1 Qatar Ministry of Interior - Public Key Infrastructure Business and Corporate CA Certification Practice Statement Issue : 1.2 Issue date : 19 October 2014 Status : Approved page 1 of 54
2 Amendment history Date Issue Status Changes Author 27/08/ Approved Issue final version MoI Policy Authority 28/09/ Approved Adding Final OID values and hosting URLs MoI Policy Authority 19/10/ Approved Updating OID values MoI Policy Authority page 2 of 54
3 Detailed contents 1 Introduction Overview Document name and Identification PKI Participants Certificate Usage Policy Administration Definitions, acronyms and references Publication and Repository Responsibility Repositories Publication of Certificate Information Time or Frequency of Publication Repositories Access Controls on Repositories Identification and Authentication Naming Initial Identity Validation Identification and Authentication for Re-keying requests Certificate Life Cycle Management Certificate Application Certificate Application Processing Certificate Issuance Certificate Acceptance Key Pair and Certificate Usage Certificate Renewal Certificate Re-key page 3 of 54
4 4.8 Certificate Modification Certificate Revocation and Suspension Certificate Status Services End of Subscription Key Escrow and Recovery FACILITY, MANAGEMENT and OPERATIONAL CONTROLS Physical Controls Procedural Controls Personnel Controls Audit Logging Procedures Records Archival Key Changeover Compromise and Disaster Recovery CA or RA Termination TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS Key Pair Generation Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls Other Aspects of Key Pair Management Activation Data Computer Security Controls Life Cycle Technical Controls Network Security Controls Time-Stamping CERTIFICATE, CRL PROFILES Certificate Profile page 4 of 54
5 7.2 CRL Profile COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS Fees Financial responsibility Confidentiality of business information Privacy of personal information Intellectual property rights Representations and warranties Disclaimers of warranties Limitations of Liability Indemnities Term and termination Individual notices and communications with participants Amendments Dispute resolution provisions Governing Law Compliance with applicable law Miscellaneous provisions Other provisions page 5 of 54
6 1 Introduction 1.1 Overview This Certification Practice Statement (CPS) describes the certification practices that apply to the digital certificates issued by the Business and Corporate Certification Authority (CA), which is operated by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) of the State. The Supreme Council of Information and Communication Technology (ictqatar) is fulfilling the role of the Policy Management Authority for Certification Service Providers in Qatar (referred to as the CSPs-PMA). Hence, the certification services from MoI as well as any CSP willing to operate in the state of Qatar, must be licensed by the CSPs-PMA and then certified by the Qatar National Root CA before issuing certificates or providing services related to electronic signatures. The Business and Corporate CA is one of the MoI subordinates CAs certified by the Qatar National Root CA. MoI Subordinate CAs deliver national Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certification services that enable citizens, residents and corporate organizations to conduct secure electronic transactions. The Business and Corporate CA is responsible, mainly for issuing and managing certificates for corporates and business organizations in the state of Qatar. Corporates and business organizations can leverage these certificates in building their own PKI-based solutions offering secure electronic transactions for their employees/customers. This CPS covers the issuance and controls surrounding the following types of certificates and their associated key pairs: Business and corporate certificates for end-users acting on behalf of the corporate or business organization they work for; this category comprises two certificates with the below purposes: o Encryption certificate - used for secure and for data/document encryption o Signing Certificate - used to produce digital signatures on digital transactions/document signing. Certificates issued for MoI Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Responder - certificates issued for MoI OCSP responder to sign OCSP responses related to the certificates issued by this CA. This CPS is maintained by MoI and is made available online along the applicable CP via MoI PKI web portal Qatar Public Key Infrastructure (QPKI) Hierarchy The figure below illustrates the PKI operated by MoI. The National Root Certification Authority (NR-CA) is the top authority in Qatar with regard to digital certification services offered in the country. The NR-CA issues top level certificates to MoI Subordinate CAs (Citizen and Resident CA, Business and Corporate CA and infrastructure CA). page 6 of 54
