Turbulent Times in Unstable Surroundings Policy letter on international security. 1. Introduction

Transcription

1 Turbulent Times in Unstable Surroundings Policy letter on international security 1. Introduction In its International Security Strategy A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World, the government concluded that peace and security cannot be taken for granted. In the year and a half since the strategy was published on 21 June 2013, the international security environment has changed. The trend towards destabilisation on Europe s southern flanks has continued, and there have been far-reaching developments on the eastern borders of the European Union and the NATO alliance. Russia s disruptive intervention in neighbouring Ukraine has widened the arc of instability around Europe, while the situation within the arc has been further destabilised by increasing conflict and unrest in the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Sub-Saharan and West Africa. The situation has rapidly deteriorated in Syria, Iraq and Libya in particular. These developments are impacting on our own security and prosperity and call for an updated analysis of the international security environment to supplement the government s International Security Strategy. Russia s annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine were an abrupt reminder to Europe and NATO that even after almost 40 years since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty in Europe cannot be taken for granted. The Netherlands itself was drawn into this crisis by the crash of flight MH17, which resulted in the deaths of 298 innocent victims, including 196 Dutch nationals. What had seemed to be a far-off foreign conflict suddenly struck at the very heart of our country. 1

2 The rapid advance of ISIS in Iraq and Syria not only has far-reaching consequences for the region itself already severely disrupted by years of repression by the Assad regime and the long-drawn-out civil war in Syria and violent conflict in Iraq but is also having a direct impact on our society and national security. Internal and external security are now more closely interconnected than ever. Terrorist networks pose a threat not only in conflict areas but also closer to home. Young men and women are leaving the Netherlands to take part in violent jihad, pro- and anti-isis demonstrations have been held in The Hague, and there is a substantial threat of terrorist attacks within our borders. The conflicts closer to Europe have deeper, more complex causes that call for international cooperation and for an integrated 3D approach by the government, comprising a properly coordinated mix of diplomacy, development and defence as well as instruments in the police, justice and trade sectors. In addition, it is necessary to strike a good balance between addressing acute symptoms and tackling the underlying causes of instability within a multiannual, structural approach that can generate sustainable solutions. This policy letter examines the most relevant developments in our international security environment and how they affect our foreign policy and our national and international security policies. The general trends and developments described in the International Security Strategy are as relevant as ever, but we are also faced with new security threats that demand new answers. As announced in the letter from the Minister of Defence to the House of Representatives of 7 November 2014, this policy letter also outlines the foreign policy aspects of the government s response to the motion by MP Kees van der Staaij (Parliamentary Papers ). The motion requested the government to indicate the required ambition level of the Netherlands armed forces in the years ahead and what kind of International Security Strategy is required to achieve it. The government s response to the motion will also take account of the advisory report that the Scientific Council for 2

3 Government Policy (WRR) intends to publish in the spring of 2015 on the Netherlands security and defence policy. This letter also responds to the requests from the Permanent Parliamentary Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence, of 5 June and 3 July respectively, for a response to the reports published by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael and The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) in the context of the Strategic Monitor. Both reports were used in preparing the contextual analysis for this policy letter. As internal and external security are so closely interconnected, good coordination is required between the various government bodies concerned with national and international security. Such cooperation is growing closer and closer, both on a systematic basis and in the face of acute crises, and it takes place both at policy and increasingly at operational level. This letter ties in with the national security strategy, the national counterterrorism strategy and the national cyber security strategy. 2. Turbulent times in unstable surroundings This section looks first at the instability on Europe s eastern flanks, which manifests itself most visibly through the crisis in Ukraine, and the consequences of Russia s increased assertiveness. That is followed by closer examination of the unrest and crises on Europe s southern flanks, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. Lastly a number of broader trends are described that may have an impact on foreign and security policy. Ukraine crisis: power politics and spheres of influence For some time, Russia has been becoming increasingly assertive, primarily towards its neighbours, but also in its relations with the West. This is not simply a matter of rhetoric, but is also increasingly expressed by Russia s actions. Rising defence spending and military activity are a source of growing concern. More and more, Russia is pushing the bounds of what is permissible and sometimes even overstepping them. This is increasing Since the defence policy review A New Foundation for the Netherlands Armed Forces was published in 2010, Clingendael and HCSS have conducted an annual survey of the changing world order and the Netherlands position within it, from a security perspective. The survey contributes to policy development at both ministries. 3

