula and Patrick Gibbons PMD 14-P1.15.A

Transcription

1 Deep Geologic Repository Joint Review Panel Commission d examen conjoint du projet de stockage dans des couches géologiques profondes PMD 14-P1.15.A File / dossier : Date: Edocs: Written Closing Remarks from Paula and Patrick Gibbons Observations écrites finales de Paula et Patrick Gibbons In the Matter of À l égard de Ontario Power Generation Inc. Ontario Power Generation Inc. OPG s Deep Geological Repository (DGR) Project for Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Installation de stockage de déchets radioactifs à faible et moyenne activité dans des couches géologiques profondes Joint Review Panel Commission d examen conjoint October 2014 Octobre 2014

2 CLOSING REMARKS FOR THE DGR JOINT REVIEW PANEL prepared by PATRICK GIBBONS Introduction Since its formation in January 2012, the Joint Review Panel has heard and read over one thousand reasons why the Ontario Power Generation Deep Geologic Repository Proposal for Low and Intermediate level waste must be rejected, unconditionally. These clear statements have been made by independent engineers, scientists, doctors, geologists, architects, business owners, banking executives, insurance industry professionals, sociologists, health care workers, farmers, emergency first responders, educators, learned university professors, First Nations citizens, politicians, religious leaders, and citizens of both Canada and the United States. I have summarized some of these valid reasons why you must reject the EIS statement and recommend to the Minister of the Environment and the Prime Minister that this project must NOT be approved. Reasons to Reject OPG s DGR Proposal 1.The unscrupulous 2004 hosting agreement created by OPG for Kincardine was fraught with abusive articles. (PMD13-P1.94 Section 2) 2. The rushed 2005 phone poll carried out in the singular community of Kincardine was clearly undemocratic. (PMD13-P1.94 Section 3) 3. An unmistakable MINORITY of only 40% of residents of Kincardine said "yes" in the 2005 phone poll. Furthermore, they were not approving the drastically different Proposal that OPG has brought forward in 2013 which includes long-lived radioactive waste, decommissioning waste, a doubled size of a DGR, greatly increased cumulative effects and the possible inclusion of high level waste in the same cavern. (PMD13-p1.94 S3.3.4) 4. OPG clearly created a CONTAMINATION ONLY Property Value Protection Plan in the 2004 hosting agreement. (PDM13-P1.94 Section 2.5) 5. Property values are hugely unprotected in the PVPP in the 2004 hosting agreement. (Failed JRP Undertaking # 60) 6. The Cash for Support payments to several communities in the 2004 hosting agreement is nothing more than bribery. (PDM13-P1.94 Section 2.7) 7. The no-complaint clause in the 2004 hosting agreement is an attempt to silence all municipalities for 30 years. (PDM13-P1.94 Section 2.7) 8. OPG has confirmed that they will not move forward with the construction of a deep geologic repository for low and intermediate nuclear waste until the SON (Saugeen Ojibway Nations), community is supportive of the project.(cd#00126-corr ). It is therefore necessary for the JRP to withhold approval until such time that SON formally decides to show support for or NOT for the proposed DGR.

3 9.Community acceptance of the project has not been defined and community acceptance was not established. The results of many of the surveys of specific people and secret focus group meetings completed on behalf of OPG are dubious at best. (PDM13-P1.94 Section 3), (CD#00126-corr ) 10. OPG intentionally ignored the reality that the adjoined community of Saugeen Shores must be part of the decision making community. (PMD14-P1.22) 11. No other site was ever considered by OPG. This is in contravention of the Environmental Assessment Process. This should have defeated this proposed project before it started. (IR-IES , Context) 12. Amberley Gavel, a Provincial Investigator has confirmed that OPG held nine years of illegal, secret meetings with Bruce County Mayors, contravening the Ontario Municipal Act and brings into question the tactics of OPG. (PDM14-P1.41 pp of 83) 13. There has been no true engagement by OPG with Bruce County residents. OPG has provided information only in the form of glossy brochures. (PDM13-P1.94 Section 4) 14. A review of adverse effects by Dr. Duinker (PMD13-P1.175) concluded that OPG's assessment was: Not robust; Arbitrary; Indefensible; Lacking a scientific basis; Unreliable in the conclusions reached; Inappropriate in the limits used; Unnecessarily complicated; and Prone to challenge. 15. As well, the methodology used for significance determination was incorrect and went against CEAA requirements. (PMD13-P1.175) 16. The methodology used in the significance determination of adverse effects is open to legal challenge as illustrated in the ruling by Justice Russell in June 2014 (PMD14-P1.15) i 17. OPG carried out, at best, a superficial consideration of cumulative effects. (Undertaking #52) 18. Tritium issues continue to multiplying with: unexplained underground tritium plumes; high tritium levels in wells on site; increasing levels of tritium found in drinking water of the regional area; and increasing tritium levels in air, food products, vegetable, milk, soil. ii iii (JRP Hearing Transcripts Sep. 30, 2013, pp & pp ) 19. OPG relies on incineration for dispersing tritium and other radioactive and non-radioactive contaminants into the atmosphere following their abusive philosophy pollution dilution solution.(pmd14-p1.9, pg 1-7)

