FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TOWARDS ISRAEL

Transcription

1 FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TOWARDS ISRAEL Amir M. Haji-Yousefi * Introduction The Islamic Republic of Iran declared officially its non-recognition of Israel since the very beginning of its foundation, denying the legitimacy of the Israeli State. This article seeks to explain the foreign policy of Iran towards Israel through a survey of the relations between the two countries in the years 1979 to The major question of this article is: what factors may explain and justify the sort of hostile relations between Iran and Israe? Since great changes in the international system play a significant role in determining the behaviour of the states towards each other, for the purposes of this study the relations between Iran and Israel are divided into two periods: the Cold War era ( ) and the post-cold War era ( ). The first part of the article deals with relations between Iran and Israel prior to the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. The second part deals with the effects of the collapse of the bipolar system on the Middle East. The third part deals with the concerns of Iran and Israel over the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Finally, the fourth part is devoted to a more detailed study of relations between Iran and Israel since In this part, relations between the two countries are taken into consideration in two historical periods as follows: a) collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the Middle East peace process in Madrid, and b) the September 11, 2001, attacks and the subsequent events. The Iranian-Israeli Relations During the Cold War Since its establishment in 1948, the state in Israel considered Iran as one of its strategic allies. The periphery strategy of Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, was based on the idea that Israel should create alliances with the non-arab nations on the periphery of the Arab Middle East, countries such as Turkey, Ethiopia, and Iran, in order to outflank the bordering Arab states.1 Thus, Israel could gradually get out of isolation and achieve its goals including national security. Accordingly, the Israeli government took measures to further expand relations with Iran during the Pahlavi reign.2 The Pahlavi Iran accorded Israel de facto recognition on March 6, 1950, i.e., two years after the establishment of the Israeli State. Although the government of Muhammad Mossadeq decided to close Iran s consulate in Jerusalem (Al-Quds) in 1951, and the Arab states considered this decision as Iran s withdrawal of its de facto recognition of Israel, Iran, apparently, continued its discreet relations with Israel. Relations between the two countries came to be more public in the late 1950s. During this period, it may be said that a kind of a strategic alliance between the two countries was formed and continued upto the fall of the Pahlavi regime in It seems that the Pahlavi regime in Iran on the whole took three major strategic considerations into account in its relations with Israel at the domestic, regional, and international levels. Internally, the Iranian State was in need of a strong intelligence service to establish its power bases and remove obstacles in the way of acquiring them. Israel could afford all necessary help in this regard. The extensive cooperation between SAVAK and MOSSAD was effective in guaranteeing internal security of the Shah s regime. Secondly, at the regional level, Iran did not enjoy stability in the

2 Middle East region. On the one hand, the threat of the former Soviet Union and on the other, the hostility of Arab governments towards the Shah s government, especially that of Egypt in the reign of Naser, and Iraq following the coup of 1958, was a major concern for Iran. Furthermore, Israel considered the former Soviet Union and Arab governments of the Middle East, as its most important enemies. Hence, the cooperation between the two countries for counteracting these common regional threats seemed quite natural. Thirdly, at the international level, the Shah s government seriously wished to strengthen relations with the United States. Because of the strategic relations of Israel and the United States, and great influence of the Jewish lobby in the United States, the Shah sought to expand relations with the US along with strengthening relations with Israel.4 The Main Formative Factors in the Iranian-Israeli Relations After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the relations between Iran and Israel were immediately severed and the former embassy of Israel lay at the disposal of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Obviously, the Islamic Revolution, one of the major goals of which being its support of Muslims throughout the world, the Palestine cause lay on the top of its objectives and interests. The regional foreign policy of Iran at the start of the Islamic Revolution was a confrontational one, based on serious opposition manifested in slogans against Israel. The opposition of Iran to Israel was based on the ideological and humanitarian notion that the Zionist regime was a usurper government occupying the Palestinian land an important part of the Muslim lands causing displacement and innumerable sufferings to the Palestinians. This policy lay in the framework of national interests without any material consideration. In other words, the most significant factor in determining the confrontational foreign policy of