4 tensions between it and the US, NATO and the EU. The Ukraine crisis has clearly shown that, in Russian eyes, the West s essential security interests are incompatible with its own. Russia s intervention in Ukraine must be seen in this light. Russia s increasing assertiveness was expressed earlier during the Georgia crisis in 2008 and in the form of destabilising activities elsewhere in the region. The annexation of Crimea is a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and of the principle of non-intervention. What is more, it contravenes the assurances that various powers, including Russia itself, gave to Ukraine in the context of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, on the basis of which Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arms. The fact that in 2014 a country in Europe should violate the most fundamental principles of international law by unilaterally annexing the territory of another state is alarming enough in itself, but equally disturbing is the way in which it happened: through hybrid warfare, using unannounced large-scale military exercises and rapid troop movements, secret support for separatist groups, economic pressure (on Ukraine and other states in the region) and propaganda. The developments that followed in eastern Ukraine exacerbated international concerns. By providing separatist groups with military as well as political support, Russia became more and more directly involved in the fighting as the armed conflict evolved. Its actions led to a political and humanitarian crisis and an unprecedented degree of destabilisation in eastern Ukraine. The MH17 disaster on 17 July 2014 took place against this background. The disaster and its aftermath show how the consequences of destabilisation in Ukraine have repercussions beyond the immediate region. The far-reaching interdependence of security and the economy referred to in the International Security Strategy is explicitly reflected in the Ukraine crisis. One of the triggers for Russian intervention in Ukraine was the latter s efforts to seek closer economic ties with the European Union, including the proposed signing of an association agreement. Russia s actions can also be seen as a response to what it perceived as a threat to its ambitions for a 4

5 Eurasian Union, the success of which it sees as depending on Ukrainian participation. In addition energy politics play a significant role in the Ukrainian question and the crisis has further clarified the need for the EU to diversify its external energy policy and reduce its dependence on Russia. There is no reason for alarmism, but we should be realistic. Russia s annexation of Crimea and subsequent intervention in eastern Ukraine have brought about a fundamental change in its relations with the EU and NATO. This does not mean a return to the Cold War. However, the revival of power politics in Russia typified by thinking in terms of spheres of influence within which it is not prepared to respect the sovereignty of neighbouring states will clearly affect our security analyses and the policies based on them. The West faces the challenge of mounting a unified response to Russia that does not lead to potentially dangerous escalation. That calls for the right balance between a resolute and clear response to Russia s actions, like that now being pursued through NATO and elsewhere, and the need to keep looking for dialogue and confidence-building measures that serve to de-escalate the situation. Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan and West Africa: destabilisation and conflict As noted in the International Security Strategy, the number of interstate and intrastate conflicts has fallen sharply in recent decades, but in the Middle East and North Africa, and parts of Sub-Saharan and West Africa, destabilisation has actually increased. Since the strategy was published, this trend has accelerated. Clingendael has concluded that the dynamics of conflict in this region have changed, with more and more parties involved (sometimes working together, sometimes fighting each other), making it more difficult for the international community to respond. In addition, conflicts are becoming increasingly international in nature, and involve more and more external parties. The warring parties are violating international humanitarian law and showing less and less respect for national borders. In the background, geopolitical and regional rivalries often play an important role too, with third parties waging war by proxy, pursuing their conflicting political 5

6 interests by providing different groups with financial and other forms of support. The underlying cause of destabilisation in this region is complex: it is often a matter of local tensions or dissatisfaction among certain groups with the status quo, fuelled further by uncertainties and changes brought about by the process of transformation in the region. Sometimes there are links with transnational organised crime. Another factor is that many countries are experiencing fragmentation and polarisation. They are embroiled in a struggle for identity and the direction they and the region as a whole wish to take. HCSS specifies four paths to conflict : 1) political turmoil (as a consequence of a radically altered political landscape and/or regimes that feel their survival is under threat); 2) social and economic issues (caused for example by food and water insecurity and large groups of young people without jobs or prospects); 3) vulnerability as a result of excessive, one-sided fuel export dependence, and 4) religious and ethnic tensions. The countries of the Middle East and North Africa region are very vulnerable in all four of these areas. There have also been albeit limited hopeful developments since the Arab Spring, including the emergence of freer and more democratic societies. Democratisation is also progressing elsewhere, with elections, the formation of governments and national dialogue on the agenda of all continents. In Africa alone, national elections will be held in around 20 countries in That is of course a positive development, but experience shows that processes of transformation and democratisation often go hand in hand with conflict and unrest. Two significant trends can be observed in Syria and Iraq: sectarian polarisation and the spread of Salafist jihadism. This has led in recent years to the rapid rise of the group that initially called itself ISIS/ISIL, a name it has since changed to simply Islamic State (IS). ISIS, which emerged from a variety of previous groupings, some related to al Qa ida, is building on experience gained fighting US troops after the military intervention in Iraq in 2003 and during the subsequent sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shiite militias. The group has been fuelled largely by reactions to the marginalisation of Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria, but it has also benefited 6

