Enlargement in perspective

Transcription

1 Enlargement in perspective Helene Sjursen (ed.) Copyright ARENA ISSN Printed at ARENA Centre for European Studies University of Oslo P.O.Box 1143, Blindern N-0317 Oslo, Norway Tel: Fax: [email protected] Oslo, January 2005 Cover picture: Francois Boucher, The Rape of Europe,

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3 Preface On 7-8 May 2004, the CIDEL consortium organised a workshop in Ávila, Spain, on Justifying Enlargement Past and Present Experiences. CIDEL - Citizenship and Democratic Legitimacy in the EU is a 3-years ( ) joint research project with ten partners in six European countries. The project is coordinated by ARENA, University of Oslo, and is supported by the European Commission s Fifth Framework Programme for Research, Key Action Improving the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base. The workshop in Ávila, which is under Workpackage 4, is deliverable no. 12 from the project. The present report is based on the workshop. Erik Oddvar Eriksen Scientific Responsible CIDEL project

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5 Table of contents Introduction Enlargement in perspective Helene Sjursen... 1 Chapter 1 Arguing about Enlargement José Ignacio Torreblanca.. 13 Chapter 2 Germany and EU Enlargement: From Rapprochement to Reaproachment? Marcin Zaborowski.. 41 Chapter 3 Ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy Sonia Piedrafita 69 Chapter 4 Between Security and Human Rights Denmark and the Enlargement of the EU Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen.. 97 Chapter 5 Turkey s EU Politics: What Justifies Reform? Gamze Avci

6 Chapter 6 Prioritisations in the Enlargement Process: Are some Candidates more European than Others? Åsa Lundgren Chapter 7 The Application and Acceptance of Democratic Norms in the Eastward Enlargement Paul Kubicek Chapter 8 Probably a Regime, Perhaps a Union: European Integration in the Czech and Slovak Political Discourse Petr Drulák Chapter 9 The Role of Argumentative Coherence in the EU s Justification of Minority Protection as a Condition for Membership Guido Schwellnus Chapter 10 Summary of Papers Børge Romsloe

7 Enlargement in perspective Helene Sjursen ARENA, University of Oslo As recognised by the Laeken European Council, the European Union stands at a crossroads. The gradual strengthening of common European institutions and the inclusion of new policy areas such as social policy, security policy, justice and home affairs issues in the joint responsibility of the EU and its member states are indicators of the political nature of integration in Europe. At the same time this political nature of European integration points to the need for a clearer conception of what the EU is or should be. There is considerable uncertainty as to what type of entity the EU will become, as to what kind of order is emerging in Europe. Often, answers to these questions about the nature and characteristics of the future European order are sought by analysing the building and reforming of the EU s institutions, rules and procedures for decision-making. However, when it comes to identifying the nature of the EU it is not sufficient to look at its emerging governance structures and its basic, overarching institutional features. We must also look more closely at developments in particular policy fields. Different actors have different interests, visions and values that they wish to project onto the European level, different ideas about what the EU ought to be about. The importance and relevance of these different interests, values and visions might become more visible through analyses of the actual policies produced by the EU. Often, it is here, in the processes of determining what should be done with regard to concrete issues, that the fundamental features of the EU are actually defined. Thus, analysing the principal reasons for particular policy-decisions might contribute to a better

8 2 Helene Sjursen understanding of what kind of order is emerging in Europe. However, even more so the question of EU enlargement should be a key issue in terms of understanding the fundamental characteristics of the European Union. Surprisingly, although enlargement has been a fundamental feature of the EU since its early days, few systematic studies of its significance for European integration have been produced. Rather, enlargements have been seen as isolated episodes, which do not tell us much about the EU as such. It is quite clear, however, that the issue of membership and how it is dealt with is at the core of any organisation including the EU. In order for an organisation to find criteria for inclusion (as well as exclusion) one would expect it to have, or to be forced to form, an idea of what its fundamental purposes are. Even though answers to such questions are perhaps unlikely to have been produced in advance, one might reasonably expect that they are at least indirectly or partly confronted through the practice of enlargement. Consequently, a thorough and systematic investigation of how the EU has handled this question (across time, across different countries or regions and with regard to different policy areas) should provide valuable insights into the EU s selfunderstanding, goals and priorities. In fact, it would seem that without looking at this issue, it would be difficult to get a clear picture of what kind of order is emerging in Europe. For example, deciding where Europe stops, or should stop, is a particular challenge. It inevitably raises questions such as who the Europeans are and what kind of values characterise Europe. Furthermore, the more functional questions such as on what conditions new members should be allowed entry should also provide valuable insights. Several possibilities arise in regard to the question of what kind of order is emerging in Europe. Following the CIDEL project, 1 three ideal-types can be identified (Eriksen and Fossum 2004). Firstly, the EU might be on its way to be reduced to a mere problem solving entity based on economic citizenship. Here, membership would be derived from its discernible benefits and the purpose of the organisation would be to promote the material interests of the member states. Secondly, the EU might be moving towards a value-based community premised on social and cultural citizenship. From such a perspective the EU would be a geographically delimited entity seeking to revitalise traditions, mores and memories of whatever common European values and affiliations there are in order to forge a we-feeling as a basis for integration. A third possibility would be that the EU is moving towards a 1 CIDEL Citizenship and Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union is a research project financed by the European Commission s Fifth Framework Programme for Research. The project involves ten partners from six different countries. For more details see:

9 Enlargement in perspective 3 rights-based post-national union based on a full-fledged political citizenship. Public support would here have as its motivation a constitutional patriotism, which emanates from a set of legally entrenched fundamental rights and democratic procedures that are deeply entrenched in the collective psyche of Europeans and in the institutional framework of the European Union. Consistent with the principal hypothesis of the CIDEL project, the various contributions to this report discuss to what extent enlargement speaks to the image of the EU as a rights-based post-national union. In order to examine this, one might ask, firstly, why has the EU systematically decided in favour of enlargement? Given the costs and risks of enlargement, why has the European Union not simply chosen to remain as it is? And why have not individual member states, in particular those that expect to pay the highest price for enlargement, used their power to veto this process? The question is particularly relevant with regard to the last of the EU s enlargements, agreed upon in principle at the European Council s summit in Copenhagen in June 1993 and confirmed with the entry of ten new member states in the European Union in May If we consider that the EU is chiefly, as the first ideal type of the EU suggests, becoming a problem solving entity, where membership is derived from its discernable benefits to the member states, we would, at least at first sight, expect a veto from some of the member states. However, no member state vetoed the process. Although this would seem to weaken the hypothesis that the EU is mainly a problem solving entity, detailed analyses are required in order to investigate the extent to which this means that enlargement speaks to the second or the third ideal type of the EU. Furthermore, the question is not only that of the basis on which the EU decides to enlarge; equally important is how and in what way the decision to enlarge is implemented. How are the norms and rules of the European Union applied in the accession process? To what extent are they applied in a consistent and similar manner in all applicant states? Comparisons should be useful here in order to determine to what extent applicants receive equal treatment and to what extent there have been prioritisations of specific applicants or groups of applicants. This would tell us something about the conception of the EU that lies behind the enlargement process. Should the emphasis on the political criteria be lesser with regard to certain applicant states than others, for example, this might weaken the argument that the EU is developing towards a rights based post-national union. Finally, the extent to which the principled decisions on EU enlargement are actually implemented is also an indicator of the extent to which democratic principles

10 4 Helene Sjursen and human rights are constitutive of the EU s identity or merely cheap talk. These questions constitute a second focus in this report. Analytical approach A lively debate has developed within the academic community, in particular about the role and importance of norms in understanding the process of enlargement. It is generally accepted in the emerging literature on this question that norms must have played a part in the decision to enlarge (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002; Sjursen 2002; Torreblanca 2001; Schimmelfennig 2001; Sedelmeier 2000; Fierke and Wiener 1999). However, to emphasise the role of norms is only the beginning. There are numerous rule-sets, norms and identities. Hence key questions are what kind of norms have been important as well as how EU norms have been applied in the accession process. A further core question is that of the mechanisms through which norms are complied with. Is norm compliance ensured through the mechanism of self-interested calculations? In other words are norms only used instrumentally, and thus functioning simply as constraints on actors (selfinterested) behaviour? Or do norms constitute the world views and preferences of actors? On which of these bases should we understand enlargement? In order to investigate these questions an analytical distinction may be made between three different types or categories of arguments that might be used to justify enlargement: pragmatic arguments, ethical-political arguments and moral arguments (Habermas 1993). 2 Each of these speaks to one of the images of the EU outlined above. In a pragmatic approach policy would be justified with reference to the output that it is expected to produce. This means that one would not expect actors to support enlargement unless arguments could be found to support the idea that it would provide utility given their interests and preferences. In an ethical-political approach justification would rely on a particular conception of the collective us and a particular idea of the values represented by a specific community. Here, one would seek to justify enlargement by referring to duties and responsibilities emerging as a result of belonging to a particular community. In a moral approach the aim would not be to justify policy with reference to calculations of utility nor with reference to the values of a particular community but to find justifications that rely on universal standards of justice, regardless of the utility of the policy to the particular actors involved in the decision or the specific values or perceptions of the good life embedded in the community outlining policy. 2 For other attempts to employ Habermas theory of communicative action to international relations see: Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Risse 2000; Müller 2001; and Lose 2001.

11 Enlargement in perspective 5 Hence, the first type of argument has much in common with the concept of logic of consequence and the second and third type of arguments are related to the concept of logic of appropriateness, although they should obviously not be conflated (March and Olsen 1989, 1998). Both concepts are developed in new institutionalist theory and have more recently been adopted in the international relations literature. 3 The logic of appropriateness does however have a certain ambiguity to it that is not resolved in the way it is employed in the current international relations literature in general and in the sociological-institutionalist literature on enlargement in particular (Sedelmeier 2000; Schimmelfennig 2001). To put it simply, the logic of appropriateness could imply both rule following as a result of habit or a particular identity and rule following based on a rational assessment of morally valid arguments (Eriksen 1999). 4 Hence, it would not be sufficient in terms of investigating whether or not the EU is moving in the direction of the second or the third of the images outlined earlier. Different criteria identify the various types of arguments: utility, values and rights (Sjursen 2002). Utility refers to an effort to find efficient solutions to concrete problems or dilemmas. Policymakers seek legitimisation by achieving an output that could be seen as beneficial to given interests and preferences. Values refer to a particular idea of the good life that is grounded in the identity of a specific community. Policy would be legitimised through reference to what is considered appropriate given a particular group s conception of itself and of what it represents. Rights refer to a set of principles that are mutually recognised. In other words, policy would be legitimised with reference to principles that, all things considered, can be recognised as just by all parties, irrespective of their particular interests, perceptions of the good life or cultural identity. A focus on arguments and reasons will only make sense if we can from the outset be reasonably certain that actors have not been forced through economic or military means to make a particular decision. This seems a safe assumption in the case of the European Union s enlargement process. Perhaps more contentious is the assumption that individual member states have not been forced by other more powerful members to commit themselves to enlargement. Yet, given that the EU is an organisation that is bound by legal rules it is difficult to imagine that individual member states have been faced 3 Two often quoted international relations texts building on the new institutionalist perspective are, Cowles et al 2001 and Stone Sweet et al Thus Eriksen (1999) suggests a third logic that he calls a logic of moral justification. This is similar to Risse s (2000) category of logic of arguing.

12 6 Helene Sjursen with direct threats of use of force unless they agree to an expansion of the EU. Furthermore, as enlargement is decided by consensus member states can not be forced to accept the policy through voting procedures either. The relevance of such analyses, as well as the credibility of their findings, might also be questioned on the grounds that there is often a considerable gap between what policy-makers say and what they actually mean. There could in other words be a hidden agenda involved. This can to some extent be controlled by examining the consistency of the arguments presented (both consistency between different actors and consistency in the arguments of a particular actor). A further, and more obvious, credibility control is that of whether what is said and what is actually done corresponds. Most importantly, however, is it that the true motives of the actors involved may not be crucial. As rational choice theorists argue, it is impossible for us to reach into the hearts and souls of policy-makers and thus to uncover their real or sincere beliefs and convictions. For methodological reasons it is simply assumed that actors are egotistical and self-interested, that they are motivated by the aim of maximising self-interest, and furthermore by considering these interests as exogenous to the analysis. The analytical framework briefly sketched here seeks to extend the range of possible rational arguments or reasons at the actor s disposal. What is important is that the arguments and reasons in themselves are such that other reasonable actors can support them, in other words that these are arguments and reasons that are considered legitimate or reasonable, and that as a consequence can lead to agreement on a policy. These arguments do not have to be valid by universal standards. Neither do they have to be the result of a deeply felt conviction on the part of the author. But they have to be able to mobilise support. The condition for this support is that the arguments are considered legitimate. The advantage of such an approach is to leave it open to empirical research to determine whether or not political processes can be seen to contain something more than considerations of utility and interest maximisation. Thus, the aim is not to reject or undermine the importance of such dimensions in political processes but to try to improve our understanding of such processes by introducing two further dimensions - a value dimension and a rights dimension - into the analysis. Consequently, references to utility are only one way in which the decision to enlarge might be justified and thus one reason why the EU decided to enlarge. An important task is to assess whether or not the two other ways of justifying policy might have contributed to this decision.

13 Enlargement in perspective 7 In this report we have sought to investigate the question of whether these arguments played a more important role than the argumentation based on utility. The report is the result of a workshop organised in Ávila, Spain in May 2004 and the articles published here are revised versions of most of the papers presented there. The report should be seen as a first step towards tackling the questions raised above. Further research than what has been possible in these pages, refining the analytical categories as well as strengthening the empirical documentation, is required. As a general starting point for the individual contributions, three hypotheses about enlargement were suggested, based on the ideal types of the EU developed in the CIDEL project. The main hypothesis, consistent with the conception of the EU as a rights-based post-national union, was that: - The EU enlarges based on a concern to protect universal principles of human rights and democracy, and would prioritize enlargement to those states that would make this possible. A first alternative hypothesis was that: - The EU would prioritise enlargement to states where the economic benefits of enlargement were considered particularly high. This would suggest that the EU is chiefly a problem solving entity whose principal purpose is to promote the material interests of the member states. A second alternative hypothesis was that: - The EU would prioritise enlargement to states towards which it had a particular sense of kinship based duty. This would suggest that enlargement is not only a matter of rights but also a matter a values, and that a sense of common identity, however thin, is emerging in the EU. The report starts with a brief look back in time, with José I. Torreblanca s review of the development of the enlargement acquis. His comparison with past enlargements is conducted in order to assess to what extent the role of norms, and the emphasis on democracy, is a new invention in the European enterprise, and thus particularly visible in the last round of enlargement, or

14 8 Helene Sjursen rather if it is a long term trend. Subsequently, we examine three member states (Germany, Denmark and Spain) and their positions on the latest enlargement. Similarly, we look at perspectives in the applicant states, with a particular emphasis on Turkey, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The aim of these country specific papers is to achieve a clearer view of what kind of understanding of the EU that emerges from their positions. Why did they support enlargement, or refrain from preventing it? Whereas Germany and Denmark are usually identified as drivers in the enlargement process, Spain on the other hand, is conventionally considered to have been reluctant to accept new member states. Clearly, Spain had little to gain from enlargement in economic or security terms. In fact, the country was expected to loose out in material terms, given the fact that its relative wealth inside the EU would increase as a result of the entry of poorer member states. Consequently, Spain would have to expect fewer transfers from the EU budget. However, Spain never vetoed enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. This is the puzzle that Sonia Piedrafita examines in her paper. With regard to the drivers in the enlargement process, Denmark and Germany, it is usually argued that they promoted enlargement due to expectations of material gain. However, the two papers in this report suggest that this is, at best, only part of the story. Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen find that in the case of Denmark s position on enlargement economic considerations have little explanatory value. Security considerations on the other hand did play a part, however they cannot on their own explain why Denmark was one of the main drivers in the enlargement process, as the Danish position also entailed security risks. Rather, a sense of duty to solidarity appears to have triggered Denmark to support enlargement. Likewise in the case of Germany, Marcin Zaborowski highlights the adherence to multilateralism as a core organising principle for European relations as crucial to the country s enthusiasm for enlargement. Hence a first cut at studying member states perspectives seems to suggest that a picture of enlargement as driven by states with a particular material interest in enlargement is insufficient. This also links to a different conception of the EU than that captured by the problem solving ideal type. Turning to the applicant states, Petr Drulák discusses the conception of the European Union as a problem solving regime or a rights-based union in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. He finds that in particular in the Czech Republic it is possible to see a clear tension between those conceiving of the EU as primarily a problem solving entity and those emphasising its role as a rights-based union. However, the case of Turkish candidature is perhaps particularly crucial in terms of discussing what enlargement can tell us about various conceptions of the EU. We know from previous research that the arguments and reasons presented in favour of enlarging to Central and Eastern

15 Enlargement in perspective 9 Europe have differed from those presented in favour of enlargement to Turkey (Sjursen 2002). With regard to the former, the EU has systematically emphasised the duty to unite Europe and the sense of commonality with the applicant states. With regard to Turkey, such arguments have rarely been heard. Rather, strategic considerations have been in focus when enlargement has been justified. However, at the same time, the decision of December 2004 to open negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 confirms the idea that the normative basis of the EU carries cosmopolitan elements and suggests that arguments for excluding applicant states that refer to religious differences have not been considered legitimate. Finally, how consistent has the emphasis on the political criteria been in the different applicant states and across different issue areas? Four papers examine this issue. Gamze Avci investigates the extent to which democratic reform in Turkey has taken place according to a process of learning where the validity of arguments have played a particular role and where domestic actors have justified the need for such reforms with reference to their value and standing in themselves and not only as necessary means to achieve the objective of membership in the EU. Åsa Lundgren examines the EU s own emphasis on democratic reform in its relation with Turkey. Paul Kubicek conducts a comparison of transition in Slovakia, Latvia, Poland and Romania, examining how norms and rules were applied as well as the extent to which democratic norms have taken root in the applicant countries. The last paper in this report discusses the issue of consistency in political criteria through a focus on the particularly thorny issue of minority rights. Guido Shwellnus asks to what extent and in what ways the EU s position on this issue challenges the core hypothesis of the CIDEL project that the EU is developing towards a rightsbased post national union. In addition to the written papers published in this report Thomas Christiansen, Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum, Alexandra Gheciu, Geoffrey Harris, Agustín José Menéndez, Andrea Ott, Børge Romsloe, Karen Smith, Gracia Trujillo and Hakan Yilmaz participated in the workshop and acted as discussant and critical interlocutors. I would like to thank all of them for their valuable input to the workshop. Particular thanks go to Geir Kværk and Majken Thorsager for highly effective and precise administrative and editorial assistance.

16 10 Helene Sjursen References Cowles, M. G., Caporaso, J. and Risse, T. (eds.) (2001): Europeanization and domestic change: transforming Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Eriksen, E.O. (1999) Towards a logic of justification. On the possibility of post-national solidarity, in Egeberg, M. and Lægreid, P. (eds.): Organizing Political Institutions. Essays for Johan P. Olsen, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. Eriksen, E. O. and Fossum, J. E. (eds.) (2000): Democracy in the European Union: integration through deliberation? London: Routledge. Eriksen, E. O. and Fossum, J. E. (2004): Europe in Search of Legitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assessed, International Political Science Review 25 (4) (October 2004), pp Fierke, K. and Wiener, A. (1999) Constructing institutional interest: EU and NATO enlargement, Journal of European Public Policy 6 (3) pp Habermas, J. (1993): On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason, in Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Lose, L G. (2001): Communicative action and the world of diplomacy, in Fierke, K. and Jørgensen, K. E. (eds.): Constructing international relations, New York: ME Sharpe. March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1989): Rediscovering Institutions: the Organisational basis of politics, London: Collier Macmillan Publishers. March, J. G. and Olsen, J.P. (1998): The institutional dynamics of international political orders, International Organization 52 (4) pp Müller, H. (2001): International relations as communicative action, in Fierke, K. and Jørgensen, K. E. (eds.): Constructing international relations, New York: ME Sharpe. Risse, T. (2000): Let s argue! Communicative action in world politics, International Organization 54 (1) pp Schimmelfennig, F. (2001): The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union International Organization 55 (1) pp Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002): European Union Enlargement Theoretical and Comparative Approaches, Journal of European Public Policy. Special Issue 9 (4).

17 Enlargement in perspective 11 Sedelmeier, U. (2000): Eastern enlargement: risk, rationality, and rolecompliance, in Cowles, M. G. and Smith, M. (eds.): The State of the European Union: Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival 5, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sjursen, H. (2002): Why expand? The question of legitimacy and justification in the EU s enlargement policy, Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (3) pp Stone Sweet, A., Sandholtz, W. and Fligstein, N. (eds.) (2001): The institutionalization of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Torreblanca, J.I. (2001): The Reuniting of Europe. Promises, negotiations and compromises, Aldershot: Ashgate.

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19 Chapter 1 Arguing about enlargement José Ignacio Torreblanca UNED Introduction 1 More than two hundred years ago, when defending the US Constitution in The Federalist Papers, James Madison noted the fact that the Articles of Confederation of 1777 had not made any reference to the eventual establishment of new States or the procedures for accession of new members into the Confederation. As Madison lamented, decisions on this realm had been left at the discretion of the nine States. 2 However, earlier in 1784, some years before the Constitution was drafted, Thomas Jefferson had headed a committee which produced a Report of Government for Western Lands which proposed a plan for dividing the western territories, providing a temporary government for the West, and devising a method for new western states to enter the Union on an equal basis with the original states. The debate on the accession conditions of new members emerged again at the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 when Gov. Morris and Sherman argued against conferring the new territories which may join the Union later on equal rights than those the founding members were granting 1 Thanks to Sonia Piedrafita and Gracia Trujillo for their most valuable research assistance, suggestions, observations and comments. I thank also all the participants of the CIDEL workshop (Avila 7-8 May 2004), and specially Karen Smith, Helene Sjursen, Erik O. Eriksen and John Erik Fosssum for their valuable comments and suggestions. 2 Madison, The Powers Conferred by the Constitution, The Federalist Papers No. 43.

20 14 José Ignacio Torreblanca to themselves. Jefferson and Madison opposed the motion, insisting that the Western States neither would nor ought to submit to a union which degraded them from an equal rank with other States. 3 Jefferson and Madison set the basis of the westward expansion of the United States. But more importantly, they ensured that this expansion would be governed by the principle of equality and non-discrimination. A few years later, in 1787, the so-called Northwest Ordinance, regulating the government of all western territories north of the Ohio River and, above all, the principle of the equality of acceding states, was adopted thus putting an end to the dispute. Jefferson and Madison s arguments prevailed not because there was any voting, or because Jefferson and Madison were more powerful than Morris and Sherman (which they were not). If Jefferson and Madison s arguments prevailed it was because they were superior in factual and normative terms to Morris s and Sherman s. Treating the new members differently, Jefferson and Madison convincingly argued to the Constitutional Convention, would be both unfair and dangerous for the legitimacy and stability of the Union. Whereas treating new members equally could be justified in terms of democratic equality and fairness, treating them differently could hardly be justified. 4 Faced with the need to devise principles to handle a situation which had not been confronted before, and for which clear norms were lacking (accession of new states), actors resorted to arguments rather than threats, decided to argue rather than to bargain and, ultimately, solved the issue by referring to commonly accepted standards of democratic legitimacy and fairness. At the end of the day, the results obtained by using a logic of justification and a high standard of democratic legitimacy proved to be more efficient and more fair than those which could have been eventually been reached had the logic being applied been a logic of utility or self-interest maximization. Despite the difference between the westward expansion of the US and EU enlargement processes, the theme of the consistency of arguments related to enlargement decisions is quite familiar for Europeans. For more than forty years now, Europeans have been examining the consistency of arguments in favour or against enlargement, and discussing the principles which should 3 If the admission be consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original States. But the Legislature may make conditions with the new States, concerning the public debt, which shall be then subsisting (James Madison, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, available at ). 4 I thank Jon Elster for this inspiring analogy and for his comments on how arguing applied then and now when dealing with enlargement.

21 Arguing about enlargement 15 orient this process. As shocking as it may appear, De Gaulle s 1963 arguments rejecting the UK s application sounded very similar to those employed today with respect to Turkey. The UK was not European, De Gaulle said. British people were not like us; they were close to the US. Similarly, today we frequently hear that Turkey is not European, that the US is behind this application as a way to weaken the EU, that admitting Turkey would alter the basic nature of the EU and make impossible achieving its finalité politique, that Turkey s agriculture and demography are just not compatible with EU policies and regulations etc. 5 Back in 1962, at the time of the British membership application, and still today with the confusing handling of the Turkish membership issue, the EU keeps on showing that it lacks clear rules for deciding who will become member, when and how. The lack of clear and precise rules, however, I argue in this paper, does not mean that there are no principles inspiring policies, or that arguments about legitimacy are not or have not been influential. Back in the sixties, I show, the EEC produced an enlargement acquis specifying what membership entailed in terms of rights and duties and how enlargement processes would be dealt with. This created deliberative conditions within the EEC and between the EEC and the applicants for them to argue over the truthfulness, validity, appropriateness of each other s arguments for accepting, rejecting or justifying enlargement. This made it possible to translate identity-based arguments, geopolitical concerns or economic anxieties into a deliberative framework in which they could be properly dealt with and be subject to objective processes of both factual and normative verification. Faced with enlargement, I show in this paper, EU governments have traditionally exchanged arguments about how to make sure that successive enlargements were both compatible with EU values and shared identities, on the one hand, as well as with the preservation of EU policies and institutions, on the other hand. They have come to agree on a set of membership conditions (the Birkelbach Report recommendations, the 1978 Declaration on Democracy, the 1993 Copenhagen criteria) and accession principles (the indivisibility of the acquis communautaire, non-discrimination in the decision to open negotiations and relative merit for determining the conclusion of accession negotiation) which make enlargement possible in ways which are 5 Nous pensons que les pays qui sont proches de nous n'ont pas vocation à une adhésion pure et simple de l'union européenne sous peine de la dénaturer complètement. Speech by Alain Juppé (UMP) on Turkish accession, April 7, and.

22 16 José Ignacio Torreblanca compatible with both the preservation of the integration process and the enhancing of the democratic nature and legitimacy of the EU. A rational institutionalist perspective would consider these principles, rules and arrangements governing enlargement (the enlargement acquis) as a typical set of institutional devices Member States use in order to minimize transaction costs, enforce compliance and solve collective action dilemmas. In this paper, however, I argue in favour of considering these conditions and principles not as institutions devised by way of instrumental oriented negotiations but as results of rational communication among actors seeking to preserve and increase the legitimacy of the EU as a supranational governance arrangement. Regardless whether enlargement serves well the material interests of member states, I argue, this set of norms regulating the accession conditions, together with the principles inspiring accession negotiations, must be seen as the outcomes of a rational deliberation, not as consequences of self-interested negotiations. The promise of deliberative supranationalism, I conclude, is worth exploring. The promise of deliberative supranationalism Despite the immense temporal and analytical distances between the westward expansion of the US and the eastward enlargement of the EU, I have argued, both cases seem to be well-suited to show the role that (legitimate) arguments can play in solving collective action dilemmas. As I will try to show in the paper, the understanding of EU enlargement may have a lot to gain by applying a framework based on communicative rationality and the logic of justification. What justifies the claim (Sjursen 2002) that the theory of deliberative supranationalism (Eriksen 2003, Eriksen and Fossum 2003) can help solve the theoretical puzzle of enlargement, to use the term first coined by Schimmelfennig (1999) in new ways? First and above all, deliberation can be seen as a way of solving collective action problems that is not only consistent with the particular interests of the member states but also with the EU interests taken as a whole; because it addresses action coordination as a process of establishing mutual understandings between diverse actors, arguing might contribute to the micro-theory required for explaining integration, (Eriksen 2003: 3). Enlargement is seldom specifically modelled as a collective action dilemma, but it quite looks as one: member states know that enlargement is good for them collectively but damaging individually in the short term in both

23 Arguing about enlargement 17 institutional and economic terms. Therefore, enlargement should result in a typical collectively suboptimal outcome which satisfies individual but not collective preferences. Deliberative processes can then solve coordination problems and result in increases of both collective efficiency and legitimacy. This is very pertinent to the case of enlargement because the basic puzzle of enlargement consists in explaining how an interested-oriented process could result in a highly normative outcome. Therefore, by providing the missing causal linking processes and outcomes, deliberation can help solving the puzzle of enlargement in ways which are theoretically sound and empirically possible. A second advantage of deliberation is that it does not force us to choose between interests and norms (Eriksen and Weigard 1997: 229). Confronting consensus (the typical outcome of deliberation) with compromises (the typical outcome of negotiations), makes thus little sense in the case of enlargement, in which we know that both are pervasive (Segall 2000: 63). When looking at enlargement, we can very easily check the existence of materialist interests, self-interested oriented negotiations and compromises reached at through bargaining (Moravscik and Vachudova 2002). To the extent that enlargement has been possible, it has been due to a very precise distribution of costs over time and (to paraphrase Schmitter s observations on democratic transitions) a very careful management of time, tempo and timing. Normative considerations, on the other hand, have played a very important role. Enlargement is today such a highly regulated and principled oriented process that even typical rationalists could concede, negotiations are little else than a process of checking that the candidates have adopted EU law. The requirements are massive, non-negotiable, uniformly applied and closely enforced (Moravscik and Vachudova 2002: 49). At the same time, justifications of enlargement based on moral and ethical arguments are so pervasive that it is impossible to reject them as cheap talk. Enlargement is a two-track process: on one track, there are compromises reached through interest-based negotiations; on the other track, there is a rational deliberation based on truth and impartiality which results in a set of norms and principles collectively agreed. The problem is that neither the logic of consequentiality nor the logic of appropriateness offer easy ways to deal with problems like the one posed by enlargement: sociological institutionalism and the logic of appropriateness are weak at explaining the origin and evolution of norms and, at the same time, the weakest point of rational accounts is that they fail to explain actors preferences, i.e. where do they originate and change (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In contrast, by assuming that both interests and norms are present in any political process,

24 18 José Ignacio Torreblanca and by suggesting the consideration of arguing as the main coordination mechanism among actors, deliberative supranationalism forces us to explore the particular relationships established between them in different contexts and try to account for observable differences. A third advantage of using deliberative supranationalism is that it seems ideally suited for analysis of institutional or decision-making settings, such as the EU, in which authority is scattered, power relations are often horizontal instead of vertical and policies are the outcome of governance rather than government. In systems like the EU, where authoritative ways of resolving conflicts or interests are absent, reason giving becomes the only way of reaching consensus (Eriksen 2003:14, also citing Lord 1999:68). That in the EU context, unanimity can help the emergence of a problem-solving approach (aimed at identifying solutions), as opposed to a bargaining approach (characterized by power assets and redistribution mechanisms) has often been noted (Elgström and Jönson 2000; Friis 1998). Enlargement, in particular, shows two features which make it ideal for deliberation: unanimity and diffuse norms. Interestingly enough, the emergence of deliberation conditions can be explained both from rationalist and sociological premises. In cooperative-bargaining theory, the cost of disagreements is crucial to define the characteristics of a game (Esteban and Sakóvics 2002). Being enlargement such an important constitutional event for the EU, a veto would certainly leave all member states worse off than the status quo. Since the cost of the status quo is negative and known and the cost of enlargement is uncertain, actors have a strong incentive to explore the future, thus having at their disposal an opportunity to engage in deliberation as to which norms and principles should inspire policies in the future. Alternatively, if we applied a logic of appropriateness to the enlargement preferences of member states, we would find that diffuse norms may create a scope for deliberation and argumentation about what the right course of action might be in a practical situation (Sedelmeier 2003: 12). Therefore, deliberative processes could both emerge as the result of self-interest behaviour or, alternatively, from the lack of clarity about the exact actions prescribed by constitutive norms and shared identities. As a consequence, rather than explaining the absence of vetoes or the power or norms as causes, we should see the emergence of deliberation being the consequence of the combined effect of unanimity and normative ambiguity. Fourth and yet quite important, deliberative supranationalism makes it possible to theorize the relation between enlargement and integration in ways which have not been explored so far. As Sedelmeier (2003) has highlighted,