Iran at this time was not national, material interests, nor international considerations. Rather, Iran regarded supporting the Palestinian cause and refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the Zionist regime, a religious as well as an humanitarian obligation. At first, opposing Israel meant absolute support of Palestine, i.e., supporting the PLO. In other words, the Islamic Republic of Iran began to openly support the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian militant groups, the PLO being considered as their representative. However, this policy was reconsidered later. In other words, since the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran upto the beginning of the Iran- Iraq war, opposition to Israel was parallel with keeping good relations with PLO. However, subsequent to PLO s support of Iraq and its Arabism, opposition to Israel no longer meant supporting the PLO. Iran continued supporting the Palestinian cause, seeking to extend its support to Palestinian groups other than the PLO, due to the tension occurring in its relations with the same.5 Despite the confrontational and irreconcilable orientation of Iran s foreign policy, not recognising Israel as a state at all and aspiring for its destruction, Israel did not seem to wish cutting off its relations with Iran, in the early years following the Revolution. Therefore, it seems that the foreign policy of Israel towards Iran, after the Islamic Revolution upto the collapse of the Soviet Union, was a pragmatic one following a double-track policy. Israel sought to hold secret relations with Iran. Some have claimed that Israel not only continued its secret relations with Iran, but also sold weapons to the latter. Hirsh Goodman claims that Israel had attempted three times to hold secret arms transactions with Iran.6

3 Perhaps one of the most important concerns of the Israelis, for seeking a way to maintain good relations with Iran, was the presence of about 80,000 Jews in Iran. However, some other factors were involved too. These factors are as follows: the Israeli supposition that the Islamic Republic of Iran would not sustain and it would collapse; attempts towards staging a pro-western coup in Iran; establishing relations with nationalist and conservative forces in Iran; preventing Iran from approaching the Soviet Union; and releasing the American hostages in Lebanon.7 Furthermore, Israel made all attempts to make Iran isolated in the regional and international arena. Some experts hold that the Zionists provoked the Iraqi invasion of Iran, and that Israel also staged other secret hostile acts against Iran at the time of war.8 Various Forms of Relations Between Iran and Israel As mentioned above, the Islamic Republic of Iran cut off relations with Israel from the very beginning of its establishment. The Islamic Republic declared illegitimacy of the Israeli State as its policy toward the same, and maintained that Israel must be wiped out from the earth. Hence, it is natural that Iran attempted to undermine the international position of Israel. This part deals with Iran s actions in this regard at the regional as well as the international levels. Iran and Israel in the Middle East Proxy war was the most significant strategy of Iran for undermining the Zionist regime and restricting it to its own borders. On the one hand, the revolutionary, anti-zionist, and anti-imperialist nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and on the other hand, the geographical distance with Israel, caused Iran to lead an indirect campaign against Israel, not only in the regions around Israel (mainly in Lebanon), but within the land of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza strip). Since Lebanese Shiites and Palestinian Muslim groups were highly influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the best strategy for Iran was to strengthen and reinforce these groups for the aim of counteracting and fighting with the Zionist regime. Iran s influence in Lebanon, the foundation of Hizbullah in 1982, and Iran s supporting Palestinian Muslim factions such as the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, were the best and most significant levers of power for Iran in counteracting Israel.9 Iran s second strategy for counteracting Zionism was to establish a sort of an alliance with Syria. This alliance won two major advantages for Iran. First, it prevented Iraqi attempts to create an Arabic front against Iran. Benefitting from the longstanding enmity of Baghdad and Damascus, Iran endeavoured to strengthen relations with Syria. Likewise, Syria could achieve its political as well as economic goals through alliance with Iran. Secondly, Syria was one of the countries in the front line with Israel, thus being of high importance for Iran in the future of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Strengthening Syria against the Zionist regime was one of the major goals of the strategic alliance of Iran with Syria.10 Iran, Israel, and the United States As mentioned earlier, one of the main reasons justifying the interest of the Pahlavi regime in strengthening relations with Israel was the issue of improving Iran s relations with the United States. In other words, throughout his life the Shah of Iran, largely dissatisfied with the foreign as well as the Middle East policy of the United States - except for a short period during the reign of Nixon was eager to seek the American support for Iran, through the influence of Israelis and the Jewish lobby in America.