7 from the years of repression by the Assad regime in Syria. ISIS rapidly gained considerable influence in Syria in 2013, taking advantage of the power vacuum in a country torn apart by civil war, the porous border between Syria and Iraq, the proliferation of arms in the region and available funding flows. Other terrorist groups, such as Jabhat-al-Nusra (JaN), which is allied with al Qa ida, have also made good use of the destabilisation of Syria to strengthen their own position. What makes ISIS unique is the combination of its terrorist nature and its pretensions and ambitions in terms of state-building. In June 2014, it declared the establishment of a caliphate on Syrian and Iraqi territory. This Islamic State could have a considerable impact on power relations in the region and on national borders in the Mashreq. Moreover, it is attracting jihadists from around the world, including the Netherlands. The ultimate aim of ISIS is to establish a caliphate in all the areas of the world inhabited by Muslims, starting in the Mashreq. The group considers all means justified in achieving that end. In recent months the world has been confronted with images of people being stoned to death and beheaded, including Western journalists and aid workers. The movement is actively encouraging its supporters elsewhere in the world to carry out attacks. The civil war in Syria has already cost the lives of more than 200,000 civilians, largely victims of the Assad regime. One in three Syrians have fled their homes, more than six million within the country itself and over three million to other countries, including Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. The number of refugees seeking safety is imposing a heavy burden on Syria s neighbours. The conflict in Syria and the massive influx of refugees is increasing tensions in Lebanon and fostering divisions between religious groups. The number of Syrian refugees to the EU has also risen sharply. In Iraq, the crisis has made more than five million people dependent on aid. Not only in Syria and Iraq, but also elsewhere in the arc of instability around Europe and the broader circle of surrounding countries, jihadist organisations and individuals are uniting behind the ISIS flag or are being inspired by similar ideologies. On several occasions in the past two months, the 7

8 Lebanese army has fought ISIS and JaN units trying to enter the country. In Yemen, Al Qa ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is fanning sectarian tensions and has its sights set on regional domination. In Nigeria, Boko Haram has displayed its territorial aspirations by announcing the establishment of an Islamic state. A possible spillover of instability and violence from Nigeria to the surrounding region could have far-reaching consequences. Al Shabaab, a group responsible for various attacks in Somalia and Kenya, has also called for international jihad. Libya is caught in a downward spiral. The country is threatening to become a safe haven for jihadist groups and a key hub in the international network of trafficking in arms, drugs and persons. The security situation has severely deteriorated since the summer of There is no effective state authority; there are currently two governments and two parliaments. The violence between armed militias in Libya is threatening the security and stability of other countries in the region, from already-fragile Mali to Egypt. In Mali itself, the security situation in parts of the north has worsened in recent months. Armed groups have strengthened their grip on the area and there are regular attacks causing casualties among civilians and UN military personnel. The situation is complex. The confrontations between different armed groups in northern Mali often have their roots in long-standing local conflicts. One hopeful development is that, in both Libya and Mali, peace talks have started under the leadership of the UN. The lack of progress in the Middle East peace process remains a source of tension in the region. After the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, led by US Secretary of State John Kerry, ground to a halt, the situation involving Gaza escalated over the summer. The agreement of a ceasefire put a stop to the rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza and Israel s Operation Protective Edge. It is crucial to find a lasting solution to the Gaza issue to ensure that this cycle of violence does not keep repeating itself every few years. At the same time, there is little genuine prospect of a resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians. That has led to the current stalemate and the associated risks of escalation and counterproductive action by one or both parties. 8

