Introduction: 1 Improving police integrity: reforming the police complaints and disciplinary systems Home Office

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1 Introduction: This is the joint response of the Chief Police Officers Staff Association (CPOSA), the Police Superintendents Association of England and Wales (PSAEW) and the Police Federation of England and Wales (PFEW) ( the Staff Associations ) to the Home Office Consultation on reforming the police complaints and disciplinary systems 1. CPOSA represents chief officers, both officers and police staff equivalents, across England Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Association endorses the observations herein where the proposals would apply to its members as witnesses in, or as a subject of, an investigation. The National Policing Lead will respond separately in terms of the view of chief constables and colleagues in their role as employer and appropriate authority. The PSAEW is the sole representative body for police officers in the rank of Superintendent and Chief Superintendent. It represents approximately 1,270 police officers across 46 police forces in England and Wales. Its members are the senior operational leaders in policing. The vast majority of Professional Standards Departments (PSDs) within England and Wales are headed by members of the PSAEW. The Association is therefore well placed to comment on the potential impact of the proposed changes. The Police Federation of England and Wales (PFEW) is the staff association for all police constables, sergeants, inspectors and chief inspectors in the 43 home office police forces of England and Wales and currently has approximately 127,000 members. It was created by the Police Act 1919, with a statutory responsibility to represent and promote the interests and welfare of its members and the efficiency of the police service. 1 Improving police integrity: reforming the police complaints and disciplinary systems Home Office December

2 The Staff Associations believe that there should be a police complaints, discipline and performance system which are fair, effective, proportionate and transparent both for the police officers involved and for the public they serve. The Staff Associations have, over the years, taken a very proactive stance in all discipline and complaint matters affecting the standards of police officers and were fully involved in the inception of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) in 2004; the Review of Police Disciplinary Arrangements, commonly known as the Taylor Review, published in January 2005, and thereafter the implementation of the recommendations of that report that led to both the Police (Conduct) and Police (Performance) Regulations in December 2008 (amended in 2012 to reflect the inception of Police and Crime Commissioners). The Staff Associations have provided professional advice to the review underpinning this consultation document and we welcome the opportunity to respond to the proposals outlined. In doing so, we will refer to each section of the consultation document in turn. Reforming the Police Complaints System: First and foremost, it is important to note that the Staff Associations are fully supportive of having a robust, transparent and effective police complaints system. Indeed, prior to the creation of the IPCC, the Staff Associations called upon the government to introduce an independent system for investigating all complaints made against police officers by members of the public. ; It had long been our contention that complaints took too long to investigate resulting in an adverse impact on officers wellbeing and public confidence. In response to the specific proposals outlined in the consultation document, the Staff Associations are clear that it is not their role to comment on the appropriateness or otherwise of the model of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). Therefore, the Staff Associations will restrict their view to making general observations on the proposals relating to police complaints. 2

3 Structure and Cost The cost of these proposals needs to be fully evaluated. The associated impact assessment simply states that the cost of these proposals is not known. In times of austerity, and where the police budget is set to be cut further by approximately 5% in 2015/16 2, it is imperative that changes within policing are fully evaluated and evidenced so that detailed justification can be made for introducing change and that all associated implications are fully understood. The Staff Associations believe that these proposals have the potential to significantly increase the cost of the complaints system. For instance, if the definition of a complaint is expanded to include any expression of dissatisfaction and the responsibility for recording such matters rests with the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC), this will have a financial impact on the OPCC and will increase bureaucracy. All complaints will have to be logged and a decision made by the OPCC. This will have a direct financial impact on forces and is likely to detract resources from the front line, reducing operational resilience and damaging public confidence. If these proposals are to be implemented, the cost-benefit analysis needs to be both valid and reliable. The structure for this system needs to be carefully considered. The Staff Associations believe that police forces should have the flexibility to resolve the vast majority of complaints through local resolution and with local accountability. The proposal that OPCCs should play a central role in how the complaints system is run at a local level (pg. 15) will result in the public receiving different treatment depending on where they live. The Staff Associations believe that the police complaints structure needs to be standardised and outlined in much greater detail, at which point we will be happy to provide further comment. The proposal to make the OPCC responsible for receiving, recording and resolving complaints that are suitable for local resolution would increase cost and bureaucracy 2 Ministerial statement from 17 December 2014, accessed at on 16 January