4 Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the issue of relations between Iran and Israel has had its own effect on relations between the former and the United States. In other words, since the United States considers Israel its strategic ally in the region, and is guaranteeing survival and security of the Zionist regime, the hostility of Iran towards the latter has sharpened the opposition and confrontation of Iran with the United States. Of course, Israelis themselves have taken all measures and made all attempts in the past to sharpen the enmity of the U.S. towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, by urging the American administration into imposing sanctions against this country. For example, following President Khatami s taking office in May 1997, there were certain expectations in the West and even in Israel that Iran would follow a more moderate foreign policy in the region, hence the probability of improving relations with the United States. Some even referred to Khatami s statement that, although we have our considerations and comments on the Oslo accords since it does not provide the necessary foundation for satisfaction of due rights of Palestinians, we would not take any measures preventing peace process, welcoming Palestinian choices including that of peace, analysing that Iran would stop opposing the peace process. However, the United States, instead of welcoming the President s statement and attempting to improve relations with Iran, extended the so-called D Amato law and had all Iranians visiting the United States fingerprinted. There is no room for doubt that American Zionists were involved in these affairs.11 However, the key point is that Iran can benefit well from this hostility toward Israel in its relations with the United States. Israel is of strategic importance in the Middle East for the United States. Furthermore, establishment of peace between Israel and the Arab countries is of vital importance in US strategy of moving towards American hegemony, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union. As Sandy Berger put it, establishment of peace in the Middle East is a strategic necessity for the US, and vital interests of the American nation lie in advancing the peace process in the Middle East.12 Hence, opposition of Iran to Israel and with the Middle East peace process is exactly in contrast with the strategic interests of the US in the region. Iran can make use of this lever for putting Americans under pressure to admit and recognise the legitimate rights of the Iranian nation. The Post-Cold War International System and the Middle East Upon the collapse of the bipolar international system in 1991, the United States appeared in the Middle East as the hegemonic power. The US domination over the region involved major consequences. For the first time, in the Persian Gulf war, Russia stood next to the US under the command of an international coalition to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and for putting a practical end to the Cold War-related universal policies. Later, holding the peace conference in Madrid, 1991, was considered a very significant event. The United States, no longer facing rivals and obstacles in the Middle East, sought to make the best use of the opportunity to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on its own will. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War enabled the Middle Eastern states to acquire further manoeuvring power in order to change their regional as well as environmental systems.13 For instance, increasing the tendencies for cooperation in the Persian Gulf sub-system, invigorating regional organisations, especially the Islamic Conference Organisation, and their reactivation were signs of this phenomenon. New conditions of self-help and new ways of symmetrical cooperation

5 (among regional actors) as well as asymmetrical cooperation (between regional actors on the one side and major powers on the other side) emerged. Thus, political issues in the region, linked to remnants of the earlier bipolar system of the Cold War era, were released in a different context, supporting different patterns of cooperation and conflict.14 Therefore, states in the Middle East, finding themselves in new self-help conditions, were forced to adapt themselves to the new situation. The most significant means towards adaptation to new conditions of self-help was that of the balance of powers. In self-help conditions of the bipolar system, the game of the two superpowers was a zero-sum game, and the countries of the Middle East faced two choices (the US or the Soviet Union) concerning winning foreign support and obtaining guarantees of their security. However, upon disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the single choice of the countries of the region for gaining and guaranteeing their security was seeking the US support. Hence, while in the bipolar system, the countries of the region were divided into two groups, i.e. US allies and those of the Soviet Union, they did not have any choice but to acquire US support towards guaranteeing their own security upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Thus, countries formerly enjoying the support of the Soviet Union, perceiving the systemic change and US domination on the Middle East turned to the United States. Consequently, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, we witnessed the emergence of a hegemony system in the Middle East