4 20. OPG cannot filter or remove tritium from water or air and, therefore from milk, soil, and the environment (JRP Hearings Transcript Sept 2014) 21. The stigma of nuclear waste is not being considered by OPG/NWMO (JRP Hearing Transcript Sept. 30, 2013 pp.157, 158) iv 22. The DGR would exacerbate the negative image... of Bruce County creating new stigma effects (File P; CD#00216-corr ; Project# ) 23. The cumulative effect of Stigma will cause Bruce County to be considered a nuclear oasis in other parts of the world. (JRP Hearings Transcript Sept. 30, 2013, pp.157, 158) v 24. The eleventh hour admission in September 2013 by OPG of their plan to double the size of the DGR with increased levels of long lived radionuclides, decommissioning waste gives further reason to call into question their honestly, transparency and openness with the people of Bruce County, Ontario, Canada and North America. vi 25. OPG/NWMO has admitted that the waste inventory submitted to the JRP was underestimated and completely left out several highly radioactive elements. OPG continue to use calculated estimates rather than actual recorded values in their waste inventory. (PMD14-P1.10A), (PMD14-P1.2G) 26. OPG has presented an unproven safety case with geotechnical uncertainties and an incomplete geoscientific verification plan (PMD14-P15 Section 3), (PMD14-P1.20&20A) 27. Gas generation overpressure at the repository level after closing will cause fractures in the bentonite barrier and rock. (PMD14-P1.20A, slide 16) 28. Far field effects of gas pressure will extend hundreds of kilometres and will cause minor earthquakes and faults. (PMD14-P1.20A, slide 16) 29. OPG/ NWMO has illustrated only limited certainty of the Geoscientific Verification Plan (GVP) modelling (30-40%, Mark Jensen, OPG, Sep.18, 2013) 30. OPG s proposal would rely on an Observational Method to carry out the DGR construction due to the multitude of uncertainties including the geology, water infiltration, methodology, monitoring and testing equipment requirements, ground water contamination to name a few. This proposal would be a multistage, untested experiment of an enormous magnitude with the potential of catastrophic consequences. vii 31. This entire proposed project is an experiment from pre-construction to post-closure and abandonment. (PMD14-P1.41, pg.20) 32. This proposed project has been expanded three times since the 2004 design, which was a one panel DGR for 95% LLW and 5% ILW which 2000 residents (out of 8500) thought they may approve. That project was 1/8 th the size of the 2 panel design and 1/16 th the size of the expanded DGR including greater long lived radionuclides. We are no longer talking rags and mops. (PMD14-P1.41, pp.20, 21)