9 Of a completely different order, but also extremely serious, is the Ebola epidemic that has held West Africa in its grip since March The impact of the epidemic, which has already claimed around 5,000 lives, has been disastrous. Besides the human tragedy, it is having far-reaching economic, political and social consequences in the affected area itself and far beyond. The UN Security Council has declared the outbreak a threat to international peace and security and the World Bank estimates that the economic damage could rise to 25 billion. The longer the crisis goes on, the greater its consequences for regional stability: the slow process of reconciliation in Sierra Leone and Liberia is coming under pressure as political and social turmoil spreads. Even after the epidemic has been brought under control, the region will need long-term support to prevent destabilisation and renewed conflict. General trends and developments A number of alarming trends can be identified in the regional developments outlined above. Power politics and thinking in terms of spheres of influence have made a resurgence on the European continent. Our beliefs about the rights of women, minorities and LGBTs (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people), and our views on the freedom of religion and expression, democracy and the legal order are being questioned more and more openly. Instability has increased around Europe s flanks. On both our eastern and southern borders we are faced with hybrid warfare, combining conventional, irregular and cyber tactics. There are not always clear battlefields, and non-regular troops are at the forefront of the fighting, which often takes place in civilian-populated areas, sometimes with the covert support of other states, though this is often difficult to prove. We are facing armed conflicts that increasingly also take place in the virtual domain, where propaganda and misinformation can be effectively deployed through new media. Underlying all this are a number of general trends that were identified in the International Security Strategy: the interconnected nature of internal and external security, changing global power relations, the blurring of divisions between state and non-state actors and between war and peace, the 9

10 changing nature of conflicts resulting from the expanding arsenal of instruments available to the belligerents, partly due to rapid technological advances for example, in the cyber domain and the increasingly heavy pressure being exerted on natural resources by rapid population growth and climate change. The International Security Strategy already considered at length on the increasing interconnectedness of internal and external security. Instability around the world is affecting us ever more directly and ever more visibly. This impact can be seen very clearly in the crises in Syria and Iraq and the terrorist threat they pose, not only in the surrounding region but also in Western countries. The ongoing shift in global economic and political power relations will also affect our security and interests in the longer term. Russia s increasing assertiveness including in military terms has already been mentioned. China is also making its presence felt more directly on the world stage. China s central concern is the integrity of its territory and territorial waters, and its growing need for natural resources and safe transport routes as a result of the structural growth of its economy. Although the Chinese government stresses that it wishes only to secure the country s future and is in favour of a multipolar world, its rising defence expenditure, rapidly growing cyber capabilities and increasing assertiveness in the East and South China Seas are an increasing cause of concern for other countries in the region. China is following America s re-orientation towards (East) Asia with growing suspicion. As a result of these developments, the precarious security balance of recent decades within Asia and between China and the US is coming under increasing pressure. In the meantime, China continues to insist to the outside world that it has no ambitions to become a global power. The growing tensions and divisions between the major international players hamper cooperation in international fora at a time when resolute multilateral institutions are sorely needed. The risk of open confrontation is increasing. The international arena has also become more complex as the dividing lines between state and non-state actors, such as NGOs and businesses, become 10

11 less clear. Non-state actors are also increasingly active in conflict areas. Both Clingendael and HCSS refer to the still-expanding role of non-state actors, but conclude that states remain relevant in the world order. The resulting hybrid international environment, with a growing number of actors, is posing new challenges for diplomacy and the security sector. In today s network society, diplomats must be able to wear many different hats. They still have to maintain traditional interstate relations, but must also play a unifying role in a network made up of civil society organisations, businesses and other non-state actors. Steps have already been taken to modernise the Dutch diplomatic service to enable it to embrace these new tasks. Militarily, this hybrid environment presents a wide range of challenges, and our flexibility and technological advances will have to keep pace with the changing context. The armed forces have to be able to respond quickly, conduct a range of simultaneous missions in various areas of deployment with sufficient capacity, and continue to do so as long as is necessary. 3. How this policy letter relates to the International Security Strategy As mentioned above, the general analysis and policy choices made by the government in its International Security Strategy remain as relevant as ever. However, the international security environment has changed substantially since the strategy was drawn up, in that the developments it describes are now manifesting themselves more explicitly. Potential threats have become real threats. In addition, with Russia s intervention in Ukraine and the rapid advance of ISIS, new threats have emerged that were not foreseen in the strategy. Strategic interests In the International Security Strategy, the government identified three strategic interests: defence of our own and our allies territory, an effective international legal order and economic security. All three are affected by the developments referred to above. The importance of defending our own and our allies territory has returned with a vengeance. Strategic relations in the Black Sea region have 11