25 Arguing about enlargement 19 enlargement has traditionally been conceived of as special case of EU foreign policy. From this perspective of external action, a good deal of analyses have then examined the policy-making process, the consistency of EU actions etc. (Sedelmeier 1994, 2002; Smith 1999; Torreblanca 2001, 2002). However, cumulative research on enlargement has led most of the scholars working on the field to start examining enlargement from the perspective of its constituting impact on the EU (Sedelmeier 2000, 2003; Sjursen 2002). The EU is a dynamic entity, permanently unsettled, Laffan (2001: 4) has written, along five major dimensions: constitutional order, geographical boundaries, institutional balance, decision rules and functional scope. Interestingly enough, each enlargement process has distinctively affected each and every one of these five dimensions, though in ways which still are insufficiently systematized in empirical and theoretical terms. Early neofunctionalism, to begin with, never considered enlargement as a cause of integration, but rather as a consequence of integration. With few exceptions (Schmitter s 1971 externalization effects), enlargement did not fit either in the initial functionalist logic of task expansion or in the neofunctional hypotheses about the expansion of the authority allocated to supranational authorities. However, today we cannot but notice: first, that the historical record shows that each enlargement round has had a major impact on the integration process (both as a pre-requisite and as a consequence); second, the unexpected functional spill-overs created by enlargement in the institutional realm (seen in the paradox of how member states have accepted to move an increasing number of policy areas to qualified majority voting in order to gain relative and absolute voting power, compared to unanimity); third, that whereas federalism has traditionally been an ideology seeking to push integration along some normative lines, enlargement to members may actually be the cause of all parties accepting federalism as an efficient technical solution to authority allocation and governance problems. This constituting dimension of enlargement offers a major and promising avenue to build the theoretical missing link between enlargement and integration on which attention is frequently drawn (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2002). Yet, it is precisely this relationship between enlargement, integration and democratic governance which lies at the core of the research agenda posed by deliberative supranationalism. Therefore, the way the EU proceeds and justifies itself is decisive in order to tell us which kind of entity it is becoming: a pragmatic agreement legitimized in terms of its efficiency, a

26 20 José Ignacio Torreblanca rights-based union, or a true community based on common values and shared identities (Eriksen and Fossum 2003). Hypotheses on enlargement, deliberation and principles Among the most recent, and apparently powerful alternative explanation to the puzzle of enlargement, one has to credit Schimmelfennigs rhetorical action argument (1999, 2001). Rhetorical action is based in the strategic use of norms, identities and arguments about legitimacy by some actors in order to shame non-compliant states and induce them to change their preferences or moderate their demands. In Schimmelfennig s view, the collective action problem of enlargement is solved because the limiting effects on the pursuit of self-interests of a community environment. He thus argues that the collective action problem is solved by combining a rational account of preferences and logic of action, followed by a constructivist explanation of interaction and dynamics (2003:157). As Eriksen (2003) and Sjursen (2002, 2003) have pointed out, rhetoric can only have an impact if actors truly share the legitimacy of these norms and the arguments employed to justify political decisions. Therefore, Schimmelfennig s rhetorical action is more of a sophisticated version of rational bargaining which has little or nothing to do with deliberation. Following Elster s (1991: 2-3) distinction, bargaining is about forcing and inducing with threats or promises (which is precisely what Schimmelfennig s governments do), whereas, when arguing, actors are constrained by ideas of impartiality and consistency. Obviously, there is nothing wrong with considering institutions, norms and shared identities as both brakes on the pursuit of particular interests and as devices to solve collective action problems. Yet, in these situations, it is not enough to explain how rational action proceeds in the presence of these institutions. When institutions are the causes of cooperation, not the consequence of rational action, our focus must then be to explain how these institutions came about, not what happens once these institutions are in place (Elster 1989). This is precisely what deliberation offers: a tool for examining how decisions have been reached, how they are justified and, therefore, which is their legitimacy basis. If one government considers that the EU has no legitimacy other than output legitimacy and that, by definition, only decisions satisfying the national interests are legitimate, that government will not be likely to be moved by rhetoric inspired by a rights or value-based community. Alternatively, if one considers the EU to be a value-based

27 Arguing about enlargement 21 community, it would not be really moved about the geopolitical benefits of having Turkey in. Equally so, if one believes that the EU is a rights-based union, it would show little sympathy for those who put pressure on the Commission to, out of political consideration, concede the applicants all sort of derogations concerning the acquis communautaire. A way out of these dilemmas, based on deliberative supranationalism, could proceed by examining the regulative aspect of enlargement from a historical perspective. Looking at the emergence and evolution of the rules of the game or the enlargement acquis seems not only perfectly suited to test hypotheses about the power of arguments, the importance of justification and the role played by deliberation, but can also help bridge some of the tensions and limitations which the logic of consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness make so evident when examining enlargement. As March and Olsen (1998: 952-3) have conceded, actors both calculate actions and follow rules: political action cannot be explained in terms of either one or the other [ ] any particular action probably involves elements of the other. Political actors are constituted by their interests, which they evaluate according to the expected consequences of their actions, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions. Reflecting on the relations with rules and interests, March and Olsen (1998: 953-4) consider four plausible hypotheses: first, situations in which interests are strong and rules or identities weak, or vice versa, so one dominates the other; second, situations in which one logic is the precondition of the other, i.e. rules sets the frame which make possible the unfolding of consequential rationality, or vice versa; developmental situations in which norms are the result of accumulated experience, i.e. actors enter in new relationships because of instrumental reasons, but develop rules and identities as a result of their interaction; and fourth, that rules and interests are just one special case of one another, as in rational institutionalism, where rules are just the outcome of an instrumental negotiation. Of these alternatives, I argue, the third, or developmental hypothesis, is the one which best suits enlargement. Why so? There are two ways of looking at enlargement deals: they can be considered as compromises reached at through negotiations or, alternatively, as consensual agreements reached at by way of a rational deliberation. Most often, however, as Laffan concluded (2001: 741) when examining the history of EU budgetary negotiations, what we find in reality is that agreement on a policy cannot be separated from agreement on the rules of the game. Therefore, looking at how the rules of the game of enlargement have come about is compatible with defending the view that

28 22 José Ignacio Torreblanca enlargement proceeds by package-dealing negotiations comprising various policy, institutional and budgetary elements. However, whereas enlargement packages are easy to identify and account for in empirical and theoretical terms, little empirical or theoretical work has been done to examine what the rules of this game are and how they have come about. Yet, this is surprising, because enlargement is a highly regulated and principled-oriented process. Today, the enlargement acquis, defined as the set of rules, norms, principles and values which establish who can be member, when it can be member and how will it become member, is wide, comprehensive and clear: it includes a precise definition of the accession procedure (art. 49, ex. 237), the conditions applicant have to meet in order to qualify for membership (art 49 in connection to art 6.1 establishing democracy, the rule and law and human rights as pre-conditions for membership), plus a series of principles (indivisibility of the acquis, nondiscrimination and relative merit) which govern the decision to open and close accession negotiations and the way these negotiations have to proceed. But what are principles, and how do we recognize them when we see them? First, principles have to be distinguished from rules (Abbot et al 2000: 413): rules are at one extreme of precision, principles, norms or values, at the other; rules prescribe what to do, principles inspire. Following Surel (2000: 496-8) we could distinguish between meta-principles which form the deep core of the EU (democracy, social-market economy) which are basic ontological normative beliefs about the world, and specific principles which are hypothetical deductive statements, which allow the operationalization of values in one domain and or particular policy. Specific principles thus serve to translate these basic beliefs about the world into legitimate public policies: they delimit, rank and legitimate the terrain for public action (Surel 2000: 499). Principles are typically reached at through a process of public reasoning, they represent outcomes which can be affirmed by all reasonable people, consistent with their commitment to their own reasonable comprehensive doctrines (Horton 2003: 12). They are usually reached at the problem-definition phase, before the actual negotiations begins, so their role is to structure the subsequent negotiation phase. Normative principles, including rules of fairness, are so important because they serve as a basis for actors involved to claim legitimacy for their respective positions (Risse and Muller 2001: 14-15; Risse 2000). Agreements can usually take the form of principles. Principles clarify behavioural obligations, help adjudicate differences of interpretation and settle disputes; raise the profile of the obligation

29 Arguing about enlargement 23 to a public commitment making actors incur in reputational costs; create a right of redress in third parties; reinforce the tendency to path dependency: set procedural or substantive precedents and limit alternative options; force actors to frame their policies and preferences in terms of legal/normative requirements (Smith 2001:84). The emergence of principles is thus a typical empirical marker of a logic of arguing: the adherence to a norm, a principle or a common authoritative value in the justification of actions is what ensures that a rational consensus is reached (Eriksen 2003: 23; Risse 2000). Therefore, the identification of the rules and principles governing actor s behaviour, as well as their degree of institutionalization, is key for the agenda of deliberative supranationalism (Eriksen 2003). Principles might then be institutionalized, contributing to the development of expectations and regularities of behaviour (Smith 2001: 84). Institutionalization, in turn, may create a path-dependency dynamic in which principles establish a predictive behaviour and are called in subsequent negotiations by actors. In subsequent situations, the lock-in dynamic of path-dependency may shift the logic at work from a logic of consequentiality to a logic of appropriateness: agreements create obligations which have to be respected and socialization raises identities and roles which have to be fulfilled. If actors consider these agreements rational and the principles which express them as legitimate, we may observe a process of embeddedness: actors may feel obliged by them, even if they are only soft-law, and delegate to an agency (the Commission) the correct implementation of these principles into practical policies. At the end of such a process of institutionalization, lock-in, embeddedness and legalization (no matter how soft), a discourse emerges in which interest or power is no longer legitimate and discussion is possible but on different premises (Abbot et al 2000: 409). The search for legitimate and fair enlargement principles Of all the principles governing enlargement, the most outstanding is that of the indivisibility of the acquis: Accession must be based on principles like full respect of the acquis, no opt-outs and no derogations, and the restrictions of transitions measures to duly justified cases for limited periods of time. 6 6 See e.g. Enlargement of the European Union. The European Parliament position. Point Q. Agence Europe /12/1997.

30 24 José Ignacio Torreblanca Therefore, according to this principle, new members accept the existing acquis in full, without any derogation. When it comes to enlargement, the acquis is very generously defined: it includes the basic Treaties; the international agreements; the legislation passed since the foundation of the EEC; all the jurisprudence of the Court (including the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of EU law); and all the agreements, resolutions and statements by the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament in pillars I, II or III (even the compte rendu of the COREPER meetings, despite the COREPER not having any legal status, can be considered acquis). Yet, as observers have noted (Jørgensen 1999), the sacrosanct nature of this principle is striking. Despite pressures to adapt or make it more flexible, four enlargement rounds have been based on this principle. In the case of Eastern enlargement, all the proposals aimed at anticipating or changing the basic character of membership, even those stemming from the Commission (both Andriessen and later Broek-Brittan suggested special statutes of membership for Central and Eastern Europe) have been consistently rejected (Torreblanca 2001), with the ECJ having clearly reaffirmed in various rulings the absolute superiority of the acquis (Gialdino 1995; Goebel 1995; Pedain 2002; Preston 1995). However, this principle is not in the Treaty (even the word acquis was not introduced in the Treaty until 1993, when article B spoke for the first time of the goal of maintaining in full and develop the acquis and build on it ). Article 237 and Article 49 have traditionally spoken of an agreement between the parties and nowhere in the Treaties is it made explicit that membership requires the adoption of the acquis in full (Becker 2001: 7-8). Actually, the same can be said about the principles of non-discrimination and relative merit, on the one hand, and some of the accession conditions set forth in Copenhagen, such as administrative capacity, the protection of minority rights, or the capacity to resist competitive pressures, which are not part of either Article 49 or 6(1) and have not been included in the Treaty despite successive Treaty modifications. Still, the apparent careless wording of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome s, which only stated that any European country may become member, should not be considered a proof of poor legal draftsmanship. Such a loose definition can be interpreted both as synonymous with an explicit open ethos and pathos in the founding project of the EEC or as confirming the implicit recognition that the founding fathers had not in fact dedicated much time to speculate about the future enlargements. The different justifications behind the negative answers given in the sixties to the UK and Spain were a good proof of this: following the Birkelbach Report, refusal to admit Spain was justified on

31 Arguing about enlargement 25 grounds of its non-democratic character. Yet, despite the UK being the oldest democracy in Europe, De Gaulle vetoed the British membership application twice, before and after the Birkelbach Report, with a double justification: value-based (i.e. they are not like us ) and pragmatic (British agriculture is not compatible with the CAP and British tariffs are not compatible with the common market). However, at the same time that the British application was being rejected, all along the 60s, the EEC signed association agreements promising membership to Malta, Cyprus, Greece and even Turkey. The different rationales and justification behind these moves did not speak well of the coherence of the EEC and, most importantly, revealed the absence of clear principles to govern enlargement applications and expectations. EEC s dealings with the membership question in the sixties confirm the hypothesis that the enlargement acquis emerged from the need to provide particular responses to particular problems at different moments, and that even then, not a lot of effort was devoted to coordinating and integrating the responses given to different requests for membership. The true founding moment of the doctrine of the acquis communautaire as a core component of the enlargement acquis was the Birkelbach Report. The fact that the Parliamentary Assembly geared a debate and established the principles governing enlargement is a strong empirical indicator of deliberation because the European Parliament obtained a formal role in the enlargement process only in 1987 (when the SEA modified EEC art 237 in order to make Parliamentary assent a requisite for enlargement). The Birkelbach Report was the product of a reflection by the EEC Parliamentary Assembly on the nature of political integration and the finalité politique of the Union in the wake of Macmillan s decision to apply for membership, not, as it is usually depicted, the Spanish demand for association. 7 De Gaulle s justification of the rejection of Macmillan s 1961 decision to apply combined two types of arguments: value-based and pragmatic. The former called attention to the fact that because of its Anglo-Saxon, transatlantic identity and non-continental character, the UK did not share the 7 The Birkelbach Report was made public on 15 January 1962, while the letter from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanding the opening of negotiations with a view to examining the possible vinculation of my country with the EEC in the most beneficial form for both parties was dated in Madrid on 9 February Rapport de la Commission politique de l Assamblée Parlamentaire Européenne sur les aspects politiques et institutionnels (15 January 1962), Document 122, Janvier (Archives of the European Communities, :32;X ), reproduced in Truyol 1999.

32 26 José Ignacio Torreblanca finalité politique of the integration process and concluded that this made it different from the EEC 6 in terms of basic values and identities. The later justification was more mundane: the different policy preferences of the UK and EEC 6 regarding agriculture (zero tariff and no restrictions versus high tariffs and price subsidies, respectively) made factually impossible the integration of the UK in the common market. 8 But much as is the case today with respect to Turkish membership (Lundgren 2002), the need to publicly justify the reasons behind political decisions in order to obtain support and legitimacy opened a deliberative round in which the consistency of arguments was examined. The Birkelbach report established that accession was not a right of the applicant but, rather, that the Community had the right to demand that applicant states fully commit themselves to honour the economic, political and institutional obligations which membership entailed. Very revealingly, the Report s reflection on democracy was part of wider reflection on the conditions under which an applicant would become a strange body (sic) once member. Besides making democracy one obvious condition of membership, the Birkelbach Report made an explicit reference to applicants not pursuing foreign policies which are in contradiction with the fundamental attitudes of member states or that substantially deviates from them. A year earlier, in 1961, the EEC Bad Godesberg Summit Declaration had for the first time proclaimed the member states desire to coordinate their foreign policies and, eventually, arrive at common positions with a view of promoting the political union of Europe. 9 Building on this declaration, the report concluded that the Community was more than just a free trade area or a customs union, that the political character of the Community cannot here on be called into question, that acceptance of the institutional framework was also a precondition for membership; and, even more importantly, that accession to the Union was irrevocable and that it could not be partial. It concluded by affirming that membership of the Community entailed not only the obligation to admit all the dispositions established in the Treaties, but also all the decisions and directives passed after the entry into force of the 8 Speech by Harold Macmillan to the House of Commons on 31 July In EEC Bulletin 1961, 9-10 Sept-Oct, pp. 7-9, reproduced in Truyol (1999: 230-1); Press Conference of President De Gaulle, Paris 14 January 1963, reproduced in Truyol (1999: ). 9 Summit meeting of EEC Member States, Bad Godesberg, 18 July European Parliament, Documents about Political Union, January 1964, pp. 9-10, reproduced in Truyol (1999: ).

33 Arguing about enlargement 27 Treaties, including those adopted by the Council of Ministers and the Court of Justice. 10 So was the acquis born. In a deliberative context such as the one created by the Parliamentary Assembly, actors were forced to frame their arguments in terms of factual or normative validity, were exposed to counter-arguments which they also had to assess, and ended up with a set of principles which amounted to a rational consensus. In this fashion, the Birkelbach Report gave birth to the two basic elements which have characterized enlargement ever since: one accession condition (democracy) and one principle governing accession (the integrity of the acquis). Accordingly, in the Acts of Accession between the EEC and the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, it was clearly specified that the new members accepted not only the Treaties, but all the subsequent legal acts from all EEC institutions, including the decisions, agreements and resolutions of the Council, the international treaties agreements and conventions signed by the EEC as well as all the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, specifically mentioning (by suggestion of the Commission, who was weary of British Courts and the House of Lord s judicial powers), the doctrines of supremacy, direct effect and uniform interpretation of EU law, which were not in the Treaties (Goebel 1995: ). In this fashion, the conditions set out in the Commission s opinions on British, Norwegian, Irish and Danish accession established the idea that the achievements of European integration were beyond negotiation (Jørgensen 1999:8; Goebel 1995: ; Preston 1995, 1997: 452). Arguing about factual and normative adequacy of enlargement principles The conditions and principles established in the Birkelbach Report not only preserved the EC. By making sure that, if correctly applied, the EC would not be diluted or weakened as a result of enlargement, they also forced the Commission and member states subsequent arguments in favour or objections to enlargement to be framed in terms of their factual and normative adequacy. This was first seen in the seventies, when the EEC had to deal with the membership applications of Greece, Spain and Portugal. In the case of Greece, 10 The acquis communautaire became established around six elements: the Treaties, the institutions, the body of legislation, the international agreements already signed by the EEC, the accession treaties; the political goals or acquis politique, and the rulings of the ECJ.

34 28 José Ignacio Torreblanca the Commission s Opinion placed the emphasis on the integrity of the acquis and advised a slow accession process. However, the Council overrode the Commission s concerns and, in a political act, decided to open accession negotiations without having yet all the guarantees Greece would be ready to adopt the acquis (Verney 2002). In a similar way, negotiations were opened with Spain in 1979 despite widespread fears about the country becoming an enfant terrible (sic) due to its foreign policy orientation, the size of its population, and its backward economic structures, including massive unemployment, the third largest fishing fleet in the world and a labourintensive agricultural sector (Barbé 1995; Commission s Opinion on the Accession of Spain). In both cases, the arguments used to justify enlargement emphasized the common values behind these countries application, and the impact membership would have in further consolidating their democratic regimes. Yet, in order to ensure that membership would effectively strengthen democracy in the candidate countries, the European Council, meeting in 1978 in Copenhagen, approved a Declaration on Democracy, which further specified what the democratic criteria actually meant. This declaration, which affirmed pluralist and representative democracy, the free expression of opinions, the rule of law, social justice, respect for human rights to be essential elements of membership meant a heightened definition or expansion of the enlargement acquis beyond the Birkelbach Report and the Acts of Accession of the first enlargement (Goebel 1995: 1150). 11 Again in the nineties, as a result of the applications presented by Austria, Sweden, Norway and Finland, on the one hand, and the perspective of a subsequent Eastern enlargement, on the other hand, EU member states and the Commission engaged in a new deliberative round aimed at refining the norms and principles governing enlargement processes. The result was a further development of the set of norms and principles which should preserve the norms and values inspiring the EC. Among them, there was the adoption at the Lisbon 1992 European Council of the deepening first policy 12, which did not only apply to the ratification of Maastricht as a precondition for starting accession negotiations with Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway but that was subsequently seen in the explicit linkage between the opening of negotiations with Cyprus and the ending of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, and in the linkage between the Treaty of Nice and the first round of Eastern enlargement. 11 European Communities, The Council, Revised text of the Declaration on Democracy, European Council, 7-8 April 1978, in Copenhagen, Brussels 5 April 1978, I/104/78 (AG 1). 12 Widening must not be made at the expense of deepening (Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement). Report from the Commission to the European Council meeting in Lisbon, June 1992).

35 Arguing about enlargement 29 The membership conditions spelt out by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council also represented a substantial addition to the enlargement acquis: first, by adding the rights of minorities to the list of democratic conditions; second, by specifying the contents of the finalité politique which candidates had to share as a part of the acquis ( full adherence to goals of the Union, including political, monetary and economic integration ); third, by adding two new criteria which had not been present in previous enlargement rounds ( the existence of a full functioning market economy and the existence of an adequate legal and administrative framework ) (Goebel 1995: 1155). Once again, however, the setting up of these new conditions and principles was not the result of a negotiation among member states and the Commission, but rather of a deliberation. Since the inherited enlargement acquis prescribed that membership was conditional on being European, democratic and wishing to respect in full the acquis, arguments in favour or against enlargement could only be framed in terms of the integrity of the Union and the acquis or the democratic character of the candidates and related problems. Therefore, no member state could argue: I oppose to enlargement because it is not good for me and I will veto it unless I get equivalent material compensations. Rather, those reluctant to enlargement were forced to argue either that the candidates would never be able to implement the acquis or, alternatively, that because the rule of law was weak and minorities were not respected, the political conditions for membership were not met. However, each of these arguments could be factually or normatively discussed, and even if the arguments were proven right, remedies could be put in place. The Balladur Plan launched in 1993 to contain minority tensions in Central and Eastern Europe, the structured foreign policy dialogue established in Essen in 1994, the 1995 White Paper spelling the legal adaptations candidates had to embark on to accede to the Single Market, the inclusion in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty of a wider definition of democracy and the sanctions associated to any likely breach of those conditions in article F.1, updated and upgraded the enlargement acquis to meet the needs of a new situation and make enlargement compatible with the preservation of the EU s goals and values Final document on Stability Pact in Europe, Agence Europe 1927, 29 March 1995; European Council of Cannes, June 1995, Agence Europe 1943, 30 June 1995; European Commission Opinion on Convening the Intergovernmental Conference, Agence Europe 1978, 8 March 1996; European Parliament Resolution on 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Agence Europe 1982, 13 April 1996; State of progress in preparation for EU enlargement, Agence Europe 2000, 9 August 1996.

36 30 José Ignacio Torreblanca Observers have described in similar terms the outcome of the Luxembourg European Council of 1997, where the member states decided that the EU would adopt a regatta approach to enlargement instead of a limited enlargement approach, which Germany, the Commission and some other countries were favouring (Friis 1998). The regatta approach was the result of a deliberative process started in Madrid in December 1995 which resulted in the EU adopting the principles of non-discrimination and relative merit. This policy culminated in Luxembourg with the decision to open accession negotiations with all the candidate countries that met the Copenhagen political conditions, rather than just with those better prepared in economic terms, in order to allow the possibility that other countries could catch up later on. By adopting a policy of yearly monitoring the implementation capacity of the candidates (the so-called screening ) and an increased emphasis on administrative capacity (Dimitrova 2002), the EU retained its ability to influence domestic events in the candidate countries and, at the same time, preserved the sacrosanct acquis. Justifying the selection of candidates The European Council meeting in Madrid in December 1995 and the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference had established the principle of relative merit as the basis of EU s policy for managing the application from Central and Eastern Europe (Agence Europe /09/1995). Accordingly, the Luxembourg Presidency had called on the Commission to make an objective evaluation of applicant states ability to join, even if this meant a differentiated approach and that some states would be left out in the first round (Agence Europe /07/1997). But the group of excluded candidates (Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania) argued that the EU decision not to start accession negotiation with them was both discriminatory and impractical, since it would further impair their ability to catch up later on with those already fully meeting the essential Copenhagen criteria. Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Mr. Vagnoriuos, argued: we are not calling for immediate membership of the European Union. But we have made intensive preparations and at least we have the moral right to be invited to open negotiations. Latvia and Bulgaria also argued in favour of having a common starting line as a basis : this, they argued, would confirm that all countries have an identical chance of becoming members. Differentiation, they proposed, should determine the closing of negotiations, not the opening date (Agence Europe July 1997, emphasis added).

37 Arguing about enlargement 31 Looking at the Luxembourg process, we can see how, once again, member states entered the process with strong geopolitical preferences but were subsequently forced to engage in a rational deliberation about factual truth and normative consistency. In line with what NATO was planning, Germany wanted to limit enlargement to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; France and Spain were insisting on the Southern European and Mediterranean dimension of enlargement, and the Scandinavian countries were worried about a likely exclusion of the Baltic countries. This patronage behaviour reflected again a rather standard geopolitical instinct. In accordance with bargaining theories (Esteban and Sákovics 2002), we should then have observed a negotiation game in which the outcomes would be mostly predetermined by the asymmetries of power of the participants (with some leeway for institutions helping member states to find equilibrium points beyond the lowest common denominator). However, the result of the Luxembourg Summit largely reflected the views of two small countries, Denmark and Sweden, joined by a larger one, Italy, which were able to bring the other member states to their own position not by inducing them by threats or promises, but just by the consistency and reasonability of their arguments. The discussion between those in favour of enlarging according to relative merit (i.e. by stages) and those in favour or a non-discriminatory approach (i.e. regatta ) proceeded in the following way. Validating factual statements meant discussing, first, whether the region would become more unstable if a differentiated approach was selected and, second, whether starting negotiations with unprepared countries could have a negative effect on the EU (as the Greek case reminded). In contrast, validating normative statements dealt with discussing, first, whether the Commission had been fair when examining selecting candidates, and second, whether the criteria themselves were fair enough. 14 When the Commission recommended in July 1997 to open negotiations with only five countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia), Denmark immediately described the Commission selection of candidates as a product of no less that an arbitrary decision (Agence Europe July 1997). Lamberto Dini, the Italian Foreign Minister, also 14 The Amsterdam Treaty envisaged that a new intergovernmental conference would be convened if EU members were to exceed twenty. Some argued that the Commission s decision to invite six members to open negotiations, and the EP s subsequent endorsement of the regatta, was self-interested, since both institutions knew that they would gain from a new IGC (Agence Europe July 1997; July 1997).

38 32 José Ignacio Torreblanca criticized the Commission saying that since none of the countries wholly met the Copenhagen criteria, the Union should therefore avoid any differentiated treatment. He also warned of counterproductive effects that the Commission s recommendation not to open accession negotiations would have on the excluded countries (especially by sinking foreign investors expectations) and concluded by asking the Commission to change its decision (Agence Europe July 1997). Stimulated by Danish and Italians criticisms, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister criticized the data on which the Commission had based its judgement of the relative merits of Lithuania for being inaccurate and outdated (Agence Europe September 1997). Latvian Prime Minister, Guntars Krasts, told the EP s Foreign Affairs Committee that one should not underestimate the feelings of frustration [which such decision would create] (Agence Europe September 1997). The insinuation that the Commission s decisions served some member states (Germany, in particular) at the cost of European wide interests (stabilising Central and Eastern Europe) and, at the same time, questioning the technical competence of EU bureaucrats to evaluate the economic conditions of the candidates, as Danish, Italian, Latvian and Lithuanian statements did, have to have hurt the Commission, for its legitimacy is precisely based on its capacity to defend European wide-interest and the professionalism of its administrative services. Watching the credibility of the Commission damaged, some Member States set out to cut short, in a radical manner, certain interpretations of the Commission document that have given rise to misunderstanding and concern [ ] and to dismantle the false impression whereby the EU is creating two separate groups of applicant countries, which would result in provoking new barriers or divisions in Central and Eastern Europe. 15 Germany, in particular, defended the Commission s decision to open negotiations only with a limited number of countries. Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minister, said yes to differentiation but no to discrimination (AE September 1997). Another relevant German personality, Klaus Hänsch, MEP and former EP President, argued that it would obviously be easier to be kind to everyone but defended that having a single opening line for all members would not be playing fair with those countries that had done best (Agence Europe October 1997). Kinkel met his Baltic counterparts and defended the selection of Estonia as fair and justified and said it would pull the other two countries along but he did not manage to convince Lithuanians and Latvians that being 15 Agence Europe September 1997.

39 Arguing about enlargement 33 excluded from the first round was good for them because it would force them to do more and better (Agence Europe October 1997). In the candidates camp, Hungary also supported the Commission s decision to exclude some countries from the opening of negotiations. Hungarian Foreign Minister, Mr. Juhasz, argued that: if the EU were now to decide to open negotiations with all [ ] what would then be of all the sacrifices asked of the population during the last eight years? (Agence Europe November 1997). The problem was that the arguments of Kinkel and Juhasz were too obviously self-serving so they could not enjoy the same legitimacy as those put forward by Danes and Italians: while Germany was supporting a limited enlargement process so as to keep the costs of enlargement down, Hungary was obviously delighted that Romania would be excluded from the first round. Pressure on the Commission mounted as time went on. The Chair of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, Tom Spencer, said that the Commission s approach had to be changed so as to avoid any image of discrimination (Agence Europe October 1997). In the run up to the Luxembourg Summit, Denmark, joined by Sweden, continued describing the Commission s selection of candidates as both unfair and unwise: it was not objective in the assessment of the candidate countries, they say, and it was counterproductive because those lagging behind, who in return were those who needed most help, they protested, would get the least support from the EU (Agence Europe November 1997). When both countries drafted a joint letter to the Luxembourg Presidency asking for a change of policy (Agence Europe December 1997), the rotating President, Jean-Claude Juncker, consulted with the other member states and finally ended up accepting Danish, Italian and Swedish arguments. At the beginning of December, commenting on the incoming European Council, Juncker gave his support to those wanting a different approach: I think we will have a single starting line for all applicant countries, he said (Agence Europe December 1997). The Commission defended its position with the argument that differentiation does not mean discrimination and that opening negotiations with all the countries would mean the risk of having to grant them excessively long periods of transition, which was not desirable. 16 But the Council finally overturned the Commission and, as it had done in 1981 with Greece, decided to run some risks in the preservation of the acquis in return for supporting democratic change, economic transformation and regional 16 Broek, Agence Europe June 1997, Agence Europe September 1997.

40 34 José Ignacio Torreblanca stability. Exposed to accusation of an inconsistent and biased application of the acquis in favour of the views of Germany and some in the Commission, the Council decided that the regatta approach was more consistent with the normative underpinnings of enlargement policy, and therefore more legitimate than the enlargement by stages. Whereas the Commission had proposed in its Opinions of July 1997 the opening of negotiations with only five candidate countries, the Heads of State and Chiefs of Government, meeting in Luxembourg in December, decided to launch an accession process comprising the ten Central and East European applicant States and Cyprus [...] The European Council points out that all these States are destined to join the European Union on the basis of the same criteria and that they are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. The Council also re-established the credibility of the Commission, by pointing out that the Commission's opinions on the applicant States constitute a sound overall analysis of each applicant State's situation in the light of the membership criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council and, at the same time, reminded those countries with who the Union had also decided now to start negotiations (Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria), that the decision to enter into negotiations does not imply that they will be successfully concluded at the same time. Their conclusion and the subsequent accession of the different applicant States will depend on the extent to which each complies with the Copenhagen criteria and on the Union's ability to assimilate new members. 17 A few days later, the European Parliament fully endorsed the change of policy. On its enlargement resolution of 24 December 1997 (Point Q.), the EP questioned the approach chosen by the Commission: all the applicant countries have the right to participate in the process from the start, on the understanding that the duration of the negotiations may vary subject to the ability of each country to accept the acquis communautaire and fully meet the criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council. In point d), the EP stated: the preparations for membership should include all Central Eastern European countries on the basis of equal treatment (Agence Europe December 1997). 17 European Council meeting in Luxembourg, December 1997, Presidency Conclusions, SN 400/97, points 10 and 26.