7 CSPs-PMA National Root CA Citizen & Resident CA Business and Corporate CA Infrastructure CA Identity signing certs Identity encryption certs OCSP certs Corporate signing certs Corporate encryption certs OCSP certs Web certs VPN certs OCSP certs Certification Services The certification services offered by this CA are outlined as follows: Registration service: It verifies the identity and, if applicable, any specific attributes of end-entities applying for certificates. The results of this service are relayed to the certificate generation service. Certificate generation service: It creates and signs end-entity certificates based on the verification conducted by the registration service. Dissemination service: It disseminates the end-entity certificates and makes them available to relying parties. This service also makes available any public policy and practice information, to subscribers and relying parties. Suspension and Revocation management service: It processes requests and reports relating to revocation for determining the appropriate action to be taken. The results of this service will be available through the certificate validity status service. Certificate validity status service: It provides certificate validity status information to relying parties. This must be based upon certificate suspension/revocation lists. The status information must always reflect the current status of the certificates issued by this CA. 1.2 Document name and Identification Document Title This document is named Qatar Ministry of Interior - Business and Corporate CA CPS and is referred in related documents as QATAR-MoI-Business and Corporate CA CPS" Identification Alphanumeric OID The Object Identifier of this CPS is page 7 of 54
8 1.3 PKI Participants Several parties are involved during the lifecycle management of digital certificates issued by this CA. They include: Certification Authorities (CA) Policy Authority Operational Authority Registration Authorities Local Registration Authority (LRA) Subscribers Relying Parties These participants and their roles are described in the following sections Certification Authorities For this CA, the Certification Authority issues Business and Corporate certificates for corporates and business end-users in addition to OCSP response signing certificates. This includes the following tasks: Issuing and managing certificates Publishing encryption certificates to a public repository that is accessed by Relying Parties Issuing and publishing Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to a public repository that is accessed by Relying Parties Pushing CRLs to MoI OCSP responder Policy Authority A PKI board is established by MoI so that it represents the policy and governing body for its PKI. This board is referred to in this CPS document as the Policy Authority (PA). It is constituted of individuals with security clearance who will be overall responsible for: Specifying and approving this CA infrastructure Specifying and approving the changes required to this CPS and other related documentation Defining the review and auditing process that ensures that this CA operations comply with practices listed in this CPS Organizing regular audits to be conducted by internationally recognized auditing firms Deciding and planning on actions to be taken as a result of deficiency Organizing key ceremonies including allocating members to key ceremonies Specifying and maintaining overall Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity plan for this CA Operational Authority The Operational Authority (OA) comprises individuals who are responsible for the operations of MoI PKI in accordance with this CPS. page 8 of 54
9 The following roles have been defined for the operations of MoI PKI including this CA: CA Master user - responsible for the configuration and maintenance of hardware and software for the CA; start-up and cessation of CA services and the initial creation of accounts for PKI Officers. CA Security Officer - responsible for managing PKI Administrators as well as other PKI Officers and the configuration of the security policies governing the different certificates types issued by this CA. CA Administrator - responsible for managing the subscriber s initialization process; the creation, renewal or revocation of certificates and the distribution of tokens (where applicable). PKI administrator can be seen as RA officers. Procedures has been put in place to ensure that OA personnel associated with PKI roles (e.g., PKI Master User, PKI Officers and PKI Administrators) are accountable for actions they perform and ensure evidence is available to link any action to the person performing such action Registration Authorities The RAs represent individuals and systems who are involved in validating the identity of individuals requesting certificates as well as in issuing and managing these certificates. The below points describe the RAs of this CA: - Certificates through MOI RA: Business and Corporate entities may request key pairs and certificates from MoI, which they received on PKI tokens (e.g., smartcards). MoI OA plays the role of the RA for these types of certificates. This includes certificate issuance and revocation. - Certificates through LRA: MoI OA, in its role as an RA for the Business and Corporate CA, registers LRA officers to the system so that these