12 changed radically. The Ukraine crisis has given transatlantic cooperation, one of the policy constants in the International Security Strategy, a new dimension. NATO solidarity has become even more crucial: our allies must be able to count on us, and vice versa. Within NATO, the Ukraine crisis has led to a reaffirmation of the importance of collective defence. In response, measures have been taken for both the short and the long term, designed to safeguard solidarity and enable NATO to respond more rapidly to potential threats to its territory. The alliance has raised the requirements for the readiness, rapid deployability and availability of its military capabilities. In the spirit of solidarity, all 28 allies are contributing to these measures, which can be stepped up as the situation demands. Of NATO s three core tasks collective defence, crisis control and security cooperation the first has gained in importance. In the years ahead, the Netherlands armed forces will be required to play a structural role in the alliance s collective defence task. We are also facing new challenges where the international legal order is concerned: how should we, for example, respond to Russia s annexation of Crimea and its broader and persistent undermining of Ukrainian stability and sovereignty? With its actions, Russia is harming the trust required to achieve international agreements and cooperation. This kind of behaviour from a permanent member of the UN Security Council transcends regional interests and sends a very negative signal to the rest of the world. A related question is how to respond to the phenomenon of hybrid warfare, as we now see being applied in eastern Ukraine. And how to deal with a non-state actor like ISIS which has no respect for national borders and operates in the territories of several states? How do we deal with a Security Council which, due to conflicts of interest and fundamental differences of perspective between the major powers, is not able to respond adequately, for example, to the crisis in Syria? How can we prevent serious violations of human rights in, say, the Central African Republic, and if we fail to prevent atrocities, how can we combat the impunity of the perpetrators? Another source of concern is the fact that increasing instability and erosion of the legal order are often accompanied by a rise in organised crime that quickly becomes transnational in nature. This, too, is a threat to Europe. How should we respond to it, or even better, anticipate it? These are questions to which there are no 12

13 conclusive answers at hand, but which will have to be discussed in the international arena in the coming period. As the government stressed in the International Security Strategy, the Netherlands efforts to promote a strong international legal order are directly related to our position as a relatively small, open and therefore vulnerable country. In the current international context, multilateral cooperation and strengthening the complex international legal order are more crucial than ever. Promoting the international legal order is also one of the main principles underlying the deployment of the Dutch armed forces. The Netherlands aim is to ensure that countries around the world understand that they have a joint responsibility to safeguard the international legal order. The Netherlands ambition to obtain a seat on the UN Security Council for the term is part of this effort. Security of Europe s energy supply for has become an acute issue in the context of our economic security. The Ukraine conflict requires that we review our energy ties with Russia. We feel the need to diversify our energy sources and suppliers more than ever. As described in the government s response to the AIV s advisory letter The EU's Dependence on Russian Gas, the Netherlands and Europe are working towards diversifying the countries from which gas is, or could be, imported. As a consequence of the shale gas revolution, the US and Canada together are expected to export more gas than Russia within five years. The transport of liquid gas by sea will increase considerably in the next five years, making maritime security and anti-piracy operations a higher priority. The Middle East and North Africa region is another important supplier of energy to Europe. Not only is this region highly unstable politically and economically, but domestic demand for energy is also growing explosively, placing exports from the region under pressure. To promote exports to Europe it is important that these countries reform their energy sectors, improve energy efficiency, phase out energy subsidies and develop renewable energy sources. The Netherlands and the EU can help in these efforts. Such cooperation contributes not only to the region s economic development and stability, but also to Europe s security. 13

14 Free trade routes and a stable world trade system remain essential for our economy and security. Together with piracy, the territorial conflicts in the East and South China Seas remain a potential threat to vital maritime transport routes. Because of the acute crises on Europe s borders, there is a danger that less attention will be devoted to these potential future threats. Trade conflicts, especially those between the major economic and political powers, also affect our security. With insufficient progress being made in WTO talks, the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is crucial. The TTIP can help move the talks forward and lay the basis for new worldwide trade rules and standards. Policy focuses On the basis of the three strategic goals referred to above, the International Security Strategy introduced six policy focuses for the government: 1. More responsibility for Europe; 2. Unstable regions near Europe; 3. Prevention; 4. Disarmament and arms control; 5. Integrated approach; and 6. Cooperation with the private sector. All six of these focuses remain relevant in the changed international security context but, in terms of their application in practice, some aspects need to be adapted to the new situation. The first two focus areas identified in the strategy more responsibility for Europe and a focus on unstable regions near Europe have become more urgent as a consequence of the developments outlined above. One of the main messages of the International Security Strategy was that Europe must take greater responsibility for and invest more in stability in its own neighbourhood. The Ukraine crisis has underlined more than ever the pressing importance of strengthening European security. Europe itself must be able to play a leading role in dealing with crises in neighbouring countries and regions. The capacities and decision-making processes at national and European level for crisis management are, however, not yet sufficiently developed to respond promptly and effectively to serious challenges, especially in regions bordering on the Union. Efforts are needed to address shortcomings in strategic capacity and to improve the planning and control of missions and operations. Another complicating factor is that the interests of 14

