1 Making Digital Signatures Work across National Borders Jon Ølnes, Anette Andresen, Leif Buene, Olga Cerrato, Håvard Grindheim DNV (Det Norske Veritas), Norway
2 DNV trusted third party for 140 years Det Norske Veritas (DNV): Independent foundation established 1864 in Norway Maritime: Classes 16 % of the world fleet (24 % of new ships) More than 80 national accreditations and management system certificates issues (ISO/IEC 9001, ISO/IEC 14001, ISO/IEC and more) Exploring business opportunities taking on trusted roles in digital value-chains
3 DNV worldwide 7000 employees, about 300 offices in about 100 countries
4 Example: DNV s signature requirements Reshaping own business processes (e-processes) Strong need for signatures, e.g. issuing ship or equipment certificates Receiving digitally signed documentation from others Global interoperability of signatures required for these e-processes built in Finland to DNV Class equipment from Germany Signed documents must be steel from South Korea verified by other parties than USA based ship owner those involved in the signing Bahamas registered process Insured in UK, calls port in Singapore,.
5 Example: Public procurement in EU Directives oblige any public purchaser in the EU to effectively recognize, receive and process tenders submitted, if required, with a qualified signature and their accompanying certificates, regardless of their origin within the EU or their technical characteristics The existing significant differences between qualified signatures. should therefore be reason for great concern. The interoperability problems detected despite the existence of standards. pose a real and possibly persistent obstacle to cross-border e-procurement.
6 The PKI eid business case The deadlock (or chicken and egg) situation Users aren t interested unless there are services Service providers don t care unless there are users There s (usually) not a single killer application, the value is in sufficient re-use Who pays for the eid and/or its use? Very slow uptake but things start to move
7 The interoperability business case C2G (citizen to government) A citizen accesses public services 2-3 times a year How many accesses are across borders? B2G (business to government) More frequent than C2G but mainly national(?) Public procurement is an exception (but that s in fact more B2B) B2B international business Yes, there is a business opportunity here! C2B international consumer market Yes, possibly a market! C2C Possibly, but a difficult market to target G2G internationally across government agencies (??)
8 Focus on relying party The front-end interoperability issue: Interoperable signing solutions use my eid everywhere Not topic here and not that relevant for B2B The back-end interoperability issue: How can the relying party handle everything it receives? Interoperability goals: Goal of eid holder: Sign towards any relying party Goal of relying party: Accept all signatures with assessed risk Additional goal: Allow any other party to verify signatures Suggestion: The independent Validation Authority (VA)
9 The relying party challenges 1. Signature verification and eid validation Technicalities complex but achievable 2. Naming, authorizations and roles What does the (person) name in an eid mean? How is this linked to business (B2B) and roles? 3. Signature acceptance Risk management legal issues, liabilities, quality of eid and signature, trust in CA 4. Signature policies for business processes What needs to be signed and what do signatures mean?
10 Challenge 2: Naming and authorizations Signature binds to name in eid Usual situation: Person name only Can include organizational naming attributes Corporate eid without person name has been suggested Not interested in person (e.g. e-invoice) Not accepted in all jurisdictions Translate to organization, role, authorization Accept signature. If anything goes wrong, person is identified On-line business registers and/or digital company dossiers Registration procedure to establish person-role link Federation, identity providers and similar services
11 Challenge 3: Signature acceptance Risk factors for accepting a signature: Reliable verification of signatures and eids If a formal approval status (qualified etc.) is required, is this OK? What is the quality of signatures and eids? Which legislation is in force (for the eid)? What are the possibilities for claiming recourse if anything is wrong (with signature or eid)? Can I trust the CA?