41 Arguing about enlargement 35 Conclusions A close look at the defining moments of the enlargement acquis, from the British membership application to the 1997 Luxembourg decision to open negotiations with all the Central and Eastern candidates, passing through the Greek and Iberian enlargement and the Nordic expansion, shows how the Member States, developed a set of principles to govern enlargement processes. In each and every one of these occasions, Member States engaged in geopolitical and economic-oriented self-interested negotiations, but also engaged in discussions about which rules, principles and norms should be applied and adapted to fit each particular case. The result was the development, consolidation and further legalization (even if in soft law terms) of a set of principles and practices which can be considered as the enlargement acquis. The enlargement acquis, however, has not consisted of a single and coherent entity. It has not been the result of a single decision, but rather, it has emerged incrementally. It has not always been completely coherent, but subject to contradictions. It has required arguing, and not just rule-following. Its legitimacy is therefore high, not only because it has proven quite efficient in helping the EU solve the collective action problems posed by enlargement, but also because of the way it has been reached. In the introduction to the paper, I argued that when dealing with enlargement, the EU has been inspired by a set of conditions and general principles. However, these principles were not there at the beginning: they have emerged gradually, as a result of a process of arguing among different actors (Member States, the Commission, the European Parliament) about which sort of actions would best satisfy the needs of the Community. Because these principles have been reached in a deliberative way, amounting to a rational consensus (or, at least, to a working agreement), they satisfy sufficient conditions of legitimacy for actors to consider them binding. In this way, the member states have been able to solve the collective action problem behind enlargement. This resembles very much the observations made by those studying legalization at the international sphere in the sense that even very small limits of obligation, precision and delegation may help solve collective action problems and allow distributional claims to be dealt with in a less conflictual and equitable way (Kahler 2000: 673). Thus, even if the legalization of enlargement is far from complete and the discretion margin still ample, the principles governing enlargement have become themselves part of the acquis communautaire. Despite the absence of a clear regulation concerning enlargement process in the original Treaties, enlargement decisions have now to be justified, or opposed, in terms of the common values which the EU defends (democracy, peace, and human rights) or the preservation or acquis. At the same time, issues such as the selection of the

42 36 José Ignacio Torreblanca candidates, the timing for the opening of negotiations and the conditions for successfully closing them are governed not by arbitrariness and discretion but by a set principles ( non-discrimation, relative merit ) which ensure that enlargement processes enhance the overall legitimacy of the Union as both a value and a rights based Union. Bibliography Abbot, K.W.; Keohane, R.O.; Moravcsik, A.; Slaughter, A. and Snidal, D. (2000): The Concept of Legalization, International Organization 54 (3) pp Barbé, E. (1995): European Political Cooperation: The Upgrading of Spanish Foreign Policy, in Gillespie, R.; Rodrigo, F. and Story, J. (eds.): Democratic Spain: Reshaping external relations in a changing world, London: Routledge. Becker, U. (2001): EU-Enlargements and Limits to Amendments of the EC Treaty, Jean Monnet Working Paper 15/01. Dimitrova, A. (2002): Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative Capacity, West European Politics 25 (4) pp Elgström, O. and Jönson, C. (2000): Negotiation in the European Union: bargaining or problem-solving, Journal or European Public Policy 7 (5) pp Elster, J. (1989): Nuts and bolts for the social sciences, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Elster, J. (1991): Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblée Constituante, Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe Working Papers 4. Eriksen, E.O. (2003): Integration and the Quest for Consensus: On the Micro-Foundation of Supranationalism in Eriksen, E.O.; Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. (eds.): European Governance, Deliberation and the Quest for Democratisation, Oslo: ARENA Report 2/03, Oslo: ARENA, pp Eriksen, E.O. and Fossum, J.E. (eds.) (2000): Democracy in the European Union - Integration through Deliberation? London: Routledge. Eriksen, E.O. and Fossum, J.E (2003): Europe in Search of its Legitimacy. Assessing Strategies of Legitimation in Eriksen, E.O.; Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. (eds.): European Governance, Deliberation and the Quest for Democratization, ARENA Report 2/03, Oslo: ARENA, pp

43 Arguing about enlargement 37 Eriksen, E.O. and Weigaard, J. (1997): Conceptualizing Politics: Strategic or Communicative Action, Scandinavian Political Studies 20 (3) pp Esteban, J. and Sakóvics, J. (2002): Why Do Lions Get the Lions Share? A Hobbesian Theory of Agreements, Juan March Institute Estudios / Working Papers 182/2002. Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998): International norms and domestic change, International Organization 52 (4) pp Friis, L. (1998): The End of the Beginning of Eastern Enlargement: Luxembourg Summit and Agenda-setting, European Integration Online Papers 2 (7). Gialdino, C.C. (1995): Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire, Common Market Law Review 32, pp Goebel, R.J. (1995): The European Union grows: the constitutional impact of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, Fordham International Law Journal 18 (4) pp Horton, J. (2003): Rawls, Public Reason and the Limits of Liberal Justification, Contemporary Political Theory 2, pp Jørgensen, K.E. (1999): The social construction of the acquis communautaire: a cornerstone of the European Edifice, European Integration Online Papers 3 (5). Kahler, M. (2000): The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, International Organization 54 (3) pp Laffan, B. (2001): The European Union polity: a union of regulative, normative and cognitive pillars, Journal of European Public Policy 8 (5) pp Lundgren, A. (2002): The Limits of Enlargement, ARENA Report 7/02, Oslo: ARENA, pp March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1998): The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, International Organization 52 (4) pp Moravcsik, A. and Vachudova, M.A. (2002): National Interests, State Power and EU enlargement, Center for European Studies Working Paper (97). Pedain, A. (2002): With or without me. The ECJ adopts a pose of studies neutrality towards EU enlargement, International Comparative Law Quarterly 51 (October) pp

44 38 José Ignacio Torreblanca Preston, C. (1995): Obstacles to EU enlargement: the classical community method and the prospects for a wider Europe, Journal of Common Market Studies 33 (3) pp Preston, C. (1997): Enlargement and Integration in the European Union, London: Routledge. Risse, T. (2000): Let s argue: communicative action in international politics, International Organization 54 (1) pp Risse, T. and Müller, H. (2001): Arguing and Bargaining in Multilateral Negotiations, Grant Proposal to the Volkswagen Foundation mimeo. Schimmelfennig, F. (1999): The Double Puzzle of EU enlargement: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Decision to Expand to the East, ARENA Working Papers 15/99. Schimmelfennig, F. (2001): The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European, International Organization 55 (1) pp Schimmelfennig, F. (2003): Strategic Action in a Community Environment, Comparative Political Studies 36 (1/2) pp Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2002): Theorizing EU Enlargement: research focus, hypotheses and state of research, Journal of European Public Policy 9 (4), pp Sedelmeier. U. (1994): The European Union's Association Policy Towards Central Eastern Europe: Political and Economic Rationales in Conflict, Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies, Sussex European Institute 7. Sedelmeier, U. (2000): Eastern enlargement: Risk, Rationality and Role- Compliance in Cowles, M.G. and Smith, M.: The State of the European Union: Risks, Reforms, Resistance and Revival, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sedelmeier, U. (2002): Sectoral Dynamics of EU Enlargement: Advocacy, Access and Alliance in a Composite Policy, European Journal of Public Policy 9 (4) pp Sedelmeier, U. (2003): EU enlargement, identity and the Analysis of European Foreign Policy, Robert Schuman Centre Papers 13/03. Segall, G. (2000): The Eastward Enlargement of the EU: A New Economic Diplomacy for a United Europe, European Foreign Affairs Review 5, pp

45 Arguing about enlargement 39 Sjursen, H. (1999): Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU's External Identiy in Henderson, K. (ed.): Back to Europe Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, UCL Press. Sjursen, H. (2002): 'Why expand? The question of legitimacy and justification in the EU's enlargement policy, Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (3) pp Sjursen, H. (2003): Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building Blocs, ARENA Working Papers 9/03. Smith, K.E. (1999): The making of EU foreign policy: the case of Eastern Europe, New York: St. Martin's Press. Smith, M.E. (2001). Diplomacy by decree: The legalization of EU foreign policy, Journal of Common Market Studies 39 (1) pp Surel, Y. (2000): The role of normative and cognitive frames in policymaking, Journal of European Public Policy 7 (4) pp Torreblanca, J.I. (2001): The Reuniting of Europe: promises, negotiations and compromises, Aldershot: Ashgate. Torreblanca, J.I. (2002): Accommodating interests and principles in the European Union: the case of Eastern Enlargement, ARENA Report 7/02, Oslo: ARENA. Truyol, A. (1999): La Integración Europea: Análisis Histórico-Institucional con textos y documentos I ( ), Madrid: Tecnos. Verney, S. (2002): Creating the democratic tradition of European integration: the south European catalyst, in Sjursen, H. (ed.) Enlargement and the Finality of the EU, ARENA Report 7/02, Oslo: ARENA.

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47 Chapter 2 Germany and EU Enlargement: From Rapprochement to Reaproachment? Marcin Zaborowski Aston University Introduction Germany has undoubtedly been the keenest and the most influential supporter of the eastern enlargement of the EU. It is safe to say that without Germany s support the enlargement would not have taken place when it did (May 2004), indeed, it is not clear whether it would have at all occurred within a foreseeable timeframe. Various reasons have been given to explain Germany s support for enlargement: these ranged from egoistic self interest (Markovits and Reich 1991) through to a more complex notion of benign hegemony (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 2000) to an idealistic category of civilian power (Tewes 2001). Outside academia the dominant view is that Germany s enlargement policy is motivated first and foremost by its economic, security and political self-interest. This account argues that Germany's enlargement policy should not be viewed as being motivated by either pure self-interest or idealism. Material factors in Germany s support for the enlargement are self-evident as determined by its geographical proximity to the new member states and its centuries-old economic links with the area. The importance of this factor was reflected in Germany s choice of favourite candidates, which included first and foremost - Poland, the Czech Republic Hungary and, to lesser extent, Slovakia whilst it excluded Turkey and at times Bulgaria and Romania.

48 42 Marcin Zaborowski On the other hand, no analysis of Germany s enlargement policy could be complete without considering normative factors, and most importantly the impact of Germany s past. It is, for example, evident that many German policy makers, including the former and the present Chancellors Kohl and Schröder, viewed enlargement as a vehicle of reconciliation between Germany and its neighbours to the East. It is also significant that at no stage after 1989 did Bonn/Berlin seriously consider other than a European solution to regulate its relations with its Eastern neighbours. Whilst, perhaps, as the German elites consistently argued, the Federal Republic has most to gain from enlargement, it is also clear that no other state is equally exposed to the risks and costs of this policy. It is therefore argued here that a rational assessment of costs and benefits of enlargement could not be the decisive factor in determining Germany s position on the issue. Instead, it is posited here, Germany s policy of enlargement is yet another example, other being the Maastricht treaty, proving that multilateral solutions are instinctively pursued by German policy-makers when faced with a major international issue. This claim, if accepted, effectively means that historically motivated norms influence Germany s perception of its interests. As a tool in addressing the complexity of Germany s interests vis a vis the enlargement this paper refers to the arguments developed by Helene Sjursen within the framework of the CIDEL project (see Introduction in this volume). According to Sjursen three categories of considerations might be used as drivers of the enlargement project. First, enlargement may be viewed as pursued for pragmatic purposes of economic and security self-interest. The second set of arguments suggests that enlargement was driven by cultural considerations and a sense of value-based kinship between neighbours artificially divided by the iron curtain. Here, this notion emphasises Germany s cultural proximity to its eastern neighbours and its normative divergence with the Balkan countries and Turkey in particular. The third argument posits that enlargement proves that the EU is evolving towards a rights-based post-modern entity, which can be joined by any state that fulfils a set of political and economic criteria proving that it is a functioning liberaldemocracy. Should this argument been true Germany's support for individual candidates should not be influenced by the sense of cultural kinship or indeed any other historical factors (Sjursen 2002). This paper discusses Germany s EU enlargement policy by focusing on two periods; the first one being the period between and the second after Whilst the first period was marked by the emergence of a degree of strategic congruence between Germany and its eastern neighbours, the

49 Germany and EU Enlargement 43 period after 1998 proved to be more conflict-prone and often affected by domestic considerations in Germany and in CEE. It is argued in the paper that whilst during the first ( ) period Germany s enlargement policy was influenced mostly by cultural (2. model) and pragmatic (1. model) factors, after 1998 Berlin s policy was marked by the toning down of cultural considerations coupled with a new emphasis on the more objective nature of the process (3. model). Fostering Rapprochement: The Politics of EU Enlargements in German-CEE Relations With the end of the Cold War Germany and its eastern neighbours were unanimous in their desire to establish closer relations. For CEE, Germany represented a powerful ally in the EU where Bonn lobbied in favour of eastern enlargement. As for the German debate, the arguments that were emphasised appear to be mostly pragmatic in nature stressing that enlargement would mean greater security and stability of Germany s immediate environment, as well as potential economic benefits resulting from its privileged position in the region. But the Germans also stressed the normative value of the enlargement the policy is expected to lead to historical rapprochement in German CEE relations and create a new international environment in Central Europe marked by the lesser role of states and ever growing importance of trans-national initiatives and civil society (Fischer and Geremek 2000). Following the example set earlier between France and West Germany, it was clear to policy makers in Bonn that the first and most essential step towards rapprochement is to achieve a congruence of strategic aims and objectives. A clear manifestation of such a congruence in Franco-German relations was an agreement to set up the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and, a decade later the Elysee Treaty establishing a uniquely close relationship verging on a political union. It was always clear that in the case of Germany's relations with CEE a common project would be to secure CEE integration with the EU. The period between the completion of the bilateral treaties between Germany and CEE in 1991/2 and the beginning of their EU membership negotiations in 1998 was the time when such a congruence was being discovered, defined and successfully pursued.

50 44 Marcin Zaborowski Germany s role in EU Enlargement The idea of integrating Germany s eastern environment with the EC found early supporters in Germany and in CEE, even prior to the end of the Cold War. Initially, the ideas in favour of fostering CEE's participation in the common market originated from within the left wing of the SPD, which was looking for ways to revitalise the flagging Ostpolitik. 1 Whilst the Cold War prevented these ideas from being seriously considered in the early 1980s, by the end of the decade Bonn was increasingly hinting at the prospects of actual EC membership for its eastern neighbours (Mertes and Prill 1989). With the collapse of communism the new CEE governments immediately identified Bonn as their main advocate on their way to return to Europe. Between the Europe Agreements and Accession Negotiations In December 1991 Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary concluded the socalled Europe Agreement, which liberalised these countries trade with the EC. Whilst the agreements lacked any a meaningful political dimension and did not commit the EC/EU to the principle of enlargement, Germany, together with Britain, managed to push through a clause that recognised these countries desire to join the EC/EU in the future (Torreblanca 1997). Subsequently, Bonn continued to promote the principle of enlargement, by supporting, for example, the report by EU Commissioner Hans Andriessen, which recommended that a set of criteria be established that would precondition starting actual membership negotiations with the former Soviet block countries. 2 With active German support, these criteria were agreed at the Copenhagen summit in 1993 leading to the prospect of eastern enlargement becoming official EU policy. The Copenhagen criteria, as they became known, were both political and economic, referring to the rule of law, democracy, human rights and an ability to compete in the common market. As such the criteria were meant to provide objective standards against which the candidates would be assessed. However, the criteria remained also very broad and as such open to interpretation and possible politicisation. Essentially here, the criteria reflected some key preferences held by the German government, which, deeply concerned with the developments in the former Yugoslavia, was determined that the conditions set out by the EU should aim to foster stability in its eastern neighbourhood. A certain peculiarity of the Copenhagen criteria was 1 Interview with Peter Glotz, chairman of the SPD in the 1980s, 12 May 1998, Erfurt, Germany. Interestingly, after the end of the Cold War Peter Glotz went to oppose the eastern enlargement of both the EU and NATO. 2 On the implications of Andriessen report see Harasimowicz 1994.

51 Germany and EU Enlargement 45 the issue of human and minority rights. This was questionable from the moral point of view as the EU did not have any such standards for itself and had therefore to refer to the Council of Europe's Charter of Human Rights, but the inclusion of this condition was strongly pursued by Germany. Bonn believed that setting a clear normative standard in this area would discourage the candidates from pursuing nationalistic policies, which, as the case of Yugoslavia demonstrated, could result in regional instability and uncontrollable migration of refugees to Germany. An additional benefit of the criterion was that it would effectively exclude Turkey from the enlargement, which was conducive with Bonn's preference at the time. 3 Once agreed upon, the Copenhagen criteria spelt out a clear perspective for joining the EU for CEE and other hopefuls who responded by putting forward their membership applications between However, whilst politically the principle of enlargement seemed accepted, it was clear that the accession countries would struggle to meet all the legal and technical requirements that needed to be adopted prior to the opening of actual negotiations. Responding to this predicament the German EU presidency in 1994 established the structural relationship for CEE that permitted the candidate countries to participate in some of the EU s internal affairs 4 and subsequently Bonn promoted the so called pre-accession strategy which gave candidate countries access to some EU programmes, including legal and technical assistance (Der Spiegel 1994). Germany s prioritisation of candidates indicates that, at least initially, its policy was driven by its particular pragmatic and normative-cultural considerations with little regard for the objectivity of the process. Until 1997, Bonn/Berlin exhibited a preference for a quick, preferably by 2000, but territorially limited expansion of the EU including only Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary (The Economist 1998). Germany initially maintained this position during the EU s Luxembourg summit in December 1997, when the issue of which countries should be invited to start negotiations was debated. However, eventually Bonn/Berlin bent under pressure from other Member States, particularly the Nordic states, and agreed that the EU should start negotiations with the group of six applicants recommended by the Commission (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus), whilst continue the so called 'screening' of other candidates with a view that they should join the negotiations as soon as meeting the Copenhagen 3 Interviews in Chancellery in March 1998 and in the national Headquaters of the CDU and CSU, Berlin June European Council 1994.

52 46 Marcin Zaborowski criteria. 5 Consequently, it was agreed at the summit in Berlin in 1999 that six other countries, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta would join the negotiations but Turkey remained outside the negotiating framework. It is important to point out that between the Luxembourg and Berlin summits there was a change of government in Germany with the conservative CDU/CSU departing and being replaced by the Social- Democrats and the Greens. The significance of this change will be returned to later. From the moment the actual decision to launch membership negotiations, the FRG s lobbying in favour of speeding up the process showed signs of weakening. This happened essentially for two reasons. The first one being pragmatic, resulting from an ever greater number of domestic actors becoming involved in the process and influencing the government's policy on the matter. This process is referred to here as domestication. The second difficulty was normative and had to do with an increasingly poor fit between the two key objectives of German European policy, 'widening' and 'deepening', which up to this point were seen in Berlin as perfectly reconcilable. In fact, enlargement was often perceived as a useful argument in favour of the reform of EU institutions and its decision-making procedures. However, this logic was not universally accepted by the proponents of establishing a genuine political union in the EU, including members of the governing CDU, who tended to see enlargement as potentially contradicting the goal of an 'ever closer union'. Consequently, a number of proposals emerged from these circles, the most famous of these being the Schäuble- Lamers paper, that argued in favour of differentiated integration as a way of preserving the EU's internal cohesion after enlargement (1994). These arguments were not unsympathetically received by Kohl, but, for whatever reasons, the chancellor did not officially endorse the ideas of the paper. The Amsterdam treaty, which was supposed to prepare the EU for the enlargement, did not satisfy its domestic critics. It also did not address the growing tensions in Franco-German relations over the eastern enlargement of the EU (Kolboom 1996). The EU began therefore the enlargement negotiations in 1998 being insufficiently reformed in the view of many members of the German government and opposition. The internal German debate on the matter did 5 This decision of the European Council was based on the recommendation of the Commission ( EU Bulletin 1997a). For the decision of the European Council see (EU Bulletin 1997.

53 Germany and EU Enlargement 47 not result in any substantially new policies and, with the exception of France, the proposals, which suggested a setting up of a mechanism of differentiated integration did not meet with much enthusiasm abroad. Due to the failure of the Amsterdam Treaty in reconciling deepening with enlarging, and faced with increasing economic difficulties at home, the government chose to take on board a more pragmatic stance towards enlargement. This was characterised by retaining its political support for the notion but coupling it with an ever growing emphasis on the need to protect domestic interests as the EU opened up to the East. Despite these issues and reservations that started to emerge in Germany after 1997 it should be noted that German and CEE enlargement policies were predominantly reconcilable if not complementary. Most importantly, these policies were based on the strategic perspectives of these countries that came to see CEE integration with the West as beneficial for their security and economic interests. The following section addresses the material and cultural basis of this strategic congruence, which, as argued earlier constitutes a necessary step towards the rapprochement of inter-state relations. Explaining Strategic Congruence Whilst it is apparent that some vital interests of CEE and Germany converged closely through the process of EU enlargement, it may remain unclear just 'how' and 'why' it exactly happened. This section seeks to explore two essential sources of these policies and poses two broad types of explanation; 'power maximisation' that refers to the pragmatic self-interested considerations and 'historical legacy', which are normative in nature. The 'power maximisation' idea stresses material notions of economic and security interests whilst the 'historical legacy' argument emphasises historical experiences and political cultures as shaping German and CEE perspectives on enlargement and European integration more broadly. The point made here is that Germany's 'inbred' attachment to multilateralism gelled with CEE's post-1989 desire to return to Europe, which resulted in a common position on enlargement. These arguments are addressed here in the respective order beginning with the material explanation. Economic benefits It is often argued that the reason why Germany supported EU Enlargement was material as the policy would serve to increase its relative power in the region and in the broader context of the EU. It is also argued that EU Enlargement would indirectly increase Germany s weight in the global

54 48 Marcin Zaborowski economy. This is based on an observation of the expansion of German industry in the region that followed the end of the Cold War. From the early 1990s CEE states trade with Germany has accounted for roughly half of all their imports and exports with the EU and about a third of their overall trade. 6 Germany has also become a major foreign investor in the region. This situation has led to the growing dependence of CEE on economic trends in the Federal Republic. However, the benefits of Germany s ever growing economic presence in the region have been mutual and in many respects CEE's trade relations with Germany remained far more equal than its trade with other members of the EU. For example, throughout most of the 1990s Poland, the largest of new member states, had a relatively small deficit in its trade with Germany, with its imports being on average just 5%-10% higher than its exports to its western neighbour. This deficit appears insignificant when compared with the respective figures for Poland's trade with Italy, which show that in Poland bought from Italy twice as much as it sold. 7 In addition, the ratio of Poland's deficit with Germany declined in 2000 and since 2001 Poland's exports to Germany has been exceeding its imports. 8 It is therefore clear that expectations of German economic domination in CEE have been somehow exaggerated (Marko and Reich 1991). At the same time, it is apparent that no other country is as exposed to the risks and costs of enlargement as Germany. To begin with, Germany remains the major net contributor to EU budget and all of the new member states are net beneficiaries. As the result of enlargement some of the East German regions will lose their right to benefit from structural and cohesion funds. Relocation of many German businesses eastwards combined with the westwards migration of Polish, Czech and other workers may affect the employment situation in Germany. The economic implications of enlargement are therefore potentially ambivalent for Germany. Security and Stability In opposition to economic considerations enlargement seems more clearly beneficial from the security point of view. With the end of the Cold War, the Federal Republic's position of a Frontstaat was transformed - it no longer 6 For example in % of Polish exports went to Germany and about 23.9% of Poland s imports came from Germany. See: Obroty handlu zagranicznego ogolem i wedlug krajow w okresie I-XII 2000 r. : 7 See the data of the Ministry of Economics, Analysis and Forecast Department, Poland s Trade in 1999 Per Country Groupings in 8 Obroty handlu zagranicznego ogółem i według krajów w okresie I-VII 2000, in

55 Germany and EU Enlargement 49 feared Russian tanks on its streets, instead, it started to fear regional instability in CEE and South Eastern Europe. As the upheavals in the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were unfolding, the human and economic costs of these developments were especially felt in Germany, where the bulk of refugees chose to relocate. Reacting to these developments, the Federal Republic sought to promote stability, which became the leitmotif of its foreign policy towards the countries of the former Soviet block. This, it was believed in Berlin, would be best achieved through the extension of western institutions to the region and effective use of conditionality towards Germany s immediate neighbours to the East. By completing the integration of CEE into the West, Germany s sensitive status as a frontier state would disappear, thereby considerably enhancing its security. 9 Moreover, with CEE s membership in western organisations, the socio-economic transformation of these countries would be consolidated with obvious benefits for the FRG. Finally, Berlin also expected that the future accession of CEE to common immigration rules as defined by the Schengen agreement would help diminish the level of migration into the FRG (Frankfurter Rundschau 1998). However, although these security considerations are clearly examples of selfinterest they do not necessarily fit into the category of exclusively pragmatic behaviour. Arguably, it would be more practical from the point of view of German security interests to promote the eastern extension of NATO, which required less effort and no sacrifices for Germany itself. Indeed the CEE states were themselves in favour of a quick enlargement of NATO taking precedence over their accession to the EU. However, in the early 1990s NATO enlargement was clearly unpopular with the majority of the German government, with Defence Minister Ruhe being the sole vocal advocate of the notion (Ruhe 1993). The foreign minister Klaus Kinkel as well as Helmut Kohl himself clearly opted for a European solution to Germany s security needs. Kinkel s predecessor Hans-Dietrich Gensher argued that threats to Germany s security are non-military in nature and as such can not be addressed by NATO (Thewes 1998). In addition, NATO enlargement, as opposed by Russia, was perceived as divisive and potentially weakening rather than enhancing Germany s standing in the region (Kamp 1998). The argument over NATO enlargement had clearly displayed the role of normative factors due to historical reasons German elites retained an apparent preference for non-military solutions to address 9 Interviews with Friedbert Pflüger (CDU) and Marcus Meckel (SPD) Bonn, April 1998.

56 50 Marcin Zaborowski Germany's security concerns. But normative reasons were also behind a swing on the issue in 1994, when in response to a nationalist turn in Russia's parliamentary elections (Zirinovsky's far-right party became the biggest one in the Duma) Bonn officially moved to endorse the notion of NATO membership for its eastern neighbours. The tone of newspaper articles and parliamentary intervention at the time leave no doubt that a sense of kinship and responsibility for Germany s eastern neighbours played a major role in this process. 10 It was also significant that during the ratification of NATO enlargement treaties the notion received support from all major parliamentary fractions, including the pacifistic Greens who either voted in favour or abstained. Despite this change of heart over NATO enlargement it remained clear that Germany preferred other than traditional military and defensive means for promoting stability in the region. Germany s strategy towards CEE remained therefore focused on fostering domestic reforms, first of all on furthering democracy and the social market economy. This was pursued through Bonn/Berlin s promotion of EU Enlargement and through a number of bilateral devices. To sum up, it is apparent that the process of integrating CEE with the West has served the fundamental interests of Germany and the states in the region. This convergence and mutual-reinforcement of CEE and German interests has furthered the prospect of the rapprochement in the region, which contains a strong normative dimension. Through the eastern extension of European structures Germany and CEE are enhancing their internal and external security. Therefore, German and CEE foreign policies have become reconcilable. In this respect it could be argued that the nexus that emerged in Germany's relations with the states in CEE, Poland in particular, in the context of western integration is reminiscent of Franco-German relations. These points notwithstanding, Germany s and CEE s concerns with maximising their powers and promoting stability do not provide a complete explanation of their EU enlargement policies. In particular, historically and culturally defined interests were also important in this process. Essentially, it is important to see enlargement policies against the background of Germany's historical experiences. 10 Interview with Friedbert Pflüger on 2 April 1998, Bonn. Also see Pflüger s speech before the Bundestag on 13 January 1994: Für die Osterweiterung der NATO in Pflüger Der Spiegel, Nr.2, 1994, by the newspaper's editior in chief Rudolf Augestein.

57 Germany and EU Enlargement 51 Historical Legacy and Western Integration In the past, Germany and its CEE neighbours had stormy and predominately unsuccessful experiences with nation-state building. Not only were they latecomers to this process (with the German state emerging in 1871 and the Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian in 1918) but also, once they became states they were quite soon engulfed in conflicts leading either to dissolution or a major crisis affecting their statehood and sovereignty. Unsurprisingly then, historical legacies of Germany and CEE states figure as one of the important factors explaining these countries support for western integration, which has been perceived there as mitigating international conflicts and enhancing their security and stability. In spite of these similarities, which contributed to the congruence of CEE and German policies after 1989, there are significant differences in these countries past experiences with nation-state building. Most importantly, Germany itself brought about most previous incursions in to its statehood. In contrast, the CEE states were subjected to various episodes of external aggression, with Germany acting as a main invader in the region. These innate differences in the CEE and German experience are, it is argued here, of great consequence for their current foreign policies. As demonstrated in the next section, these differences have led to some discrepancies between CEE and German policies towards EU enlargement and towards the notion of supranational integration more generally. Germany s Excessive Multilateralism The Federal Republic has been renowned for its strong preference for multilateralism and an attachment to international institutions as a means of conducting its foreign policy. As argued by Helga Hafterndorn, Bonn/Berlin s relationship with international organisations has been intimate and reciprocal (Haftendorn 1996). To explain why this has been the case it is important to consider Germany s past. In particular two issues come at the front of all arguments about the peculiar nature of Bonn/Berlin's international behaviour: its unsuccessful experience with the nation-state and, as a consequence of this, externally imposed constraints upon its sovereignty (Heurlin 1996). With its sovereignty considerably limited in the wake of the Second World War, Bonn viewed its membership in international organisations as 'an opportunity to change external restrictions into voluntary commitments' (Haftendorn 1996). Paradoxically, then, the internationalisation of its surroundings and integration with the West served to enhance West Germany s autonomy. The decision to join the European Coal and Steel Community and NATO facilitated West Germany s international

58 52 Marcin Zaborowski rehabilitation, gave it a platform for the conduct of diplomacy and opened possibilities for its economic expansion in Europe and beyond. Consequently, then, western integration served Bonn's interests well and at the same time it kept its allies assured that enmeshed within international institutions, the Federal Republic would be prevented from acting belligerently. This perception was not considerably challenged until The end of the Cold War brought back the discussion about Germany s role in the international community. Other countries, notably America, called upon Germany to return to normality and act in the international arena in the way that would reflect its economic power. Partners in leadership, the term coined by President Bush (senior) in 1989, came to symbolise the new international expectations placed upon Germany. These new perceptions were mobilised by some writers in the discipline of International Relations, most spectacularly by John Mearsheimer whose famous article 'Back to the Future' suggested Germany's return to the super-power status with all necessary assets including the acquisition of nuclear weapons (Mearsheimer 1990). This line of thinking known as the normalisation debate', also implied that the post-cold War Federal Republic would be more assertive in its international behaviour and less inclined to support supranational integration (Maull and Gordon 1993). As regards CEE, the implications of this thesis were that Germany would either pursue a unilateral policy towards the region or it would pursue a limited enlargement hoping to form a pro- German block in the EU. Over a decade after German unification it appears that the prophecies of the 'normalisers' remain unfulfilled. The FRG not only strove to secure the united Germany s membership in NATO, but through the adoption of the Maastricht treaty, it bound itself more strongly than ever to the EC/EU. Most importantly here, as demonstrated in Germany's promotion of EU enlargement, Bonn/Berlin did not display unilateralism in its policies towards CEE. Although, it is true that for the bulk of the enlargement process Germany did pursue a limited enlargement, there is no evidence that it did so in expectations of forming a block of like-mined counties inside the EU. For example Germany always strongly championed the Polish candidacy although it was clear that Polish and German interests and perspectives on European integration would rarely converge. Far from being driven by a narrowly-defined self-interest Germany s enlargement policy contained a strong normative dimension, where European integration was seen as promoting regional stability and serving as a

59 Germany and EU Enlargement 53 vehicle of reconciliation. Consistent with its sustained multilateral approach, Germany s EU enlargement policy remained based on the pursuit of a dual and preferably simultaneous development of the EU: its deeper internal integration coupled with expansion to CEE. The first feature is directly connected with Germany s policy of strengthening its anchoring to the West and the latter serves to Europeanise its relations with CEE (Pflüger 1994). However, it still remains unclear whether the widening of the EU is really fully compatible with its deepening. Part of the reason why this is questionable is to do with the deep attachment towards national sovereignty held by the new member states. Unlike in Germany, nationalism has in CEE positive historical connotations, which results in a situation where CEEuropeans are less willing to give up on their sovereignty. In the situation where for the last two hundred years Polish, Czecho/Slovak and Hungarian states was constantly threatened (often by Germany) the notion of national identity grew to symbolise cultural defence against foreign aggression. Therefore, the CEE have been proud of their national identity and hold a positive image of the nation state. In fact, the very notion of return to Europe bolstered nationalism in CEE further, as it became apparent that these countries could never embark on joining the European project had they not regained their sovereignty in Importantly here, whilst these divergent attitudes towards European integration and the 'modern' state were of only peripheral consequence during the political phase of enlargement, with the beginning of EU membership negotiations in 1998 they started to act as an increasingly divisive factor in CEE-German relations. Towards Interests Convergence? Germany's rapprochement with CEE neighbours remained based on a reconcilability of strategic interests and perspectives, which proved crucial in bringing about EU enlargement. Since 1998 these processes have already been politically irreversible, which was a great success for Bonn/Berlin but this development opened up the question as to the future of the relationships in an enlarged EU. The divergent attitudes towards European integration in Germany and CEE were not essentially important prior the start of the negotiations, not least because these differences were largely not apparent up to this point. Throughout the 1990s public opinion in CEE continued to support the principle of EU membership without being engaged in the debate about implications of European integration for national sovereignty. At the same time the government chose not to express its views on the issue fearing that this could undermine its position in the run up to the negotiations. However, already the in the late 1990s it became apparent that