under the US domination. Within this hegemony system, the national interests of the US, including the security of Israel in the Middle East, was the top priority in the foreign policy of the US. Despite these systemic changes and consequent changes in the foreign policy of the countries of the region, as well as changes in regional asymmetrical alignments, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not exert any fundamental change in its foreign policy and did not approach the United States at all. There was merely a change in Iran s foreign policy orientation, from a confrontational state to a defensive one. Such an independent foreign policy caused the US to sharpen its enmity towards Iran and attempt to further isolate it. This policy, too, was parallel to the interests of the Zionist regime. Thus, definitely, Israel played a key role in intensifying this anti- Iranian policy of the United States. Implications of the Collapse of the Soviet Union for Israel and Iran The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about a major concern for Israel, since the latter felt that it would be losing its strategic significance for the United States. In other words, following the end of the bipolar system, the strategic milieu which caused the US to give priority to relations with Israel (Israel as a counter weight against the Soviet Union s interests in the Middle East) underwent a change. Although the US emerged as a dominant power in the Middle East, the major question was the definition of the new function of Israel in the Middle East and the new position of Israel. In addition, Israelis had two more principal concerns at this time. The first was that the Persian Gulf war and liberation of Kuwait caused the strengthening and the reactivating of the United Nations, since the formation of international coalition and the outbreak of war against Iraq was due to the failure of Iraq in the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations. This fact was a matter of concern for Israelis since they feared a new attempt by the international community, or at least by a part of it, for implementing the previous resolutions of the United Nations, not implemented by Israelis up to

6 then (particularly those relevant to the occupied lands of 1967). The second concern was related to unfavourable economic conditions of Israel, particularly with regard to the new stream of Russian Jewish immigrants to this country.15 However, the principal concern of Iran following the collapse of the Soviet Union was not losing a supporter and an ally in the region since the Islamic Republic of Iran from the very beginning of its foundation, taking the policy of neither east nor west, had taken a revisionist policy and a confrontational orientation towards both the superpowers of the time. Consequently, contrary to other states, in order to achieve its goals Iran did not follow the policy of engagement of one superpower against another in the Middle East. Even we can claim that the disintegration of the Soviet Union was considered a good opportunity for Iran, since the latter no longer faced its most important threat of the last two centuries (the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union). However, the new concern was the domination of the Middle East by the archenemy of Iran, i.e. the United States. The US at this time was seeking a new enemy and Muslim countries, or Islamic fundamentalism, could be a good substitute for the former Soviet Union. Evidently, the United States would make every attempt to put under pressure what it considered to be one of the most important sources of Islamic fundamentalism, i.e. Iran. The policy of dual containment targeting Iran as well as Iraq was indicative of the ultimate goals of American foreign policy toward containing Iran.16 In spite of this systemic change, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not show any tendency towards admitting it and behaving accordingly. In other words, Iran, due to its own ideological orientation and its independent role in foreign policy, did not have any intentions of taking this change and its consequences into account and accordingly making necessary decisions based on its material interests. The Islamic Republic of Iran, for guaranteeing its own security and having formed its foreign policy based on Islamic principles, could not act based on realism (in the sense of realpolitik) and seek closeness to the only surviving superpower, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The one thing Iran could do (and was successful to some extent in this regard) was to avoid subjecting itself to the increasing pressure of the United States, refusing to adopt policies that would give a pretext to the US for further pressurising the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, Israel, considering the changes resulting from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its consequences, including the lowering of its strategic importance for the US, made every attempt to prevent damages to its national interests. Portraying Iran as an international threat, especially for the US, and consequently increasing its hostilities towards Iran, can be seen mainly in terms of Israel s attempts to achieve its above-mentioned goals. The Iranian-Israeli Relations Following the Cold War The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar international system brought about new conditions in the Middle East. The opening of peace negotiations was one of the most important consequences of the new milieu that emerged in the Middle East in On the whole, the beginning of the Middle East peace process between Israel and Arabs and the likelihood of its success, caused the satisfaction of the former need of Israel for Iran within the framework of the Periphery doctrine of Ben Gurion against Arab countries. Some Israeli officials held that Israel should continue its efforts to mend relations with Iran because the