12 Challenge 4: Signature policies What needs to be signed in an e-process? All documents, selected documents, cover letter? At what steps in the business process are signatures required? Signature acceptance requirements Governed by jurisdiction of process owner And the process owner s own requirements Authentication is not (sufficient for) trust! 1. Signature acceptance, relying on the appropriate trusted parties (CA/VA) 2. Acceptance of the (authenticated) actor do I trust this one (may need to rely on other trusted parties/services) 3. Is the signature policy adhered to? 4. Process documents according to the business process
13 Role of the Validation Authority Certificate Authorities issuing eid certificates CA s policy and national legislation Quality of CA s services? Integration complexity SENDERS of documents digitally signed with eid certificates from different CAs Relying Party RECEIVER of digitally signed documents
14 Role of the Validation Authority Certificate Authorities issuing eid certificates Contract VA CA Quality assessment Integration complexity outsourced Validation Authority Contract VA RP Quality assessed by VA Simple integration TRUSTED SENDERS of documents digitally signed with eid certificates from different CAs Relying Party RECEIVER of digitally signed documents
15 Requirements to the Validation Authority Trustworthiness Accreditation/registration at Supervisory Authorities (as for CAs)? Brand Independence from CAs Responsibility and liability Ability to handle many CAs Quality of service Availability of service
16 One stop shopping for relying parties The VA is an independent trust anchor, trust is not delegated from the CAs Challenges the PKI axiom that only a CA may be a trust anchor The VA handles each CA individually Must be independent from any CA treat all CAs on equal terms Eliminates need for certificate path discovery and validation One agreement for processing of eid certificates, irrespective of origin One point of contact and billing Proper management of risk and liability Removal of complexity Classification and assurance of quality Acceptance of liability (agreement RP/VA) Transfer of liability (agreements VA/CAs) One software integration Web Service interface proposed for the VA service Scalability Acceptance of new customers, with eid certificates from new CAs
17 Risk management requires agreements Relying on general statements in policies is too risky A policy is an implicit agreement between CA and RP Written in foreign language, referring to foreign law An RP cannot enter agreements with all CAs Cannot by itself judge quality and liability Unknown risk situation A CA cannot have agreements with all possible RPs Europe: In principle unlimited liability for issuers of qualified certificates Unknown risk situation for the CAs
18 eid quality and legal status DNV s current scheme, proposed as suitable for Europe: 0. Inadequate or non-determined quality level: Very low confidence or assessment not possible, usually because a certificate policy does not exist. Many corporate PKIs will be placed in this category. 1. Low quality level: Low confidence in eid but certificate policy exists or quality assessment is possible by other means. 2. Medium non-approved quality level: Medium confidence eid with private key storage usually in software. 3. Medium approved quality level: Same quality level as 2 but CA is registered/ approved by inspectorate/authority according to applicable law to the CA. 4. Qualified non-approved level: eid quality is at or very close to qualified level, but eid is either not marked as qualified or the CA is not registered/approved. (Note that qualified eids can only be issued to persons, not other entities.) 5. Qualified approved level: eid is marked as qualified and the CA is registered/ approved by assigned inspectorate/authority according to applicable law to the CA. Hardware security token (smart card or similar) is not guaranteed to be a certified SSCD (Secure Signature Creation Device). 6. Qualified signature level: eid is marked and registered as for level 5, and use of a certified SSCD according to CEN CWA is mandatory. This level supports qualified signatures (EU Directive on electronic signatures).