officers could then generate and manage digital certificates of their community of users. See LRA section in this policy document for further details. - Virtual ID certificates through LRA: Business and Corporate entities may receive virtual ID certificates from MoI PKI. These certificates are managed by a dedicated LRA acting on behalf of an entity. See the LRA section of this policy for further details. - OCSP certificates: The OA acts as the RA for MoI OCSP responder certificate lifecycle management Local Registration Authority (LRA) MoI offers LRA services to organizations willing to manage certificates lifecycle for their own communities. The organizations willing to use the LRA service will have to sign an agreement with MoI through which it commits to use the LRA service from MoI in accordance with the applicable CP and this CPS. page 9 of 54
10 The organization, which opts for the LRA service, appoints an LRA officer who will be enrolled to this CA by MoI RA as an administrator having the credentials to enroll and manage the subscribers of the organization that the LRA officer represents. The duties of the LRA officer are as follows: Collecting and validating subscribers identity data Conforming to the rules of this CP and related CPS of the Business and Corporate CA Issuing and managing certificates of the organization s subscribers Subscribers Subscribers of this CA are Qatari Citizens and residents receiving identity certificates and acting on behalf of business organizations they adhere to. The PA is responsible for the subscriber agreement to specify the liabilities and warranties of this CA and the responsibilities and obligations of the individuals applying for infrastructure certificates Relying Parties Relying parties are public, private business organizations and corporates within the state of Qatar in addition to citizens and residents of the country Other Participants There are no other participants for this CA. 1.4 Certificate Usage Appropriate Certificate Use A Qatari Citizen or resident acting on behalf of a Corporate or Business organization applies and receives two key pairs and related certificates as follows: - Encryption key pair with related encryption certificate used for: o Secure o Document/data encryption - Signature key pair and related certificate used for: o Authentication o Signing digital transactions This CA also issues OCSP certificates intended for MoI OCSP responder. page 10 of 54
11 1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Use Certificates referred to in this CPS document shall not be used for purposes other than the ones listed above under section of this document. Using certificates for other purposes is explicitly prohibited. 1.5 Policy Administration Organization Administering the Document This document is administered by MoI PA Contact Details Inquiries, suggested changes or notices regarding this CPS should be directed to MoI PKI Policy Authority (PA) Contact person: Capt. Ahmad Al-Hamar/Dr. Capt Jassim Al-Hamar Address (PO Box): P.O.Box : 6858, Duhail Area, Doha, Qatar Phone: Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy The MoI PA determines the suitability of any CPS for MoI PKI policy Ref [QATAR-MoI-PKI CP] CPS Approval Procedures A dedicated process of the PA involves the PA officer reviewing the initial version of this CPS and any subsequent updates. Amendments shall either be in the form of a document containing an amended form of the CPS or an update notice. The PA officer approves the changes and issues an approval note to MOI PKI board. The CPS update is formally approved through a meeting of the MoI PKI board. 1.6 Definitions, acronyms and references Definitions and acronyms The following sections contain the definitions of terms and acronyms. The source of a definition is cited when available. Activation data - Secret information, other than cryptographic keys, that are required to operate cryptographic modules that need to be protected, for example, a PIN, a password or pass-phrase, or a manually held key share. page 11 of 54
12 CA - Certification Authority CA certificate - A certificate for one CA s public key issued by another CA CCTV - Closed Circuit TV Certificate Policy (CP) - A named set of rules that indicate the applicability of a certificate to a particular community/ class of application with common security requirements Certification Practice Statement (CPS) - A statement of the practices which a certification authority employs in issuing certificates CRL - Certificate Revocation List DRP - Disaster Recovery Plan DN - Distinguished Name FIPS - Federal Information Processing Standards HSM - Hardware Security Module, a device designed to provide cryptographic functions, especially the safekeeping of private keys. HTTP - Hyper Text Transfer Protocol HVAC - Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning IEC - International Electro-technical Commission IETF - Internet Engineering Task Force IPSEC - Internet Protocol Security ISO - International Standards Organization Issuer - The name of the CA that signs the certificate Issuing certification authority (issuing CA) - In the context of a particular certificate, the issuing CA is the CA which issued the certificate ITU - International Telecommunications Union KGC - Key Generation Ceremony, the complex procedure for the generation of a CA s private key. LDAP - Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, a common standard for accessing directories. MoI - Ministry of Interior. MoI-IO - Ministry of Interior s Immigration Offices. page 12 of 54
