The Taliban-Pakistan Movement and the Challenges for Security in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

Transcription

1 Seguridad Internacional The Taliban-Pakistan Movement and the Challenges for Security in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Gonzalo Fernández AI 022/2011

2 Abstract The ongoing Taliban-Pakistan conflict represents one of the most challenging and complex confrontations in the Middle East. The militant movement (the Taliban) has gradually grown into a force that endangers regional stability and poses a threat to Pakistan national security. Understanding its logic and dynamic demands a historical and political narrative and is crucial in order to achieve a peaceful solution. The present study addresses the origins of the conflict and the problematic of the current situation. It also suggests numerous recommendations for each of the parties. 2

3 The Taliban-Pakistan Movement and the Challenges for Security in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Gonzalo Fernández 1 Introduction Oringins of the Taliban Movement-Afghanistan The original Taliban movement dates back to the early 1990s, and according to local Afghan people, the group was devoted to the peace process - searching for a solution to the Afghan civil war. Mullah Muhammad Omar became the leader of the group when he wore the sacred cloak of Prophet Muhammad in front of a public meeting, consequently declaring himself Leader of the faithful. In November 1994, the group launched its first major military activity, seizing control of the city of Kandahar in the south of the country. In the course of 1994, the Taliban took control of 12 of the 34 provinces that were not under the control of the state (Radish 2000). By 1997 the movement made rapid military progress; it gained control of around 95% of the territory of Afghanistan. Such a quick rise to power was due to two reasons: the fragmented nature of Afghan society and the foreign financial and military support the movement was receiving from Pakistan and other countries. Other arguments point out the relevance of historical and situational circumstances. Despite the Taliban managed to create an atmosphere of security and stability, running Afghanistan was far more complicated than they had first imagined. By 2001, they were losing the legitimacy to its own people and the support from the international community --due to its extremist perspective of Islamic law (Afsar, Samples, Wood 2008). The Taliban government was increasingly criticized for systematic human rights violation, tolerance to poppy cultivation and providing support to international terrorism (Stenersen 2010). Since September 11 of 2001, the Middle East, but particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan, have undergone important political and security changes. The US retaliated massively against Afghanistan due to its continued refusal to hand over Bin Laden. Ultimately, the 1 El autor es estudiante de la licenciatura en Relaciones Internacionales (UCC). 3

4 Taliban regime was overthrown by US military operation Enduring Freedom, for it was discovered that the terrorists attacks had been planned and organized in Afghan territory. The spread of the Taliban to Pakistan When the United States first started its military campaign in Afghanistan against the Taliban, supporters and sympathizers of the Taliban in Pakistan were not recognized as Taliban themselves. However, because of geographical linkages between these two countries, the Pakistan state devoted a lot of resources in locating foreigners in the area connected to Al- Qaeda (Abbas 2008). Sooner or later the fate of Taliban-Pakistan was determined to change: After the terrorist attack of 9/11 a large part of the Taliban movement, including Omar and Bin Laden, retreated to Pakistan and despite American and Pakistani pressure, Al-Qaeda, Afghan- Taliban and other foreign groups have successfully established themselves in the area. Their objective is to recreate a smaller, more rudimentary version of their former Afghan training infrastructure in the Shakai Valley (Gunaratna, Bukhari 2008). With the passing of time, the logistic strength, military power and leadership quality of the Taliban in Pakistan grew dramatically. The transition from being Taliban sympathizers to actually becoming a recognized group in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) began when numerous cells working independently started collaborating with each other. The residents of FATA actually regarded the rise of the Taliban positively for they have cultural, religious and ideological affinities. Even more, the Taliban effectively established as a real alternative to the traditional tribal leadership. Nowadays, this group constitutes an effective force and is challenging both, the Pakistan army and NATO forces (Afsar, Samples, Wood 2008). According to theorists like Abbas, the opportunity for the Taliban to take over Pakistan s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas lies within two reasons: In the first place, years of neglect together with ineffective governance and the failure to create an operative policy against extremism have all fostered the re-rise of the group. On the second place, Pakistan s transition from General Pervez Musharraf s rule to a democratic regime operated as a distraction that opened up more avenues for Taliban s plans (Sheehan 2008). These events have led to the formation of a new group in Pakistan: The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP denotes the Taliban movement in Pakistan that merged in December 2007 under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud a wanted military leader from South Waziristan (Abbas 2008). Now that the entire area across the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has 4