15 the member states do not always coincide, especially when it comes to countries on the Union s borders. The Netherlands believes that within the limits of the EU Treaty and the financial frameworks agreed within the Union everything possible must be done to ensure that the EU acts as effectively and efficiently as possible in the areas of security and defence. That means strengthening and deepening the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), greater risk-sharing and burden-sharing by the European countries within NATO, and enhancing cooperation on defence within Europe. These points will be addressed in greater detail below in section 4. The importance of the third policy focus, prevention, is also underlined by current developments. Europe and the international community have, to too great a degree, allowed themselves to be surprised by the current crises. The EU, NATO, the UN and the OSCE are now all working to strengthen their early warning mechanisms. We have to learn to recognise signs that things are threatening to get out of hand and respond to them earlier. The best opportunities and at the same time the least visible successes lie in the pre-conflict phase. It is in this phase that addressing the underlying causes of conflict can make the greatest difference. Through strategic partners like the International Crisis Group, the UN Department for Political Affairs, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Interpeace and the Conflict Research Unit at Clingendael, the Netherlands supports efforts to increase the capacity to recognise conflicts in fragile environments at an early stage and to seek solutions, for example through dialogue. In addition, the Netherlands actively supports organisations like UNDP and the World Bank, which are engaged in conflict-sensitive development work. The OSCE s High Commissioner on National Minorities, based in The Hague, also performs important preventive work with the active support of the Netherlands. As the Ebola crisis has taught us, the international community needs to be more alert to outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases and respond to them more quickly and effectively. This applies equally to outbreaks in regions that are further afield, when our own interests may seem at first not 15

16 to be under threat. Without our being aware of it, such outbreaks can have a deep impact on our own security. If the international community had intervened at an earlier stage on a fraction of the scale that it is doing now, Ebola could have been brought under control much more quickly. We all have to learn lessons from this outbreak, so that we can respond more effectively in the future. In today s international security context, it is essential that we continue pressing to keep disarmament and arms control, the fourth policy focus, on the agenda. The government continues to strive for the reduction and eventual removal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from the whole of Europe, on the basis of negotiations and reciprocity. The ultimate aim is Global Zero, a world without nuclear arms. The scope for significant steps in this direction has not increased in the current international context. Partly as a consequence of the developments that led to the Ukraine crisis, the dialogue between the US and Russia on the further reduction of their nuclear arsenals has practically come to a standstill. Although the US remains ready and willing to enter into a dialogue, Russia does not seem prepared to reciprocate. In addition, as a consequence of its intervention in Ukraine and its extensive military exercises, mistrust of Russia has grown considerably among several of our allies. There are also concerns that Russia may violate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, one of the pillars of the European security architecture. In the current circumstances, therefore, there is little scope within the context of US-Russian relations or within NATO to discuss nuclear disarmament or transparency. Nevertheless, the Netherlands will continue to draw attention within NATO to reducing the role of nuclear arms and will actively work to ensure that nuclear arms and the nuclear deterrent do not once again come to play a greater role. The Netherlands will also continue pressing for a focus on arms control and confidence-building measures. It is especially crucial in times of rising tension that these key issues continue to be discussed; and that, when it comes to conventional arms control, Russia and NATO continue to inform each other of troop movements or exercises so as to avoid misinterpretations. Increasing the predictability of Russia s actions also 16

17 remains important. Nuclear and conventional arms control, transparency and confidence-building measures can all help in this respect. In addition, the Netherlands will play a constructive and proactive role in the run-up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference in the spring of For the Netherlands, the NPT is the cornerstone of the global architecture for disarmament and non-proliferation. During the conference preparations, it emerged that many countries feel frustration and impatience about the slow pace of disarmament. Moreover, the increased focus in recent years on the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapon explosion can partly be explained by dissatisfaction about this lack of progress. There is a widening gap between these expectations and developments in Europe (and their impact on countries opportunities and willingness to disarm). The Netherlands aims to help make the review conference a success by playing the role of bridge-builder, for example through initiatives in the context of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. Lastly, the Netherlands will closely follow and where possible and necessary support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the negotiations between the E3+3 (the UK, France, Germany, the US, Russia and China) and Iran. The transnational threats facing the Netherlands and other countries, whether international terrorism or organised crime, including drug and human trafficking, can be tackled only at international level and call for an integrated approach. That requires a good balance between diplomacy, development cooperation, economic measures (including sanctions) and the deployment of defence, police, judicial and intelligence capacities. The various available instruments must be used as effectively as possible in combination with one another, in cooperation with government bodies in the conflict areas themselves, international partners and organisations, and civil society organisations. The Netherlands actively stresses the importance of the integrated, or comprehensive, approach in the international arena. Fortunately, within the EU and the UN there is increasing recognition of the importance of such an approach. The Netherlands perspective is described in detail in the recently published Guidelines on the Integrated Approach. In addition, cooperation with non-state actors like NGOs and think-tanks has 17