60 54 Marcin Zaborowski the nation-state remained sacrosanct in CEE politics with many parties taking somewhat reserved positions on European integration often inspired by de Gaulle's notion of a Europe of independent states. In addition, as the prospect of enlargement was becoming more real the economic interests of Germany and its eastern neighbours did not always appear reconcilable. Since the start of accession negotiations these differences came to the forefront of the enlargement process and had a negative impact on the relationships. All of this meant that while Germany s political support for its neighbours EU membership remained unchanged, the start of actual negotiations in 1998 marked the beginnings of an evolution in the German debate on aspects of implementation. In other words, as a result of the start of negotiations in 1998, EU enlargement has lost its special status an exclusive position at the level of high politics. Instead, debating enlargement has become exposed to all levels of German and CEE national systems the process referred to here as domestication. The Domestication of EU Enlargement Process after 1998 The technical logic of the negotiations was such that it de-emphasised strategic considerations, which acted as a unifying factor in German-CEE relationships, whilst it brought into fore many particular issues - which were often problematic for these states. Whilst Germany remained the strongest supporter of its neighbours EU membership, it was also more worried than any other member state about the economic implications of EU enlargement. The particular nature of the negotiations also required a more detailed and technical definition of the member states and accession countries positions in the process. Until 1998 the enlargement policy of Germany were pursued almost exclusively within the realms of its foreign and European policy. The start of the negotiation process led to all major ministries becoming involved in the process. The same was true for political parties and Länder who started to perceive EU enlargement as a process that would affect their domestic constituencies. Overall, negotiations led to a greater engagement more domestic actors attempting to influence national positions and defend their particular interests in the process. The natural consequence of these post-1998 changes was that Bonn/Berlin began to construct its policies in such a way that reflected to a greater degree its specific national conditions. Subsequently, in order to address the relationship during this period it is essential to focus analysis on the domestic

61 Germany and EU Enlargement 55 mechanisms underpinning the processes of constructing enlargement policies of Bonn/Berlin. It is also important to consider the perspectives of key domestic actors that were able to influence the process. Germany s EU Enlargement Policy after 1998 Domestic Factors The Frameworks of Germany's European Diplomacy Germany's European policy is renowned for its ambivalence. On one hand, consensus has often prevailed in Bonn/Berlin when strategic issues of European integration were under consideration. For example, the key constitutional policies of the EC/EU, such as the European Monetary System, Single Market or EMU, were supported by all major political parties in government and opposition. At the same time, however, Germany s policy in the EU has been reputed for being poorly co-ordinated due to a deconcentration of its decision-making processes. Thus, unsurprisingly, Germany s European diplomacy is famous for being good on pursuing strategic objectives but poor on tactics (Bulmer and Paterson 2000). This ambivalence, it is argued, is a consequence of Germany s specific domestic conditions or, in other words, its national opportunity structure. The German system of governance is considered highly decentralised first and foremost because of its federal nature but also because of the considerable autonomy enjoyed by individual ministries and non-state actors, e.g. the trade unions, all of which aspire to influence Berlin's European policy. On one hand, the extensive and constitutionally guaranteed position of the Federal Chancellor (Art. 65 of the Basic Law) enables a clear articulation of the strategic aims of Germany s European policy. This system known as Guiding Competence - Richtlinienkompetenz proved effective even when the government adopted unpopular policies, for example the EMU and the abolition of the D-Mark - the symbol of (West) German prosperity. On the other hand, the relative autonomy of individual ministries (Ressortprinzip) allows ministries to run their autonomous policies, which are often determined by particular sectoral interests. This phenomenon, known as sectorisation, led to the emergence of in-house European policies of individual federal ministries that are sometimes incongruent with the government s main position. Further decentralisation of the government s competencies is a consequence of the participation of the Länder in the governing process. In addition, the decision making process is exposed to

62 56 Marcin Zaborowski differences of opinion apparent within political parties in both government and opposition. The Government and EU Enlargement After the EU agreed to start accession negotiations with the group of six countries in 1998, the German administration underwent some changes to cope with this more technical phase. As argued earlier, this resulted in EU enlargement losing its special status, as the process began to be dealt with by European technocrats rather than area specialists. At the beginning of 1998, the Foreign Office reorganised its system of dealing with enlargement issues, which were moved away from the political department, the Politische Abteilung, to the department of European affairs, Europaabteilung. Before 1998 the main person responsible for EU enlargement in the Ministry was Mr Vogel, a traditional career diplomat who previously had spent many years working in the West German Embassy in Poland, he spoke perfect Polish and developed a genuine interest in the area. Essentially, Vogel perceived EU enlargement in terms of political rapprochement and reconciliation. 11 His successor, Reinhard Silberberg was known as a skilful technocrat who had been formerly responsible for preparing the Ministry's position for the 1996/7 IGS but his interest in East Central Europe was mild at best. It was also made clear to the new head of the task-force that his job would be to deal with the technical aspects of enlargement. 12 This technocratisation of Bonn s EU Enlargement policy increased further with the change of government in September The task-force for enlargement in the Ministry of Economics was moved to the Finance Ministry and its competencies were extended to include those issues previously dealt with by the Foreign Office. Crucially, the Finance Ministry took over all responsibilities for the chapters of the accession negotiations that were considered significant for the economy. 13 Needless to say, these have been the most difficult and the most important aspects of the negotiations. The new, more domestically-focused government argued more assertively for what it called a fairer allocation of EU resources and for lowering Germany s payments to the EU (FAZ 1998c). Under a left-wing Finance Minister, Oskar Lafontaine, who resigned in a spectacular manner in March 11 Interview with Mr Vogel; Auswärtiges Amt, Arbeitstab Ostmitteleuropa, Bonn, Interview with Reinhard Silberberg, Auswärtiges Amt, Arbeitstab EU/Mittel und Osteuropa, Bonn, Confidential interview in the Finance Ministry, Bonn,

63 Germany and EU Enlargement , Bonn also pursued a policy of tax harmonisation and synchronisation of employment policies, both of which served further to undermine EU enlargement (Financial Times 1998). Although calls for budgetary reforms were initiated by the former coalition, the new government pursued its policy in a way that antagonised other Members States and disinclined them to support enlargement, which was often seen as a German project. More importantly, for the first time, Bonn directly linked budgetary reform with the eastern expansion of the EU, declaring a no enlargement without financial reform (Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform) policy (FAZ 1998b). Lafontaine's EU employment policy could not be easily reconciled with extending the free movement of workers to those countries where the costs of labour units were considerably cheaper than in Germany. Finally, the tax harmonisation proposal caused a lot of antagonism in the EU, chiefly in Britain (The Economist 1998b) pushing for the time being the enlargement question further down the EU s agenda. In sum, it is clear that the start of EU membership negotiations led to the decentralisation of the federal government s EU enlargement policy and the emergence of a division between the strategic and technical levels of policy-making. This broadening of participation in enlargement policy also stretched outside the government to include the Länder, whose voice became increasingly important in the process of constructing Germany s policy towards enlargement. The Länder According to Charlie Jeffery and Stephen Collins, EU enlargement represents for the Länder the same qualities as apple pie has for Americans, no-one can really refuse it and everyone considers it a good thing (Jeffery and Collins 1998). Indeed, the Länder have never opposed enlargement and have often declared it to be a desirable development. Already in 1993 the European Ministers Conference of the Länder issued a declaration of support for Poland s, Czech Republic s, Slovakia s and Hungary s EU membership. They also welcomed the outcome of the 1996/97 Intergovernmental Conference as preparing the way for enlarging the EU to the East. However, as has been the case with the national government, since late 1997 the attitude of the Länder towards enlargement has been transformed from an unreservedly positive to what Jeffery calls a range of yes, but qualifications (Bulmer and Paterson 2000). The Länder have not only begun to raise various reservations about individual aspects of enlargement but (again like individual Ministries at the governmental level) they started to perceive

64 58 Marcin Zaborowski the notion through the prism of their particular and often conflicting interests. Inevitably, once enlargement entered its technical stage the focus began to shift onto its immediate costs rather than its long-term political ramifications. This has been especially true for those Länder that share borders with prospective new member states, who are concerned that while investment might migrate further East, the cheaper Polish and Czech labour force would move West. In addition Agenda 2000 proposed a number of solutions that involved cuts in the resources so far received by the poorer East German Länder. Thus, unsurprisingly, the Länder reacted with mixed feelings to this proposal. The Bundesrat published a resolution in which the Länder reaffirmed their support for enlargement and welcomed the decision of the European Council (Luxembourg: December 1997) to start negotiations with the group of six countries. It was also noted in this document that EU enlargement was in the Länder s own interest. But the resolution also stressed that the special concerns of the regions bordering with prospective Members needed to be taken into consideration. The Bundesrat also called the proposed reform of the structural and cohesion funds too drastic especially with regards to the Eastern Länder. 14 Thus, the reaction of the Länder to the publication of Agenda 2000 saw the emergence of the yes, but.. attitude in their EU enlargement policies. The 'but..' element of this qualification was to become more prominent in due course. For example, it was significant how the European Ministers Conference of the Länder welcomed the start of the membership negotiations in March The declaration issued at the meeting in April 1998 in Bremen once again expressed the Länder s support for the process but it also put forward a number of reservations that needed to be tackled prior to the actual implementation of enlargement. In particular, European Ministers stressed that transition periods for new members were imperative in some fields, such as the free movement of people. The negative impact of enlargement upon the border regions was also repeatedly stressed. 15 Political Parties Until the mid 1990s the cross-party consensus on the conduct of an EUfriendly policy allowed consecutive German governments to proceed with a 14 Entschließung des Bundesrates zur Mitteilung der Europäischen Kommission Agenda eine stärkere und erweiterte Union, Beschluss des Bundesrates, 28 november See: Erweiterung der Europäischen Union Beschluss-Top3, 19. Europaministerkonferenz in Bremen, 22/23. April 1998.

65 Germany and EU Enlargement 59 policy of embedding Germany s interests in a supranational context to achieve its foreign policy goals. However, this consensus also became weakened. The increasingly eurosceptic CSU began to dispute Kohl s policy of parallel deepening and enlarging as early as the mid-1990s (Waigel 1995). Also, the SPD, whilst in opposition, expressed concerns about the costs of expanding the EU eastwards as well as criticising the government s policy on CAP and EU structural funds. 16 In addition, the previous positive attitude of the German public towards the process of European integration continuously weakened throughout the 1990s. The financial burden of unification considerably limited Federal resources, which led consequently to the emergence of public reluctance against subsidising other than domestic policy priorities. Perhaps, the most clear reaction of the Kohl government to these internal social pressures was its new assertiveness, displayed during the EU budgetary debate. While reaffirming that national contributions to the EU s treasury should not exceed the level of 1,27 % of GDP, the government s policy did not diverge from the view of the SPD. The CSU and Bavarian government went even further and suggested a lowering of the German share below the threshold advocated by Bonn. 17 Although the economic benefits of expanding the EU beyond the FRG s eastern border have been appreciated by German elites, the majority of the general public identified mainly with the negative aspects in this process (such as migration, cheap labour, crime, environmental degradation), and consequently objected to eastern enlargement. 18 Clearly, these public fears could not be ignored by political parties, who often reacted by demanding that the government takes a more assertive position in the negotiations. The CSU initially argued in favour of a quick completion of EU eastern expansion, however, already before the September 1998 elections, the party changed its position and started to dispute the notion, arguing from a conservative position of law and order with concerns over influxes of cheap labour from CEE. Ironically, the same argument - the threat of cheap labour - was raised by the SPD, although the Social Democrats did not appeal to law and order arguments, but expressed their concerns about the domestic employment market (Rzeczpospolita 1998a). The run up to the general election in autumn 1998 resulted in EU enlargement being instrumentalised for domestic purposes by the parties of 16 Finanzierung der EU-Osterweiterung, Das Parlament, 20 December 'In Sachen Europa hat Bayern ein Forderungspaket geschnürt', Mainpost 3 December In 1997 only about 30% of Germans supported Poland s membership in the EU and 52 % were against it: See: Eurobarometer, 47, Spring 1997, Annex B.20.

66 60 Marcin Zaborowski the governing coalition. The CSU, aided by some politicians on the right of the CDU, attacked the allegedly hasty timetable for enlargement. They also demanded conditions for the Czech Republic s and Poland s membership in the EU, for example, that these countries show a readiness to return former German properties confiscated by the Czechoslovak and Polish authorities after On 29 May 1998 the government parties voted in the Bundestag in favour of the Heimatvertrieben resolution in which they demanded that in the context of EU enlargement, Poland and the Czech Republic should respect the rights of those Germans who lost their properties at the end of the war and let them return to their homeland (FAZ 1998a). The SPD and the Greens voted against the resolution and the future Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder rejected linking the issue with EU enlargement (Rzeczpospolita 1998b). On the other hand, some members of the SPD attacked enlargement on pragmatic grounds, stressing that neither the EU nor the applicant countries were ready for it and warned that should enlargement happen, Germany would pay for it (Financial Times 1998a). With the change of government in autumn 1998, the parties of the new governing coalition, the SPD and the Greens, initially advocated a more cautious approach towards EU enlargement. For the SPD it was imperative that the EU's financial system be reformed so that Germany would not have to shoulder the bulk of enlargement-related costs. The Greens were less concerned with the economic burden of enlargement, but were anxious that the widening of an unreformed EU might endanger its internal cohesion and hinder further integration. However, after it became apparent that change in Germany s EU enlargement policy could have jeopardised the reconciliation process the SPD and the Greens altered their cautious rhetoric. In the meantime the CDU attacked the parties of the new government for irresponsible behaviour in the area (FAZ 1998d). Arguably, the post-1997 emphasis on the protection of Germany s economic interest in the enlargement was influenced more by the logic of negotiations than politics. However, the change of government in 1998 produced a certain shift in emphasis from normative, value-related arguments towards the more objective rights-based considerations. Kohl s government pursued, aggressively at times, limited enlargement including Germany s immediate neighbours to whom Germany felt a sense of guilt and was connected to by many cultural bonds. Kohl is also reputed for claiming that the EU is a Christian project and as such there is no place in it for Turkey. 19 Equally, 19 Interviews in the CDU and CSU headquaters, Berlin, June 2001.

67 Germany and EU Enlargement 61 there was no enthusiasm is the CDU/CSU for EU membership of Romania and Bulgaria both considered backward countries to whom Germany owed nothing. The success of the SPD and the Greens in November 1998 marked not only political but also a generational change. Whilst Kohl s generation was shaped by the memories of the Second World War, Schröder and Fischer were both far more influenced by the anti-establishment revolts of Hence the sense of historical guilt and cultural kinship, so acute in Kohl s European policy, was far less pronounced in the policy of its successors. In this context, it is perhaps of no coincidence that after Kohl s departure Berlin s prioritisation of CEE candidates lessened and Germany agreed to the big bang mode of the 2004 enlargement. More certainly, it is clear that Germany s support for Turkey s bid to be recognised as a candidate country would have not occurred had the CDU/CSU remained in power. Domestication and German-CEE Relations Germany can rightly claim credit for the fact that the first phase of enlargement began and that CEE states found themselves firmly on track to join the EU. Bonn/Berlin's support for enlargement was the main reason for the dramatic improvement in these relationships. On the other hand, soon after the launch of membership negotiations it became apparent that the connection, which had been established between EU enlargement and rapprochement could also become problematic for these relationships. As argued earlier, the start of the negotiations in 1998 coincided with Bonn adopting a far more cautious position on enlargement, which was increasingly impacting upon the domestic affairs of Germany. This development meant that Germany arrived at the negotiating table with much more constrained and convoluted postures than it had had in the former more political stage of the process. Despite this, Bonn/Berlin never questioned the basic principle of the enlargement, which it continued to see as the bedrock of the rapprochement with CEE. However, in some policy areas, such as land purchasing or the free movement of workers, discord emerged which was subsequently instrumentalised for domestic purposes. This development has undoubtedly affected the pace of these relationships and led to a number of much-publicised disagreements between Bonn/Berlin and CEE states (Poland and the Czech Republic in particular). The first serious blow to Warsaw s and Prague s confidence in the Federal Republic s role as its advocate emerged in the wake of the CDU/CSU/FPD coalition s vote in May 1998 in support of the Heimatvertrieben resolution. The arrival of the SPD/Green government in 1998 with its new realism in

68 62 Marcin Zaborowski EU enlargement was a further setback for the relationship. While Kohl could be forgiven for playing a nationalistic tune for domestic purposes, he somehow managed to establish himself in these countries as the chief promoter of EU enlargement. The SPD was different. It had a record of ignoring the pre-1989 dissidents and of co-operating with communists. Many in the SPD opposed NATO enlargement and remained ambivalent about expanding the EU. This was coupled with a perception of the Greens as a leftist, anti-american force, both of which were viewed with suspicion by the new foreign-policy elites in CEE (Majcherek 1998; Jalowiecki 1999). Thus, when after winning elections Joschka Fischer declined to set a target date for enlargement and Gerhard Schröder warned in Pörtschach against too quick an opening of the EU to the East, many in CEE felt that they had lost their advocate. Following this, the Polish Foreign Minister expressed his scepticism about the red-green coalition by saying: The CDU and Helmut Kohl, we knew that they were our friends but the new government we are not sure (Gazeta Wyborcza 1998). The Polish and Czech press was full of articles accusing the SPD/Green coalition of pursuing a nationalistic new Realpolitik that would lead to the isolation of CEE and renewal of the German-Russian bond. At the same time it was hardly noticed in Warsaw and Prague that the new government had inherited from Kohl a European policy which was already contradictory, unsustainable and, most importantly, increasingly reserved about enlargement. It was, however, widely noted that while setting an agenda for its EU presidency (in the first half of 1999), the red-green government prioritised issues other than enlargement (Majcherek 1998; Smolar 1998). This rather unfavourable climate began to improve after In spite of early criticism of Berlin's EU presidency, it soon became apparent that the enlargement negotiations accelerated during this period. Poles were also pleased that Berlin strongly opposed any plans that would not include Poland in the first wave of enlargement and Joschka Fischer repeatedly stated that without Poland the notion was not conceivable. Finally, During the Nice summit in December 2000, Berlin fought with CEE against the French proposal to discriminate new members by granting them proportionally lesser voting powers than they were entitled to by the merit of their demography (Buras 2000). To conclude here, the case of post-1998 German-CEE relations in the context of EU enlargement shows two fundamental points. The growing impact of European integration on the domestic scene provoked responses

69 Germany and EU Enlargement 63 from multiple domestic agents, which inevitably put pressures on national governments. The findings of this section have shown that German European policies, have at times, been dominated by domestic considerations. This seemed to have been the case in the latter stages of the Kohl Government, as seen in its Heimatsvertriebene resolution, and in the early phase of Schröder's Chancellorship. A second point is that the growth of domestic actors involved in the process does not necessarily mean that governments will always let domestic interests lead their policies. It is clear that the post-1989 rapprochement acted in the German-CEE case as the constraining factor against enlargement policies being determined solely by short-term considerations Conclusion In the 1990 s EU enlargement served as an engine of CEE-German reconciliation, rapprochement and co-operation. As a framework for establishing new relationships, the enlargement process illustrated points of co-operation, but also, as demonstrated by the events after 1998, it occasionally prompted divisions and discord, when the aspirations of domestic actors diverged. Since 1998, the Federal Republic has not had a single, comprehensive EU enlargement policy. Instead there have been the policies of the Foreign Office, Finance Ministry and Chancellor's Office, as well as other ministries. There have also been the policies of Bavaria, Brandenburg as well as other Länder. Party politics have additionally contributed to aggravating the complexity of the German system. It is true that some common grounds remain, most importantly neither a single Ministry nor a Länder questioned the underlying principle of enlargement. Nonetheless, as argued in the chapter, the differences were often substantial. Second, due to the complexity of the issue and growing criticism of it at home, the yes, but attitude came to dominate Bonn/Berlin's EU enlargement policy. Third, from being a key advocate for a quick enlargement, Germany came to prefer a slower pace, as demonstrated in the objection to naming a date for enlargement. The issue of EU enlargement became central to the rapprochement of German-CEE relations. As long as the Federal Republic was perceived in CEE as an advocate of the enlargement, these relationships continued to improve dramatically. However, since enthusiasm for enlargement dropped in Germany the link existing between EU enlargement and bilateral relations in CEE came to have a rather ambivalent impact upon these relationships.

70 64 Marcin Zaborowski This ambivalence became only more apparent after 2001 when CEE states (Poland in particular) and Germany started to voice increasingly divergent views towards the future shape of the EU. In this context some commentators raised the question whether CEE-German rapprochement would be sustainable after enlargement. On one hand, EU enlargement represents a joint success for CEE states and Germany that consistently pursued this policy since On the other hand, the actual realisation of enlargement opens up the question as to whether the rapprochement is sufficiently advanced to encourage Berlin and its neighbours to put their differences aside and work together in an EU of 25. Developments between and in particular the disagreements over the war in Iraq and, in the Polish-German case, EU constitution do not allow for much optimism when considering this question. As regards the three types of considerations developed by Sjursen, that may have potentially driven Germany s enlargement policy it appears that it was the normative value-based arguments that prevailed most strongly in Berlin s policy. As demonstrated in this chapter, Germany consistently perceived enlargement in the context of a broader rapprochement process attempting to establish similar types of relations towards its eastern neighbours as it had developed with France. As argued by Kohl, the process of European integration could not have started without the Franco-German reconciliation, equally, it can not be completed without Germany s rapprochement with Poland. (quoted in Malinowski 1996). The CDU foreign policy spokesman, Friedbert Pflüger routinely promoted enlargement by referring to normative considerations, stressing the notion of cultural closeness as apparent in the shared experience of western Christianity, renaissance and enlightenment (Herzog 1997; Pflüger 1994). Two types of normative value-based considerations were therefore here at play: firstly, Germany s perceived need to pursue a multilateral, European, route to achieve reconciliation with its eastern neighbours and secondly a sense of cultural kinship with CEE states prevailed in the German approach. The absence of these factors in Germany s policy towards the Balkan states and Turkey explains the difference in Berlin s attitude towards these countries bids to join the EU. As regards the pragmatic self-interested considerations the evidence is rather mixed here. As argued in the paper the economic benefits of EU enlargement may be substantial for Germany but so are the costs. Whilst security arguments are often at the forefront of the German debate, these are focused on the notion of enhancing stability of Germany s environment the argument that does not squarely fall into the category of self-interest. In

71 Germany and EU Enlargement 65 addition, it is clear that whilst the German elites have consistently argued that enlargement is in Germany s economic and security interests the majority of the population clearly does not buy this argument as evident in its, pragmatically-motivated, opposition to this policy. Finally, the third category of argument, implying that enlargement prompts evolution of the EU towards a right-based post-national polity, might have influenced the German debate only at the final states of the process. As argued earlier such an argument would require a non-biased and objective approach towards enlargement. It is clear that prioritisation of CEE candidates, which indeed was apparent in Germany s policy, contradicts this argument. On the other hand, the change of attitude of the Schröder s government towards Turkey s membership and the vision of EU s future developed by Joschka Fisher and presented at the Humboldt University indicate that such an evolution is begging to take seed in Germany. Bibliography Bulmer, S,; Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W.E. (2000): Germany's European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu, MUP: Buras, P. (2000): The Most Serious Challenges Facing Poland s European, Policy Reports & Analyses, 4/2000, Warsawa: CIR pp.12-3 The Economist (1995): European Union. Single-currency-minded, 23 December The Economist (1998): Britain out of Harmony Again, 28 November EU Bulletin (1997a): Agenda 2000 (1/1), 7 August 1997 EU Bulletin (1997b): Agenda 2000 (1/5), December European Council (1994): Presidency Conclusions Anex IV, Essen 9-10 December FAZ (1998a): Rechte für die Heimatvertriebenen 30 May FAZ (1998b): Bundesregierung: Keine EU-Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform, 3 December FAZ (1998c): Schröder fordert niedrigere deutsche Zahlungen an die EU, 9 December FAZ (1998d): Kritik der Union an der Europa-Politik der Regierung / Bundesdebatte vor dem Wiener Gipfel, 11 December 1998.

72 66 Marcin Zaborowski Fischer, J. (2000): From Confederacy to Federation Thoughts on the finality of European Integration, Speech at the Humboldt University, 12 May 2000, in Joerges, C.; Meny, Y. and Weiler, J.H.H. (eds.): What kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fisher, Florence: EUI. Fischer, J. and Geremek, B. (2000): Deutsch-polnische Beziehungen - Schlüssel zum Aufbau einer stabilen Europäischen Union, Der Tagesspiegel, 17 February Financial Times (1998a): SPD warns on EU enlargement, 2 June Financial Times (1998b): Germany to Push Ahead with EU Tax Harmonising Plans, 24 November Frankfurter Rundschau (1998): Kampfansage an Flüchtlinge. Schengen-Staaten beschließen Aktionsplan, 16 September Gazeta Wyborcza (1998): Geremek: nie wiemy czego oczekiwa, 29 November Haftendorn, H. (1996): Gulliver in the Centre of Europe: International Involvement and National Capabilities for Action in Heurlin, B. (ed.): Germany in the Nineties. Macmillan Press. Harasimowicz, A.(1994): Po podpisaniu układu europejskiego in Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 1992, Warszawa: PISM, pp Herzog, R. (1997): Die Osteuropaeischen Staaten und die Europaeische Union in Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamtes der Bundesregirung, 78. Heurlin, B (1996): The International Position and the National Interest of Germany in the Nineties in Heurlin, B. (ed.): Germany in the Nineties, Macmillan Press, p. 47. Jalowiecki, B.(1999): Swiat 1998 czyli Sprawa Polska, Zycie, 8 January Jeffery, C. and Collins, S. (1998): The German Länder and EU Enlargement: Between Apple Pie and Issue Linkage in Handl, V.; Hon, J. and Pick, O. (et al): Germany and East Central Europe since 1990, Praha: Ustav mezinarodnich vztahu. Kamp, K-H. (1998): Germany and NATO: The Opening of the Alliance and Its Future Institute for German Studies, Discussion Paper 14/1998. Kolboom, I.(1996): Frankreich und Deutschland: Die neuen Akzente in Kaiser, K and Krause, J.(eds.): Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik. Band 3.

73 Germany and EU Enlargement 67 Interessen und Strategien, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Oldenburg, München, pp Majcherek, J.A.: (1998): Widmo Nowej Realpolitik, Rzeczpospolita, 3.november Malinowski, K. (1996): 'Asymetria Partnerstwa: Polityka Zjednoczonych Niemiec wobec Polski', in Mazur, Z. (ed.) Rola Niemiec, Poznan:Instytut Zachodni. Markovits, A. and Reich, S. (1991): Should Europe Fear the Germans? in German Politics and Society 23, pp Maull, H.W. and Gordon, P.H. (1993): German Foreign Policy and German National Interest : German and American Perspectives, The Johns Hopkins University: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Discussion Paper 5, January. Mearscheimer, J. (1990): Back to the Future, Instability in Europe After the Cold War, International Security, 15(1) pp Mertes, M. and Prill, N.J. (1989): 'Der verhängnisvolle Irrtum eines Entweder-Oder', FAZ, 19 July Pflüger, F. (1994): Die Zukunft des Ostens liegt im Westen. Beiträge zur Aussenpolitik, Düsseldorf/Wien: Econ Taschenbuch Verlag, pp Pflüger, F. (1995): Poland and the European Union, Außenpolitik, 3/95, pp Rühe, V. (1993): Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: Grand Strategy for a New Era, Survival, 35(2), pp Rzeczpospolita (1998a): Gerhard Schröder w Warszawie. Nie stawiajmy warunków, 18 June Rzeczpospolita (1998b): Niefortunna Rezolucja. Verheugen: Po zwyci stwie SPD b dzie inaczej, 7 July Schäuble-Lamers: Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik. Positionspapier der CDU/CSU- Bundestagsfraktion vom , Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 10, pp Schröder, G. and Buzek, J. (2000): Wspolna przyszlosc ma na imie Europa, Rzeczpospolita, 18 November Sjursen, H. (2002): Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU s Enlargement Policy, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(3), pp

74 68 Marcin Zaborowski Smolar, A.(1998): Unia na horyzoncie, Rzeczpospolita, December Der Spiegel (1994): Falsche Hoffnungen, 12 December Tewes, H. (1998): Germany as a Civilian Power. The Western Integration of East Central Europe , University of Birmingham: Institute for German Studies,pp (unpublished). Tewes, H. (2001): Germany, Civilian Power and New Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Torreblanca, J.I. (1997): The European Community and Central Eastern Europe ( ): Foreign Policy and Decision-Making, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Socialeas. Waigel (1995): 'Wer soll das bezahlen?', Focus 3 July 1995.

75 Chapter 3 Ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 1 Sonia Piedrafita UNED It is still an open and controversial question why the Spanish governments did not veto the EU s Eastern enlargement in spite of its impact upon important Spain s interests. They have constantly strived to reduce or contain its negative effects and their support to the process has been conditioned by many ifs and buts. Since the early 1990s Spanish representatives have been quite insistent on the negative consequences that Eastward enlargement could have upon the integration process, the Common Policies, the institutions and other budgetary and financial aspects. Moreover, their support to the process has not been unconditional, in the sense that it hasn t been just a yes, but rather a yes but. Still, the successive governments have never threatened to veto the accessions and have kept on expressing their sense of solidarity with the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the moral duty to help them with their socio-economic and political transformations, regarding membership as the best means to achieve this goal and overcome the division of Europe. Since it is the European Council that ultimately decides by unanimity whether and when to ask for the Commission s opinion on an applicant, 1 This paper is a revised version of the first draft presented at the workshop held in Ávila (Spain) on 7-8 May 2004, as part of the workpackage Justifying Enlargement of the CIDEL Project financed by the European Commission 5 th Framework Programme and coordinated by ARENA in Oslo. I truthfully thank all the participants for their valuable comments, particularly E.O. Eriksen, J. E. Fossum, Å. Lundgren, H. Sjursen and J. I. Torreblanca.

76 70 Sonia Piedrafita whether to give it the status of candidate, when to start the accession negotiations, and whether to accept their final terms, in principle each member state has a veto power upon the different stages of the decisional process. Accordingly, Spain could have vetoed the process whenever its interests proved negatively affected or in order to achieve its goals, but it did not. Why did Spain support Eastern enlargement to the (apparent) detriment of its own interests? According to a rational choice approach, the Spanish government would not have used this veto power, in spite of negative expected consequences, insofar as opposing Eastern Enlargement was not a realistic political option, since the costs of veto for reluctant incumbents could be even higher than those derived from the accessions. Other powerful member states were in favour, with Spain having no chance of blocking the process without discrediting itself or losing support in other negotiations. Undoubtedly, this would have been against interest-maximising premises. Under these circumstances, when it was difficult if not impossible for Spain to oppose enlargement outright, the best remaining option the lesser evil as one might say was to support enlargement and in the process do its best to protect its interests and get some concessions, using value- and norm-based arguments strategically to make a virtue out of the necessity. However, history provides us with some instances in which member states have used the veto power to block some or other stage of an enlargement process (when their national interests have been considered to be at stake). It is the case of De Gaulle s veto to the British application for accession to the EC in 1963, or France s and Great Britain s block of Spanish accession negotiations in the early 1980s, or Spain s threat to veto the conclusion of negotiations with Norway in The present time is also offering an interesting debate on whether accession negotiations with Turkey should automatically lead to membership, with some member state governments being very reluctant to accept it. Therefore, why did the Spanish government decline similar actions on the occasion of Eastern enlargement? Although interests-maximising premises can explain some of the Spanish government s claims along the process, a further explanation is needed to better understand the fact that the Spanish government never threatened to veto Eastern enlargement in order to achieve its goals or achieve better outcomes. A significant difference between rational choice and sociological approaches is the emphasis they put on different logics or modes of social action and interaction that are characterized by different rationalities as far as the goals of action are concerned (Risse 2000: 3). The next section of this paper will try to develop

77 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 71 an analytical framework to analyse which logic can better explain this political action: 1) the consideration of a set of national preferences and the anticipation of the consequences of the action, which has been referred to as logic of consequentiality (Elster 1984); 2) the conception of the self in a social role, or logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998); 3) the assessment of morally valid arguments, or logic of justification (Eriksen 1999). In section 2, the predictable consequences of EU Eastern enlargement for Spain will be analysed. Section 3 will review the main contents of Spanish Eastern enlargement policy in the 1990s and examine to what extent they respond to an instrumental rationality. In section 4, the question will be approached from a sociological perspective, and in section 5 some conclusions will be drawn. Different modes or logics of social action: consequentiality, appropriateness and justification Under the premises of rational choice theories in International Relations (IR), such as liberalism (Moravcsik 1997) and neo-realism (Baldwin 1993), interstate interaction responds to a logic of consequentiality (Elster 1984; March and Olsen 1989; Eriksen 1999). On reaching international agreements, states are considered rational actors who define their preferences about certain subjects in relation to their own material interests and act according to them in a basically technical environment (Scott 1991) where bargaining is the common procedure to resolve disputes (Elster 1992; Schimmelfennig 2003). Therefore, the outcome depends on the distribution of power and on the individual preferences, which, although a priori defined, may be changed because of coercion, compensations, or persuasion. Rational institutionalism applies these assumptions to interaction within an organization, on the account that the institutional settings might set limits to the strategic behaviour of the members. Still, state governments are considered to build their respective positions as a result of an analysis of the expected consequences of the political actions, although with the consideration of these institutional constrains, acting thenceforward in a strategic way in order to maximise their gains. Efficiency in terms of the satisfaction of the members interests lends legitimacy to a collective policy. Negotiation demands and salient concerns correspond with pragmatic issues such as the efficient attainment of economic or geopolitical objectives. The table below is elaborated from concepts in: Elster 1992; Elster 2000; Eriksen 1999; Eriksen 2003; Eriksen and Fossum 2003; Fossum 2000; Habermas 1996; March and Olsen 1998; Moravcsik 1998 and Sjursen 2002.

