Legal Barriers to the Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Drug-Impaired Driving

Transcription

1 Legal Barriers to the Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Drug-Impaired Driving John McNair, J.D. Paul Ruschmann, J.D. Highway Safety Research Institute University of Michigan Presented At: 24th Annual Conference American Association for Automotive Medicine Rochester, NY October 1980

2 ABSTRACT The authors examined driving-under-the-influence and implied-consent laws as well as the proposed legislation that appears in the current Uniform Vehicle Code (UVC). Examination of state legislation revealed several statutory barriers to the effective prosecution of the drug-impaired driver. First, the definition of "drug" in many states' statutes is not broad enough to cover the entire range of drugs that can impair driving ability. Second, while the statutes of all states prohibit both alcohol- and drug-impaired driving, most do not expressly prohibit operating a vehicle while under the combined influence of alcohol and other drugs. Third, most implied-consent laws do not authorize analyzing body fluid specimens for drug concentration. Fourth, a drug analysis can be prevented by provisions that limit police officers to taking only certain types of specimens, or that permit a driver to choose certain tests, other than blood, which is the preferred body fluid for drug analysis. Finally, language in many implied-consent statutes that refers to "a test" rather than "tests" could be construed to prevent police officers from demanding a second analysis in case an initial test shows little or no alcohol.

3 Driving while under the influence of drugs, or DUID 1, is recognized by law system personnel as a highway safety problem; thus, DUID is prohibited by law in every state, and the legal mechanisms of enforcement, adjudication, and sanctioning are used to deter drivers from committing this offense. However, existing legal mechanisms are not as effective as they could be in dealing with the problem of DUID. One major--and avoidable--reason is that current state legislation does not provide police and prosecuting agencies with all the necessary legal tools to deal with drug-impaired drivers. Our analysis of the chief legal tools directed at impaired driving--namely, state DUID and implied-consent legislation--has revealed several important deficiencies in those laws. With respect to state laws that define and prohibit DUID, two major weaknesses are: first, some DUID statutes do not prohibit driving while under the influence of all drugs that can impair driving; and second, many DUID statutes fail to prohibit driving while under the combined influence of drugs, or the combined influence of alcohol and other drugs. With respect to implied-consent laws, which regulate the collection of body fluid specimens, three major deficiencies are: first, many statutes either do not provide for withdrawal of blood specimens or contain choice-of-tests provisions that permit the driver to choose a test other than blood; second, most implied-consent laws currently do not expressly permit chemical analysis of specimens for drugs other than alcohol; and third, some statutes apparently limit police officers to requesting a single test rather than multiple tests that could better determine the presence of drugs other than alcohol. Background Society's principal approach to deterring DUID is a legal one. The legal approach operates in two modes: the drug-control mode, which focuses on the availability of drugs; and the driver-control mode, which relies on criminal laws prohibiting DUID and on criminal procedures to establish the offender's guilt of DUID. The latter is of interest to this discussion. The driver-control laws directed at DUID are nearly identical to those directed at driving while under the influence of liquor (DUIL) 2. Three classes of legislation are central to the deterrence of drug-impaired driving: DUID laws, which define and prohibit drug-impaired driving; implied-consent laws, which govern the acquisition of body fluid specimens that can be analyzed for evidence of drug impairment; and controlled-substances laws, which list and classify most substances that can be misused or abused. The latter class of legislation is of only indirect interest to this discussion, as its primary purpose is to control the availability of drugs; however, many DUID laws incorporate the state controlled-substances law in their definition of impairing substances. 1 As used in this paper, the term "DUID" refers to the offense of driving while under the influence of drugs other than alcohol. State laws use various expressions in place of the term "under the influence" and, as discussed in this paper, varying definitions in place of the term "drug." 2 State laws prohibiting driving while under the influence of liquor vary widely with respect to nomenclature. The term DUIL, which is used in the authors' home state of Michigan, is used in this paper.