4 and would increase frustration to complainants. A large number of complaints are suitable to be immediately resolved to the satisfaction of the complainant. Requiring the complainant to report to the OPCC, and having to wait for a decision on how the complaint will be handled, will risk adding bureaucracy and unnecessary delay to resolving the complainant s grievance. In a policing structure based upon local accountability the Staff Associations believe that the responsibility and authority for the oversight of complaint handling should now sit locally. As an unelected national organisation, the role of the IPCC within the police complaints system would need to be comprehensively reviewed in light of the proposals in this consultation. The Staff Associations would welcome the opportunity to engage in further discussion on potential structural reforms to the police complaints system. The Staff Associations agree that the terms discontinuance and disapplication should be replaced (Question 7). Finally, with regard to the notion of super-complaints, the Staff Associations would welcome further detailed information about how this would work in practice before we could make useful and constructive comment. As far as the Staff Associations are aware, super-complaints are currently used within the commercial sector for markets that provide goods or services to consumers. The concept has not been tested in the public sector and it is difficult to envisage the type of complaints that could be classified as a super complaint in a policing context. Reforming the Police Disciplinary System: As with the police complaints system, the Staff Associations recognise and support the need to have a disciplinary and performance system within policing that is effective and accountable. As noted in our introduction, the Staff Associations welcomed the introduction of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008, the Police (Performance) Regulations 2008 and the associated Home Office Guidance in 4

5 December These were a major step forward for the police service to embrace the ethos of the Taylor Report and move the culture of the service from one of sanction and punishment to one of learning, developing and improvement. Those reforms also brought the police officer system more in line with normal employment practice which the public would recognise. The Staff Associations were instrumental in the review of the above regulations by the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales (PABEW) which introduced on 22 November 2012 the Police (Conduct) and Police (Performance) Regulations The Staff Associations believe that the current regulations are fit for purpose. However, the Staff Associations believe that there has been an acute lack of training in both the ethos of the system and how it is intended to operate. This is particularly so in the lack of understanding of how the Police (Performance) Regulations can and should be part of the system. The Staff Associations welcome the recommendation in the recent HMIC inspection 3 regarding the need for accredited training for officers and staff in Professional Standards Departments. Despite the Staff Associations view that it is not the system itself which requires reform, we make the following general observations about each proposal in the consultation. We note that the consultation questions do not invite comments on all the proposed changes, some of which are contained in the narrative of the document. The Staff Associations will provide our views on those proposals as well. Before doing so however, we feel that we must raise our significant and ongoing concerns regarding the Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2014 that prevent officers from leaving the service whilst subject of misconduct investigations. We are extremely disappointed, and nor do we understand why, the consultation document, which lists all of the recommendations from the Chapman Review, omits recommendation 10 relating to officers who retire or resign from the service. 3 Integrity Matters - An inspection of arrangements to ensure integrity and to provide the capability to tackle corruption in policing - HMIC January

6 Such an omission causes us additional concern as the Impact Assessment accompanying the Amendment Regulations makes specific reference to progressing primary legislation to supersede them when parliamentary time allows. In our view the progression of this primary legislation ought to form part of this consultation rather than be dealt with separately and in isolation. The omission causes the Staff Associations to question whether there is the appetite from Government to seek a broader and more appropriate solution to this issue than that afforded by the recent amendments. We would draw particular attention to Paragraphs 2.11 to 2.21 of Major General Chapman s report (concerning the appropriateness of resignations/retirement) and seek assurances that measures will be taken forward to address the concerns around this issue that have been repeatedly and consistently expressed by the Staff Associations and a wide range of policing stakeholders. Q14: What factors should be considered when sanctions are benchmarked? The Staff Associations do not believe that the benchmarking of sanctions/outcomes is helpful. There can never be a one-size-fits-all approach to discipline, for this would undermine the key principles of fairness, proportionality and flexibility. As the ACAS guide on discipline and grievances at work 4 states: It should be clear what the normal organisational practice is for dealing with the kind of misconduct or unsatisfactory performance under consideration. This does not mean that similar offences will always call for the same disciplinary action: each case must be looked at on its own merits and any relevant circumstances taken into account. Such relevant circumstances may include health or domestic problems, provocation, justifiable ignorance of the rule or standard involved or inconsistent treatment in the past. (emphasis added) 4 Discipline and grievances at work: ACAS guide (2014) [accessed via on 16 January 2015] 6

7 The Staff Associations strongly support this stance. As such, we advocate that training on how to distinguish and assess conduct and performance must be provided. There should be good dialogue between Professional Standards Departments, the IPCC and staff associations. Any benchmarking guidance must not fetter the discretion of a properly constituted regulatory panel which sits in judgement. Therefore, it should be entirely a matter for the misconduct hearing panel to determine, when in possession of all the facts and having had the opportunity to test and challenge the evidence, to decide whether an officer s conduct warrants dismissal from the Service. Q15: To what extent do you agree or disagree that the performance management process should be streamlined, bringing it into line with the process for misconduct? The Staff Associations believe that there is already parity between the two systems with the ability to switch between misconduct and performance or vice versa. However, the Staff Associations believe that performance issues are inherently different to misconduct issues. Misconduct processes are there to manage matters of personal inappropriate behaviour, whereas performance processes are there to manage capability issues. The Staff Associations believe that a system that does not clearly distinguish between the two will lead to an over-reliance upon misconduct processes and result in unfair and disproportionate outcomes. It is also important that a link between the two systems is maintained to ensure that individual performance issues arising from complaints and misconduct investigations are addressed, and vice-versa. The Police (Performance) Regulations 2012 provide for a simple three stage process to manage performance/attendance issues and is in line with the ACAS guidance 5. Para 3.32: This paragraph suggests changing the term severity assessment to dismissal test and abandoning the terms misconduct and gross misconduct. 5 ( 7