13 MoI-IS - Ministry of Interior s Information Services Department OA - Operational Authority, the team within MoI-ISD in charge of operating MoI PKI OID - Object Identifier, a value (distinguishable from all other such values) which is associated with an object. (ITU-T X680) It is referred in many RFCs and used in the ASN.1 encoding of certificates. OCSP - Online Certificate Status Protocol. PA - Policy Authority PED - PIN Entry Device PIN - A Personal Identification Number or password used to protect private information and keys on PKI tokens PUC - PIN unblock code PKCS # 1 - Public-key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 PKCS # 7 - Cryptographic Message Syntax PKCS #10 - Certification Request Syntax Specification PKCS #12 - Personal Information Exchange Syntax published by RSA Security PKE - Public Key Encryption PKI - Public Key Infrastructure PKIX-CMP - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate Management Protocol Policy qualifier - Policy-dependent information that accompanies a certificate policy identifier in an X.509 certificate QID - Qatar Identity, the State of Qatar citizen and resident card identity scheme. Each card is assigned a unique number linked to that individual. QPKI - Qatar Public Key Infrastructure RA - Registration Authority Re-key Ceasing use of a key pair and then generating a new key pair to replace it Relying party - A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance on that certificate/ digital signatures verified using that certificate Renewal - Issuance of a new certificate to the subscriber without changing the subscriber s public key or any other information in the certificate page 13 of 54
14 Repository - A trustworthy system for storing and retrieving certificates or other information relevant to certificates. RSA - The acronym for the inventors of RSA algorithm - Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman SCEP - Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol Secret Shares - A set of devices, smartcards, PINs, etc. used with MofN control SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm S/MIME - Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions SSL/TLS Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security Sponsor An individual or organization, authorized to vouch for another individual in their employment or an electronic device in their control subjectaltname A certificate attribute field that often contains the subject s address Subject - A subject is the entity named in a certificate Subscriber - A subject who is issued a certificate Trusted Role Those individuals who perform a security role that is critical to the operation or integrity of a PKI. UPS - Uninterruptible Power Supply URI Universal Resource Identifier, a URL, FTP address, address, etc VSC Virtual Smart Card: Virtual ID credential where the key pair is generated and stored on a highly secure backend system X.501 A common standard for directory entry naming (ITU). X.509 A public key certificate specification originally developed as part of the X.500 directory specification, often used in public key systems. It is now governed by IETF standards. References [RFC3647] Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework [RFC5280] Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile [ETSI ] ETSI EN V1.1.1 ( ) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; page 14 of 54
15 Part 3: Policy Requirements for Certification Authorities issuing public key certificates [ETSI ] ETSI TS V2.2.1 ( ) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing public key certificates page 15 of 54
16 2 Publication and Repository Responsibility 2.1 Repositories The MoI operates the repositories for the Subordinate CAs. The core repository is an LDAP directory server where various PKI related data is published including CA certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). The MoI also has a replica of the core LDAP referred to as public LDAP that is published and made available to relying parties. Other than the public LDAP repository, the MoI maintains a PKI web portal where relevant PKI documentation is published for relying parties including MoI PKI CP and this CPS. The URL of this site is 2.2 Publication of Certificate Information The following certificate information is available on MoI public LDAP All encryption public key certificates issued by this CA Certificates of MoI OCSP responder CRLs that contain a list of revoked certificates This CA publishes both CRL Distribution Points and Uniform CRLs simultaneously. 2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication Repositories Certificates The below Certificates are published to the public repository (MoI Public LDAP) as soon as they are issued CA and OCSP certificates Encryption Certificates CRLs The following rules apply for CRLs issued this CA: At minimum, CRLs are refreshed every 24 hours. The lifetime of CRLs is set to 26 hours (24 hours update period + 2 hours preupdate period). 2.4 Access Controls on Repositories Public read-only access to the CP, CPS, certificates and CRLs published. Access control techniques are implemented by the MoI to protect the Public LDAP and PKI portal from unauthorized addition or modification of any published data. page 16 of 54