4 DUID Laws. In essence, DUID laws state that any person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of specified drugs commits a criminal offense. There is no national DUID law, and it is left to each state to enact its own DUID provision. However, the Uniform Vehicle Code (UVC) is model legislation that deals with all areas of vehicle and traffic law, including the rules of the road and driver licensing laws. The UVC is not binding on any state, but because it is drafted by well-known experts in the field of vehicle and traffic law, it is highly respected and therefore widely followed by state legislatures. In general, many of the UVC's provisions indicate the future direction of state laws. The 1979 UVC's DUID provisions state: A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle while...under the influence of any drug or combination of drugs to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving ( [a][3]). A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle while...under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug or drugs to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving ( [a](4]). The fact that any person charged with (driving while under the influence of drugs) is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug shall not constitute a defense...( [b]). Thus the UVC provisions apply to driving while under the influence of any drug, and do not exempt those who drive while under the influence of prescription or over-the-counter drugs. Implied-Consent Laws. DUID is prohibited by law in all 50 states. It is a criminal offense in nearly every state, and criminal procedures (namely, arrest and search and seizure) are universally used to apprehend offenders and determine guilt or innocence of DUID charges. Because DUID enforcement. procedures are nearly identical to those used for DUIL, discussion of chemical testing for alcohol is appropriate to the subject of testing for concentrations of other drugs. As chemical testing for blood alcohol concentration (BAC) became widely used, police officers often physically forced drivers arrested for DUIL to submit to the test. Because DUIL is a crime, and because the amount of ethanol in the driver's body is relevant evidence of the offense, the Constitution permits a police officer to conduct a forcible search for it, provided it is not done in a violent or brutal way. Although forcible testing was--and still is--constitutional, it not only raises serious issues of public acceptability, but also is highly inconvenient to the police. The legislative solution to the problem of compelling drivers to submit to chemical tests was to enact so-called "implied-consent" legislation. All states now have such statutes; these are known by the label "implied consent" because they contain language to the effect that a driver, by operating a vehicle on the public highways, has given permission to chemical analysis of body fluid specimens. The UVC's implied-consent provisions state: Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent...to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or drug concentration of his blood or breath if arrested for any offense arising out of the acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual

5 physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug. The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while under the influence of alcohol or any drug. The law enforcement agency by which such officer is employed shall designate which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered ( [a]). Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action (related to impaired driving)...evidence of the concentration of alcohol or drug in a person's blood at the alleged time, as determined by a chemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance, shall be admissible ( [a]). Thus the UVC authorizes tests of all body fluids, provides for multiple tests if necessary, allows the arresting officer to choose the test to be given, and, most importantly, permits the analysis of specimens for drugs other than alcohol. One important point must be raised here about the legal status of implied-consent legislation. Although these statutes appear to allow for the testing of any driver under a broad range of circumstances, testing must in every instance follow the requirements of the Constitution: specifically, there must exist the equivalent of probable cause to arrest the driver for that offense; and the testing must be conducted in a reasonable manner, that is, it must be conducted in a medically approved manner and be neither violent nor brutal 3. Therefore, as a practical matter, implied-consent laws actually impose restrictions on chemical testing in addition to the basic ones imposed by the Constitution. These include the requirement of a formal arrest, drivers' rights to choose from among available tests, limitations on the type of tests, and--of course--the driver's option to choose a mandatory license suspension in lieu of submitting to the test. Because these added restrictions are the result of state law rather than the Constitution, they are capable of being amended by state legislatures. Examination of Current Legislation The DUID and implied-consent statutes contained in the UVC contain perhaps the most inclusive provisions dealing with drug-impaired driving. The UVC, however, is not binding on any state and each state is free to enact its own legislation. Our examination of the states' DUID and implied-consent legislation shows that there is considerable difference among state laws, as well as considerable variation between state laws and the UVC. In this paper, the principal differences between state and UVC provisions prohibiting DUID are discussed first, followed by a discussion of the differences between the UVC and state implied-consent legislation. Tables 1 and 2 present an overview of the principal deficiencies in current legislation, while Tables 3 and 4 list citations to states' DUID and implied-consent laws. (1966). 3 These requirements are dictated by the Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757