7 establishment of total peace with all Arab countries would be impossible.17 However, the Madrid peace talks indicated that the establishment of peace with Arabs was not impossible. From then on, Israel took a new approach towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran was considered the most important threat to Israel and hostility of Israel against Iran was clearly expressed. The foreign policy of Israel at that stage was to put Iran into isolation (exactly in accordance with the US foreign policy towards Iran).18 On the one hand, the direct implication of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of peace talks on the Middle East, was to undermine the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region and force it to change its assertive regional foreign policy to a more moderate one. In other words, the opening of peace talks on the Middle East brought about new conditions for the Islamic Republic of Iran, hence forcing it to change its counteracting and assertive policy in the Middle East to rather a defensive and to some extent passive one. On the other hand, Iran was forced to take a more moderate policy towards Arab countries. Iran s attempts for improving relations with Arab countries in this period are considerable. On the other hand, opposition with the Zionist regime and taking measures towards undermining the same was to take a new form. Although at first, Iran explicitly opposed the Middle East peace process, it declared later that, despite Iran s belief that the current peace talks would not lead to the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the region, Iran would not create any obstacle before it. The Foreign Policy of Israel Towards Iran The concept of the New Middle East, suggested by Shimon Peres, was intended to expand Israel s domination over the Middle East and encirclement of Iran. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Israel s new thrust is that it must put Iran into any isolation whatsoever, in order to guarantee its own security. Signing the Oslo peace accords with the PLO in 1993 and afterwards with Jordan in 1994, Israel s attempts to reach Central Asia and the Caucuses, the beginning of a strategic alliance between Israel and Turkey, the presence of Israel in the Persian Gulf under the pretext of the Middle East Economic Conference, and expanding relations between Israel on the one hand, and China as well as India on the other, were all measures towards the encirclement of Iran. On the other hand, the Israelis, enjoying tremendous influence of the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States, made every attempt to prevent the improvement of Iran s relations with the US, and sharpen the hostility between them. However, it is noteworthy that despite this orientation in the foreign policy of Israel, there are two views concerning Iran in that country. One view considers Iran the most important threat to the security of Israel and expressing concerns over Iran s access to nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other weapons of massdestruction.19 This view holds that Iran has actually begun a war with Israel through the Lebanese Hizbullah. Iran has also given rise to increasing concerns in Tel Aviv due to its supporting the Islamic Jihad and Hamas in the occupied lands. This view also holds that since Iraq no longer can play the role of a deterrent to an Iranian power, Israel must play it particularly vis-à-vis the interests of the U.S. in the Middle East. The second view is the reverse. It does not consider Iran a serious threat or danger for Israel and holds that the opposition of Iran with Israel does not go beyond words

8 and slogans. This view holds that Iran continues to be a natural ally for Israel, facing Arab threats. Proponents of this view maintain that Iraq is more a threat to Israel than Iran. Consequently, Iran s objectives in its arms procurement program are not parallel to its preparation for counteracting Israel. All things considered and as the current evidence suggests, the author believes that the foreign policy of Israel towards Iran at present is based on the first view. The Foreign Policy of Iran Towards Israel There was no significant change in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Israel following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In other words, although the change in the international system brought about numerous limitations and pressures in the milieu surrounding Iran, Iran sought to follow its foreign policy regardless of these limitations. However, perhaps two major changes are noteworthy in this period in the foreign policy orientation of Iran. The first change, as Ramazani pointed, is that emphasis on the policy of neither east, nor west has been replaced by that of either north, or south. It does not mean that Iran has moved towards dependence on a superpower. Rather, it suggests that since the eastern superpower in the sense of its Cold War concept ceased to exist, Iran paid more