17 3 Identification and Authentication 3.1 Naming Types of Name The certificates issued by this CA contain X.500 Distinguished Names (DN) in English. This CA is identified in the Issuer s name field of the Subscriber certificates as follows: CN=Business and Corporate Certification Authority, O=QECC, C=QA Subscribers Certificates issued for business (private) companies through MoI RA: cn=<individual unique name organization unique registration number>, ou = corporates, o = QECC, c = QA Certificates issued for corporate (non-private) organizations through MoI RA: cn=<individual unique name organization meaningful unique name >, ou = corporates, o = QECC, c = QA Certificates issues to business (private) companies through LRA: cn=<individual unique name>, ou=< organization unique registration number >, ou = corporates, o = QECC, c = QA Certificates issues to corporate (non-private) organization through LRA: cn=<individual unique name>, ou=< organization meaningful unique name >, ou = corporates, o = QECC, c = QA Virtual ID certificates issued to business (private) companies through LRA: cn=<individual unique name>, ou=< organization unique registration number >, ou = VSC_corporates, o = QECC, c = QA Virtual ID certificates issued to corporate (non-private) organization through LRA: cn=<individual unique name>, ou=< organization meaningful unique name >, ou = VSC_corporates, o = QECC, c = QA MoI OCSP Responder certificates: cn = MoI OCSP, cn Business and Corporate Certification Authority, o = QECC, c = QA Meaningful Names For certificates issued to individuals, names are meaningful since the CN contains the name of the subscriber. For certificates issued to the MoI OCSP responder, the names are meaningful and indicate the OCSP name (MoI OCSP) Anonymity and Pseudonymity of Subscribers This CA does not support the issuance of anonymous certificates. page 17 of 54
18 3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms No stipulation - this section intentionally left blank Uniqueness of Names Unique subject DNs are enforced as follows: For certificates issued for individuals: o Business (private) entities: The unique company registration number is used as part of the certificate DN to uniquely identify the company. o Corporate entities (non-private such as government entities): A convention for a meaningful name representing uniquely the individual and the entity he works is enforced by the MoI. For certificates issued for the MoI OCSP responder: The OCSP responder unique name is included in the subject DN to ensure uniqueness Recognition, authentication and role of Trademarks No stipulation - this section intentionally left blank. 3.2 Initial Identity Validation Method to Prove Possession of Private Key Certificates issued for individuals: o PKI tokens (smartcard, USB token, etc.) - the token or smartcard that signs a proof of possession included in the PKIX-CMP request submitted to this CA. o Virtual ID certificates - the subscriber s keys are generated and stored securely within the VSC platform, however the VSC platform signs a Proof-of-Possession (POP) and include it as part of the PKIX-CMP request submitted to this CA. Certificates issued for the MoI OCSP: Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) generated by the OCSP responder contains a Proof-of-Possession (POP) of the private key as part of the PKCS#10 request file submitted to this CA Authentication of Organization Identity Organizations are verified through the certificate enrolment process Authentication of individual identity The below points describe the rules that apply for authentication of certificate applicants: For certificates issued for corporate cards by MoI RA, the subscriber s identity is established as follows: page 18 of 54
19 o The subscriber appears in person and brings supporting documents related to the application of the certificate, hence providing evidence to establish the relation between the applicant and the organization o The MoI RA validates the association between the applicant and the organization For certificates issued for PKI tokens by LRA: The subscriber s identity verification is done according to the applicable corporate/organization business rules. For Virtual ID certificates: Each enrolment channel has its own Identification and authorization approach: o o Hukoomi Portal: Virtual ID account holder identity is established through PKI authentication procedure involving his eid card Hukoomi Portal validates the association between the applicant and the organization through an automated process MoI Self-Service Kiosk: Virtual ID account holder identity is verified