6 DUID Legislation. Ideally, a DUID statute should cover driving while under the influence of any drug to the extent that driving ability is impaired to an unacceptable degree. In the case of DUIL, no problem is presented because only one substance--ethanol--is of interest. On the other hand, hundreds of drugs other than alcohol are available to drivers, as well as countless combinations of drugs (including alcohol in combination with other drugs). Not all states' laws have kept pace with the proliferation of drugs that can impair driving ability. Official recognition that a wide variety of drugs present a safety hazard has been relatively recent: the UVC originally prohibited driving while under the influence of narcotic drugs only. In 1944 the UVC added "any drug" to narcotic drugs in its definition of DUID, and in 1968 dropped all reference to "narcotic drug" in favor of the inclusive term "any drug." Amendments enacted in 1971 and 1979 prohibited driving while under the combined influence of impairing substances, both alcohol and other drugs. In addition, the UVC explicitly provides that driving while under the influence of licit drugs is not exempt from the prohibition of DUID. Our analysis of state legislation showed that two major weaknesses are common among state DUID laws: first, many statutes still retain narrow definitions of "drug"; and second, most statutes fail to prohibit driving while under the combined influence of two or more impairing substances. Definition of "Drug" in DUID Statutes. Only thirty state statutes have broad enough definitions to cover all or at least most drugs. Eleven states follow the UVC and use the term "any drug" as the sole definition. Six states prohibit driving while under the influence of "narcotic drugs or any other drug," and four others contain a prohibition against driving while impaired by "controlled substances or any other drug"; thus, statutes in these twenty-one states are substantially similar to the UVC. Nine states have other definitions of drugs, but these appear to include all types of drugs in their definition, as does the UVC. The remaining twenty states' statutes define "drug" in a variety of ways. Some use only the term "narcotic drug" or "controlled substances," while others use the terms in addition to the drug classifications or specifically named drugs. Typical drug classifications other than "narcotic drug" or "controlled substance" include "hallucinogenic or hypnotic drugs" or "central nervous system stimulants." Specific drugs named include marijuana, barbiturates, and toluene (model glue). In some of these states, the definition of "drug" is derived from the state's controlled substances law. Thus, the list of controlled substances is incorporated into the DUID law in its entirety. Most state controlled substances laws are patterned after the Federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970 and include marijuana and other commonly used drugs that would impair driving ability. However, where controlled substances laws are incorporated into the DUID statute, gaps may exist in the law. Such noncontrolled substances as over-the-counter cold remedies and sleeping aids might result in impaired driving ability, yet be outside of the provisions of a DUID law that refers to controlled substances. Combined Influence of Alcohol and Other Drugs. The other major weakness of state DUID laws is the failure of many statutes to prohibit driving while under the combined influence of two or more impairing substances. Many law enforcement personnel and prosecutors believe that a significant number of people drive after taking alcohol and another drug, often marijuana. However, only nineteen state statutes contain provisions prohibiting driving while under the combined influence of alcohol and

7 other drugs. In the thirty-one states without prohibitions of "polydrug"-impaired driving, a prosecutor faced with a combined-influence case may be forced to choose between prosecuting the driver for DUIL or DUID, and risk being unable to prove either. As evidenced by a 1966 South Carolina case 4, some courts in the remaining states may, in the absence of a statute making it unlawful to drive under the combined influence of alcohol and other drugs, find that the statute covers the situation anyway. Clearly, though, the most effective way to deal with the problem is to enact a provision in the law prohibiting driving while under the influence of any combination of substances, including alcohol. Implied-Consent Legislation Ideally, an implied consent law should be as effective as physical compulsion was in inducing the arrested driver to submit to a chemical analysis of body fluids. Currently, blood is the only body fluid that can yield meaningful analytic results for a DUID prosecution. Thus an ideal implied-consent statute must not only authorize tests of blood for drugs other than alcohol, but also must give the arresting officer authority to demand a blood specimen from the driver, under penalty of license suspension. In addition, because DUID cases account for only a small fraction of all DUI cases, the arresting officer often will presume a driver under the influence of alcohol and initially administer the breath test. A driver whose impairment is totally or partially caused by drugs other than alcohol may, however, "pass" the breath test (show a BAC below the generally followed legal standard of.10%) in which case the officer would require another test to prove drug impairment. Thus an ideal implied-consent statute also must authorize multiple tests when necessary. Our analysis of state legislation showed several deficiencies in existing state implied-consent laws: first, some statutes prevent the collection of specimens that can be analyzed for drugs; second, most laws do not specifically permit chemical analysis for drugs other than alcohol; third, some statutes permit the driver either to choose from among available tests or refuse a blood test without penalty; and fourth, many statutes appear to limit the arresting officer to a single test. These deficiencies are discussed in order below. Chemical Tests Capable of Being Analyzed For Drugs. Unlike alcohol, there is no realistic method for testing the breath for other drugs. If implied-consent laws do not allow for chemical tests other than breath, they are useless with respect to testing for drugs other than alcohol. At the present time, fourteen states' implied-consent laws provide only for breath tests from conscious drivers. The remaining thirty-six states have provisions in their implied-consent statutes that allow for chemical tests of blood in addition to breath. In those states that do not include at least a provision for the chemical testing of blood, police officers are unable to use their implied-consent laws to enforce their DUID laws as effectively as they could if blood specimens were available for analysis. Authority to Test For Drugs Other Than Alcohol. Even if blood or some other body fluid specimen can be obtained under the implied-consent law, thirty-eight states currently have no 4 State v. Sheppard, 284 S.C. 464, 150 S.E.2d 916 (1966)