attention to its north and south.20 In this new orientation, Iran was still opposed to the United States. The second change was that Iran turned more to realism and pragmatism in its foreign policy. Thus, stability and security of the region surrounding Iran, particularly the northern region (Central Asia and the Caucuses) and the southern region (the Persian Gulf) assumed priority in the foreign policy of Iran. Therefore, Iran recognising the fact that if it is seeking contribution to regional stability and security, it should remove some diplomatic deadlocks of the past emanating from the atmosphere of early years of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The most important action the Iranian government took in this regard was endeavouring towards releasing western hostages in Lebanon. Following a long process of talks and attempts by Iran, eventually all western hostages in Lebanon, except two Germans were released in late From then on, Iran made serious attempts to improve and strengthen relations with the Arab countries. These attempts aimed not only at improving relations with Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, but also with other Arab countries such as Morocco and Egypt. It is self-evident that the goal, which was to be achieved at the very beginning of the Islamic Revolution, i.e. establishment of an Iran-Arab front against Israel, was likely to be reached at this stage with a one-decade delay. However, this expectation did not materialise and its failure was not entirely due to Iranian diplomacy. The Iraqi attack against Kuwait and afterwards the formation of an international coalition under the command of the United States against Iraq, paved the way for US hegemony in the Middle East. It was towards a solidification of this hegemony that the US held the Madrid Peace Conference for establishing peace in the Middle East, during which the Israelis and Arabs opened the Middle East peace talks. This fact created a serious obstacle before the foreign policy of Iran, which was based on the non-recognition of Israel and making attempts towards its destruction as a state. Arab countries, once being the major party of opposition with Israel, sought to establish peace with the latter. The conclusion of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 between the Palestinians and Israelis raised a more serious problem for the

9 foreign policy of Iran. On the whole, Iran continued its opposition with Israel, regarding peace talks futile. It was merely the failure of peace talks, which won and still win the manoeuver power of Iran in the Middle East. The September 11 Attacks and the Iranian-Israeli Relations It seems that the September 11 attacks occurred in favour of Israeli interests in the Middle East. This terrorist act brought about a good opportunity for Israel for sharpening its opposition to Iran. Immediately after these attacks, the Jewish lobby in the United States attempted to urge the American administration to state that Iran was the principal agent behind these attacks. Failing this goal, Israelis tried to make Iran the target of American attacks, depicting it the major supporter of terrorism in international relations. The outcome of this attempt was placing Iran in the axis of evil by President Bush. In other words, Israel has had a key role in declaring Iran as one of the countries in the US axis.22 Considering the current processes of the international system, the Islamic Republic of Iran is in a very difficult situation. Israelis have done their best to deal a heavy blow on Iran whether through their own forces or through the United States. It seems that relations between the two countries are entering a new stage with a rather counteracting and contending nature. Under these conditions, Iran, keeping its independence in foreign policy, must act in a more cautious way to avoid becoming a target of America or Israel. Considering the weak diplomacy of Iran at present which is rooted in various factors the most significant of which being an incoherence in defining goals and decision-making in foreign policy, there is no expectation of a diminution of the serious threat of the US and Israel. Rather, it seems that the threat would be ever increasing. Conclusion Irrespective of geo-political conditions, the Islamic Republic of Iran severed relations with the Israeli regime and followed its own policy in the Middle East, which is not understandable in the framework of most nationalist-materialist theories of international relations. The determining factor of the behaviour of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Israel was not due to material and tangible factors, but on account of the norms leaving a direct influence on the interests and identity of the Islamic Iran. One of the main others factors of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding its identity was its opposition to Zionism and the Israeli regime. In other words, opposition to Israel (as well as the US) defined the Islamic nature of the Islamic system. The leaders of the Islamic Revolution claimed that Zionism along with Imperialism was staging plots against Islam, the manifestation of which being the Islamic Republic of Iran. To understand the point, I refer to some directions of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. He expressedly referred to this point in his messages and speeches. Warning the threat of international Zionism for Islam and the Islamic Revolution, de-islamisation by Israel, opposition of Israel to the very religion of Islam, threat of Israel for the Middle East and the Muslim lands, the sinister purposes of Israel for ruling over Muslim countries from the Nile to the Euphrates, ir-religionism of the Zionists, colonisers support to Israel, the US support to the Shah and Israel, etc. are factors indicative of the understanding which the Islamic Republic of Iran has had, and still has of itself, regarding its proper expected behaviour towards Israel.23 Severing relations between Iran and Israel immediately after Ayatollah Khomeini s