78 72 Sonia Piedrafita Goal of the political action Rationality Mode of interaction Type of outcome Legitimacy of the collective decision Justification of the decision Rational Choice Logic of consequences: actors act purposely to reach their objectives, which are fixed a priori as a result of the anticipation of the consequences of a political action. Instrumental: actors are considered rational when they pursue their material and ideal welfare with their actions. Bargaining: actors seek their respective purposes and engage into interaction in order to induce the others to accept their claims. Threats to veto, linkages between issues and sidepayments are usual instruments of negotiation. Compromise: although parties might not get exactly what they want, each regards the result as better than no outcome at all. How much the various actors have to deviate from their opening position depends on the strength of their bargaining power, i.e. the resources at their disposal, and their ability to conduct the bargaining process. It relies on its efficiency. A collective decision should promote the interests and preferences of the members and solve their problems in a more efficient way. On its utility: a policy decision is justified on its efficiency in reaching a goal (pragmatic arguments). Sociological Institutionalism Logic of appropriateness: actors act according to their role within a community as a result of habit or a particular identity. Contextual: actors are considered rational when their actions derive from the conception of self in a social role. Role conformity: actors consider what they are expected to do according to their social roles, the norms to be applied and the values of the community to which they belong. Consent: issuing from a successful search for collective selfunderstanding, it expresses self-reflection and resolve on a form of life. It is a matter of identity. Collective decisions develop and protect the sense of we-ness, accordingly defining common goals and visions and establishing bonds of solidarity. On values: a policy decision is justified with ethical arguments stemming from a given cultural context and the shared collective identity. Communicative Action Logic of justification: actors seek to reach an agreement through the assessment of arguments deemed legitimate by all parties involved. Communicative: actors are considered rational when they are able to explain and justify their actions. Arguing: actors seek consensus and engage into communication for the purpose of convincing the others, i.e. to make them change beliefs about factual or normative statements. Working agreement: the parties clarify arguments and challenge the reasons given in order to reach higher degrees of understanding and a provisional agreement to make further cooperation possible. The better argument is the one that generates most support. Rational consensus: it expresses the right thing to do according to universally-valid standards. Actors appeal to the force of a norm or a principle on justifying a political action and agreement is reached round the better argument, that which convinces all the parties. Collective decisions rely on a universal conception of justice, based on the respect and entrenchment of fundamental rights and a fair system of cooperation and deliberation. On rights: a policy decision is justified with moral arguments stemming from universally-valid standards and democratic procedures for deliberation and decision-making.

79 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 73 For constructivist approaches, social action in international relations might also respond to a logic of appropriateness, that is the consideration by the actors on defining their preferences of what they are expected to do, i.e. the roles and norms to be applied (March and Olsen 1989). Applied to institutional environments, historical institutionalism highlights the role of previous institutional commitments in defining state preferences and determining future policies path dependence (Pierson 1995), whereas sociological institutionalism stresses the constitutive effects of norms and principles, which are internalised by the members of the organization so that preferences are defined and decisions are taken according to them (Parsons 2000; Johnston 2001). The criteria for social action justification rely on values stemming from a particular cultural context, distinctive of that institution (Fossum 2000) and salient concerns of the decision-making process concern the search for collective self-understanding and the building of a common identity, which can serve as the basis for developing stable goals and visions. Rational choice approaches usually consider national preferences as given and in any case exogenous to the interaction process. Constructivist approaches note the influence of structural factors on the actors preferences and actions, but also tend to overlook the fact that they might vary during, and as a result of, the interaction process. A more recent sociological approach, based upon the theory of communicative action (Heath 2001; Habermas 1996), the power of language and the effects of the speech acts (Kratochwil 1989), maintains that preferences and policies might be endogenous to interaction; they can not be taken as given, but are seen as built in the discursive settings of the institution, where arguing rather than bargaining is the characteristic mode of communication (Elster 1992). Actors are considered rational not only when they act according to their interests but also when they comply with norms and principles accepted by all, so that they have to justify their actions with arguments considered legitimate by the rest (Habermas 1993). This mode of social action has been called logic of justification (Eriksen 1999). In this process of communicative interaction, actors appeal to the force of a norm or a principle, and a rational consensus is reached round the better argument on what is the right thing to do according to universally valid standards. Actors do change preferences and model their behaviour through communicative interaction (Eriksen 2000) and co-ordinate their plans through argumentation, aimed at reaching mutual agreement (Eriksen and Weigård 1997: 221). Notwithstanding, the consensus of such a process could either be a working agreement (Eriksen 2003: 34). In this case, the arguments given do not have to be valid by universally standards. Neither do they have to be the result of a deeply felt conviction on part of the author. But they have to be able to mobilize support (Sjursen 2002: 496). Arguments

80 74 Sonia Piedrafita are clarified and reasons are challenged in the process, reaching a higher degree of understanding and making agreement possible. However, it might not lead to a shift in opinions and beliefs and actors might accept them for different reasons. All these concepts are very important to approach the puzzle of why Spain supported Eastern enlargement to the detriment of its own interests. Was the decision based on a cost-benefits calculus; that is a matter of efficiency (instrumental rationality)? Or was it a solidarity action determined by Spain s belonging to the European Community; that is a matter of identity (contextual rationality)? Was it the result of the assessment of morally-valid arguments and the need to justify its actions with legitimate arguments (communicative rationality)? The anticipation of the consequences Following assumptions of instrumental rationality such as it is considered in Liberal IR Theory (Moravcsik 1997), domestic political systems generate a set of stable, weighted objectives concerning particular states of the world (future substantive outcomes that might result from international interaction), which the governments pursue with the maximum efficiency afforded by available political means (Moravcsik 1998: 23). This ordered and weighted set of values constitutes the national preferences, which reflect the objectives of those domestic groups that influence the state apparatus. They are prior to interstate political interaction, and determine any significant foreign policy action (dependent variable). State officials define state preferences on the basis of the domestic society s interests and act purposively in world politics. Each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of the other states and the asymmetrical distribution of power and information among them. Even though preferences might be grounded in ideas and values, economic interests remain primary. International actors are considered rational when they interact to pursue their respective material and ideal welfare. This brings us to the key question of what could be the anticipated consequences of Eastern Enlargement for Spain. It is difficult not to share the claim that Spain will not benefit from the process as much as other member states, while at the same time it may negatively affect its geopolitical and economic interests. On the one hand, reasons in favour of the process of enlargement on the basis of proximity, interdependence, security and stability apparently do not have much to do with Spanish interest, which are in geopolitical terms much more affected by developments in the Mediterranean area and economically much

81 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 75 more connected with other parts of the world, such as Latin America. In 1998, with the liberalisation process quite advanced, the exports to the CEECs only represented 2% of total Spanish exports and 7.4% of Spanish exports out of the EU. Moreover, these sales only represented 2.4% of total CEEC imports, with Spain being one of their least significant providers (Viguera 2001; López Moreno 1999). Likewise, Spanish direct investments in the area are very low and have not increased since the liberalisation of East European markets. 2 On the other hand, the process could have far-reaching negative implications for Spain. Due to the CEECs socio-economic structure, their accession might constitute a threat to Spanish interests in commercial and budgetary terms. As far as trade is concerned, agricultural and material- (iron and steel) and labour-intensive (footwear and textiles) goods are quite relevant in the production and export composition of both Spain and the CEECs. With regard to capital-intensive goods, Spain and the CEECs enjoy comparative advantages as they are in the lower range. In addition to this, Eastern countries have a competitive advantage over Spain as their labour force is cheaper and transportation costs will be lower due to their proximity to the main customers of Spanish exports. With regard to the agriculture, competition might become even fearcer insofar as Spain will have to compete with the CEECs for the allocation of the production quotas and CAP compensations and will have to suffer the reduction of protective tariffs required by the WTO each time the EU admits a new member. In order to assess the importance of EU funds for Spanish economy, it is worth noting that in 1999 Spain had become the number one net recipient of structural funds, and was number four as far as agriculture funds were concerned, with a positive financial balance of 6 billion. Taking into account the regional prosperity of the CEECs and the situation of their agriculture holdings and prices, together with the 1999 Berlin Council decision to steadily reduce EU expenditure from 2003 on, it would be reasonable to assume that the next round of accessions will decrease the level of funds that the poorest member states are receiving at the moment. Incidentally, we must not forget that not only public EU funds but also private investments coming from other Western countries will be readdressed from Spain to the emergent CEECs economies. With the anticipation of such consequences, it is quite puzzling why the Spanish government never expressed opposition to Eastern enlargement, but rather agreed to the process of the 1993 Copenhagen European Council 2 Martín, C:. Exports and Direct Foreign investment of Spain and the UE to the CEECs, in Spanish newspaper Expansión 16 November 2000.

82 76 Sonia Piedrafita without previously having obtained assurances of a more favourable allocation of the costs. According to IR Liberal Theory state preferences are not only important, but their intensity also matters. The relative power of states is defined in terms of asymmetrical interdependence, which dictates the relative value of agreement to different governments, that is to say the intensity of their preferences. When governments have varying preference intensities across different issues, it may be to the advantage of parties to exchange concessions (Moravcsik 1998: 65). Spain might have no special interest in Eastern enlargement, but provided that other member states did, cooperation was in the interest of all. In exchange of concessions on this issue, the Spanish government could have pursued other objectives, avoiding discredit and loss of support in other negotiations. Policy contents, exchanges and concessions On the specification of the Association policy After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González ( ) seemed more fascinated by the subsequent events than could in the opinion of some foreign diplomats - be expected from a prime minister of an off-centre European medium power. On the eve of the Council of Ministers meeting in Paris in November 1989 he played an essential role in getting the Twelve to reach a common supportive position towards the changes in the socialist bloc. 3 Right after this meeting he expressed his desire to advance on the EC institutional reform (which was a priority for the Spanish government, who considered its weight in the Council not to be in accordance with Spain s population size) in order to facilitate a closer relationship with Eastern countries. 4 However, he insisted on the need to consider the consequences that any EC policy towards the CEECs could have upon Spanish internal development and some important dimensions of Spanish foreign policy. Therefore, Spain had to act positively in favour of these changes and defend at the same time its internal and external interests. 5 When it was time for discussing the Europe Agreements in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Spanish Parliament 6 prior to the meeting of the 3 El País, 17 November 1989: Felipe González intenta consensuar con Aznar y Suárez la política española sobre los países del Este. 4 El País, 3 December 1989: Los motivos de la Moncloa. 5 In his Inaugural Address to the Spanish Parliament on 4 December 1989, cited in Torreblanca, 2001b: Foreign Affairs Commission 5, 16 April Session Diary of the Spanish Congress 69, IV Legislature.

83 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 77 June 1990 Dublin European Council and also in the Prime Minister s address to the Plenary Session right afterwards 7, representatives of the main political parties showed no opposition to the Association Policy, but expressed concern about its consequences for the Spanish economy (because of trade liberalisation), the structural policy (due to the imminent integration of East German regions) and some dimensions of European foreign policy (e.g. relations with Latin America and North Africa). In fact, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Parliamentary Commission expressed a will to prioritise European solidarity over Spanish interests so that the Agreements would be approved unanimously. The European Council finally agreed to open exploratory talks on Association Agreements with some CEECs, to broaden and intensify efforts on security and cooperation with the Mediterranean countries under the framework of the coming Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and to increase the aid earmarked for Latin America. 8 Moreover, in November 1991, the Spanish government threatened to veto the conclusion of the Europe Agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia because the aid proposed for their iron and steel production and exports could negatively affect the Spanish sector, which was undergoing a severe restructuring process. Besides, further concessions on the textile and coal sectors had also been made. Spain finally accepted to sign the Agreements in exchange of a declaration that would permit the government to control Eastern imports by starting an antidumping process or applying a safeguard clause. 9 In the coming months the Spanish government s priority became the design and approval of the cohesion principle in the framework of the Treaty of the European Union, as well as the negotiations of the financial perspectives for On the development of the pre-accession strategy The Spanish government s preference for postponing any decision on enlargement was reinforced by the fact that the IGC had not achieved an agreement on the institutional reform and this issue was considered essential before the accession of news members. Spain s worries for the cohesion policy increased with the negative result of the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in June At the European Council meeting held in Lisbon that month, Spain agreed to accept the EFTA countries 10 as candidates, provided that their accessions were conditioned on 7 Plenary Session 43, 27 June Session Diary of the Spanish Congress 47, IV Legislature. 8 European Council at Dublin, June, Conclusions of the Presidency, European Parliament, SN 60/1/90. 9 El País, 23 Nov 91: La CE rubrica los Acuerdos de Asociación con el Este. 10 I will use this term to refer to Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

84 78 Sonia Piedrafita the ratification of the TEU and the approval of the financial perspectives. Besides, the candidates had to assume the objectives of the economic and political union and fulfil the convergence criteria. Spain also got the compromise to strengthen relations with the Maghreb. 11 At the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992 Spain conceded to start negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, although Maastricht had not been ratified yet, in exchange of an expenditure increase to 1.27% for the financial perspectives and a more favourable allocation for Spain. At their next meeting The Fifteen also agreed to deal with the Commission s proposal for further action to promote CEECs future membership. 12 With the financial perspectives approved and the Treaty of the Union in force, the main contents of the Spanish government s enlargement policy continued to be that of institutional reform and the guarantee of continued integration. The European Community that Spain regards cannot remain a closed club for rich people. But neither can it give in to the temptation of enlarging just to be larger It must offer accession to the countries capable and wishful to assume the acquis and the finalité politique of the Community (González Márquez 1992/1993: 20). Thus, the CEECs should undergo further institutional and economic reforms first so that they could assume the objectives and responsibilities of the Political and Economic and Monetary Union. Besides, it was necessary, before any new enlargement, to take the pertinent institutional decisions so as to prevent the EU from modifying its structure with each new member, in words of the Spanish Socialist MEP, Enrique Barón (Granell 1993: 73). However, when on 3 May 1993 the Commission informed the Council on the necessity to open a clear perspective for accession for Eastern countries in the upcoming meeting of the Heads of State in Copenhagen, the Spanish government supported the Commission s initiative and showed in favour of giving the CEECs a clear reference to their belonging to the Community and taking the necessary steps to speed up the process. 13 The 1993 Copenhagen European Council agreed that the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union but also established a set of conditions (the so-called Copenhagen criteria) which were very favourable to the Spanish government s pretensions. The applicant countries had to satisfy political and 11 European Council at Lisbon, June, Conclusions of the Presidency, Bulletin of the EC PE European Council at Edinburgh, December, Conclusions of the Presidency, EP, SN 456/ El País, 14 May 1993: La ampliación no debe servir para cargarse la CE.

85 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 79 economic conditions and be able to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of the Political and Economic and Monetary union. Besides, the accessions would not take place unless the Union could absorb new members and provided that it did not affect the integration process negatively. Further trade liberalisation measures were also agreed, but accompanied with the remark of the importance of approximation of laws in the associated countries to those applicable in the Community. This last point was very important for Spanish interests as it could limit a distortion of competition. Besides, the European Council agreed to upgrade the partnership between the Union and the Maghreb countries. 14 In June 1994 in Corfu, the coalition of the Southern member states forced the inclusion of Cyprus and Malta in the next round of enlargement and the decision not to start negotiations before the 1996 IGC on the institutional reform, as well as an agreement to review the global Mediterranean policy and identify concrete actions which could increase EU actions in that area. 15 In exchange of Southern member states support for the pre-accession strategy, the Essen European Council at the end of the year agreed to solve the Spanish problem with regard to the fishery policy 16 and to ask the Commission to produce a report on the impact of enlargement upon the Community Policies. The European Council also agreed to initiate tradeliberalization talks with Mercosur, Chile and Mexico, and to design a global, flexible and multi-annual Mediterranean Policy similar to that of the CEECs (although without the accession prospect). 17 Spain was permitting Eastern enlargement to go ahead but its main claims were being attended to. On the stipulation of the accession terms From the beginning of the Spanish Presidency in the second semester of 1995, Germany was pressing to open negotiations with a selected number of CEECs. The fact of holding the Presidency brought pressure on the Spanish government to bring forward some sort of initiative in cooperation with the Commission. It was time to design the policy to develop thenceforward; the first applications for membership were addressed and the EU had to take a decision on the policy to follow for the selection of candidates and the development of the negotiations. The policy of the Spanish government was 14 European Council at Copenhagen, June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, EP, SN 180/ European Council at Corfu, June 1994, Presidency Conclusions, EP, SN 150/ The Council urged the Fishing Ministers to adopt the necessary technical mechanisms to make possible the Spanish full integration in the Common Fishing Policy in 1996 (reducing the transitional period established till 2003). 17 European Council at Essen, 9-10 December 1994, Presidency Conclusions, SN 300/94.

86 80 Sonia Piedrafita to be conditioned by other related issues such as institutional reform, the financial perspectives and the common policies. It proved quite hasty, insofar as they did not expect the debate at that time. At the Plenary Session of the European Parliament on 15 November 1995, 18 Prime Minister González outlined his starting stance regarding the timing of the accessions and the selection of the candidates. He expressed a wish for both larger Europe and more Europe, and stated that: those who suggest a free-of-costs process are missing the point. 19 The Spanish government could accept a quick political membership but with long transitional periods for the economic integration through a compromise guaranteing the structural and agricultural policies. The time had come to try to dilute and more fairly allocate the costs of the process. The Madrid Summit agreed to call for the Commission s opinion on the applicants and start negotiations as soon as possible, treating all candidates on equal terms. 20 In 1996 the Popular Party won the general elections and José María Aznar became Prime Minister. The previous Socialist discourse stressed the general interest of the Union and the government s European spirit, but the discourse of the new conservative government was riddled with references to the national interest. From the beginning it was linking the success of Eastern enlargement to the solution of the financial aspects, the institutional reform and the guarantee of the common policies. In the words of the new Foreign Affairs Minister: the EU is still the main factor of peace and stability for the continent the unique real prospect for peace and prosperity for the Eastern republics Enlargement is a project assumed by all and supported by Spain, because we believe that the stability and prosperity of the continent depends on it. But it is a sensible and complicate task, and, in order to carry it out successfully, the Government will defend the consolidation of the institutions and the acquis communitaire and avoid financial troubles The Spanish Government thinks that the European Union should count on the necessary resources to face such an ambitious project (Matutes 1996: 103-4) 18 Agence Europe, 15 November 1995: Presidents Haensch, Santer and Gonzalez emphasize the ambition of the Union s plans for entering the 21st century. 19 El País, 16 November 1995: González asegura que la ampliación de la UE al Este exige profundizar la cohesión interna. 20 European Council at Madrid, December 1995, Presidency Conclusions, SN 400/95.

87 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 81 When the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 agreed to initiate the negotiations with the group of candidates proposed by the Commission in the Agenda 2000, and to open the screening process with them, José María Aznar expressed both the satisfaction of Spain for having contributed to the definitive burial of the European division born in Yalta and the special Spanish solidarity towards the future members of the Union, due to its own historic experience (Torreblanca 1999/2000: 113). However, the Spanish government had previously made some progress regarding the institutional reform, the financial aspects and the common policies. A new intergovernmental conference had been convened to solve the question of institutional reform. Spain had accepted to postpone the decision against its preferences, in exchange of the extension of the Ioannina agreement until the next round of accession, and the Council s compromise (Declaration 50) to work out a solution for the Spanish claim in the meantime (Elorza 2001: 91). As for the financial aspects and the Common policies, the Agenda (presented to the Council in July) analysed the effects of enlargement on the application of the Common policies and the next financial perspectives, guaranteeing the agricultural and structural policies in spite of enlargement, and thus, calming down the incumbents that would be most affected. However, there was still a long way to go before an agreement was achieved on the financial perspectives. The Spanish government s strong defence of the structural and cohesion policy faced Germany s preference for re-nationalising some common policies and the United Kingdom s wish to reduce the Community budget. Once the financial perspectives were approved in Berlin in March 1999, the Spanish Prime Minister reiterated his desire to speed up negotiations with the candidates and to start negotiations with the rest of the CEECs. On 7 April 1999, he told the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, that he favored Hungary s accession to the Union as soon as possible. On 13 July he insisted once more, this time before the Bulgarian President Meter Stoyanov, that the Spanish position in the Helsinki European Council (December 1999) would be to defend a negotiation process with all the candidates according to the regatta principle, which established the same departure point for all, although the development of the process would depend on each canditate s progress. He also advocated starting negotiations with Bulgaria before the end of the year. In September, on the occasion of the Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek s, visit to Madrid, Aznar stated that Spain had always shown its support 21 European Commission (1997) Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications, Luxembourg.

88 82 Sonia Piedrafita to Poland s accession to the EU and wanted it realized as soon as possible. 22 The institutional issue was finally settled in Nice in December 2000, after the Spanish Prime Minister had threatened to veto any agreement in opposition to Spanish interests. Finally, in the compromise solution Spain lost a Commissioner but increased its weight in the European Council more than the other large states (Elorza 2001: 95). The conception of self in a social role and the force of moral arguments The rational choice assumptions present in IR Liberal and Intergovernmental approaches to the study of the EU offer a good explication for the dispositional dimension of Spanish enlargement policy, that is the choices that the government made on the basis of the national preferences with the goal of getting the most satisfactory outcomes for Spanish interests (Carlsnaes 1992). Under these premises the Spanish government would not have used the veto power insofar as the costs of such an action would have been even higher, losing support in other negotiations. However, while the Spanish government was accepting an eventual Eastern enlargement despite so many loose ends, it was using this veto power in the process of EU enlargement to the EFTA countries in order to achieve its goals. During the Portuguese Presidency of the Council in the first semester of 1992, some member states became very interested in dealing with the membership applications of Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden as soon as possible since the agreement on the European Economic Area had been declared inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome by the European Court of Justice. The Spanish government showed its opposition to deal with these applications if the financial perspectives presented by the Commission were not approved first - in the view of the net contributors reluctance to increase the Community budget. 23 The idea of the EFTA enlargement prior to the IGC on institutional reform, and the context of a restrictive budget, made the Spanish government believe that the compromise, on a cohesion policy acquired in Maastricht, as well as its position in the future European Union might become threatened. As the European Commission s FSU (Forward Studies Unit) had reckoned, the enlargement would not take place at the most favorable moment for Spain insofar as it would imply the consolidation 22 Statements obtained from Task Force: Positions of the Member States, 23 El País, 5 May 1992: Felipe González supedita la ampliación de la CE al cumplimiento de los acuerdos de Maastricht.

89 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 83 of the Nordic perspective (a large little-cohesive Custom Union with its axis increasingly displaced to the North). 24 In the meeting of the General Affairs Council in Brussels on 11 May 1992, the Ministers from Spain, Portugal and Ireland announced their governments decision to veto any decision on the EFTA enlargement unless a satisfactory agreement on the cohesion funds was achieved. 25 The Spanish government also blocked the Common Position on the fishing chapter in the negotiations with Norway at the beginning of In December, Felipe González, backed by the Spanish Parliament, decided not to proceed with the deposit of the instruments of ratification of the Accession Treaty of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway, unless the end of the Spanish transitional period for the Common Fishery Policy was made effective. 26 The Spanish government did not use similar strategies to prevent negotiations on an eventual Eastern enlargement. On the contrary, an eventual accession of the CEECs was taken for granted from the early 1990s and Spanish representatives never questioned it or used the veto power. The President of the EP Institutional Committee in charge of preparations for the IGC, the Spaniard Marcelino Oreja, shared the wish of the applicant countries to become members of the Community, and said that, although it could not occur in the immediate future, Spain had an important role to play in a Europe whose centre was moving Eastwards (Oreja 1990: 36-44). Prior to the 1990 Dublin European Council, in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Spanish Parliament, representatives of the main political parties deemed the association agreements and the IGC on Political Union as the first step leading to CEECs membership, which was regarded as the logical end of the road. They did not question either the Association policy or eventual enlargement 27 in spite of important Spanish interests being at stake. After the 1992 Lisbon European Council, the Spanish Prime Minister explained in the Spanish Parliament that the CEECs should undergo further institutional and economic reforms in order to be able to face the objectives of Political Union and those of the EMU and be part of the European Union in the future. 28 From a constructivist perspective, it could be said that the government never opposed Eastern enlargement because it was the appropriate thing to do 24 El País, 23 May 1992: A España le asusta una CE ampliada. 25 El País, 12 May 1992: España bloqueará la ampliación de la Comunidad si no recibe los fondos de cohesión. 26 El País, 20 Nov 1994: España amenaza con no permitir la ampliación de la Unión Europea. 27 Foreign Affairs Commission 5, 16 April Session Diary of the Spanish Congress 69, IV Legislature. 28 Plenary Session 198, 1 July Session Diary of the Spanish Congress 204, IV Legislature.

90 84 Sonia Piedrafita according to the EC collective identity, with a policy rather responding to a contextual rationality. The idea of community seeks to dictate a different type of intercourse among the actors belonging to it, a type of self-limitation in their self-perception, a re-defined self-interest, and hence re-defined policy goal. (Weiler 1991: 2480) As far as Eastern Enlargement was concerned, the self as part of the Community prompted from the Founding Treaties to substitute age-old rivalries with peace and stability and to strengthen democracy; and from the Community culture developed over time, to look for the interests of the overall system, not just for the individual interests (Friis 1998). However, on the occasion where the European Agreements were negotiated the Spanish government made clear that they would not accept any agreement which could be a threat to Spanish interests. The government was quite reluctant to accommodate the CEECs interests beyond national preferences. Therefore, it does not seem as domestic regimes simply absorb international norms or principles from the institutions in which they are embedded. However, this result might be achieved by two mechanisms: social learning and communicative action. Social learning and the force of moral arguments Knowledge allows leaders to order the world and explain their perceptions of political reality (Adler 1987); it implies specialized and specific understanding about a particular issue or problem (Haas 1990). As Marks (1997) underlines it is not only technical knowledge (data, findings, conclusions ) but also political knowledge that influences politics; that is the way that decisionmakers understand political conditions and options themselves. The knowledge of how the EC operated regarding enlargement in practice stemming from Spain s own accession negotiations and EFTA enlargement was a very valuable source for Spanish policy makers. Before 1992 the only experience Spanish representatives had on EC dealing with enlargement in practice was Spain s own accession negotiations. From that interaction process, they had their perceptions about which political actions would be deemed as legitimate and which would not. In 1976 when the Spanish government first showed its interest in applying for EC membership, it had to tackle some member states reluctance based upon national economic interests. It did so, confronting these pragmatic arguments with moral arguments based on the promotion of democracy and the spirit of the Treaty of Rome potentially addressed to all the Western European Nations (Bassols 1995: 156-7). Finally, in September 1977 the Council of Ministers decided to call for the Commission s opinion on Spain, underlining the priority of the political features of Spanish candidature, especially the contribution to the development and consolidation of the democratic

91 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 85 processes in Southern Europe, as well as the new dimension that the construction of Europe would acquire (Bassols 1995: 201). Accession negotiations started quite soon (February 1979) but the process was long and tough, with the United Kingdom and France blocking the process because of economic interests. The same kind of moral arguments were decisive in order to accept an eventual membership of the CEECs by the Spanish government: (1) The Treaty of Rome gave them that right and Spain did not have moral authority to deny it to them; (2) The political features of the candidatures promotion of peace, democracy and stability - should prevail in the decision; (3) Spanish political elites and public opinion had always regarded EC/EU as the best means to consolidate democracy, become a modern country and get through the hindrances from the past; a country with this perspective could not deny the same perspective to the candidate countries. In the horizon of the coming new century, enlargement of the Union to the Eastern and Central countries will become true. Europe will reconcile with her own history and this great reunification will become a factor of security and stability for the whole continent. The challenge is moral, historic, and geopolitical, more than economic or financial. (González Márquez : 17). Our party supports the integration of all the democratic Eastern and Central European Countries in the Union. Moreover, it is a priority for us as long as, on assuming all the acquis communitaire, they have acquired an indisputable right to become members that nobody has moral authority to deny. This is the main reason to undoubtedly support their membership. (José Maria Aznar, at the Spanish Parliament 1994) 29 We regard enlargement as a serious political project of reunification of a Europe that can only be conceived united. We cannot conceive Europe without Warsaw, Budapest, or Prague; it would be a partial Europe in little accordance with her history, Europe has been our political horizon, our reference of progress, liberty, democracy and social justice. We regarded Europe as the way to consolidate our 29 Plenary Session 116, 21 December Session Diary of the Spanish Congress 117, V Legislature.

92 86 Sonia Piedrafita democracy and advance in the structural reforms A country with this perspective can t deny the same perspective to the current candidates (Josep Piqué, Spanish Foreign Minister, at the Spanish Parliament 2000) 30 Not only does this argumentative line appear in the official discourse during the period under analysis, but the same reasons for the policy were also claimed by Spanish policy-makers in personal interviews. 31 They considered that they would be able to defend Spanish interests in the negotiations themselves, insofar as pragmatic arguments were deemed legitimate at that stage of the process. The fact that the government used its veto power strategically in the case of the EFTA enlargement might have been due to the fact that this enlargement was not backed by strong moral reasons and therefore allowing this kind of political action to be considered reasonable. However, this perception also changed as a result of the interaction process - during the first enlargement negotiations in which the Spanish delegates participated at the EU side of the table. The Spanish government s attitude was strongly criticized within the Union, with their delegates being described as bandits in diplomatic circles. 32 They got the reputation of blocking anything that was against national interests and were marked as against-enlargement. The Spanish government learned the importance of legitimate arguments that were understood by the rest of the EU actors to collect support for political action. As a consequence, their effort to justify their preferences with arguments considered legitimate by all actors would increase from this time on. For instance, the linkage between the pre-accession strategy with the CEECs and the Mediterranean policy was explained by the Spanish Prime Minister in the following terms: We have confirmed the EU compromise in favour of an equal treat for the East of Europe and the South of the Mediterranean Sea, as long as they are the main neighbouring areas and the peace here depends on the stability there. All the members of the Union are equally compromised with this double challenge because the last 30 Joint Committee for European Affairs, sessions 2 (3 October 2000) and 4 (28 November 2000), Session Diary of the Spanish Congress, VII Legislature. 31 Interviews with enlargement advisers for the Spanish government and deputies of the Secretary of State for European Affairs are being carried out under the framework of the CIDEL project. 32 El País, 20 March 1994: Otra vez los Pirineos.

93 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 87 enlargement to Fifteen hasn t meant to alter our priorities, but to widen our common responsibilities This new European reality requires from us to assume the responsibilities of our external projection. In fact, the German Presidency has approached the EU s relationship with their neighbours from a global and balanced perspective. The Spanish Government has unambiguously shown in favour of a strategy with the CEECs which makes their accession feasible. 33 Also, during the 2000 IGC on institutional reform, the quite aggressive negotiating style of the conservative Prime Minister was carefully thwarted with numerous statements by Spanish representatives clarifying the action: Spain did not oppose enlargement, on the contrary, it understood better than any other member state due to its own historic experience; rather it was only defending a fair institutional agreement (Piqué 2001: 60-63). The importance of the communicative interaction process for the policy-making A communicative conception of rationality does not solely designate consistency or preference-driven action based on calculus of success, nor merely norm-conformity or accordance with entrenched standards of appropriateness, but rather public reason-giving: when criticised plans of action can be justified by explicating the relevant situation in a legitimate manner (Eriksen and Fossum 2003: 4). We can see the effects of this mode of social action (logic of justification) in the development of the Spanish policy on Eastern enlargement. From the very outset of the transition process in Eastern countries, the Spanish government, political elites and society took their future accession to the European Community (EC) as granted and never questioned it. However, the government could not fix a clear position on which countries to be included in this round of enlargement, or when negotiations should start, insofar as these points depended on future developments which were difficult to predict. At first the only clear feature of Spanish policy seemed to 33 Plenary Session 116, 21 December Session Diary of the Spanish Congress 117, V Legislature.