8 provisions allowing for chemical analysis of specimens for drugs other than alcohol. The status of each state's law is shown in Table 1. Without this provision, implied-consent laws cannot be used to enforce DUID laws, since analytic results cannot be admitted into evidence at DUID trials 5. The legislative trend to change implied-consent laws to allow for analysis of drugs other than alcohol is relatively recent: the UVC added the provision in 1971; and since then, twelve states have enacted similar provisions. Authority to Choose the Test to Be Given. If police officers are to obtain a body fluid specimen that can be analyzed for drugs, they must have the authority to choose the test to be given. As mentioned previously, blood is the preferred body fluid for analysis of drugs other than alcohol. If the choice of tests is left to the driver, he could avoid drug analysis by requesting a breath test. As stated already, fourteen states authorize breath tests only for conscious drivers. In addition, six states have absolute provisions allowing the driver to choose from among available tests. The remaining thirty states express or imply that the police officer has this authority, but in some states the authority is far from absolute. In one state, Michigan, the police officer may initially determine which test will be given, but the driver may defeat the officer's choice by demanding that only a breath test be given. If such a demand is made, the driver cannot be penalized for refusing another type of test. Eight other states allow the officer to designate the test but the driver may refuse to submit to a blood test as long as he takes any other test or tests that the officer may choose. Finally, in six states, the implied-consent law is ambiguous or even silent on the subject. This leaves only fifteen states in which the police officer has the express authority to designate the test to be given. Thus, choice-of-test provisions present a major impediment to obtaining a body fluid specimen that can be tested for drugs. Authority to Obtain More Than One Test. In many instances, especially when alcohol and other drugs are used in combination, the first chemical test that a police officer obtains is a breath test for alcohol. If the breath test indicates little or no alcohol concentration, yet the driver is obviously impaired, the police officer's attention may turn to impairment by drugs other than alcohol. In these instances, a police officer would need to obtain a blood or other body fluid specimen to be analyzed for drugs. In as many as thirty states, however, the implied-consent law allows for only one test, since the language of these thirty state laws reads "test," not "tests." Thus, when the breath test was given, the driver had already complied with the implied-consent statute, and the threat of sanctions imposed by the implied-consent law cannot be used to obtain an additional test. Since breath tests are already the most common initial test given in almost all jurisdictions, one-test limitations in implied-consent laws could handicap the police in enforcing DUID laws in these cases. 5 It has been suggested that police officers could obtain specimens without relying on the implied-consent law. Two possible strategies have been reported by law enforcement officials: first, asking the driver to voluntarily give a blood specimen; and second, forcibly removing the specimen from the driver, as was done in the case of DUIL prior to the enactment of implied-consent laws. Neither strategy is a workable substitute for implied-consent laws, however. With respect to the first strategy, a driver who knows he is suspected of drug consumption is unlikely to voluntarily provide evidence of his guilt. In regard to the second, even if forcibly removed specimens are admitted at trial, the police department risks adverse public reaction and perhaps even a lawsuit by the driver, since forcible testing runs counter to the policies supporting implied consent.