10 return from Paris, the opening up of the PLO embassy in Iran, severe criticism of the Camp David Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel, cutting off of relations with Egypt, declaring the liberation of al-quds as the main objective of Iran after defeating Iraq, opposition to any reconciliation whatsoever between Israel and the Arabs, and wishing for the destruction of the Zionist regime, all point to the picture that the Islamic Republic of Iran had of itself and the expected measures that it pursued to that end. By understanding this inner essence of the Iranian psyche, it is possible to understand the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a more accurate way. The Islamic Republic of Iran, like any other state, enjoys a social code reflecting its particular identity and strengthening its political actions. This social code, suggesting value preferences of the government, leads it to take certain actions. Therefore, the foreign policy of Iran towards Israel lies parallel to a combination of some of its value preferences. In this sense, foreign policy is no longer only the strategies for directing state actions towards mere material, tangible objectives, but an attempt towards achieving what it considers its desirable or proper role in a global arena. It goes without saying that one of the principal concerns, which is a part of the identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran and naturally approved and encouraged by the state, is supporting Palestine and opposing Israel. Broadly, we can say that all states have their own values, which are in rivalry on international scale. Hence, international politics resembles a scene of competition of values in which actions are hardly determined by objective and material conditions. Rather, individual judgements and assessments of states concerning those conditions determine the course of action they pursue. In this milieu, it is concepts and attitudes of the states, concerning what they consider as desirable and the undesirable, that determines their actions. References *. Dr. Amir M. Haji Yousefi is Assisant Professor at the Department of Economics and Political Science, Beheshti (National) University, Tehran, Iran. Benjamin Beit-Hallahami, The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why, New York: Partheon Books, 1987, Chapter 1. See, for example, Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process, London: Oxford University Press, See Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations: , New York: Praeger, Robert Reppa, Israel and Iran, New York: Praeger, 1978, pp See, for instance, A. Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic, Routledge, Hirsh Goodman, Jerusalem Post, November 1986, quoted in Henry Paolucci, Iran, Israel, and the United States, New York: Griffon House, 1991, pp See also J. Marshal et al., The Iran-Contra Connection, South End Press, See, for example, Irangate: The Israel Connection, Third World Traveler, Internet, G. Mahler, Israel after Begin, State University of New York: 1990, p See, for example, Fouad Ajami, Lebanon and Its Interiors Foreign Affairs, spring 1985.

11 See, for example, Amir M. Haji-Yousefi, The Origins of Iranian-Syrian Alliance, M.A. Research Paper, Department of Political Science, McGill University, Ali Nourizadeh, Why Israel is Cheering for Iran s Hard-Liners, The Daily Star on Line, 2001, Internet. Quoted from Akhbar-e Eqtesaad (The Economic News), Tehran, Iran, January David Pervin, Building Order in Arab-Israeli Relations: From Balance to Concert? in David Lake and Patrick Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, The Pennsylvania State University Press, B. Hansen, Unipolarity and the Middle East, Richmond: Curzon, 2000, p. 3. Shibly Telhami, Israeli Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Middle East Policy, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1992, p. 85. Shireen Hunter, Iran from the August 1988 Cease-fire to the April 1992 Majlis Elections, in R. Freedman (ed.), The Middle East After Iraq s Invasion of Kuwait, University Press of Florida, 1993, p Susan Hardesty, U.S. Policy and Israel s Changed View of Iran, U.S.-Iran Review, Vol. 1, No. 5, August Bulent Aras Turkish-Israeli-Iranian Relations in the Nineties: Impact on the Middle East, Middle East Policy, Vol. VII, No. 3, June 200. Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Iran, and Prospects for Nuclear War in the Middle East, Strategic Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, Spring 1993, and Uri Lubrani, Iran v. the West: The View From Israel, May 15, 1997, Internet. R. K. Ramazani, Iran s Foreign Policy: Both North and South, Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3, Summer Shireen Hunter, op. cit., p Iran and the Axis of Evil, The New York Times, February 12, Fellestine as Didgah-e Imam Khomeini (Palestine in Imam Khomeini`s Viewpoints), Tehran: 1999.