5 been talibanized, the group can use the region to set up their training camps, to transport weapons and to recruit followers among the Pakistani youth. Background The Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan The group emerged in 2007 and a local newspaper stated that its ultimate goal was to flush out gangs carrying out criminal activities in the name of Taliban. Today, the movement is regarded as the largest organization of Pakistani militants and it is widely spread over the area. It is an umbrella organization constituted by a shura of 40 senior Taliban leaders. The shura has representation from both, the 7 tribal agencies from the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas and also from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Abbas 2008). Since its constitution, the TTP has announced the followings as their core objectives: 1- Enforcement of Sharia law, uniting against NATO forces in Afghanistan and performing defensive jihad against the Pakistan army. 2-Reacting strongly if military operations are not stopped in Swat District and North Waziristan Agency. 3- Demanding the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area. 4-Demanding the release of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Imam Abdul Aziz. 5-Refusing future peace deals with the government of Pakistan (Abbas 2008). Despite being a relatively new organization, the TTP has incredible operational capability. A strong reason supporting the previous argument is the fact that this group is directed by experienced leaders. Among its preeminent and first frontrunners -was- Baitullah Mehsud. He had been part of militant activities for the last few years in FATA and contiguous areas (Abbas 2008). Another important figure is Hafiz Gul Bahadu, supreme commander of the North Waziristani Taliban. The leader rose to fame in 2005 when directing the course of war in a military operation against the Pakistani government. Finally it is worth mentioning Maulana Faqir Muhammad, a senior leader in Bajaur district and the most popular cleric in the Bajaur region. The Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan and the Pakistan State Up until the Pakistan government had been supporting the Taliban movement. However, this relationship had been ignored during the Bush administration with the exception of Zalmay Khalilzad, former US special representative to Afghanistan who openly denounced the Musharraf s regime. However, there was no clear evidence regarding the relationship between the two actors the Pakistan state and the Taliban. It was only after 5

6 2007, the same year the TTP emerged as a militant movement, that the American government started to put pressure of Musharraf s government so as to resist Taliban activities in Pakistan (Lafraie 2008). However, despite the change of attitude and policy from the Pakistani government, the Taliban movement still poses a huge challenge. In general, Pakistan s military operations have been badly organized and coordinated. Pakistan relies on sporadic strikes rather than an aggressive and sustained effort to dismantle the TTP. Even more, a poorly thought strategy gives militant networks time to absorb the attacks. Because Pakistan s military attempts have been left futile, this has pressured the regime to look out for peace deals with the movement. However, peace deals could ultimately increase confusion in the area since they are logically opposed to the tactics the Pakistani government had been previously implementing military assaults v. peace deals. It is also important to understand that a resilient solution will not be achieved only by military means. It is largely believed that Pakistan s military effort against religious militancy in FATA is likely to fail unless the government introduces political changes in the area. Militants have gained control over the place largely because state institutions are ineffective in that part of the country: This encroaching Talibanisation is not the product of tribal traditions or resistance. It is the result of short-sighted military policies and a colonial era body of law that isolates the region from the rest of the country, giving it an ambiguous constitutional status and denying political freedoms and economic opportunity to the population 2. Continued underdevelopment, a fact which military operations have further undermined, will ultimately lead to the strengthening of the already existing black market that trades drugs and weapons. Against all odds, the TTP was finally banned as a movement in 2008, in part due to its responsibility for abrupt violence and suicide attacks in the country all over The Pakistani government rejected a cease fire offer from the TTP, thus the ban represented an end to the government s policy of negotiation with the militant group and came as a response for the displacement of 300,000 people in the region. However, most people claim the ban is meaningless, for it will have no real effect. The Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan and Al-Qaeda Nowadays, it is well-known that the Tehrik-i-Taliban is an affiliated group to Al-Qaeda together with other extremist movements the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat- 2 Countering the Taliban s Militancy in Pakistan Tribal Areas. (2009) Asia report N 178. International Crisis Group. 6

7 e-muhhamadi (TNSM) and the Haqqani Network. The reason to these linkages, however, is to be found back in 2001, after the terrorist attacks of September 11th. After Al-Qaeda was removed from Afghanistan in late 2001 and 2002, hundreds of fleeing Arabs and foreign fighters linked to al-qaeda, reallocated themselves in North and South Waziristan Pakistan. Immediately, Al-Qaeda started working together with local tribal militants and used these affiliations to re-create a clerical support base (Gunaratna, Bukhari 2008). However, despite Al-Qaeda s strong presence in the region, it was not until 2007, the year the Tehrik-i-Taliban emerged as a new movement that coordination and cooperation between the groups started to toughen up. It was in this specific time frame when Al-Qaeda and the Afghan-Taliban linked up with the Pakistani-Taliban. Al-Qaeda has been reported for assisting the Tehrik-i-Taliban and providing them with technical training and capabilities for attack. Cooperation between these groups has had severe consequences for the Pakistani government and the region as a whole. Because Al- Qaeda is a stronger international terrorist network, it can provide these local groups with the facilities to operate on a global level (Smith and Schaffer 2010). The United States Position For the United States Pakistan plays a dual position. On the one side, the Pakistan state appeared at first as a key ally for the struggle against terrorism. Pakistan cooperation has been said to be crucial: On June 24, 2003 in a meeting at Camp David, George Bush recognized Pakistan s effective border security measures and law enforcement have helped to neutralize Al-Qaeda s efforts in the region (Tellis 2008). However, this previous assessment has been revised. The rebirth of the Taliban in Afghanistan together with the reconstruction of Al-Qaeda in Pakistani territory the FATA areas- and the emergence of the TTP, has inevitably put the America-Pakistan relations under strain. This has led many people to reconsider whether Pakistan is actually helping in the war against terror since the Pakistani state has been receiving security and financial assistance since 2002 around $1 billion per year-. Some less optimistic analysts argue that Pakistan s only reason for being engaged against the spread of terrorism is to gain US support for its longstanding conflict with India (Tellis 2008). 7