18 been stepped up. The integrated approach is crucial for effective results and is therefore a core thread in all of the policy measures outlined below. The value of Dutch efforts depends heavily on the extent to which the Netherlands is properly informed, in good time, of new developments. This is true of all the policy focuses set out in the International Security Strategy, but particularly those concerning unstable regions, prevention and arms control. The intelligence and security services play a key role in this respect, underlining the importance of their work and how it is aligned with policy. The last policy focus of International Security Strategy is cooperation with the private sector. In the international network society that has now emerged, cooperation with the business community is crucial on many fronts. Whether it is the impact of climate change, developments in the cyber domain, or the security of our energy supplies and transport routes, these are issues that exist to a significant degree in the private domain and call for a public-private approach. 4. Specific consequences for government policy This section describes the government s specific actions in response to current threats on Europe s eastern and southern flanks. First it examines policy aimed at the immediate arc of instability around Europe and several countries and regions in the broader ring around it. It then describes how the government plans, in practical terms, to promote greater European responsibility, a more effective CSDP, greater burden-sharing within NATO, and higher quality UN and EU peace missions and operations. Geographical focus on the arc of instability around Europe Eastern Europe As a result of Russia s annexation of Crimea, destabilising interventions in and around eastern Ukraine and broader external activity generally, Dutch- Russian relations have been fundamentally damaged. Trust has dissipated and will take time to restore. The Netherlands is focusing its efforts on reaching a sustainable solution to the conflict in Ukraine, based on that 18

19 country s stabilisation and the recognition and restoration by Russia of its neighbour s territorial integrity. That is not only crucial for Ukraine s future as a sovereign state, but is also important for other countries in the region, especially those with Russian-speaking minorities, and for European security as a whole. Various routes towards a sustainable solution are being explored, with a focus on dialogue and pressure: the political route (especially through the EU and the OSCE), sanctions (primarily through the EU), and the security route (through the EU, the OSCE (monitoring and border observation) and NATO). The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has an important role to play in the political route. As a regional security organisation, it is well placed thanks to its inclusive model to operate in the Ukraine crisis. It acts as mediator in the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which drew up the Minsk Protocol, and is helping to supervise the Protocol through the Special Monitoring Mission and the Border Observation Mission. The Netherlands is contributing human and financial resources to these missions and supporting the OSCE in its important mediating role. It also envisages the OSCE playing an important role as a platform for intensive dialogue with Russia on the security structure in Europe. The Ukraine crisis raises fundamental questions about the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act (on the eve of the 40th anniversary of its signing) and about how to respond to violations of the basic principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity by a member state. Viewed in this light, pursuing the Helsinki +40 process is especially crucial. The process could play a significant part in addressing the current situation. It is important that we not be swept up in thinking in terms of 19th-century spheres of influence and zero-sum games. The Netherlands will continue to work on the assumption that we have shared interests with Russia and the rest of the world. Furthermore, long-term stability in Europe is only possible if we can find a modus vivendi with Russia. The EU s efforts are therefore focused on keeping the pressure on Russia to genuinely implement the agreements in the Minsk Protocol and on reaching 19