94 88 Sonia Piedrafita be that Eastern enlargement could not be questioned. Actually, in 1992 the State Secretary for the European Community had advised the Spanish Permanent Representative to stand aside the fight about the borders of the future Europe and the timing of the enlargement process and not to define preferences until further progress of the debates. 34 In 1994 the representatives of the main Spanish political parties reproached the Socialist government that its policy was not stemming from a thorough analysis of the consequences of the enlargement. 35 In the address of the Spanish Prime Minister to the Parliament that December, the opposition leader, José Maria Aznar, insisted on the fact that the decision to be taken on the timing, manner and scope of the process was not indifferent to Spain. 36 It was not until the Plenary Session of the European Parliament on 15 November 1995, under the Spanish Presidency of the European Council, that Felipe González outlined his position on the issue: A vaster Europe requires more Europe (...) The candidates do not want the Union to be diluted or common policies dismantled (...) or the abolition of the Structural Funds, he said; 37 they wished a progressive integration of their economies with adequate transitional periods, but an immediate political membership: Spain wanted enlargement to strengthen not to weaken (the Union). 38 This stance implied a half-way solution that took into account both some member states claims for speeding up the process and Spanish preferences for the defence of the structural and cohesion policies and the prioritisation of the deepening of the EU over its widening. The immediate political accession for all candidates gave moral legitimacy to the proposal, as it was justified on universally-valid principles such as the non-discrimination or the promotion of democracy and peace through membership. A slower economic integration was legitimised in impartial (not self-interested) terms of efficiency; it would reduce the negative transitional effects, with a better adaptation of the CEECs economies to the single market and a lower impact on the structural and agricultural policies. However, the arguments did not mobilise much support and, in the end, the Spanish Presidency proposal for the Madrid Summit (December 1995) was to set a date to start negotiations with all the candidates and to advance depending on their particular progress ( regatta principle). Finally, The Council agreed to open negotiations as soon 34 El País, 23 May 1992: A España le asusta una CE ampliada. 35 Plenary Session 84, 29 June Session Diary of the Spanish Congress 85, V Legislature. 36 Plenary Session 116, 21 December Session Diary of the Spanish Congress 117, V Legislature. 37 Agence Europe, 15 November 1995: Presidents Haensch, Santer and Gonzalez emphasize the ambition of the Union s plans for entering the 21st century. 38 El País, 16 November 1995: González asegura que la ampliación de la UE al Este exige profundizar la cohesión interna.

95 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 89 as possible and treat all the candidates on equal terms. 39 Not only did the Spanish government define its policy endogenously to the interaction process, while taking into account and challenging claims from other participants, it did also accept an agreement around an argument that all the member states could live with (Eriksen 2000: 57) and contrary to its original preferences: delay the process as much as possible in order to dilute the costs. This was not the only time that the better argument might have worked to accommodate some points of view and values, which afterwards made further co-operation possible (Eriksen 2000: 59). It is true that in Copenhagen in June 1993 the cohesion issue had been solved, but the question of institutional reform was still unresolved and the negative consequences of Eastern enlargement for the common policies and for the negotiations of future financial perspectives were evident. However, the Spanish State Secretary for the European Community, Carlos Westendorp, was not only in favour of the Commission s proposal but he also advocated to speed up the process stating that the EU should not be stingy but offer the CEECs a clear perspective and an ambitious goal. 40 The Spanish government s revealed preferences in favour of the regatta principle did not fit exactly with the 1997 Luxembourg decision to start official negotiations only with the candidates proposed by the Commission. However the acceptance of this kind of working agreement would make further cooperation possible. We find another instance when, on the occasion of the Draft of the Common Position on the free movement of people in 2001, the Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar tried to reach a compromise on the cohesion policy. The Spanish government linked its support to the German proposal for a transition period of at least five years for the free movement of Eastern workers, to the recognition of the statistical effect of enlargement on the application of the cohesion policy and a compromise to take it into account in the upcoming negotiations of this chapter and of the financial perspectives. However, his arguments were challenged by other member states that deemed this action as the definite proof of the Spanish government being opposed to enlargement and only moved by self-interest. Finally, Mr. Aznar accepted the transition period in the 2001 Gothenburg Council, although he had not achieved his goal. 39 European Council at Madrid, December 1995, Presidency Conclusions, SN 400/ El País, 14 May 1993: La ampliación no debe servir para cargarse la CE.

96 90 Sonia Piedrafita Concluding remarks The Spanish government s decision to support Eastern enlargement in spite of the expected costs does not seem to respond to an instrumental rationality, although this gives a satisfactory explanation for the intentional dimension of the policy: they acted as interest-maximisers in dealing with the allocation of the costs and tried to get concessions on other issues insofar as other member states were more interested in (and benefited more from) Eastern enlargement. However, some relevant features of the policy remain open, specially the fact that the Spanish government never vetoed Eastern enlargement in order to achieve its goals or whenever it failed to get these concessions. The threat to veto the institutional reform in Nice in order to increase Spanish weight in the European institutions cannot be considered a veto to the enlargement process. The Spanish government insisted that it was in the interest of all to get an agreement (which for so long had been postponed) in order to be able to absorb the new members; it was a priority for the Spanish government to settle a question that they had for so long (since Spain s own accession) failed to solve. Neither was the incident on the occasion of the draft of the Common Position on the free movement of people in 2001 a veto to the enlargement process; the Spanish government offered its support to the preferences of other member states in exchange of their support to Spanish preferences with regards to the cohesion policy. In neither case the preferences or interests of the CEECs were the nitty-gritty or the object of the veto. In fact, in both cases the Spanish government had to make big efforts to explain this point, because at the least chance, even in the face of non-relevant technical objections to secondary charters, Spain has been accused of being against enlargement, not only because of its eccentric geographic situation, but also due to its alleged competitiveness in the allocation of the structural funds (Viguera 2001: 73). To what extent does the contextual or the communicative rationality characterise the Spanish policy? Was it a solidarity action stemming from Spain s belonging to the European Community or the result of the assessment of morally-valid arguments and the need to justify actions with legitimate arguments? In order to better understand Spain s policy on Eastern enlargement we should also consider its dispositional (perceptions and values) and structural dimensions (Carlsnaes 1992). As for the latter, I think that the structure-agent influence on the policy-making might be better explained with a dynamic model that does not stop at the analysis of the current decisional process, that does not take this influence for granted, and

97 ifs and Buts of Spain s Eastern Enlargement Policy 91 that also considers the agent-structure direction. A model based on communicative action might offer us a useful tool to put this into practice. We have seen that not only have moral arguments prevailed over ethical arguments, but also that the force of the moral arguments stemmed from the communicative process. Thus, the mode of social action known as logic of justification has been very patent in the process. However, since the other modes of social action are also possible and other kind of arguments might also deemed as legitimate, a working agreement is more feasible than a rational consensus. When a decision is taken in a collective communicative process, actors try to seek a consensus on factual and normative matters, that is: (1) on the actual situation and the cause-and effect relationships between goals and means; and (2) on which norms apply under given circumstances or which principles should guide the policy under discussion. For factual statements, validity means the same as truth. For normative statements impartiality and consistency are necessary conditions for validity (Elster 1992); consistency with previous acts and statements as well as with principles and norms by all accepted. We have observed along the process that member states often phrase their arguments in impartial terms (as not pursuing their own selfinterest), as well as the fact that, once a normative argument is used, the speaker is stuck with it (Elster 1992). In Schimmelfennig s opinion, the stronger the institutional component of the environment, the more often the actors will choose arguing, the more they have to justify their claims by social values and norms in order to pursue their interests effectively, and the more successfully they will be able to counter the effects of bargaining power with the power of argument. But he asserts that using arguments is not the same as engaging in a Habermasian cooperative search for truth ; on the contrary, actors use their arguments strategically, i.e. they choose arguments that are both suitable to back their claims and promise to resonate well with their particular audience (Schimmelfennig 2000, 2003). However, this paper does not seek to reveal the actual motivations for the Spanish government to justify its actions. The point is that they have to do it in order to garner support and legitimacy and this fact influences policymaking. In my opinion, in order to speak for communicative action, arguments do not have to be true for the person who gives them. Neither do they have to derive from its self-conviction; they just have to be reasonable for the others. After all, the goal of a political deliberation does not need be to find out what is universally moral or the actual motivations of the actors, but rather to facilitate the necessary conditions to achieve an agreement considered legitimate by all.

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103 Chapter 4 Between Security and Human Rights Denmark and the Enlargement of the EU Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen ARENA, University of Oslo In this paper we seek to contribute to the debate about the role and importance of norms in understanding the process of enlargement by an explicit focus on the position of Denmark. 1 Denmark has from the early 1990s pushed not only for enlargement but for a process of enlargement that would allow all the states that sought membership in the EU to be treated equally, in other words to have an equal opportunity to enter the Union (Hansen 1996; Tepsa 1999; Riddervold 2002). Danish authorities were particularly concerned about ensuring that the Baltic States were given the same opportunity as the Central and East European states to negotiate for membership. 2 In the words of Bertel Heurlin (1999: 4): Denmark s reestablishment of diplomatic relations as one of the first western countries in 1991 marked a substantial change and implicated the beginning of a unique position for the Baltic countries in Danish foreign policy. Bilaterally and through the regional organisations ( ), Denmark took a great responsibility upon itself in order to assist the former East Bloc countries in general and especially the three Baltic States. Intuitively, one would expect both Denmark s strong general support for enlargement, and its particular emphasis on enlargement to the Baltics, to be 1 The paper is based on Sjursen 2002 and Riddervold Interviews in the Foreign Ministry and in the Folketing 2001 and This focus is also obvious in the written material (DUPI-DOK).

104 98 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen due to expectations of economic benefits or to concerns about national security. This would also be consistent with the argument that those states that were most strongly in favour of enlargement held this position due to expectations of material benefits (Schimmelfennig 2003). However, it is far from clear that Denmark would benefit in any particular way from enlargement in general or enlargement specifically to the Baltic States. In fact, Denmark moved from being a net beneficiary from the EU s budget to becoming a net contributor in the context of enlargement. Likewise, it is not clear that Denmark s position on enlargement was due to security concerns. In the early 1990s, taking a clear position in favour of enlarging western institutions to these former Soviet Republics also entailed a security risk, given the uncertainty about the reaction of Russia. And in this early phase Denmark s position was markedly different from that of most of its partners in the EU (Hansen 1996). How then, can we understand Denmark s position on EU enlargement? 3 The above question is even more pertinent given that the main image of the EU in Denmark, both at the level of the political elite and in the population at large, is that of a so-called problem-solving entity whose main purpose it is to provide discernible benefits, in particular economic, to its member states. Danish membership in the EU is usually justified in such terms 4. How come then, that Danish authorities as well as Danish public opinion strongly supported an enlargement that most likely would reduce the material benefits of Denmark s EU membership? And how come in particular that there was such an emphasis on the Baltic states? The principal hypothesis of the paper is that Denmark prioritised enlargement to the Baltic States to a large degree due to a sense of solidarity with these particular states. Hence, we follow the general argument in much of the enlargement literature that norms must have played a part in the decision to enlarge (Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig 2002; Sjursen 2002; Schimmelfennig 2003; Sedelmeier 2000; Torreblanca 2001; Fierke and Wiener 1999; Friis 1998). 3 The focus here is on the arguments and reasons presented by Danish political elites (including those set to implement the policy). There is no a priori assumption of Denmark being a unitary actor, however, on this particular issue there was a broad consensus across all political parties, hence it seems unproblematic to refer to Denmark s policy. Where the reasons for supporting enlargement were different amongst different actors this is referred to in the text. 4 Friis 1998, Fossum 2000, Riddervold 2002.

105 Between Security and Human Rights 99 However, to emphasise the role of norms is only the beginning. There are numerous rule-sets, norms and identities. In this paper we seek to contribute to the theoretical debate regarding the role of norms by a twofold strategy. First by examining the relative importance of instrumental versus normguided justifications for Denmark s position on enlargement. Second, by discussing the impact of different forms of norm-guided justification. Furthermore, the mechanisms through which norms are complied with are contested in the literature on enlargement. Is norm compliance ensured through the mechanism of self-interested calculations? In this paper we argue that norms are not only used instrumentally but also constitute the identity of the actors. Norms do not function only as constraints on actors (selfinterested) behaviour. They constitute the world views and preferences of actors. We argue that it is on this basis that Denmark s position on enlargement should be understood. After a brief discussion of the particular approach chosen (section 1), we turn to discuss to what extent Denmark s strong support for enlargement and in particular its emphasis on the importance of the right of the Baltic states to enter the EU can be understood as based on calculations of utility (section 2). The hypothesis to be investigated here is that Denmark prioritised enlargement to the Baltics because the benefits to Denmark in doing so were considered to be particularly high, either in economic or security terms. After this we turn to examine the role of norm guided justifications in the enlargement process by discussing the relative importance of values and rights as mobilizing arguments for Denmark s position in the enlargement process (section 3). Hence, in addition to the hypothesis pointed to above about a sense of solidarity as a mobilising force in enlargement, an alternative hypothesis, that Denmark prioritised enlargement to the Baltic States in order to ensure the respect of democracy and human rights in these states, will be examined. The approach In order to examine the hypotheses outlined in the introduction we focus on the arguments and reasons that the actors provided for their actions. 5 5 The article is based primarily on interviews and documents produced by the Folketing (Danish Parliament) and Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook/ DUPI-DOK (contains the official collections of Folketing-debates, articles and speeches by government-members etc) from Two rounds of interviews were conducted (in June/July 2001 and in May 2003) with representatives from the Danish ministry of foreign affairs as well as from the main

106 100 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen Following the overall framework of the Cidel project an analytical distinction is made between three different types or categories of arguments that might be used to justify enlargement: pragmatic arguments, ethical-political arguments and moral arguments (Habermas 1993; Eriksen and Fossum 2004; Sjursen 2002). In a pragmatic approach policy would be justified with reference to the output that it is expected to produce. The approach is based on a means-ends type of rationality where actors are considered to take decisions made on calculations of utility based on a given set of interests. This also means that one would not expect actors to support enlargement unless arguments could be found to support the idea that it would provide utility given their interests and preferences. In an ethical-political approach justification would rely on a particular conception of the collective us and a particular idea of the values represented by a specific community. Here, one would seek to justify enlargement by referring to duties and responsibilities emerging as a result of belonging to that particular community. In a moral approach the aim would not be to justify policy with reference to calculations of utility nor with reference to the values of a particular community, but to find justifications that rely on universal standards of justice, regardless of the utility of the policy to the particular actors involved in the decision or the specific values or perceptions of the good life embedded in the community outlining policy. Whereas the distinction between pragmatic arguments on the one hand and ethical-political and moral arguments on the other hand are probably fairly conventional, the distinction between ethical-political and moral arguments, or between values and rights, is perhaps less so in international relations. In the so-called constructivist literature for example, there is a strong focus on the role of norms (Ruggie 1998; Katzenstein 1996). However, little attention is paid to the fact that there are different types of norms and to the significance of this for understanding political processes and decisions. The distinction is nevertheless important in general because it allows us to highlight that some norms can be universally shared whereas this is not necessarily the case with all norms. While the concept of values is connected to the characteristics of a specific community and to the identity of the members of that community understood as collective representations of the good that vary according to cultural and social context (Habermas 1996: 259; Eriksen, Fossum and Sjursen 2002:17), moral norms or rights are universal in the sense that they can be generalized and accepted by all in a political parties in Denmark. Translations from Danish are made by the authors. See also Riddervold 2002.

107 Between Security and Human Rights 101 free and open debate, independently of identities and belongings (Eriksen and Weigård 1997; Habermas 1996, 2000). Based on Habermas theory of communicative action, where actors are defined as rational when they are able to justify and explain their actions and not only when they seek to maximise their own interests, we assume that support for - or at least loyalty towards - a policy, such as enlargement, can be obtained as a result of a process of deliberation where arguments and reasons are provided in favour of this policy, on the condition that the arguments are deemed legitimate by the parties involved. Or to put it differently: the arguments and reasons provided in favour of enlargement have to be of a type that others can support: they must be considered legitimate. Consequently, identifying which types of arguments may have functioned as mobilising arguments for Denmark s position on enlargement should help us to provide a better understanding of the prioritisations made. Consequently, the methodology suggested here is explanation through interpretation in the Weberian sense: social science is a science concerning itself with the interpretative understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences (Weber 1978: 4). It is not possible to understand the causal mechanisms in a social setting without looking at the reasons that actors give for their actions. As Kratochwil (1989: 24) has argued Meaningful action is created by placing an action within an intersubjectively understood context, even if such imputations are problematic or even wrong in terms of their predictive capacity. To have explained an action often means to have made intelligible the goals for which it was undertaken. This can only be done by looking at the arguments and reasons that actors give for their actions. The relevance of this analysis, as well as the credibility of its findings, might be questioned on the grounds that there is often a considerable gap between what policy-makers say and what they actually mean. There could be a hidden agenda involved. This can to some extent be controlled for by examining the consistency of the arguments presented (consistency between different actors, consistency over time, and consistency in the arguments of a particular actor). A further, and more obvious, credibility control is that of whether what is said and what is actually done corresponds. Most importantly, however, is it that we do not in this paper seek to investigate what might be called the true motives of the actors involved. As rational choice theorists argue, it is impossible for us to reach into the hearts and souls of policy-makers and thus to uncover their real or sincere beliefs and

108 102 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen convictions. For methodological reasons it is simply assumed that actors are egotistical and self-interested, that they are motivated by the aim of maximising self-interest, and furthermore by considering these interests as exogenous to the analysis. This paper simply extends the range of possible rational arguments or reasons at the actor s disposal. What is important is that the arguments and reasons in themselves are such that other reasonable actors can support them, that these are arguments and reasons that are considered legitimate or reasonable, and that as a consequence they can lead to agreement on a policy. These arguments do not have to be valid by universal standards. Neither do they have to be the result of a deeply felt conviction on the part of the author. But they have to be able to mobilise support. Following Weber, the condition for this support is that the arguments are considered legitimate. The advantage of such an approach is to leave it open to empirical research to determine whether or not political processes can be seen to contain something more than considerations of utility. Thus, the aim here is not to reject or undermine the importance of such a dimension in political processes but to try to improve our understanding of such processes by introducing two further dimensions - a value dimension and a rights dimension - into the analysis. Consequently, references to utility are only seen as one way in which the decision to enlarge might be justified and thus as one type of reasons why Denmark decided to push for EU enlargement. An important task for the analysis is to assess whether or not the two other ways of justifying policy might have contributed to this decision. Justification through efficiency Denmark as a border state Is it possible to document arguments or reasons that would suggest that Denmark expected substantive economic or security gains from enlargement in general, and most specifically from enlargement to the Baltic States? Would these gains be important enough to convince Denmark to push for a firm commitment of the EU to enlarge to all the applicant states already in the early 1990s? Security considerations Given Denmark s geographical position as a relatively close neighbour to the applicant states in Central and Eastern Europe (compared to for example Britain or the Benelux countries) and in particular to the Baltic States, it is

109 Between Security and Human Rights 103 not unreasonable to assume that Denmark expected particular benefits from enlargement. Even in an increasingly globalised world, geographical proximity between states may lead to a more intense interdependence than between states that have larger distances between each other. This is particularly so in terms of security. Enlargement to border states may thus be a way of either stabilising unstable neighbours and in that way enhancing national security, or in a more traditional conception of security, creating a buffer zone between the national territory and a perceived external threat from another territorial state. However, the evidence on the security dimension is ambiguous. It is quite clear that security considerations were important for the early Danish support for Baltic membership; however, it is not entirely clear that these considerations should be interpreted only as reflecting self regarding calculation of national security benefits. That security issues were present in the minds of Danish policy-makers with regard to enlargement is clear. According to Danish policy-makers: The enlargement of the European Union is the most comprehensive response to the security-challenges and risks Europe is facing 6. And, Security for all of us is at stake 7. Even the traditionally EU-sceptical political parties strongly favoured enlargement from the early 1990s and used security-related arguments to justify this: We shall first and foremost place the eastern enlargement on the agenda as the most important and decisive securitypolitical project in Europe 8. And My party is supportive of enlargement, but we also support enlargement to have a security-political perspective 9. This is so, even though, when talking about security in relation to enlargement, it was often the European interest in security that was highlighted, rather than the national security interest of Denmark itself: And it is through the enlargement of the EU that we can contribute to security and prosperity on our own continent 10. With regard to the particular emphasis on the Baltic States, Danish political actors also underlined the importance for Danish security of developments in neighbouring areas already in the early 1990s (DUPU-DOK ). 6 Foreign Minister N.H. Petersen, Morgenposten Fyens Stiftstidende 11 March 1995: DUPI- DOK. 7 Foreign Minister N.H. Petersen at the conference in Riga August on securitycooperation and integration in the Baltic Sea area. See also the government s basis for negotiation at IGC 1996, agreed in the Folketing. On the Danish policy in these negotiations, see Kelstrup and Banner Jes Lunde (SF), debate on the international political situation in the Folketing 29 May Holger K. Nielsen (SF), the opening debate in the Folketing 10 October Speech by Foreign Minister Mogens Lykketoft, Copenhagen, 23 August 2001.

110 104 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen This then seems a likely cause for the Danish prioritisation. 11 Both in debates in the Folketing and in speeches by members of the government, Baltic membership in the EU and their integration into western institutions was, especially in the first half of the 1990s, presented as something that would have positive consequences for Denmark in terms of increased stability and security. The following quote, from a newspaper article written by Niels Helvig Petersen while he was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Denmark is symptomatic: The main [Danish] security challenge these days is to strengthen the political and economic stability in Europe and in particular in our neighbourhood. It is therefore in our own interest to contribute to the developments in the Baltic area. 12 The thesis of self-interest-based security considerations also finds support in the interviews. Government-officials in the foreign ministry, and to a large degree the interviewed Folketing representatives, all claim that security considerations were central to their emphasis on Baltic membership in the early 1990s. However, as the above quote from Helveg Petersen shows, rather than a traditional conception of security, Danish authorities, as well as the parliamentary representatives, subscribed to a wider understanding of security. This is so both with regard to enlargement in general and to the Baltic states in particular. 13 There is no evidence to suggest that ensuring enlargement to the Baltics was a matter of creating a buffer zone towards the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this emphasis on broader security challenges is presented as something that has particular benefits for Denmark: The Baltic States are a part of the Danish neighbourhood. This means that their further development in areas like democracy, security, economy, trade, culture and environmental protection has a great impact on Denmark. The purpose of Danish policy towards the Baltic States is to support the countries in their development. This is 11 Security-related arguments were more widespread in the first half of the 1990s. One explanation for this could be that as the Baltic States established stronger ties to the EU and came closer to EU-membership, there was less of a need for such arguments. On securityconsiderations, see also among others Archer 1997 and Hansen N.H. Petersen, Berlingske Tidende 8 November See also Heurlin, 1997 (:10 our translation): what has been one of the main goals of Danish defence and security-policy: to secure stability in the Baltic Sea area, not least by military means. But these means are the means of a wider security: Military cooperation, integration, the support for democratisation, transparency and through this mutual trust.

111 Between Security and Human Rights 105 the best way to retain the security and stability of the Baltic Sea area 14. It was also to a large extent from this instrumental perspective of stabilising an unstable neighbourhood that Denmark s bilateral development assistance, Øststøtte (East-support), which was given mainly to these countries, was justified. 15 Thus, security in Denmark is seen as closely related to security in its neighbouring region as a whole and is linked to more unconventional issues such as the environment, migration and international crime. Often, references to Baltic enlargement are linked to the Danish idea of common security, which is a cornerstone of Danish foreign policy (Holm 1997). 16 In the same vein it was argued by representatives from the foreign ministry that it is no coincidence that much of the bilateral support to the Baltic countries was directed to environmental projects. 17 Security concerns do not however seem to provide a sufficient explanation for Denmark s strong support for enlargement in general, nor for the 14 Uffe Elleman Jensen on the reasons for the active Danish policy towards the Baltic states in the early 1990s, interview in Denmark, - gateway to the Baltic Sea. Danish Foreign Ministry publication in relation to the Presidency: See also Petersen F.A A high official in the Foreign Ministry working directly with development assistance highlighted this in an interview on 5 July 2001: The main goal has, of course, been security. The reason why we have to give economic support [to the Baltic countries] is of course to create calm in our neighborhood. Furthermore, a core principle of the East-support programs has been the closer, the more (Hansen 1996). 16 Defined as All aspects of security short of military operations including the defence of national territory (Holm, 1997: 54-74). Pointing to a broader concept of security is widespread in the material. E.g. The new security challenges in the form of regional conflicts, minorityconflicts, environmental threats and cross-border criminality, are getting increasingly clearer (N.H. Petersen, article in De tre Stiftstidender on the IGC, June 1995). According to Foreign Ministry officials (interviews 2001), this is especially so when talking of security in relation to the Baltic States, where the focus on security include highlighting issues such as environmental problems and migration. 17 Interviews, 2001 and See also the strategy for the Danish Eastsupport ( Strategi for den danske øststøtte ) and on eastsupport on This is also an argument in the Folketing-debates. As early as in November 1993, the Minister for Foreign Aid, Helle Degn, argued in favour of prioritising environmental measures in the financial support to the Baltic States: At the same time [as being important for the wellbeing of the Baltic populations], environmental problems are a major threat to our own quality of life (debate on the Danish East-support, 25 November 1993).

112 106 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen candidature of the Baltic States. 18 This is so because, contrary to its partners in the EU (as well as NATO), who chose to keep a low profile towards the Baltic states in order not to provoke Russia, Denmark strongly supported the claims of the Baltic states as early as during their struggle for independence. In the early 1990s, however, Russia opposed integration of the former Soviet republics into western structures, and claimed that they were a part of the Russian sphere of interest. 19 If the principal mobilising force of Danish policy towards, and in relation, to the Baltic States were an expectation of increased national security, it seems quite paradoxical that Denmark, as opposed to most other west-european states, disregarded the potential security risk involved in provoking Russia during the tense period during and after the Baltic States independence. 20 With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to conclude that it made sense to take such a risk. Nevertheless, it remains a fact that Denmark s policy differed from that of the other EU member states at that particular time. 21 This requires an explanation. Several written and oral sources confirm that there was concern about how Russia might react to Denmark s position. 22 And in order to reduce the risk of negative reactions, Denmark actively worked to establish cooperative regimes in the region that included Russia. One such regime was the Baltic 18 Denmark was the first country to recognize Baltic independence in 1991 (Hansen 1996). Also, compared to the other Nordic states: Denmark was by far the most eager and most efficient advocate of the quick admission of the Baltic countries to NATO (Heurlin 2001: 12). 19 The vehement Russian campaign against NATO enlargement thus cannot be seen in isolation from the Russian perception that, at a minimum, the states of the former Soviet Union remain within the Kremlin s exclusive sphere of influence Russians simply can not come to terms with the fact that, for instance the three Baltic States are now fully sovereign actors in international affairs (Skak 2000: 15-16). As late as 1995, van Ham (1995) wrote that: As Russia considered them part of the USSR, Moscow is reluctant to accept the idea that the Baltic states may become members of the EU and WEU, and has in particular raised strong objections against their joining NATO. 20 The potential risk related to the active policy in favour of Baltic integration into western institutions was perhaps particularly strong with regard to Baltic membership in NATO. Still, a strong sense of the risks involved in an active policy towards EU-enlargement to the Baltic States is confirmed in interviews in the Foreign Ministry in 2003, and is also evident from debates in the Folketing in the early 1990s. 21 Germany for example chose to keep a low profile on this issue in order not to provoke Russia (Hansen 1996). On the cautious attitude of Western states see for instance Bajarnas 1995: Much remains to be done to convince the international community that these newcomers on the international scene [the Baltic States] will not pose problems and risks to Europe's overall stability and security and Viksne 1995 Today the West is understandably reluctant to give a clear security guarantee to the Baltic states. ( 22 Interviews in the Foreign Ministry 2003, debates in the Folketing from the early 1990s: DUPI-DOK.

113 Between Security and Human Rights 107 Sea Council, which was established in 1992 on Danish and German initiatives. Furthermore, in the first years after their independence, Danish actors almost consistently addressed Russia when arguing for Baltic EUmembership: I hope Russia will accept it and understand the peaceful purpose of it [Baltic EU-membership] 23 and No new iron-curtains must be drawn. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must be aware of the importance of maintaining and developing good cooperative relations to Russia 24. How then, can we understand the Danish position? There was concern in the Danish ministry of foreign affairs that something would happen in Russia that could lead Russia to once again try to gain influence in the Baltic States. And that this would lead to instability and migration-chaos. And taking such a clear position in favor of the Baltic States is described in the aftermath as taking a risk. 25 If the only concern of Danish policy-makers was to enhance Danish security, why take such a risk, rather than lying low? Could this be a matter of geopolitical interests and a desire to promote Denmark s position as a regional power in the Baltic Sea area? Although an enlargement that did not include the Baltic states might not have entailed a particularly large cost in geopolitical terms for Denmark, as the candidature of states such as Poland would still have ensured a focus on the northern part of the EU, an enlargement to the Baltic states might have been considered an additional gain from a Danish perspective. Even though one might expect that policy-makers would be reluctant to publicly admit to such ambitions for national influence, the possibility of increasing Danish influence in the region and in the Baltic countries was described (during interviews) as something that was being actively pursued. This ambition of influence is also to some degree underlined in speeches and Folketingdebates. 26 However, this was an objective that was actively pursued only after the decision to support the Baltic States in their struggle for independence and their aim of integration into western structures had already been made Then Prime Minister P.N.Rasmussen, debate on the internal and foreign political situation in the Folketing 1993, Dupi-dok. 24 Foreign minister N.H.Petersen in the newspaper Morgenposten Fyens Stifstidende 11 March Interviews N.H.Petersen, debate on the international and domestic situation in the Folketing, 29 May 1997; Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller, interview on Denmark s vision for the development of the Baltic Sea area and an enlarged EU in Denmark, - gateway to the Baltic Sea. Danish Foreign ministry publication in relation to the Presidency : 27 Interviews in the Foreign Ministry, May 2003.

114 108 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen Hence, rather than the main aim, it must be seen as a positive side-effect of the early Danish support for Baltic membership, which in turn was pursued more actively and directly, when it was discovered that The regional cooperation has added a whole new dimension to Danish foreign policy. 28 In sum, self-regarding considerations of national security benefits do not seem sufficient on their own to explain Denmark s early, firm support of Baltic membership in the EU. On balance, the potential security risks entailed from Denmark s strategy were as important as the potential security gains. Thus, other factors must be brought into the analysis in order to understand what tipped the balance in the direction of an active policy promoting Baltic membership rather than towards passivity or at least a wait and see policy for Denmark. Can economic considerations then explain this? Economic interests Representatives of successive Danish governments have presented EUenlargement - and thus enlargement of the internal market - as an economic win-win-situation. The expected economic gains are long term gains from increased commerce and trade, in particular in the Baltic Sea area: enlargement will, through increased trade, in particular contribute to economic growth and create new jobs in all of Europe, and not least in Denmark. 29 From the early 1990s, Danish governments have presented the Baltic Sea Area as a future growth-area, with potentially positive effects for the Danish economy and Danish businesses: In our vision of the new Europe we see the creation of a growth centre in the Baltic Sea Area and we wish to promote strongly this new zone of growth in Europe 30. Prime Minister Poul Schluter pointed to the positive economic effects for Denmark of a centre of economic growth in this region as early as 1992: The Baltic Sea Area as a future growth centre is a prospect that from all viewpoints is extremely positive. 31 This win-win-situation and the Danish economic self-interests especially in the Baltic Sea Area are also from early on reflected in, and used as arguments in favour of, investments in Eastern Europe and bilateral eastern aid: 32 because one of the objectives of the East-support is to turn the 28 Foreign minister N.H.Petersen, Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, 30 December 1997 and interviews in the Foreign Ministry, May Prime Minister, P.N.Rasmussen, debate in the Folketing on the domestic and foreignpolitical situation, 30 May 1996: DUPI-DOK. 30 Helle Degn, Minister of Development Aid, speech at The conference on the economic development in Central- and Eastern-Europe in Copenhagen April Opening-debate in the Folketing, The Baltic States have received a large amount both from the Eastsupport and also through the Danish Investment-fund for Eastern Europe. The Baltic countries, Poland and St.