5 33. While OPG acknowledges through its review of literature that Climate Change will result in flooding of the proposed DGR site resulting in an overflow of contaminated water in the Storm Water Management Ponds, OPG and CNSC refuse to immediately redesign these ponds. As well, the proposed doubling of the size of the DGR and the rock pile will result in a huge increase in need for enlarged storm management but, again, neither OPG nor CNSC are willing to reconsider these plans.(cd#00126-corr ), (PMD , pp.10-12) 34. The safety of GVP hinges on the investigation of six deep bore holes in the proximity of the WWMF. NWMO has extrapolated evidence from these six bore holes to deem two nearby communities unfit for a DGR. The specific reasons given by NWMO s Communications Manager were: cap rock permeability and the existence of pinnacle reefs in the geosphere. (PMD14-P1.58), (stated by Mike Krizanc, NWMO, Jan.16, 2014, Saugeen Shores) 35. OPG and CNSC have acknowledged unresolved technical issues with shaft seals, EDZ permeability and water penetration from above and below viii ix (PDM14-P1.15, Section 3) 36. Severe shaft seal failure remains a conspicuous failure mode for the repository. The performance of the shaft seals and shaft EDZ is less than expected, this will create an open pipeline for radionuclides transport from the repository. (PMD14-P1.47) 37. The DGR safety case is jeopardized by cap rock permeability. (JRP Hearing Transcripts Sep.18, 2014, pp.47, 48) 38. There remains no stated go/no go" triggers by OPG. (JRP Hearing Transcripts Sep.18, pp ) 39. There is a significant potential for gas build up when corrosion is created and radionuclides mix with water. x 40. There is a significant risk that gas pressure will create cracks in rock. xi 41. There is a potential for, and risk of the release of radionuclides to the surface xii 42.The fact that abandonment is an essential part of OPG s plans for a DGR means that any approval of the DGR project is also an explicit endorsement of the concept that nuclear waste should be abandoned. Abandonment is forever. There is no scientific or ethical basis for this endorsement. (PMD14-P1.63, pp.1, 2) 43. The emergency response preparedness for radioactive contaminated people appears to be uncertain at best. After 9 months of investigating this issue, none of the Kincardine Community Emergency Management Coordinator, Kincardine Hospital, Toronto General Hospital, Bruce Power Communications Contact, Bruce Power Manager of Emergency Planning or OPG could simply state what plans would be in place for radioactive contamination at the proposed DGR site. (PMD14-P1.55) 44. None of OPG, CNSC, Federal, Provincial or County Health Departments plan to initiate a baseline health study for Bruce County to validate long term human safety case. As the Joint Review Panel has heard continuously during the hearings, a baseline health study is a necessity before any Nuclear Waste facility, (whose waste remains radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years) is planned for any community. The safety of workers, citizens and the environment is apparently not a priority until after a catastrophe. (PDM pp.10, 11)

6 45. The safety record for OPG owned facilities include the following breaches which erode public trust in OPG: (PDM14-P1.19, pg.4) 1983 pressure tube rupture in Unit 2 at Pickering A; extended safety related shutdown of multiple OPG reactors in the late 1990 s; exposure of Bruce Power workers to alpha radioactivity in 2009; March 1986 Bruce Reactor 2 LOCA shutdown due to a tube rupture during a pressurizing test; August 1992 Pickering Reactor 1 heavy water leak of 2,300 trillion Bq of radioactive tritium into Lake Ontario effecting Toronto s drinking water; December 10, 1994 Pickering Unit 2 LOCA and spill of 185 tonnes of radioactive water; June 11, 2002 Bruce B Unit 6 pressure tube and calandria tube damage during channel maintenance 46. OPG has not addressed the cumulative effects of contamination of the environment including Lake Huron from: planned and unplanned radioactive releases at the Bruce Nuclear Power Plant operation on site; historical waste from AECL s Douglas Point on site; radioactive storage of High Level, Intermediate Level and Low Level Waste, at the WWMF on site; WWMF incinerator operation on site; the repackaging of all radioactive waste that is occurring on site; the proposed repackaging of high level waste for transport to a proposed High Level Waste DGR; the transportation and packaging of refurbishment waste from all three Ontario reactor sites on site; the transportation and packaging of all OPG decommission waste on site. 47. CNSC, our regulator, will make no guarantee of safety for the humans or the environment: the DGR Project is not likely to result in significant adverse environmental effects, taking into account implementation of mitigation measures, OPG commitments and CNSC staff s recommendations... (emphasis added). This statement is hugely conditional. When something goes wrong during the hundred thousand years that the waste is dangerously radioactive, not likely changes to likely. (PMD14-P1.2) 48. CNSC is blindly accepting a multitude of unknowns and weak assumptions made by OPG. For example, with regard to the GVP: If reaching a value triggers a course of action, how is that trigger level set what is the value and by whom and on what basis is it set and what will the course of action be and who will determine it and what transparency will there be around this sequence of events? (PMD14-P1.2, section 2.2), (PMD14- P1.17, pg.9) 49. In disruptive scenarios, such as severe shaft failure and the human intrusion, both before and after the revised inventory, the radioactive dose limits to the public are above CNSC criteria. Both