19 Signature quality Calculation formula: Signature quality = eid quality + hash algorithm quality + public key algorithm and key length quality If any quality parameter is 0, signature quality is 0 regardless of the values of the other two quality parameters. The signature is considered too weak to be trusted. If eid quality is 6, and both other quality parameters have value 2 or higher, the signature quality is 20. This value thus indicates a qualified signature according to the EU Directive. Quality values for cryptographic algorithms with key sizes: Quality 0: Inadequate - should not be trusted. Quality 1: Marginal - reasonably secure for short term Quality 2: Trustworthy for approximately five years. Quality 3-6: Increasing levels of quality (Adapted from NIST recommendations to US Government, aligned with similar recommendations in Europe)
20 Classification (ongoing development) Objective, globally applicable criteria for eid classification Base on existing work (Federal Bridge CA (USA), EU qualified level, ETSI Normalised Certificate Policy, American Bar Association (ABA), Web Trust, T- scheme, Asia PKI Interoperability Guide, Extended Validation SSL certificates etc.) Acknowledge national accreditation schemes Determine a CA s class from policy and other documentation (CPS etc.) Plus perhaps other information on CA and owners (customer base, credit rating, income versus expenses etc.) Classification may be less stringent than policy mapping for cross-certification Assess assurance level for classification Study of documents, self-assessment, surveillance, third party audit report, certifications etc. Publish quality classification Numerical value (0-N) Profile (structure) of values for different quality parameters Criteria should be turned into standards And be used as basis for third party certification of CAs
21 Signature verification Web Service Request (may be signed) contains: One digitally signed document or pair(s) of signature(s) and hash value(s) belonging to the same document Optionally quality requirements to signatures and eids (default values may be configured in the VA for the specific relying party) Optionally flags for requested respond with parameters Response (always signed by the VA) contains: Overall assertion (trusted, not trusted, indeterminate) for document Assertions for each signature and eid (valid, invalid, indeterminate, insufficient quality) Names (DN) from all certificates Values for respond with parameters Other requirements Should handle all signature formats (PKCS#1, PKCS#7, CMS, PDF, XML DSIG, ETSI TS , ETSI TS and possibly more) Should handle all cases of nested and independent signatures Must handle all necessary hash and crypto algorithms
22 eid certificate validation Web Service Request contains: eid certificate(s) (support for certificate chains to be added) Optionally quality requirements to certificates (default values may be configured in the VA for the specific RP) Optionally flags for requested respond with parameters Response contains: Assertions (valid, invalid, indeterminate, insufficient quality) for all eids Name (DN) of eid holder(s) Values for respond with parameters Other requirements Validation based on direct trust in the CA no need for certificate chains Must handle all necessary hash and crypto algorithms
23 Respond with parameters (extensible) Key value (the public key) Hash algorithm X.509 certificate chain X.509 CRL Subject key identifier OCSP (from CA) Time stamp Signed hash (decrypted hash) Content (signatures removed) Signature quality level Certificate quality level Key usage (from certificate) Extended key usage (from certificate) Basic constraints (from certificate) Valid from (from certificate) Valid to (from certificate) Certificate serial number Issuer name (DN of CA) CRL URL CRL number
24 The VA Gateway VA Gateway Internet Validation Authority VA domain Document content removed, only signatures to VA Customer domain Customer policies can be applied in GWY and web GUI interfaces can be provided
25 CRL archive, historical validation The VA downloads CRLs from CAs to local archive Cache of revocation status and time of revocations Time parameter in request ask for historical validation Response states validity at the time requested May also use time-stamps in signatures or signed document Not possible for CAs that use OCSP only Earliest time is start of caching for this CA Complements long-term signed data objects An interface not offered on-line by CAs today
26 Distribution architecture A hub of the world VA will not scale Simplest distribution architecture: replication More advanced architectures will be developed Distribution of: VA service instances CRL download services Probably 1-2 central CRL archive sites A VA service instance answers by itself (except possibly historical validation) Efficient information distribution to all VA instances Alternative is rerouting of requests to the appropriate VA
27 Miscellaneous Relationship to bridge-cas and similar? Co-exist may even be mutual benefits What about CardSpace etc.? Fits well the relying party has to validate credentials even in this case What about protocols? OCSP is too limited in functionality SCVP: Why use a specialized protocol when standard Web Services does it all? XKMS: We used this as a basis OASIS DSS: Yes, we need to look closer at this Standardization? We publish our specifications Some of our work should in fact be taken over by standards bodies What is the attitude of the CAs? CAs are positive! Better re-use of eids, risk management, CRL archive Plus income sharing based on proportion of the VA s traffic Number of CAs? Estimated in the order of 100 public CAs in Europe (number of agreements needed) Several 100s world-wide Consolidation rather that proliferation expected Some corporate CAs will need to be included What does it cost? No definite answer. What s the value of a signature on a contract? Scanning cost of invoice?
28 Summary The Validation Authority: A single trust anchor for the PKI Relying Party Handling complexity Providing risk and liability management Providing interoperability and scalability VA Trust services to enable effective use of eid and digital signatures, realising the potential of PKI DNV VA is available to pilot customers PEPPOL e-procurement pilot Partners: Ascertia (UK), BBS (Norway) EEs RP
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