115 Between Security and Human Rights 109 Baltic Sea Area into a growth-centre The Eastern countries and in particular the Baltic Sea Area will in a long term perspective be of great importance to Denmark s economy. 33 However, as far as we have been able to establish, Danish authorities did not evaluate the potential economic gains (or costs) neither of enlargement in general nor enlargement to the Baltic States until So when Danish political actors used economic arguments to justify enlargement and pointed to the positive economic consequences for Denmark, this does not seem to have been based on positive knowledge of a net-gain, as one would expect from a rationalist perspective. And furthermore, even if enlargement in a long term perspective will be profitable, which is expected by many actors although it is hard to predict, Denmark will have to increase its economic contribution to the EU, and will have to accept a wide range of readjustments 35 Furthermore, Danish political actors admitted that the enlargement would cost: there will be changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and in the structural policy; changes that might lead to fewer transfers to Denmark. But we are ready for this. 36 And also: We are prepared to pay our part of the costs of enlargement, even Petersburg and Kaliningrad have been given priority in Danish aid to the Central-and East- European countries. Approximately 1/3 of Danish bilateral aid, in billion DK, was given to the Baltic States. 33 Helle Degn, Minister of Development Aid, debate in the Folketing on the Danish Eastsupport, 25 November Interview, Danish Foreign Ministry, 30 May 2003 and mail from the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs/Ministry of Finance. 35 On the basis of the Information note from the Commission on the common financial framework for the accession negotiations ( the Ministry of Finance calculated an increase in Denmark s contribution to the EU-budget of 0,5 bill DK in 2004, 1 bill DK in 2005 and 1,2 bill DK in 2006 ( Changes in transfers from CAP etc. are not included. Further on costs of enlargement see the conclusions from the European Council December The financial framework for will be decided 2004/2005. Daniel Gros, Director of Centre for European Policy Studies says that the key point is that the CEECs will be sitting around the table when the next multi-annual framework (for the period ) is decided in It is at that point that the cost of enlargement will be fixed ( With regards to CAP, Denmark has decided to implement the agreed CAP-reform from 1 January While Denmark received 1.27 bill euros in CAP funds in 1999 (euractiv: home=search), it is according to the Danish Ministry of food, agriculture and fisheries ( expected that Danish farmers will receive appr 7 bill DK (or appr 940 mill euros) when the reform is implemented. 36 Jacob Buksti, Social democrats, the opening debate in the Folketing, 8 October 1998.

116 110 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen if this for a period will imply additional payments for Denmark 37. The costs of enlargement were seldom used as an argument against enlargement. 38 Hence, enlargement was expected to provide long term positive economic gains, however in order to justify the short term economic costs, other arguments than economic ones were prevalent: The effort for peace has its price. The rich countries in Western Europe must be willing to pay. 39 And: securing peace and stability in Europe making sure that we get a full European house - that costs And that we must be ready to pay for. 40 This kind of reasoning, that one must be willing to pay for other reasons than as an investment for future economic gains, was also present in the biggest opposition-party s, the Social Democrats, EU-initiative of June This EU-initiative was presented after the agreements with the candidatecountries were signed, and expressed an actual willingness to accept less EUtransfers when negotiating a new EU-budget in It says that The revision of the EU budget should be used offensively we should already now prepare for wide-ranging and totally reasonable changes. Our goal in the negotiations should be the political substance and not the narrow selfinterest. And further: We must hold on to that the resources are distributed according to needs. Therefore, the efforts should naturally be directed towards the new member-states and only in a highly limited extent towards prosperous member-states like Denmark 42. Support for a rejection of economic self-interest as a sufficient explanation of the Danish enlargement-policy also comes in the responses from the interviewed government-officials in the Foreign Ministry and representatives 37 Foreign Minister, N.H.Petersen, article in Erhvervsbladet 22 February The populist parties sometimes refer to the cost of enlargement, but then as an argument for changes and reforms that might reduce the cost of enlargementand not as an argument against enlargement as such. 39 Debate in the Folketing on the domestic and international situation, 21 February Prime Minister P.N.Rasmussen, debate in the Folketing on the domestic and international situation, 21 February It is widely agreed in the literature that the coming EU-budget will be much more costly for the West-European countries than hitherto acknowledged. According to the Dresdner Bank, enlargement to ten new Member States would cost 44 billion euro in 2005 alone if the new members received the same structural, cohesion and agricultural aid as the current members. Under this assumption (which, must be noted, will not be the case), the EU would have to increase its budget by 50 percent, which would require raising the own resources ceiling of 1.27 percent of GDP to 1.4 percent of GDP. ( Even if the EU does not equal a nation-state in terms of budgetary-costs, cohesion is still expected to impose higher costs. 42 Ugebrevet Mandag Morgen, 2 June 2003.

117 Between Security and Human Rights 111 of the Folketing. When asked what economic gains make up for the costs they answer: The enlargement can not be outweighed economically 43 and None. We know that it s not unproblematic (economically), but securityconsiderations are decisive 44 Finally, regarding the Baltic States, an official in the Foreign Ministry underlined that Poland represents a much bigger market for Danish business. 45 Costs were not used as an argument against enlargement. Even the populist parties did not argue against enlargement as such when expressing unwillingness to pay the bill for enlargement. 46 But most importantly, it could almost look as if references to long term economic benefits have been used to legitimise a policy developed for other reasons. This might be due to the general Danish debates on the EU, where economic arguments traditionally have dominated. If this is so, it might paradoxically be that economic justifications have been used rhetorically while the most important reasons for initiating the enlargement-policy must be found elsewhere. A normative dimension to enlargement? Because an exclusive focus on utility cannot capture the Denmark s position on enlargement, alternatives must be examined. Several studies point to a value dimension in the overall EU position on enlargement (Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig 2002; Schimmelfennig 2001; Sedelmeier 2000; Fierke and Wiener 1999). The emphasis on values is also evident in the official documents of the EU. According to the Treaty on European Union it is open to all European states with a democratic system of governance. 47 The 43 Folketing-representative, SF, interview, Folketing-representative, Social Democrats, 28 June Interview, 5 July Denmark does not have a seven-year transition-period on the free movement of persons though this has caused debate and resulted in a set of measures to secure the levels of wages and to prevent misuses of the Danish social security system. This has not, however, been used as an argument against the enlargement and the eventual free movement as such has not been questioned. Rather, it is underlined in the agreement (between the Liberals, the Conservatives, the Social Democrats, the Social Liberals, the Socialist People s Party and the Christian Democrats concerning access to the Danish labour market for workers from the new EU Member States from 1 May 2004) that the main goal is to assure that the Danish labour-market de facto is opened to the new EU-members from 1 May 2004 ( 47 Article 49 (ex Article O) states that Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6 (1) may apply to become a member of the Union. According to article 6(1) (ex Article F) The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human

118 112 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen official aim is to construct an ever-closer union amongst the peoples of all of Europe. Likewise, in addition to a certain number of economic criteria, criteria related to democracy and rights are unambiguously stated in the Copenhagen declaration and later systematically repeated (European Council 1993; Verheugen 2000a, 2000b). 48 This strengthens the idea that normative considerations have been important in the decision to enlarge also in the case of Denmark. However, such statements cannot be taken at face value. Most importantly, if they were, what are the mechanisms through which values have an impact on policy choices? One possibility would be that actors in the enlargement process use norms and values instrumentally or strategically in order to forward their own material interests (Schimmelfennig 2003). Enlargement is from this perspective the outcome of rhetorical entrapment as actors with a selfinterest in enlargement have strategically used normative arguments to shame the rest of the EU into accepting it. Here, norms function only as constraints on the actors behaviour. However, this does not seem to have been the case with Denmark. Even though Denmark was one of the drivers of the enlargement process, as shown, its policy can not be explained by material interests alone. It looks as if some kind of a normative commitment, in addition to a concern for national security, has influenced Denmark s position. To explain this we need a theory where the actor is conceived of as capable of assessing the validity of norms. We need a conception of actors as communicative and not only strategic, as outlined earlier in the paper. Without this competence collective norms will not be produced in the first place. Neither will they be adhered to and reproduced in concrete situations such as enlargement. Strategic rationality presupposes communicative rationality (Eriksen 2000: 48). Some norms will be adhered to and others not, depending on the actor s rational assessment of their validity and legitimacy. However, to argue that norms were important is just the beginning. There are numerous rule-sets, norms and identities (Olsen in Eriksen 1999: 216). Hence, an important question is what kind of normative arguments and reasons have been important. As noted in the first section of the paper we have suggested two alternative forms of normative justifications that might have led Denmark to support enlargement. The first of these were ethicalrights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. 48 The emphasis on democracy as a criterion for membership goes back to the first years of the EU (Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne 1962).

119 Between Security and Human Rights 113 political arguments that are revealed through references to values and traditions that are seen as constitutive of European identity. One would thus use arguments and statements that explicitly include or exclude people from a European community and perhaps also make efforts to describe people as part of a common cultural entity (or not). Alternatively, in order to understand Denmark s prioritisation of the Baltic States, one could imagine arguments that would indicate a particular sense of identity or commonality between Denmark and the Baltics rather than the EU and the Baltics. Indicators of a feeling of a community of values can also be references to duty and solidarity to those that are seen as one of us, as opposed to references to justice and rights that would have a broader address. This last dimension is thus what has been labelled a moral approach to justification. Hence, in principle Denmark could argue for a solution that seems appropriate given a particular identity or role or a solution that appears right or just according to standards that are not dependent on a particular cultural identity in order to resolve issues such as who should be part of the EU and where should the borders of the EU be. The distinction is important because it seems likely that the notion of universal rights would be more difficult to use as a mobilising argument for enlargement. It does not yield criteria for establishing borders. If rights were the only mobilising argument for enlargement, there would be few reasons why for example Canada should not become a member state in the European Union. Thus the distinction might allow us to better understand the prioritisations made. By the same token this distinction signals a further difference between the analysis undertaken here and the sociologicalinstitutionalist analyses of enlargement (Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig 2002; Fierke and Wiener 1999). At a theoretical level they do not make the distinction between ethical-political arguments and moral arguments. In turn this means that they cannot capture this element of differentiation in the enlargement process unless these are attributed to calculations of expected costs or benefits. Thus, if we refer to Taylor s best account principle, the approach chosen here is useful because it can make sense of the position of the other explanations whereas the opposite is not the case (Taylor 1989: 58). The advantage of this approach is that it operates with a broader and thus more nuanced set of categories of reasons for action than conventional approaches. Is there an ambiguity in Denmark s arguments and policies on this issue of defending universal rights versus taking on a particular duty towards those that are one of us?

120 114 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen Values or rights as mobilising arguments? References to democracy and the importance of securing human rights can be found in many Danish statements about EU enlargement. Sometimes enlargement is also described as the most important or best way to ensure that the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe will live in liberal democratic states where human rights are respected and can be enforced. From such a perspective, Danish Prime Minister P.N. Rasmussen, underlined Denmark s moral responsibility to the Folketing in 1995: Our ambition in the coming years, our duty in Europe, is to make a very concrete contribution to the stabilization of the democracies, securing of peace and new prosperity in Europe, neither more nor less. 49 The then largest opposition-party, Venstre, also argued that a reason for extensive aid to the CEECs is that human rights are secured for the millions of people who for too many years have lived under repression. 50 They claim that it is Denmark s most essential task to contribute to ensure that the development the transition to democracy and the securing of human rights which we have seen since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, is not stopped but on the contrary continues and that Denmark must make the necessary effort to defend the value-norms, the freedoms and the opportunities that, the removal of the iron curtain has given the central- and east-european peoples the chance to discover. 51 The material does not however seem to point unequivocally to this as the principal mobilising factor for Denmark s position on enlargement in general. Most importantly however, when it comes to the strong emphasis on the rights of the Baltic States, it seems more difficult to settle for this as the principal explanation. Arguably, the Danish position would be the result of a concern for ensuring respect for a principle of equal treatment of all states applying for membership. However, this would hardly explain why Denmark s principal economic and political efforts have focused on the Baltic States. In order to conclude that the prioritisation of the Baltic States was also due to a general commitment to democratic principles and human rights it would be necessary to show that (1) The Baltic countries have from the very beginning of the enlargement process been better at fulfilling the human rights criteria than the others. Or (2) the Baltic countries have had a stronger need for assistance in assuring their citizens human rights than the other applicants. Denmark could have seen preparation for, and membership in, the 49 Debate on the international development and especially the development in Europe, 21 February Charlotte Antonsen, debate in the Folketing on Danish East-support, 25 November A.F. Rasmussen (V), the opening debate in the Folketing, 5 October 1995.

121 Between Security and Human Rights 115 European Union as the best way to ensure the rights of all citizens in the Baltic States. However, one would expect Estonian and Latvian membership in the EU to be ruled out until the political conditions were fulfilled regardless of whatever self-interests Denmark might have in these countries becoming members. A particularly crucial test in the case of the Baltic States would be the treatment of minorities. Together with the Romani-people in many of the CEECs, these Russian-speaking minorities are the most exposed/vulnerable minorities in the applicant countries. The first alternative can easily be ruled out based on the treatment of the minorities in Estonia and Latvia. After independence was reached in 1991, Estonia and Latvia decided to use ethnic criteria for citizenship, which made the Russian-speaking minorities stateless (Dorodnova 2000). 52 Much progress has been made, but as late as 2001, The Open Society Institute (OSI) found that Estonia and Latvia still had some way to go to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria: Notwithstanding much progress to date, the legacy of restricted access to citizenship continues to limit the rights and opportunities of many Russian speakers (OSI 2001a: 177). 53 What then about the second alternative? There is evidence to suggest that Danish authorities did consider the carrot of membership as an important tool for ensuring domestic reform on this issue, as well as ensuring democratic rule more generally. For instance in the debate in the Folketing (25 October and 21 November 1995) on the ratification of the European agreements with the Baltic countries, different political parties justified ratification based on such arguments: They [the agreements] shall help the Baltic countries in building their democracies 54 Even by the Progress party, which traditionally is sceptical to economic aid, was in favour of supporting 52 The term Russian-speaking minority is used as synonymous with Estonian/Latvian minorities, even though there are also other small groups of ethnic minorities in these countries. For instance, as of 1 July 2002, ethnic Latvians constituted 58,1 % of the population in Latvia, while 36 % of the population over the age of 7, including 3 % of ethnic Latvians, considered Russian to be their mother tongue. Still, the problems related to minorities are connected to the way in which citizenship is linked to ethnicity, and the main group is Russians (29, 1%). 22 % of the Latvian population was state-less 1 July (source: Central Statistical Office, Provisional results of the 2000 population census, Statistical Bulletin: OSI report 2002: 300). 53 Further, the report (OSI 2001a: 177) points among other things to problems related to restrictions on the use of their language, which when coupled with citizenship and job requirements, tend to exclude them from mainstream society. For more on the situation for the Russian-speaking minority, see among others Dorodnova (2000), and Reports from the European Parliament 1999 (a). 54 Anne Baastrup (SF).

122 116 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen the Baltic countries economically and politically. This was considered: good for democracy good for the peaceful development in Europe And I think, we have a possibility of helping them with this 55 The Danish commitment to the fate of minorities also comes through in practical policyinitiatives. According to a former representative at the OSCE s office in the Baltic States in Riga, Denmark was among the best countries when it came to practical policy initiatives to facilitate integration of the minorities. 56 Even if these projects were not large in economic terms, Denmark is considered to have initiated and implemented important efforts and projects to ease the integration of the Russian-speaking minorities. 57 Furthermore, in 2001 all (EU) member states signed bilateral treaties establishing visa-free travel with Latvia, but only Denmark extended this regime to include non-citizens. This amounts to a form of indirect discrimination and does not encourage the Latvian government in the direction of respect for and protection of minorities (OSI 2001b: 271). Foreign Ministry officials expressed a belief that the prospects of membership and not least membership itself, has been and is an important factor in improving the minority-situation in Estonia and Latvia. EU-membership is wanted, and this provides incentives to change an ethnic and, according to themselves, nation-building policy: you only have to visit the Baltic States and talk to the population in order to understand how important Europe and regional cooperation are to them. The referendum in Latvia that resulted in increased rights for the Russian minority was not an easy one but the answer was positive and illustrated the ambition and desire of Latvia to become a member of the European Union. 58 Also, the last quote from the Prime Minister is an example of how the government pointed to concrete examples of the prospect of EU-membership improving the situation for the Russian-speaking minority. This does not, however, necessarily mean that such concerns were the main reason for enlargement. In fact, the above arguments must be seen in connection with the high degree of domestic attentiveness given to this problem in Denmark. Danish parliamentarians have monitored the minority- 55 Interview Interviews spring Initiatives for securing of human rights are parts of the east-support, where the goal is to create increased awareness and debate on democracy and human rights in the Baltic countries (Pamphlet from the Foreign Ministry 1998). 58 P.N. Rasmussen at the Conference on Regional Cooperation in an Enlarged Europe, 19 April 1999 (European Parliament A).

123 Between Security and Human Rights 117 situation (see below), and it seems as if it has been necessary for Danish governments to give clear examples of improvements of the situation as a result of tough demands from the EU, to legitimize the active Danish policystance towards enlargement to these countries. 59 Finally, the current status of minorities in these countries is contested. Problems remain even if enlargement has now taken place. For instance in Latvia, according to OSI government policy in general, does not pay sufficient attention to concerns of civil society and minorities in the area of minority rights, such as the need for greater access to education, and the electronic media in the mother tongue, greater promotion of minority languages, the need for dialogue between minorities and the state, and the effective participation of minorities in public life. 60 Even if legislation and institutional arrangements are in accordance with the demands from Copenhagen, practical problems remain. Concerns about ensuring respect for democratic principles and human rights seem to have been present in the minds of Danish policy-makers. However, it is not clear that this has functioned as the major mobilising argument for enlargement in general or for the particular focus on the Baltic States. There is little focus on the Russian minorities as rights-holders in the early 1990s. If a moral logic were behind the focus on the Baltic states even from 1991/1992, one would expect a clearer focus on the rights of the minorities in debates and speeches from this period. Rather it looks as if there has been pressure on Danish authorities to work for the improvement of the minorities rights and to ensure that enlargement to these states were not accepted unless such principles were respected. In this sense it has been an important constraining factor rather than a mobilising one. 61 The conviction that the citizens of the Baltic States had the right to freedom from the union Soviet, was according to the interviewed foreign ministry- 59 N.H. Petersen, feature article in Fyens Stiftstidende 18 December : Minority protection in Latvia an assessment of the national program, Integration of society in Latvia. 61 Officials in the Foreign Ministry (interviews 2001 and 2003) confirmed that promotion of human rights play an important role in the Danish foreign policy, but underlined that when it comes to enlargement, this is more so as an important criterion for enlargement than as a reason for enlargement as such.

124 118 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen officials a primary reason why then foreign minister Uffe Elleman Jensen was so engaged in supporting their struggle for independence and openly criticized Soviet pressure. 62 Such considerations of rights the right to democracy and respect for human rights - and enlargement as a means to secure these standards, is further highlighted as a reason for enlargement by different actors during the entire period. This however, does not explain why Denmark clearly gave priority to the Baltic countries in the enlargementprocess - and not to the citizens of any of the other countries who in this regard would have the same right to choose their relations with the Soviet Union/Russia. What then can help explain this prioritisation? A particular duty towards the Baltic States? To make this and the issue of the willingness to take a security risk, as well as accept economic costs, more comprehensible, we must turn to the valuebased hypothesis. Prime Minister P.N. Rasmussen used the argument of a historic duty as a reason for why Denmark actively supported EU-enlargement, at the same time as a sense of a special responsibility towards the Baltic States was highlighted, when he said that (it is) an historical duty also based on the experiences we have for European cooperation now to take the next big step, which is to give new opportunities to the Central- and East-European countries. In the EU, we [Denmark] have consequently led the way when it comes to the expansion of relations with the Central- and East-European countries and not least the Baltic States. 63 Still, there is little evidence of the Baltic States being viewed as a more natural part of Europe than the other applicant states. Arguments about a particular duty to expand in order to finally unite Europe (see below) clearly also covers the Baltic States. Yet this can not explain why these countries have been given priority in the Danish enlargement policy. As one of the Folketing-representatives put it: I do not think that one in any meaningful way can argue that the Baltic States belong more to Europe than, say, Norway or Poland. 64 What then, can explain the Danish priority given to the Baltic States from the very beginning of the 1990s? 62 Interviews, 2001 and This was also in line with the official Danish policy of nonrecognition during the Cold War, as Denmark did not recognize the Soviet occupation in 1940 (Hansen 1996). 63 Debate in the Folketing on the domestic and international situation 26 May Folketing-representative, SF, Interview, 2001.

125 Between Security and Human Rights 119 Though the assertion of the Baltic people being more Scandinavian or Nordic than the other applicants is rejected by some of the interviewed on the basis of different cultures, religions, languages etc, what clearly emerges is that they all (representatives in the Folketing as well as officials in the Foreign Ministry) share a sense of some kind of closeness and fellowship with the Baltic countries and peoples. Even amongst those actors who most clearly underlined security considerations as the main reason for the Danish policy towards these states, this commitment to security in the Baltics was explained as having something to do with whom one felt closest to. The prioritisation of the Baltic States (and the unofficial distribution of candidate-countries amongst the EU-countries) can be explained with reference to geography but is also linked to a feeling of some kind of closeness and nearness: It also (together with geographical location) has to do with who we know, which contributes to who it is natural to support. 65 The special Danish commitment to the Baltic States in the enlargement process, towards the other EUmembers and through aid and other practical support, can not be explained by idealism or security considerations alone: It (the Danish assistance) is also idealistic, but if it was only to help, we could have chosen a number of other countries. It might be because of a sense of historical duty, or the feeling that there are some countries that are more like us It is therefore natural to support the Baltic States and not Turkey, Hungary, Romania etc. 66 This perception of closeness is further underlined by how all the interviewed pointed to historical relations and trade between Denmark and the Baltic countries, even though they had difficulties in explaining exactly what these historical ties were, except from trade. A feeling of closeness or some kind of special solidarity towards the Baltic States also comes through in the interviews with the Foreign Ministry officials. 67 When confronted with the contradiction in on the one hand explaining Danish policy towards the Baltic States as driven by security considerations and on the other hand acknowledging the potential security risks entailed in supporting Baltic membership in Western institutions in the early 1990s, a special relationship between Denmark and the Baltic States was given as a contributing reason for Danish policy. A feeling of solidarity with the Baltic States, a solidarity based on the countries being small and having a large neighbour, like the small country Denmark historically has had Germany as a big neighbour was highlighted. 68 The Baltic countries 65 Folketing-representative, Social Democrat, interview 28 June Folketing-representative, V, interview, 6 June Interviews, 2001 and Interviews 2001 and 2003.

126 120 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen geographical position and the countries being small and thus making it easier to make a difference, were also pointed to as important reasons for the Danish policy. But, as one of the Foreign Ministry officials expressed, this has also led to a sense of commonality and thus contributed to why Denmark has felt a special solidarity towards the Baltic States, a special understanding, and a desire to help them. And this feeling of solidarity was according to the official, a contributing reason for why Denmark took the chance and supported the Baltic States in their struggle for independence in 1991, when Denmark had the chance to help. 69 One of the officials in the Foreign Ministry also referred to a feeling in the population in general of a special relationship with the Baltic countries. That this might be the case is supported by Danish opinion-polls, where a larger number of the interviewed agreed that Denmark should work more actively towards Baltic membership in the EU than towards the other candidate s membership. 70 Other than geographical closeness, the Baltic countries being small with a large neighbour, and a sense of some kind of historical relationship through trade and commerce, it seems difficult to define exactly what lies behind the expressed sense of closeness: I think it is mostly a feeling, and I am not sure it (the feeling) is right. 71 Based in particular on the interviews it seems probable that such a feeling of closeness has been important for Danish policy. The very fact that it is hard to define in concrete terms what this sense of a particular solidarity is, might be a reason why this argument is not very widespread in the debates in the Folketing. It suggests a policy based on a tacit value consensus in which certain things are simply taken for granted and not considered necessary to spell out in detail. These are not moral arguments in the Kantian sense but rather implicit understandings of who we are as Danes or as Europeans. A duty to unite Europe? It is not only with regard to the Baltics that this sense of a particular duty to enlarge based on a sense of solidarity is prevalent. The perception of a particular duty to enlarge is obvious also in Danish political actors reasoning 69 Interview, May % of the Danes agreed that Denmark should work actively towards Baltic membership, 25% partly agreed while 14 % disagreed. As regards the Central European countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic), 36 % agreed, 29% partly agreed and 16 % disagreed, while only 20 % of the Danes agreed that Denmark should work actively for enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria. Source: AIM-Nielsen, for Ugebrevet Mandag Morgen March 1996 and DUPI-DOK. 71 Interview 06 July 2001.

127 Between Security and Human Rights 121 and argumentation for enlargement in general: The Central- and East- European countries are natural members of the European family. The Danish Government has wholeheartedly and actively promoted the integration of these countries into European cooperation-structures The time has come to create an undivided Europe The historic task of our generation will be to extend the existing zone of stability to the rest of Europe. It will not be easy. But History will not forgive us if we fail. 72 There is a clear indication of a feeling and perception of a common European history and a common destiny being used as justification for EU-enlargement, by pointing to what is the right thing to do in this particular historical context what Denmark has a duty to do. We now have a joint historical responsibility to form the future of Europe 73 ;.. it is the responsibility of our generation to unite Europe 74. And because of this duty, it is argued that the population must accept the costs related to enlargement: What is the far most important is to have the courage to explain our historic chance and duty to the Danish population, which I don t think will come again if we don t use it now: The duty to give our modest contribution so that Europe is enlarged 75. It is the present member-states, and thus Denmark s, responsibility, that this happens. If not the present member-states shame is total. 76 This is also underlined in the way security is highlighted as security and stability in all of Europe. 77 There is a widespread all-party use of this kind of argumentation. Furthermore, such justifications were used throughout the entire period. This is so also with regard to the EU- sceptical parties such as the Socialist Folkparty: It is our historic duty to use all our strength to place this subject (enlargement) on top of the agenda 78. Their arguments are similar to those of the pro-eu parties: From a conservative point of view, we want the EUenlargement with the Central- and East-European countries and the Baltics placed on top of the agenda, because here we have a historical duty 79 and For the Radical Left, the vision is the broad cooperation, the undivided 72 Foreign Minister N.H.Petersen, speech at the Institute of European Affairs, Dublin 28 October Prime Minister, P.N. Rasmussen, debate in the Folketing on the domestic and international situation, 30 May Brixtofte, V, opening debate in the Folketing, 08 October Prime Minister P.N. Rasmussen, debate in the Folketing on the EU s IGC, 10 May E. Arnold, RV, debate in the Folketing on the IGC, 28 May F. Rasmussen, S, opening debate in the Folketing, 07 October S. Gade, SF, debate in the Folketing on international developments, especially developments in Europe, 21 February H. Engell, KF, opening debate in the Folketing, 05 October 1995.

128 122 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen Europe, the bridge-building 80. Given the all-party agreement on enlargement and the population s strong support for enlargement, it is furthermore not plausible to argue that value-based arguments are used rhetorically by the government in order to gain support amongst the opposition and the voters. 81 Rather, it looks as if there might have been costs involved in saying no, in the sense that it is not being deemed legitimate to argue against enlargement, where not even the populist parties have argued against the enlargement as such. Arguments that point to a historic duty and to the need for European unification are obvious in the written data, but this duty is also evident in the justification for enlargement made by the interviewed officials in the foreign ministry and the Folketing representatives, both in interviews conducted in 2001 and in Neither the value-based argumentation in the Folketingdebates, nor the justification of enlargement given by the interviewed, point to exactly what this specifically European is, and when asked, the interviewed all had problems drawing concrete borders between Europe and non-europe. Still, they all expressed a feeling of some countries belonging to Europe, and a duty to enlarge as a reason for why enlargement must take place, in spite of its costs. There was a clear perception of who naturally belongs to Europe and who does not and thereby has a right to join the EU. E.g. You might say they have a right to join because they are European. 82 They all expressed an understanding of some kind of geographical and identity-based dividing-lines between Europe and non-europe, that there are limits for how far the EU can enlarge as a European community, even though it is not clear what it is that defines this community. Conclusion The aim of this paper has been to contribute to the discussion of the role and importance of norms in understanding EU enlargement. In order to contribute to this debate we have analysed the qualitatively different reasons presented by Danish actors involved in formulating the Danish position. Thus, in accordance with a tradition of explanation through interpretation we have sought to explain the role of Denmark as one of the drivers of EU 80 J. Estrup, RV, debate in the Folketing on the domestic and international situation, 27 May The thesis of a felt kinship duty to a large is also strengthened by how as shown Danish actors, when talking about security in relation to enlargement, often highlighted the European interest in security, rather than the national security interest of Denmark itself. 82 Folketingrepresentative (S), interview, 28 June 2001.

129 Between Security and Human Rights 123 enlargement by making intelligible the goals for which the country s policy was undertaken. There are several reasons why Denmark is an important case to examine if we want to understand EU enlargement. Firstly, as already noted it was one of the drivers of enlargement, as it took a strong stand in favour of enlargement very early in the 1990s. Secondly, Denmark held the Presidency both when the decision to enlarge was made, in 1993, and when the membership negotiations were concluded in Hence Denmark has, despite being one of the small member states of the EU, been a key actor in the enlargement process. Finally, Denmark is generally considered to be a Euro-sceptic member state, a reputation that was fortified with the no to the Treaty of Maastricht in However, contrary to the British support for enlargement, the Danish support for widening has never been considered simply as a the result of its reluctance to further deepening of the Union. This in itself warrants further examination. The general argument in the enlargement literature suggests that the role of the drivers of the enlargement process can be understood as expressions of particular interests. However, we have found that this is not the case with Denmark. In fact, the emphasis on economic gains was particularly weak in the Danish context. This is even more surprising given that Danish membership in the EU is most often justified in such terms. Security considerations on the other hand, seem to have been more important for Danish policy-makers, although we have argued that they cannot on their own be seen to have tipped Denmark unanimously in favour of enlargement. With regard to normative considerations we have, based on a distinction between rights-based and value based justifications, suggested that a sense of solidarity is important in order to explain not only why Denmark has been one of the drivers in enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe but why Denmark was a particular champion for the candidature of the Baltic States. Although the political criteria for enlargement have been considered as absolute by Danish policy-makers, what emerges from the material is a sense of who belongs to Europe that signals something else than, or in addition to, a concern for the respect for human rights and democratic principles. To understand this one must take into account the value-based conception. Hence, the analysis here fits with what existing research on enlargement has concluded, but takes the analysis a step further. Firstly, it challenges the assumption that the mechanisms through which norms and identities have an impact are self-interested calculations of costs and benefits. Norms do not

130 124 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen matter because it costs something not to comply with them, but because they are ends in themselves. They appeal to principles or values that are considered valid, true or right. Secondly, the findings of this paper take the explanation beyond the existing literature by suggesting that enlargement is not based on moral arguments in the Kantian sense but rather on a tacit value consensus that is perceived to imply certain duties and responsibilities. This may not be a sense of common identity in a thick sense; however arguments of a particular solidarity and sense of commonality have guided policy priorities. Consequently, the idea that there is not even a minimum common cultural substrate amongst EU states is also weakened. Bibliography Agreement concerning access to the danish labour market: Archer, C. (1997): Security Considerations between the Nordic and Baltic Countries, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (DUPI-DOK) Bajarnas, E.(1995): Lithuania s security dilemma, in Van Ham, P. (ed.): The Baltic States: Security and Defence after Independendence, Chaillot Paper 19, June Danish Ministry of food, agriculture and fisheries: Dorodnova, J. (2000): EU concerns in Estonia and Latvia: Implications of Enlargement for Russia s Behaviour Towards the Russian-speaking Minorities, EUI Working Paper RSC 2000/40. Dresdner Bank: DUPI-DOK : Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (DUPI-DOK) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, Eastsupport: Eriksen, E.O. and Fossum, J.E. (eds.) (2000): Democracy in the European Union. Integration through Deliberation?, London: Routledge.

131 Between Security and Human Rights 125 Eriksen, E.O.; Fossum, J.E. and Sjursen, H. (2002): Widening or reconstituting the EU? paper prepared for the Arena Conference on Democracy and democratic governance. Towards a new political order in Europe, Oslo, 4-5 March Eriksen, E.O. and Weigård, J. (1997): Conceptualizing Politics. Strategic or communicative rationality?, Scandinavian Political Studies 20(3), pp EU-oplysningen: Euractiv: Euractiv 2: euractiv: European Council (1993) Presidency Conclusions: European Council in Copenhagen, June. European Parliament (1999): The Russian Minority in the Baltic States and the Enlargement of the EU, Secretariat Working Party Task-Force Enlargement, Briefing 42, Fierke, K and Wiener, A. (1999): Constructing institutional interest: EU and NATO enlargement, Journal of European Public Policy, 6(3), pp Folketinget: Foreign Ministry (1998): Danmarks Balticum-politik, 13. Copenhagen: Det kongelige danske udenrigsministerium. Friis, L. (1998): Denmark s Fifth EU-referendum: In Denmark nichts Neues?, DUPI Working Paper 13/1998. Friis, L. and Murphy, A. (1999): The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and boundaries, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(2), pp Friis, L. (2000): Den populære udvidelse, Fokus, 2/2000. Fossum, J.E. (2000): Constitution-making in the European Union, in Eriksen, E.O. and Fossum, J.E. (eds.): Democracy in the European Union. Integration through Deliberation?, London: Routledge. Habermas, J. (1993): On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason, in Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.