7 OPG and CNSC have erred in not updating the Safety Case. (JRP Hearing Transcript Sept. 10, 2014, pp ) 50. The tragic incidents at the WIPP facility resulted in two realities. Although the cause of the radiation leak of Feb. 14, 2014 and onward, has not yet been confirmed, both that leak and the Feb.5, 2014 truck fire illustrated that, even the model DGR that OPG held in high esteem, is susceptible to tragic events that damaged property, human health, result hundreds of millions of dollars in over-runs and could render this multi-billion dollar facility unusable. Neither OPG nor CNSC will pause to consider all possible scenarios that could result is serious consequences for any DGR regardless of the plans that are put in place. Safety culture cannot be regulated, dictated or legislated. Over-confidence, on the other hand, is will always appear when an organization relies on risk analysis to create a safety plan. (PMD14-P1.19) 51. OPG has provided cash for support not only to silence the Bruce County and several municipalities but also to Bruce County service clubs and not-for-profit organizations. (This money comes from the pockets of Ontario tax payers and utility customers). These organizations were then asked to write letters and/or make oral presentations to the JRP supporting the DGR project. These steps are immoral. (JRP Hearings Transcript Sept. 16, 2014, pg. 143) 52. Over 71,000 citizens have gone on record to state that no DGR should be built on the Bruce Site. (JRP Hearings Transcript Sept. 10, 2014, pp ), (PMD14-P1.43) 53. Over 130 municipalities in Canada and the United States have passed resolutions against the siting of a DGR on the Bruce Site. (PMD14-P1.43) 54. Sen. Carl Levin introduced a resolution in the U.S. Senate on Sept. 18 that urges the administration to oppose not only the dump in Kincardine but any permanent nuclear waste storage facility on the Great Lakes. The resolution calls for the president and the secretary of state to ensure that the Canadian government does not permanently store nuclear waste in the Great Lakes Basin. Michigan s other senator, Debbie Stabenow, cosponsored the resolution, along with Mark Kirk, R-Ill., and Tammy Baldwin, D-Wis. Both Levin and Stabenow are Democrats. (PDM14-P1.43) 55. A resolution was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives by Rep. Dan Kildee, D-Flint, on Sept. 8, the day before the start of two weeks of hearings on the dump by the Canadian Joint Review Panel for the Deep Geologic Repository for Low and Intermediate Nuclear Waste. The panel is charged with deciding whether or not to recommend the building of a nuclear waste dump. Kildee s resolution was co-sponsored by Reps. Sandy Levin, D-Royal Oak, Gary Peters, D-Bloomfield Township, and Brian Higgins, D-N.Y. The resolution notes that the waters of the Great Lakes Basin are precious public resources shared by the Great Lakes States and Canadian Provinces, are relied upon for drinking water by 40 million people in both countries and that nuclear waste is highly toxic and can take tens of thousands of years to decompose to safe levels. (PDM14-P1.43)

8 56. The resolutions in the United States Senate and House of Representatives point out that the Canadian government opposed an effort by the U.S. Department of Energy to establish a waste facility near the lakes in 1986.(PDM14-P1.38) A spill of nuclear waste in the lakes could have lasting and severely adverse environmental, health and economic impacts on the Great Lakes and the people that depend on them for their livelihoods. (PDM14-P1.61) The resolutions urged the President and the Secretary of State to work with their Canadian counterparts to find a safer solution to the nuclear waste problem. (JRP Hearings Transcript, Sept. 11, 2014, pp ) 57. The Michigan State Senate passed 4 resolutions in opposition to the construction of the DGR on the Bruce site. (JRP Hearings Transcript, Sept. 11, pp ), (PDM14-P1.38). Conclusions Over the past twelve years, many individuals and organizations have attended meetings, read material and came to the conclusion that OPG s DGR was poorly thought out and, to this day, lacks the safety plan and design details that are required for a burial ground for radioactive waste that remains dangerous to humans, other biota and the environment for an eternity. During the past two years and ten months, many people and organizations have independently researched all available information and have come to the same clear conclusion that this OPG DGR project must NOT be approved. The Joint Review Panel records illustrate the concerns of individuals going back to 2006 when CEAA first opened public comments and responses concerning this proposed project. These comments were clear then. As individuals have become more informed, their resolve has strengthened. My brief summary illustrates that this project is not worthy of further time nor money and must begin anew and must follow a process that is legal, open to all and completely transparent.

9 Endnotes