8 Final Considerations (Recommendations for a peaceful solution) Brining change and peace in the region of FATA is a difficult task that will take time, effort and will demand the parties to make concessions to each other. Perhaps one of the reasons that make this conflict so problematic is the numerous actors involved in it, all with different attitudes and aims. Thus, the peace process will be anything but simple. Recommendations to the Pakistan State A true change in attitude and policy- in Pakistan s strategy towards the militant groups located in FATA would initially demand two things: First of all, an acceptance from the Pakistani state that it is actually the TTP and Al-Qaeda and not India the ones that constitute an imminent and grave threat to Pakistan s national security and to the population dwelling the area. Second, Pakistan has to show the will to sacrifice the rahbari shura in order to help defeat the insurgency and ultimately coordinate with the US stabilization effort in Afghanistan (Tellis 2010). Though in the short-run nothing in Pakistan suggests a vindication of these facts, in the long-run this will necessarily need to change. The unexpected early exit of the Americans from Afghanistan President Obama announced in 2011 the drawdown of US troops from the country- will finally demand full commitment from Islamabad to the issue. Islamabad has to start taking measures immediately so as to inject itself even more vigorously into a tactical fight against the insurgency (Tellis 2010). From an American perspective, a successful ending to this conflict is urgent for the amount of human and economic capital invested in it- and a Pakistani reconciliation with the Taliban group is unacceptable for it would ultimately throw away the previous US effort. Apart from fully committing itself to the conflict, Pakistan will want to undertake political and security reforms so as to make the tribal areas safer and thus protect the people living there. Perhaps, a good start would include the following policies: Repealing all religious laws that discriminate on the basis of religion, sect and gender; prosecuting anyone who encourages or glorifies violence; improving the resources of federal and provincial agencies enforcing civilian law; Strictly following article 256 of the constitution that states: Private armies are forbidden - No private organization capable of functioning as a military organization shall be formed, and any such organization shall be illegal. 8

9 Other reasonable policies include: Strictly enforcing article 8 of the constitution so as to prevent the fractioning and disintegration of the FATA3. It also needs to follow Webber s old rule: States and only State posses the monopoly of physical force. Though this objective may now seem quite idealistic, a great start would be desisting from providing arms and technical support to any kind of insurgent group in the tribal areas - and preventing the army from doing the same-. Finally it would also include dismantling black markets, particularly illegal trade of weapons and drugs. Recommendations to the United States American position in this particular conflict is extremely difficult, particularly because the US recently decided to draw back its troops from Afghanistan. Though bringing change in the region is challenging, a thoughtful plan and a clear strategy can always defeat the difficulties. First of all, the American government should change its hegemonic image in the region. Instead of threatening Islamabad, the US government should use cooperation and structured inducements as the main components of its strategy. Even more, the United States should design its assistance to bring U.S. and Pakistani officials closer together and provides Pakistan with the specific tools required to confront the threats posed by militancy, terrorism, and extremist (Markey 2008). It is important to recognize that US military strikes against militants ensconced in FATA represent a strain to Pakistan s sovereignty and agency. Instead, an interesting alternative could be supporting fostering a smooth democratic transition in the Pakistani government. Finally, it is important for the US to keep a close eye to the relationship between Islamabad and Afghanistan. Pakistan s strategic culture is traditionally inclined to dominating Afghanistan. Pakistani interests in the region date back to the times before the Soviet occupation and in recent times Islamabad has been a determinant actor either supporting the jihadists against USSR or Taliban during the civil war time (Busam 2010). Recommendations to the Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan A great part in overcoming the challenges demands recognizing the real status of this particular group and its power. The TTP has become into an organized movement with its own rationality and goals. Underestimating the TTP s agency and capability to conduct itself and the 3 Article 8 states: Any law, or any custom or usage having the force of law, in so far as it is inconsistent with the rights conferred by (this article) 9

10 population in the FATA is a huge mistake. Therefore it is also crucial to make recommendations to it. It is central to avoid confrontations with the Pakistan state. After all, this militant group dwells within the limits of the Pakistan state. It is always possible for the Pakistani government to demand military aid from the western powers and crush the resistance. It is crucial as well to stop generating demographic chaos. Because of the TTP suicide attacks and fights against the government and other rebel groups, thousands of people have been displaced from their homes. Understanding that the civil population should not be damaged is critical for future negotiations with the government. It is finally possible to suggest one last recommendation. The group should rise up to their ideological beliefs. It is clear that the movement is fighting against western hegemony. However, many of their actions further increase western power. Ex.: Black market trading (Drugs and weapons) further fosters multinational businesses that make millions of dollars per year. 10

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