132 126 Marianne Riddervold and Helene Sjursen Habermas, J. (1998): Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. Hansen, B. (1996): Dansk Baltikumpolitik , in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (DUPI-DOK) Heurlin, B. (1997): Dansk forsvarspolitik. En ny verden en ny forsvarpolitikk, Fokus 5/1997. Heurlin, B. (1999): Denmark and the Northern Dimension, DUPI Working Paper 11/1999. Heurlin, B. (2001): Danish Security Policy over the last 50 Years - Long- Term Essential Security Priorities, DUPI Working Paper 7/2001. Holm, H. (1997): Denmark s Active Internationalism: Advocating International Norms with Domestic Constraints, in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (DUPI-DOK) Katzenstein, P.J. (1996): The culture of national Security: Norms and identity in world politics, New York: Columbia University Press. Kelstrup, M. and Branner, H. (eds.) (2000): Denmark's policy towards Europe after 1945 : history, theory and options, Odense: Odense University Press. Kratochwil, F.V. (1989): Rules, Norms and Decisions. On the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Moshes, A. (2002): The Double Enlargement, Russia and the Baltic States, DUPI Working Paper 4/2002. Open Society Institute (OSI) (2001a): Minority Protection in Estonia, Open Society Institute (OSI) (2001b): Minority Protection in Latvia, Open Society Institute (OSI) (2002): Minority protection in Latvia an assessment of the national program, Integration of society in Lavia. Petersen, F.A (1997): The international Situation and Danish Foreign Policy, in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (DUPI-DOK) Ruggie, J.G. (1998): Constructing the World Policy. Essays on International Institutionalization, London: Routledge. Schimmelfennig, F. (2003): The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

133 Between Security and Human Rights 127 Sedelmeier, U. (2000): Eastern Enlargement and the EU as an Actor in European Security. Structures: The interplay Between the EU s Role and Policy, in Redefining Security? The Role of The European Union in European Security Structures, ARENA Report 7/2000, Oslo: ARENA. Sedelmeier, U. and Schimmelfennig, F. (eds.) (2002): European Union Enlargement. Theoretical and Comparative Approaches, Journal of European Public Policy. Special Issue 9(2). Sjursen, H. (2002): Why expand? The question of legitimacy and justification in the EU s enlargement policy, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(3), pp Skak, M. (2000): Back in the USSR, DUPI Working Paper 7/2000. Taylor, C. (1989): Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tepsa (1999): Enlargement and agenda 2000 WATCH; Torreblanca, J.I. (2001): The Reuniting of Europe. Promises, negotiations and compromises, Aldershot: Ashgate. Treaty on European Union: Ugebrevet Mandag Morgen (2003): Ambitiøst S-udspil tvinger regeringen i defensiven, nr. 21, 2 June Van Ham, P. (ed.) (1995): Introduction, in The Baltic States: Security and Defence after Independendence, Chaillot Paper 19, June Viksne, I. (1995): Lavia and Europe s security structures, in The Baltic States: Security and Defence after Independendence, Chaillot Paper 19, June Weber, M. (1978): Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology, Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley: University of California Press. Zakheim, D.S. (1998): The role of Denmark in the Baltic Sea Area: An American Wiev, in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, 1998.

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135 Chapter 5 Turkey s EU Politics: What Justifies Reform? Gamze Avci Leiden University Introduction The Turkish candidacy for European Union membership presents a formidable challenge for the Union. It is not a new issue, it all began about four decades ago with the Ankara Association Agreement (1963) and it has intensified since the positive decision on Turkey s candidacy status at the Helsinki Council in Despite the long time period that has elapsed since the Association Agreement, which already then envisaged membership for Turkey, much uncertainty prevails within the EU whether Turkey will ever or eventually join. The EU will now be put on the spot again, when it faces the question whether Turkey can move on to the next stage, namely negotiations for EU membership. An affirmative answer will entail and require a much deeper commitment by the EU to Turkey than so far exhibited. Up to now, the Union has delayed or avoided a deep commitment to Turkey except affirming her association status and right to candidacy (Avci 2002b). Research on past enlargements reveals that possible answers converge around the triangle of rights-values-utility (Sjursen and Smith 2001; Sjursen 2001). Neither is unambiguous and definite in the Turkish case. Cost and benefit

136 130 Gamze Avci analyses do not necessarily work in the case of Turkey, at least not in the short-run (which is somewhat similar to Eastern enlargement). For many EU policymakers, Turkey is a costly addition for economic and even geopolitical reasons. Identity issues have so far proven to be difficult to overcome. Hence, if kinship is a criterion (Sjursen and Smith 2001), the Turks are not next of kin. Turkey is considered to be too different. Thus, there is not a double puzzle like in the case of Eastern enlargement (Schimmelfennig 1999) but potentially a dual impassé the Turks have to overcome. Still, past and current Turkish governments have continued to work for an admission to this exclusive European club. Especially, the eagerness of the current AKPgovernment (1999- ), a religious conservative government appears irrational in this respect, if one considers identity issues and possibly religion as a dividing line. The AKP has chosen to stick -like the previous coalition government (DSP, MHP and ANAP) - to the reform path associated with candidacy and has even chosen to accelerate it. This is a puzzle for many. The difficulty with the existing explanations in the literature is that they are applied to and concentrate on the EU-side. This has three different drawbacks. Firstly, these explanations seek to analyze what motivates and justifies enlargement from the EU perspective and neglect the demand side of enlargement (Mattli and Plümper 2002). With a hard case like Turkey, the result changes are not fully explained. In other words, with just the EU-side under the lense, it is difficult to explain why reform happens in the first place in Turkey. Secondly, by solely looking at the supply-side, one cannot capture the discussions and change within Turkey. How is the carrot presented to the Turkish public? Why and how do Turkish policymakers choose particular propositions when it comes to EU-related reforms? Thirdly, the Turkish scene represents possibly the other game-board in a two-level game (Putnam 1988). The changes within Turkey have important repercussions for the EU level as well. The main goal of the paper is to understand how reform is (or is not) justified in turkey. For that purpose, it analyzes the discussions around the politics of enlargement in Turkey and searches for the underlying logic(s) of action used by Turkish policymakers. The research looks in particular at political parties in government given that they shape the national process of preference and interest formulation and are critical when it comes to passing legislation

137 Turkey s EU Politics 131 required to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In this context, the paper maintains that political parties are one of the key players in making progress towards EU membership. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first part the paper briefly looks at the ongoing enlargement approaches and anchors the present paper. The second part of the paper looks at the politics of EU-related reform in Turkey. In the third part, the actual reforms passed are presented. The fourth part of the paper identifies the tendencies in the justification of Turkey s EU policy. The paper concludes with implications for the theoretical discussions on justifying enlargement within the EU. The theoretical discussion Schmitter (1996:14) suggested that the analysis of enlargement has taken place in a theoretical vacuum in that enlargement has been dealt with largely outside the body of theoretical writing on integration. In the last couple of years, especially with Eastern enlargement, this has changed significantly. Today, a range of theoretical perspectives competes for influence when it comes to enlargement. The theories use a variety of conceptual tools to explain why the EU chooses to enlarge. The parameters of discussion are rationalist (variants of realism, liberalism, and institutionalism), versus constructivist accounts. The rationalist approaches focus more on interests and power whereas constructivist accounts focus more on identity, values and norms. Furthermore, there are studies that explore enlargement as a foreign policy tool as well as how it has contributed to the formation of a role of the EU in the promotion and defence of human rights and fundamental democratic principles mainly through its mechanisms of conditionality. Institutional explanations have concentrated on how EU institutions and their logics have mattered in this process. Sjursen and Smith (2001) present us with very functional tools for identifying the different dynamics behind EU foreign policy. They begin with the premise that there are three analytically distinct ways in which a foreign policy can achieve legitimacy. These are linked to three different kinds of logic: a logic of consequences, a logic of appropriateness and a logic of moral justification. Utility, values and rights respectively identify these logics. The first one, utility, indicates that achieving an output that could be seen as an efficient solution to given interests and preferences. The second one, values

138 132 Gamze Avci implies through reference to what is considered appropriate given a particular group s conception of itself and of what it represents. The last one, rights, means that enlargement could be justified by referring to principles that are recognised as morally acceptable to everyone, irrespective of particular interests or cultural identity. This paper suggests that using Sjursen and Smith s framework can be equally effective when discussing Turkey s EU reform policy. The reform process in Turkey: The context and the domestic discussions The EU reform process represents a major reference point of political battles in the candidate countries. Thus enlargement not only shapes the politics of Europe at large; it also largely determines the pattern of domestic political agendas and competition. This is not any different in Turkey. The candidacy period has begun during the ANAP-DSP-MHP coalition and has continued with the AKP since 1999 and the battle for reform has been carried on in both periods. A discussion of the reform process will clarify where and how Turkey has made progress. Up until the Helsinki Summit (1999), Turkish political discourse on the issue of EU membership was relatively uncomplicated. This was largely due to a consensus among the major political parties, groups and elites that Turkey should pursue EU membership. Although there were clearly varying degrees of enthusiasm and nuances in their different approaches, no major Turkish political grouping or actor questioned the objective of EU membership in a substantial manner. After all, Turkish EU membership had been was one of the major pillars of Turkish foreign policy since the 1960s. Nonetheless, very often this did not really lead to a deliberate and well thought-out assertion of support and public backing for EU membership. In the past, there was very little serious debate about what EU membership actually entailed. Changes, prospective costs and benefits of accession were not pondered. The Turkey-EU debate was couched in very abstract and broad geo-political or historical terms relating to general notions such as becoming part of Europe or becoming European. Furthermore, given the apparent consent among political elites, many Turkish Eurosceptics were

139 Turkey s EU Politics 133 probably hesitant to deplore EU membership. Given that, one could possibly argue that past polling data on EU membership support in Turkey may have overstated the real levels of public support. This shallow consensus on EU membership was critically shaken with the initiation of the required reform process in Turkey. The process received its official start when Turkey was formally accepted as a candidate at the Helsinki Summit in With Helsinki, the reform process received an irreversible impetus. Turkey s political parties, in particular, began wrangling over details of what the government is ready to concede to the EU. 1 Very frequently the political debates around EU membership turned into ideological confrontations between the nationalists and the rest of the parties. The Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP) was been the primary source of nationalist opposition. But the military s elite and left wing nationalists, or extremists, also repeatedly voiced their concern or opposition on certain EU issues. Though, despite its reservations, the military was careful to distance itself from an anti-eu label overall, because it believes NATO member Turkey s economic and political destiny lies in Europe, one way or another. On the other hand, support for EU membership has come more from business circles, liberals, and, somewhat inconsistently, from the mainstream right parties (the True Path Party Do ru Yol Partisi, DYP, and the Motherland Party, Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). 2 Occasionally pro-islamists 3 have voiced support for this step, when it fitted their purposes. Among the pro-islamic parties, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP), which is in government since 1999, voiced an all out support for the Turkey s so-called EU project. It is worth mentioning that nationalist overtones have been heard occasionally from all parties. 4 Finally, NGOs have been very 1 For a discussion of the various turbulences caused by the democratization process after Helsinki, see: Tsakonas For example, see the statements of Mesut Yılmaz, ANAP s party leader in Hürriyet 19 July 2000, Turkish Daily News, 11 September 2000, Cumhuriyet, 10 October Past and present Islamist parties include Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, banned by the Constitutional Court in 1998), Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, banned in 2000), Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party), Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party). 4 See for example the discussions surrounding the Customs agreement between Turkey and the EU, Eder 1999:

140 134 Gamze Avci outspoken and generally very supportive of the EU. 5 In the since 1999, two parties have stood out: the MHP and the AKP in either hampering or accelerating the process. ANAP, DYP and the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People s Party, CHP) have been by and large supportive of Turkey s EU candidacy. Turkish public opinion has been generally very supportive of European Union membership. When asked in May 2003, whether they would support Turkey s membership in a referendum, 72% said yes, 16% no and 10% gave no answer. 6 Interestingly enough, the figures for support are higher than before the reform process started. 7 From 1999 to November 2002, the MHP s role was overly noticeable because it was a coalition partner in the government and key in passing (or not passing) reforms. Incidentally, the first three years of Turkey s EU candidacy have been under the governance of the coalition government led by Ecevit. Ecevit s Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party, DSP) received 22.3 percent of the votes in 1999 and his coalition partners MHP and ANAP received 18.1 percent and 13.3 percent respectively. This reflected to a certain extent the ongoing fractionalization of the Turkish political system. On March 18, 2000, the government announced that the three coalition partners had finally reached a compromise on the commitments Turkey would make to the EU. The national program (NPAA) of short- and medium-term reforms announced 89 new laws, forthcoming amendments to 94 existing laws and proposed a massive overhaul in Turkish politics. This occurred only after long deliberations and much struggle. The NPAA appeared to be a joint declaration of the three coalition partners but also, in a 5 TÜSiAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve Isadamları Dernegi - Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association) and IKV (Iktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı - Economic Development Foundation) are the leading organizations favor of the EU. The IKV has frequently acted as an umbrella organization for other NGOs when gathering support for the EU movement. It has garnered support of as many as 200 NGOs when appealing to the government to focus on and speed up EU affairs. TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı - Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) as well as the European Movement 2002 have also played a critical role with their activities geared towards educating the public and mobilizing EU supporters. 6 For a detailed overview, see Carkoglu 2003 Perceptions in Figures and Numbers presented at the conference Turkey and the EU: from Association to Accession?, 6-7 November 2003, Amsterdam. In May 1998, 62 % said yes, 21 % no and 17% did not know, see Carkoglu 2003, also note 22.

141 Turkey s EU Politics 135 way, was a symbol of all the difficulties the coalition partners had when trying to agree on sensitive issues. Many of the requested and listed reforms were watered down versions of what was truly needed. Despite the commitment made in the national program, progress was inconsistent, particularly in some of the substantial areas. Most of the delay in the NPAA was caused around discussions of the national interest. Once more, although nationalist tendencies existed in all three coalition parties, these tendencies tended to be more pronounced in the MHP. As a consequence, the MHP acquired a critical role in the coalition when it came to EU reforms. Its refusal to go along with certain reforms set the agenda of discussion. Parties either responded to the MHP s objections or compromised along their protest. Frequently, MHP s attitude led to deadlocks within the frail coalition. This situation may have been predictable given the MHP s ideological standing but it was delayed due to the streamlining effect of being in government but became more evident over time. 8 The MHP s attitude constrained the parameters of the EU discussions for the other parties on the already sensitive and difficult issues. 9 This becomes more apparent by looking at the MHP s attitude towards the EU and particular EU-related issues such as Cyprus, the abolition of the death penalty, allowing teaching, free broadcasting or publication in the Kurdish language and Turkey s role in the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The discussions on early elections overlapped with discussions on a final attempt to pass necessary EU reforms. As parliament finally approved elections to be held on 3 November 2002, it also approved at the same time, on 3 August, a package of human-rights' reforms it hoped would clear the way for Ankara to join the Union. The package was adopted after an overnight marathon session. It included the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime, to be replaced with life imprisonment with no possibility of parole. It also legalized broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish, notably Kurdish. Furthermore, the package did away with penalties for criticizing state institutions, including the military; eased restrictions on demonstrations and 8 For a discussion of the MHP s nationalism, see Çınar and Arıkan In Mesut Yılmaz s words, the MHP had some concerns pertaining to the preparation and implementation of the National Program. They have stated those views. We made changes on many issues by taking their views into consideration. We had the same difficulties when time came for the final arrangements. Anadolu Agency, 21 March 2002.

142 136 Gamze Avci associations; and allowed non-muslim religious foundations to buy and sell real estate. The package was presented by Yılmaz s ANAP and was passed despite the opposition of the MHP (on all reform items in the package), with votes of the DSP, ANAP and opposition parties. The MHP voted no en bloc. The other parties despite their various talks before- supported the package. There have been defections from all of the other parties (government and opposition) but no consistent resistance to the package as a party line. In remarks made on 4 August, Bahçeli said that the MHP would appeal to the Constitutional Court in a bid to force parliament to reverse its decision regarding the death penalty and minority rights. This petition was eventually rejected by the Constitutional court rejected this petition in December The 2002 elections exhibited a massive reaction of the voter to the established parties inability to master the economic crisis or deliver on promises. This combined with a mounting dislike with mainstream, secularist establishment parties never-ending bickering led to an entirely new party political picture. ANAP, MHP and DSP were all wiped out. In conjunction with the economy and the constant quarrelling, the coalition government (in this case ANAP and DSP) s inability to use EU integration as a winning topic, rendered them eventually all obsolete. On 3 November 2002 the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has pro-islamic roots and was formed 18 months before elections, won a landslide election victory. The AKP was built by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the former Mayor of Istanbul, who campaigned on the grounds of liberal Islam and split with the more conventionally Islamist leftovers of the old Welfare and Virtue Parties. AKP captured 362 out of 550 parliamentary seats, only a few seats short of the two-thirds absolute majority that would allow it to amend the constitution without a referendum. Another 177 seats went to the Republican People's Party (CHP), the Republic s oldest political formation, and closely associated with Turkey s secular establishment. Another eight seats went to independent candidates. Elections were declared void in three districts of the eastern Anatolian Siirt Province. The victory made AKP the first party in recent years to be able to govern without coalition partners. Though, of course it should be mentioned that the AKP won only 34.2% of the vote, even if it ended up with 80.4% of the seats in Parliament. That was a peculiarity of the 10% electoral threshold rule, which in effect rendered 46% of the votes cast by voters irrelevant.

143 Turkey s EU Politics 137 The victory arrived 38 days before the crucial Copenhagen summit at which the EU leaders where to decide on a potential negotiation date for Turkey. Hence the AKP s leader Erdogan, moved quickly to assure the West that he does not have an Islamic agenda and is committed to the secular principles that govern Muslim Turkey. Erdogan also promised support for Turkey's bid to join the European Union right after the first unofficial results were in. Once the government was sworn into office in late November, Erdogan embarked upon a series of trips to visit European Union leaders. He outlined an ambitious program of EU-oriented reforms and lobbied leaders to support Turkey's bid for membership. The AKP s roots are pro-islamist, but unlike the Welfare Party under Erbakan, it is publicly committed to pushing for membership in the European Union. The Welfare party, an openly Islamist movement, was eased out of power in 1997 by the army with what has been described as a post-modern or soft coup. The AKP has repeatedly stated that even regardless of the EU, it is committed to fully secure freedom of expression and thought, transparent government, and the strengthening of local government. The AKP has presented itself consistently and credibly as a new type of a pro-islamic party. The profile of AKP members are mixed, some hanker after radical Islamism but others are merely Islamic conservatives who would like to see their religion given some public recognition. The party itself insists that it is committed to the secularism of the Turkish state, merely opposed to the exclusion of religious symbolism from public life, such as the ban on women wearing headscarves in public facilities (which includes universities). It insists that it is Islamic in the same sense that Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe are Christian. Reforms passed: A massive acceleration The reform process that has accompanied the candidacy is an important measuring stick in Turkish-EU relations. Overall, the EU accession process has been an important catalyst in Turkey's human rights progress, especially in Achievements included the abolition of the death penalty, easing of restrictions on broadcasting and education in minority languages, shortened 10 Human Rights Watch: Curbing Torture Top EU-Turkey Priority at

144 138 Gamze Avci police detention periods, and lifting of the state of emergency in the formerly troubled Southeast. The Ecevit government passed in total three harmonization packages. Since its election in November 2002, the AKP has accelerated the flow of reform. The AKP s opposition has been confined to the CHP. The centre-left Republican People's Party (CHP) was the only other party to win seats besides the AKP in the November 2002 elections. The CHP is considered to be the party most committed to secularism. Yet, despite their differing philosophies on the issue of religion in politics, CHP s leader Deniz Baykal agreed to act in unison when it comes to the EU. Thus usually reform packages under the AKP have been passed with the implicit support of the CHP. The parliament passed the so-called fourth harmonization package on 4 December 2002 (effective 11 December). The package includes 32 articles and envisages amendments to 16 different laws. 11 The legislation abolishes a law that says police superiors must authorize the prosecution of officials at lower levels accused of torture. Prisoners have immediate access to lawyers and courts are barred from suspending sentences of convicted torturers. The reforms also seek to strengthen civil and political liberties, including a lifting of restrictions on freedom of association. Journalists are no longer required to disclose their sources to authorities. According to the package, non-muslim religious foundations will be allowed to obtain properties. Associations will be able to stage international activities to reach their targets explained in their regulations. They will be able to open offices abroad, and become members of international associations or organizations. 12 The fifth reform package, the second under the AKP, became effective on 23 January This one paves the way for a retrial of imprisoned Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) deputies. According to the law, former DEP deputies who were granted a retrial by the European Court will have the right to apply to Turkish courts for a retrial within a year. The imprisoned leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Worker s Party (PKK) Abdullah Öcalan is excluded from this right. Meanwhile, the Commission removed an article Anadolu Agency-AP news -NTVMSNBC-Turkiye/

145 Turkey s EU Politics 139 from the reform package, which would pardon university students suspended for disciplinary infractions, including the female students that insisted on wearing headscarves at universities. 13 The latter was seen as related to addressing the AKP s core voter but was removed upon public criticism and pressures. The AKP fought off criticism by stating that they would work to lift a ban on women wearing headscarves in universities and state offices, but that it was not a top priority for the new administration. The sixth package, passed in July 2003 harmonizes Turkish laws and regulations with those of the EU. The package includes major reforms, such as abolishing Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law and extending freedom of broadcasting in Kurdish. The package also revoked the authority of the Secretary General of the National Security Council (NSC) to appoint one member to the supervision board for cinema and music works. The sixth package also amends the related provision of broadcasting law (RTUK) to guarantee the right to broadcast in languages other than Turkish. Despite the fact that the reform package of August 2002 had recognized that right, no significant action had been undertaken until then. Moreover, the package provides guarantees in naming children. In several reported incidences, some civil servants had denied registering the traditional Kurdish names although the Turkish Supreme Court had recognized this right. In the realm of religious freedoms, the new clauses in the package ease the rules and procedures with regard to places of worship for other faiths than Islam. These changes also facilitate the registration of the real estates of foundations of various religious communities by extending the application period. Although the August 2002 reforms had abolished the ban for these foundations to register new real estate, these foundations still faced difficulties in registering their properties prior to the defined deadlines. The seventh package of August 2003 eliminates the structural means with which the Turkish military has influenced the political system in the past and introduces larger scrutiny of military expenditures. The package was important in terms of changing the structure of the National Security Council (NSC). Underlining the advisory status of the military-dominated NSC, new measures limited the number of times the NSC meets, enabled appointment 13 Turkish Daily News, 23 January 2003.

146 140 Gamze Avci of a civilian head to the NSC's secretariat and allowed greater parliamentary scrutiny over military expenses. According to the amendments, a deputy premier can be appointed to oversee the execution of some of the NSC's recommendations, a duty previously carried out by its secretary-general. Furthermore, the Parliament approved a bill in December 2003, attempting to remove policies of secrecy governing the NSC s staff, by-laws and regulations, allowing decisions on these matters to be published in the government s Official Gazette. The eighth package includes abolition of State Security Courts used to try political and security-related crimes and the removal of military representatives from boards overseeing higher education, radio and television. It also enshrines the legal equality of men and women for the first time, gives Parliament full control over the military budget and removes all residual references to the death penalty, scrapped by Turkey in an earlier reform package. The ninth package passed on the 14 July Although the death sentence was totally removed from the Constitution, there are references to the death sentence in many laws, especially in the Penal Code. These were eliminated. The bill also ended the practice of having members of the military sitting on the Council of Higher Education (YOK), Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK), Communication High Council and the Council of Protecting Minors from Harmful Publications. Despite these nine substantial reform packages there have also been setbacks. When the Constitutional Court on Thursday banned pro-kurdish People's Democracy Party (HADEP) on charges of aiding the terrorist organization Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), and carrying out activities challenging the state, the EU called this a troubling departure from the country's political and democratic reform efforts in recent years. A recent decision to uphold the Court s verdict has infuriated the Commission and the European Parliament. The biggest criticism, however, has been that these reforms have not fully taken root yet. Finally, a discussion on Turkey s reform process without including the unofficial condition of Cyprus would be incomplete. The impending

147 Turkey s EU Politics 141 accession of Cyprus, with or without resolution of the island s split identity, has posed a major headache for Turkey. Erdogan, by taking it to the public sphere, and trying to create a national debate on the Cyprus issue has pledged to revise Turkey's traditional policy toward the Cyprus issue which is generally considered as a national cause. 14 Erdogan stated that he is not in favour of the continuation of the policy that has been maintained in Cyprus over the past years, 15 He said the AKP was neither supporting a view in line with the hardliners who have been defending a no settlement is a settlement policy, nor pursuing a defeatist sellout policy. Our policy is a 'Solve it and let it live' policy, he said, stressing that a Cyprus settlement must be built on compromises from both sides and must be found acceptable by the both peoples of the island. He said he still believed that a settlement of Cyprus was possible and reiterated the strong will of his party to bring about an end to the almost four-decade-old problem on the island. The change of heart in the Turkish government was not well received by the Turkish Cypriot side and among various groups within the Turkish establishment such as the military. Nonetheless, Erdogan s success in persuading the Turkish public and the Turkish Cypriots in supporting the Annan Plan shows how the EU process has been able to shift parameters. What logic of action? When evaluating the picture of the last four years, it is apparent that there has been a political avalanche of democratisation in Turkey. Turkey may not fulfil all Copenhagen criteria (which are rather defined vaguely) but the changes are unprecedented in contemporary Turkish politics. There have been substantial changes in particular in Turkey s human rights legislation and democracy. This has been possible with the EU-related reform process. The reform process has changed political bargaining positions, redefined real interests and has made difficult political choices possible. Turkish public opinion has provided a firm base for the reform process, 16 which is largely and consistently supportive of Turkey s EU accession. The EU has provided a platform of socialization and learning. Turkish political parties have acted like rational 14 Turkish Daily News, 28 January BBC News, 2 January 2003, Turkey pushes for Cyprus Deal. 16 See for ex, Carkoglu 2003 Perceptions in Figures and Numbers presented at the conference Turkey and the EU: from Association to Accession?, 6-7 November 2003, Amsterdam.

148 142 Gamze Avci actors and have responded to this. Those who did not support the process or were disruptive were marginalized such as the nationalist Euro-sceptic MHP. Turkish political elites have accelerated EU reform policy. They have taken action on the basis that this is the right thing to do rather than who we are or what we get. Action, in this sense, is no longer taken on the basis of a logic of appropriateness associated with rules, routines, rights, obligations, standard operating procedures and practices (March and Olsen 1989). The behaviour change is rooted in the different interpretation of the situation. The ultimate purpose of reform has been redefined. This is related to a process of learning where behaviour changes as actors question original implicit theories underlying programs and examine their value (Haas 1990: 3). Political islamists have rethought and redefined the west and westernization. Being in power alone has aided them. The AKP has agreed to decisions, which may go against its own interests. It has broadened the appeal of legislation to a number of different groups. The justification has been done to adjust to international and EU norms. Change has been gradual though. The time period between has been defined by reactions to nationalist rhetoric, yet the period after the elections in 2001 exhibits a whole new picture. The government and opposition emerging after 2001, moved to new and in this case more powerful justifications. They acknowledged the Turkish public s inherent belief that EU reforms are a good thing for the country and also became aware of the shortcomings of a national interest approach. AKP and CHP declared that they are both in favor of admission to the EU and have repeatedly stated that they will work towards that end. AKP in their election manifesto states that even asides EU membership; the Copenhagen criteria need to be inevitably fulfilled. 17 Prime Minister Erdogan reconfirmed this more recently stating Turkey will adopt the Copenhagen political criteria and consider[s] them as the Ankara political criteria. He underlined that they continue progressing on our own path even if the EU 17 AKP election manifesto, accessed 3 September 2004.

149 Turkey s EU Politics 143 fails to open accession talks with Turkey. 18 The reasoning is presented as that Turkey needs to be aware of and be part and parcel of contemporary times. Only then can Turkey convey its messages and only then can Turkey -by using the means of the modern age- continue its existence in the international arena. In the same document, AKP distances itself from nationalist argumentation. It states that the circles that are against our integration with Europe delay the accomplishment of the Copenhagen criteria with their ideological approaches in the realm of national sovereignty, national security, national interest, national and local culture. 19. In its government program, AKP states that it considers Turkey as a part of the political values system of Europe. 20 Clearly one can identify the elements of a rights-based justification. Two immediate questions emerge. First, what and why have things changed? Secondly, what are the consequences? Two levels have been important in this transformation process: The Turkish societal level and the EU s role as an anchor. At the societal level, we can observe Turkey s transformation from a country ultra-sensitive about its national identity to a more serious, self-confident EU candidate. There are major shifts. Kurdish or the use of other languages than Turkish are no longer considered to be a threat. The Sevres syndrome, which stands for the idea that the West is trying to divide up Turkey, has lost its vehemence. Turkey s progress is not only on paper but real and can be verified because it concerns constitutional and legal changes. Mental shifts in the bureaucracy and administrative ranks can be observed as well. Shifts in mentality can be observed in particular on critical issues such as the Cyprus issue and religious minorities. At the EU-level, what has been crucial is the ongoing intertwining process of Commission policies (geared towards aligning Turkey with the Copenhagen criteria). Regardless of official positions or delays, the snowball effect of EU bureaucratic procedures has led to discussions and socialization at various levels. The role of the EU has become important in that it has presented new opportunities and reshaped preferences in Turkey. Yet, change is not easy. Path-dependent behaviour is much easier to justify and accomplish. 18 Turkish Press, 21 July 2004, accessed 3 September AKP election manifesto, accessed 3 September AKP government program, accessed 3 September 2004.

150 144 Gamze Avci Furthermore, often when change occurs it does not do so simultaneously or in the same quality. We see that in a number of areas in the reform process. Differences among the judiciary or bureaucracy persist and at times bring controversial responses among individuals and collectivities. Conclusion EU enlargement studies increasingly impinge upon how enlargement is justified on the basis of rights and what kind of effect this has on the EU a rights-based entity. It is therefore worth opening the black box in candidate countries and to look at their respective EU policy justification in order to understand how politics comes about in the specific environment of European enlargement. This paper has argued that we need to broaden our analysis to include the domestic political dimension within Turkey when discussing European enlargement. There the role of interest groups, political parties, governments and institutional frameworks becomes crucial. A discussion of the reform process shows that the EU issue in Turkey is increasingly discussed as a rights-based process. In a way, Turkish governmental elites have used constructivist rhetoric for rational objectives (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2002). In other words, in the Turkish case, at least during this first phase of substantial reform, norms have been used for rational purposes. The strong resolve to do so among party political elites in Turkey has been particularly pronounced under the political islamists. Whether the Union will change its views on Turkey based on this reform process remains to be seen. As argued by Moravcsik, underlying ideas and discourses change only at rare critical junctures, which arise in response to political crises. In addition to that, European state executives themselves are already constrained by domestic political processes. This includes the pressure of domestic groups, public opinion, the desire to be re-elected and political ideologies. At the same time it is important to remember that the EU requires applicant states live up to certain economic and regulatory requirements; it also sets particular standards for fundamental rights protection, and expects applicants to have a democratic system of government. (Eriksen, Fossum and Sjursen 2002: 3) If Turkey has moved to narrow the gap between itself and the

151 Turkey s EU Politics 145 Union, the pressure on the Union will increase to be consistent with what it expects from candidate states. The EU will be compelled to justify its decisions. The trickiness in this situation is that double standards and cognitive dissonance will be problematic (Eriksen, Fossum and Sjursen 2002: 4) if not impossible. The Copenhagen criteria are based on the logic of rights. Hence Turkish reform has focused increasingly on an understanding that the EU would prioritise enlargement to those states that respect the universal principles of human rights and democracy (Sjursen 2001). Kinship and economic gain - also the more difficult approaches in the Turkish case- have not been emphasized. Yet the notion of rights is more difficult to use as a mobilising argument for enlargement within the EU (Sjursen 2001). Furthermore, the rights-based argument may be weak if not used in combination with valuebased done. The Turkish case will be the acid test for this. Bibliography Aleskerov, F.; Avci, G; Iakouba, V and Türem, Z.U. (2002): European Union Enlargement: Power Distribution Implications of the New Institutional Arrangements, European Journal of Political Research, 41(3) pp Avci, G. (2002a): Turkey s Slow EU Candidacy: Insurmountable Hurdles or Simple Euro-scepticism, Turkish Studies, 4, pp Avci, G. (2002b): Putting the Turkish EU Candidacy into Context, European Foreign Affairs Review 7, pp Brewin, Ch. (2002): Turkey and Europe after the Nice Summit, Istanbul: TESEV. Buzan, B. and Diez, T. (1999): The European Union and Turkey, Survival 41, pp Çarkoglu, A. and Rubia, B (eds.) (2003): Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics, London/Portland: Frank Cass.

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