9 CONCLUSIONS Existing procedures for the chemical analysis of body fluid specimens for drugs other than alcohol are often not adequate in terms of prosecuting the DUID offender. Some reasons for their inadequacy are scientific or practical rather than legal: the detection and quantification of drugs other than alcohol is costly; not all standard testing procedures are sensitive enough to detect the drugs of interest; specimens routinely obtained by police officers are too small to analyze; and the wide variety of available drugs leads analysts to require that police agencies specify the drugs for analysis. Nonetheless, some prosecuting agencies contacted by researchers in this area indicated that analytic results, when they are available, have value in prosecutions for DUID and that the absence of results reduces the strength of the prosecution's case. Therefore, legal barriers to the collection of body fluid specimens could represent an unnecessary hindrance to the prosecution of at least some DUID cases. An abandonment of the implied-consent principle, which is to substitute physical coercion for the threat of license loss, is not recommended. We do, however, recommend amendments to existing DUID legislation. The 1979 UVC provisions deal with, and eliminate, the statutory weaknesses discussed in this paper. Under the UVC, driving while under the influence of any drug--illicit, prescription, or over-the-counter--is prohibited, as is driving while under the influence of any combination of alcohol and other drugs. Drivers arrested for impaired driving can be required under the UVC to submit to a test of any body fluid, including blood, that is designated by the arresting officer. Specimens may be analyzed for drugs other than alcohol and analytic results may be introduced at a trial for DUID. To deal with the impaired driver whose BAC is too low to indicate alcohol impairment, the UVC authorizes multiple tests. So far, however, no more than twelve states have adopted legislation substantially similar to the UVC provisions. The other states' implied-consent statutes are directed at alcohol alone, and most of those statutes permit drivers to choose a test other than blood. The trend toward amending those statutes has so far been slow, partly because interpreting blood drug concentrations is still at best an art and at worst impossible. Although cases in which analytical results provide clear evidence of drug-impaired driving may be infrequent, there are indications from contacts with law-enforcement personnel that chemical test results are useful in at least some DUID trials. Even though the outlook for immediate amendment by the states is not particularly bright, past experience shows that most states eventually enact provisions substantially similar to those that originally appeared in the UVC. Informing legislators of the magnitude of the drug-and-driving problem, and of the inadequacy of current legislation in dealing with it, could help legislative reform of deficient DUID and implied-consent provisions.

10 Table 1 State Implied-Consent Statutes Allowing Chemical Tests for Drugs States Allowing (12)* States Not Allowing (38) Connecticut Georgia Indiana Minnesota Nevada New Hampshire New York Rhode Island Tennessee Utah Vermont Wisconsin Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Delaware Florida Hawaii Idaho Illinois Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Mississippi Missouri Nebraska New Jersey New Mexico North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania South Carolina South Dakota Texas Virginia Washington West Virginia Wyoming * Of the twelve states allowing chemical analysis for drug concentrations, five--georgia, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin--expressly grant police officers the authority to designate the test to be administered. Three--Indiana, New York, and Tennessee--are not specific on this point, but probably grant police officers such authority. Three states--connecticut, Minnesota, and Nevada--allow the driver to choose a test other than blood.

11 Table 2 Summary of Major Deficiencies in DUI and Implied-Consent Legislation DUI Law Implied Consent Law Does Not Cover All Combinations Restrictive Definition of "Drug" Law Applies to Alcohol Only Breath Test Only Authorized Choice of Tests Provision Single Test Limitation Alabama!!!! Alaska!!!!! Arizona!!!! Arkansas!!! California!!! Colorado!!!! Connecticut!! Delaware!! Florida!!!!!! Georgia Hawaii!!!! Idaho! "! Illinois!!!!! Indiana!! "! Iowa! Kansas!!! Kentucky!!! Louisiana!!! Maine!!!! Maryland!! "! Massachusett s!!!! Michigan!!! Minnesota!!

12 Mississippi!!!! Missouri!!!!! Montana!!! Nebraska!!!! Nevada! "!! New Hampshire!! New Jersey!!!!! New Mexico!!!! New York! "! N. Carolina!!! N. Dakota!!!! Ohio!!! Oklahoma!!! Oregon!!!!! Pennsylvania!!!!! Rhode Island!! S. Carolina!!!! S. Dakota!! "! Tennessee!! "! Texas!!!!! Utah Vermont " Virginia!!! Washington!!!! West Virginia!!! Wisconsin!! Wyoming!!! Number of States: Definite (!) Possible (")