through fingerprint verification procedure involving his eid card The Self-Service Kiosk validates the association between the applicant and the organization o VSC LRA: The subscriber s identity authentication is done according to the applicable corporate/organization business rules. For certificates issued to the OCSP responder: The certification process is initiated by an authorized OCSP administrator under the supervision of the MoI PA. A dedicated operational key ceremony is documented by the MoI involving relevant OA roles Non-verified subscriber information All subscriber information written in the certificate issued by MoI CAs is verified by the applicable RA Validation of Authority No stipulation since only a physical person may be certified Criteria for Interoperation No stipulation. page 19 of 54
20 3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-keying requests Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Keying Authentication for re-keying is performed as in initial registration Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after revocation Identification after revocation is performed as in initial registration Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request Revocation requests are validated as follows: Revocation of Business and Corporate certificates through MoI RA: o The subscriber or an authorized representative visits the MoI-IO in order to request the temporary or permanent blocking of his/her PKI token or VSC. o The MoI-IO officer authenticates the subscriber s identity through a face-toface verification in addition to identity verification involving the individual s ID card. o The MoI-IO officer requests the subscriber to fill and sign a revocation request form. o The MoI-IO officer sends a copy of the revocation request form to the MoI OA team and archive the original revocation request form o The MoI RA officer revokes the subscriber s certificates o The CA generates an updated CRL and publishes it to the MoI public repository Revocation of Business and Corporate certificates (including VSC certificates) through an LRA: o The LRA receives a revocation request from the subscriber o The LRA validates the identity of the subscriber for a revocation request through a dedicated organization process o The LRA records the revocation request according to the organization s business rules o The LRA officer revokes the subscriber s certificates o The CA generates an updated CRL and publishes it to the MoI public repository Revocation of OCSP certificates: The revocation is conducted as part of a PKI process internal to the MoI and is approved by MoI PA. This process involves communications with relying parties in order to update them with the OCSP certificate revocation. page 20 of 54
21 4 Certificate Life Cycle Management 4.1 Certificate Application Who Can Submit a Certificate Application For certificates issued for MoI RA: The MoI Information Security (MoI-IS) RA officer submits the certificate application as part of the corporate card issuance process. For VSC certificates: The LRA officer submits the application for the certificate implicitly when submitting the VSC enrolment request for a corporate employee. For certificates issued by corporates for PKI tokens (smartcard, USB token, etc.): The LRA submits the certificate application for a corporate employee during the PKI token issuance process. For OCSP responder certificate: An authorized OCSP administrator can submit a certificate request to the OA Enrolment Process and Responsibilities The process of issuing certificates for corporate cards through the MoI RA is a twostage process as follows: o o Stage 1: Smartcard Issuance Stage 2: Certificate Issuance through the MoI-IS Officer Stage 1: Smartcard Issuance a) The applicant (corporate end-user) submits a signed corporate card application form to the MoI-IS b) An officer from the MoI-IS checks the applicant s qualification for card issuance by performing background checks against data held by its own and other law enforcement agency databases c) The MoI-IS prints and issues the smartcard d) The applicant or their authorized representative collects the card from the MoI-IS Stage 2: Certificate Issuance through the MoI-IO Officer a) The applicant signs the subscriber agreement. b) The MoI-IS RA officer creates the subscriber s DN in the MoI LDAP and enables it for certificate Issuance. c) The MoI-IS RA officer submits the certificates enrollment request through a dedicated RA application. d) The RA application communicates with this CA in order to issue end-user certificates. e) The CA generates the certificates and sends back to the RA application that installs the certificates on the card. f) The applicant is now a registered subscriber, who will receive a smartcard, an initial PIN label, a CD containing smartcard driver and a software for changing the PIN. page 21 of 54
Qatar Ministry of Interior - Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy Issue : 1.2 Issue date : 19 October 2014 Status : Approved page 1 of 58 Amendment history Date Issue Status Changes Author 27/08/2014
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