20 a sustainable solution to the conflict. Until this has been achieved, a combination of sanctions and dialogue will remain necessary. NATO has responded to Russia s actions by taking a number of measures to reassure our Eastern European allies, in both the short and the long term. The Readiness Action Plan (RAP) agreed at the recent summit in Wales was a first step towards achieving a higher level of preparedness. The RAP aims to provide a set of measures to allow NATO to respond quickly, flexibly and adequately to the changing security situation on the flanks of the treaty area. The plan does not provide for the permanent stationing of large military units in eastern NATO countries. Instead, training and exercises will be carried out on a rotational basis, and advance command and logistics facilities will be set up. The RAP also entails establishing a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which will allow troops to be deployed in a very short time frame with a view to reassurance and deterrence. A greater NATO presence in the eastern parts of the treaty area and the higher level of readiness will require a more intensive effort from all 28 NATO states, including the Netherlands. In 2014 the Netherlands has contributed to reassurance measures by providing F16s for Baltic Air Policing, minehunters for NATO s permanent fleet and AWACS (airborne warning and control system) tankers. In addition, together with other countries that are making an important contribution in 2015 by supplying rapid deployment units for the NATO Response Force, the Netherlands has offered to develop a programme of exercises for SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) as a testing ground for the interim VJTF. The VJTF concept will be further developed and tested in After giving little cause for concern for the past 25 years, collective defence once more requires our close attention. Lastly, the Netherlands is providing emergency aid to alleviate the most acute humanitarian suffering in eastern Ukraine and will support the reforms and reconstruction required in the country in the coming period, both bilaterally and through the EU. Ukraine s association agreement with the EU is an important instrument in a reform process that will take a long time. In many respects, the Ukrainian state will have to be completely restructured. The reforms may have the backing of the country s political leaders, but at 20

21 lower administrative levels, support is still limited. For its part, the general public has clear expectations of reform. The conflict in the east of the country and the annexation of Crimea have made the process more complex. The Netherlands is also contributing to EUAM Ukraine, the civilian EU mission aimed at helping to strengthen the rule of law in Ukraine through reform of the civilian security sector. In addition, the Netherlands will work at bilateral level to promote security sector reform in Ukraine in the coming period. Syria / Iraq / ISIS The situation in Syria and Iraq calls for a long-term commitment in the region. Only a robust, inclusive political solution for both countries can contribute to de-escalation and help restore stability. The Netherlands supports the efforts of UN representative Staffan de Mistura to this end, and those of the EU to develop an integrated action plan for the region. Parallel to these activities, the Netherlands is also engaging in its own diplomatic initiatives, for example supporting moderate forces in the region. In the short term, Dutch involvement in Iraq is aimed at degrading the military effectiveness of ISIS, both through airstrikes and by contributing to international training activities in the country. These activities are part of the efforts of the international coalition which, besides the US and the Iraqi government, primarily includes countries in the region itself. To ensure that international action to combat ISIS does not strengthen the position of the Assad regime, the Dutch government is also exploring options for providing moderate armed groups in Syria with military and other support, with the exception of supplying arms. In addition, the Netherlands is contributing to international efforts concerned with early recovery, preparing for reconstruction and a sustainable solution. It continues to support activities aimed at promoting accountability and safeguarding data and information on human rights violations. The Netherlands will also broaden the initiative to bring together Syrian women who could play a role in the future peace process to other countries in the region. Furthermore, to prevent spillover effects of the crisis in Syria, the Netherlands will continue to provide humanitarian assistance in various 21

22 countries, including Lebanon and Jordan. It is contributing to the Lebanon Syrian Crisis Trust Fund and supports the efforts of the Lebanese army to promote stabilisation. Organisations like ISIS and al Qa ida benefit from polarisation and the incitement of ideological conflict between Muslims and the West. The advance of Salafist jihadism through ISIS goes hand in hand with terrorist activity in Iraq and Syria, and possibly also in Western countries. This calls not only for concrete counterterrorism measures, but also for efforts to identify and address the complex causes underlying jihadism and the terrorism it engenders. ISIS presents itself as the defender of the Sunni Arabs. An effective strategy to combat ISIS must expose this myth and devote attention to the deeper causes of radicalisation and conflict. These often lie in local circumstances and dissatisfaction among disadvantaged groups suffering economic and political exclusion. The most effective way to combat ISIS is to address the justified grievances of these population groups and promote efforts to introduce inclusive and effective forms of governance with the constructive involvement of the entire region, and to ensure that this gives young people in these countries better prospects for the future so that they have opportunities to build a normal life. That calls for a long-term approach combining political, humanitarian, economic and development efforts. The EU has recently developed a broad counterterrorism strategy that focuses on integrating European policy with the international community s broader efforts in Syria and Iraq and cooperation with strategic partners, especially in the Gulf region. Important elements in this strategy included partly at the insistence of the Netherlands are combating the financing of terrorism, tackling jihadist fighters and supporting an inclusive Iraqi government. At national level, an integrated action plan to combat jihadism was presented in August, coordinated by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). The plan anticipates national and international developments. Its aims include finding better ways of identifying and restricting the movements of jihadists in good time, for example through 22