13 Table 3 Citations to State Impaired-Driving Legislation Prohibiting DUID ALA. CODE (1977) ALASKA STAT (a) (1978) ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN (I) (Supp ) ARK. STAT. ANN (1979) CAL. VEH. CODE 23102(a), 23105(a), 23105(b) (West Supp. 1980) COLO. REV. STAT (1)(c) (1973) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN a (West Supp. 1980) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, 4177 (1979) FLA. STAT (1) (Supp. 1979) GA. CODE ANN. 68A (1980) HAWAII REV. STAT (1976) IDAHO CODE (c) (Supp. 1979) ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp ) IND. CODE ANN (b)(1) (Burns Supp. 1980), amended by P.L. 83, eff. June 1, 1980 IOWA CODE ANN (West Supp ) KAN. STAT. ANN (b) (1975) KY. REV. STAT (2) (1971) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:98(A) (West Supp. 1980) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, 1312 (1979 and Supp ) MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN (1977) MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, 24(1)(a) (Michie/Law. Co-Op. 1975) MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN (a), (b) (Supp ) MINN. STAT. ANN (1) (West Supp. 1980) MISS. CODE ANN (1973) MO. ANN. STAT (Vernon 1979) MONT. CODE ANN (1979) NEB. REV. STAT (1979) NEV. REV. STAT (1979) N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 262-A:62 (1979) N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:4-50 (West Supp. 1979) N.M. STAT. ANN (1978) N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1979) N.C. GEN. STAT (Supp. 1979) N.D. CENT. CODE (1980) OHIO REV. CODE ANN (Page Supp. 1979) OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, (West 1972) OR. REV. STAT (1977) PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, 3731 (Purdon Supp. 1980) R.I. GEN. LAWS (Supp. 1979) S.C. CODE (Supp. 1979) S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN (Supp. 1979) TENN. CODE ANN (1980) TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701f-5 (Vernon Supp. 1979) UTAH CODE ANN (Supp. 1979) VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, 1201 (Supp. 1979) VA. CODE (Supp. 1980) WASH. REV. CODE ANN (Supp. 1980) W.VA. CODE 17C-5-2 (Supp. 1980) WIS. STAT. ANN (West Supp. 1979) WYO. STAT (1977)

14 Table 4 Citations to State Implied-Consent Legislation ALA. CODE (1977) ALASKA STAT (1978) ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN (A) (1976) ARK. STAT. ANN (1979) CAL. VEH. CODE (West Supp. 1980) COLO. REV. STAT (3) (1973) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN b (West Supp. 1980) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, 2740, 2741 (1979) FLA. STAT (1)(a), (1)(c) (Supp. 1979) GA. CODE ANN. 68B-306 (1990) HAWAII REV. STAT (1976) IDAHO CODE (Supp. 1979) ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, (a) (Smith-Hurd Supp ) IND. CODE ANN (a) (Burns Supp. 1980). "Chemical test" is defined in (Burns Supp. 1980) IOWA CODE ANN. 321B.3 (West Supp ) KAN. STAT. ANN (a) (Supp. 1979) KY. REV. STAT (1) (Supp. 1978) LA. REV. STAT. ANN (A) (West Supp. 1980) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, 1312 (1978 and Supp ) MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN (a), (c) (Supp. 1979) MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, 24(1)(e), 24(1)(f) (Michie/Law. Co-Op. 1975) MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN a (Supp ) MINN. STAT. ANN (2), (2a) (West Supp. 1980) MISS. CODE ANN (1973) MO. ANN. STAT (Vernon 1979) MONT. CODE ANN (1979) NEB. REV. STAT (1979) NEV. REV. STAT (1979) N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 262-A:69-2 (1979) N.J. STAT. ANN. 39: (West Supp. 1979) N.M. STAT. ANN (1978) N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1979) N.C. GEN. STAT (Supp. 1979) N.D. CENT. CODE (1980) OHIO REV. CODE ANN (Page Supp. 1979) OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, 751 (West Supp. 1979) OR. REV. STAT (1977) PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, 1547 (Purdon Supp. 1980) R.I. GEN. LAWS (Supp. 1979) S.C. CODE (Supp. 1979) S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN (Supp. 1979) TENN. CODE ANN (1980) TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701f-5 (Vernon Supp. 1979) UTAH CODE ANN (Supp. 1979) VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, 1202 (Supp. 1979) VA. CODE (Supp. 1980) WASH. REV. CODE ANN (Supp. 1980) W.VA. CODE 17C-5A-1 (Supp. 1980) WIS. STAT. ANN (West Supp. 1979) WYO. STAT (1977)