8 The rationale for removing the term severity assessment is that the term has led to a need to see over-assessments 6. In our response to question 14, the Staff Associations suggested that training is needed for Professional Standards Departments to distinguish between levels of conduct and for managers to take a proactive role in performance management. Investment in those who are expected to operate the system will significantly reduce the likelihood and occurrence of overassessments. We believe that the phrase dismissal test is unnecessarily emotive in the context of misconduct procedures. It will raise internal and external expectations on misconduct hearings to dismiss, and is likely to be prejudicial against accused officers in terms of both findings and outcomes. Accordingly, the Staff Associations do not agree that there is a need to change the term severity assessment, which is both balanced and easily understandable to the police and public alike. In addition, the terms misconduct and gross misconduct both regularly feature in the ACAS code on disciplinary and grievance procedures 7. Any attempt to move away from these widely accepted terms is likely to cause confusion to both police officers and the public, and we therefore do not agree that these terms ought to be abandoned. Q16: To what extent do you agree that inspector is the appropriate rank at which to take decisions about matters below dismissal? The Staff Associations believe that the current regulations are sufficient in this regard. 6 Chapman, C (2014) An Independent Review of the Police Disciplinary System in England and Wales, pg 65 7 Code of Practice 1: Disciplinary and grievance procedures, ACAS, (2009). [Accessed via on 16 January 2015] 8

9 Q17: To what extent do you agree that time limits should be considered for disciplinary proceedings? The consultation document notes that there are already timescales in respect of serving notices and informing officers of decisions and the Staff Associations believe that the potential introduction of independent, legally qualified chairs 8 will speed the overall process up. Ordinarily the Staff Associations would not be arguing for prescriptive timescales for the completion of investigations. However, with the introduction of the Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Regulations 2014, restricting police officers from retiring or resigning based only on an allegation against them, we strongly believe that the issue of timescales for investigations now requires urgent review. The principle of innocent until proven otherwise has been reversed, with police officers who will now suffer detriment based on an allegation being made against them, having to wait for the conclusion of an investigation before being able to retire/resign. Many investigations have taken years to resolve and it is simply unacceptable to suggest that officers should suffer detriment due to limitless investigations. The Staff Associations therefore believe that consideration must now be given to having mechanisms to challenge the time an investigation is taking. Q18: Do you agree that police disciplinary hearings should be held regionally rather than locally? The Staff Associations are not in principle opposed to holding disciplinary hearings regionally. However, we would expect that the cost-benefit of this proposal, in comparison to holding disciplinary hearings locally, to be fully explored to justify its introduction. The associated impact assessment for this proposal simply states that the costs are not known. As identified earlier, in times of austerity, it is essential that the cost of proposals is known before a decision is taken to implement them. 8 Home Office consultation on changes to the police disciplinary system, November 2014, accessed via on 19 January

10 Q19: Given the proposed changes to handling mitigations, are there any additional safeguards that would need to be put in place? Q20: Are there any consequences for force welfare systems? The Staff Associations do not recognise the problem that these proposals seek to address. The panel has the discretion to draw an adverse inference if the officer relies on a fact at the hearing which he or she could have mentioned either after being served with a notice of investigation, or in his or her Regulation 22 response. The Staff Associations are opposed to the proposal that a panel can disregard, or attach less weight to, mitigation that could have been declared earlier. If this is intended to mean at the time of the Regulation 22 response it is neither feasible nor reasonable to restrict mitigation to that notified in the short time scale of fourteen working days from service of the Regulation 21 notice. This takes no account of the possibility that an officer who initially indicates an intention to deny the allegation may later decides to change his or her plea, This proposal might serve as a disincentive to such a change of mind which should, in fact, be encouraged where appropriate. More importantly, it is not always possible in the tight time frame for the officer s representative to take sufficient instructions and to speak to every potential defence or character witness so as to be able to set out every point and detail of mitigation. The current Regulations are more than adequate to encourage early notice of points of mitigation and with the potential of an adverse inference being drawn if later additions or changes are made without good reason [see Regulation 33(10)]. Para 3.39: This paragraph states that the IPCC should present those cases where it has carried out an independent investigation and directs that a case should be taken to a hearing (and any subsequent appeals hearings) The Staff Associations are supportive of this proposal. Q21: Which of these options do you prefer? (Re: appeal hearings location) 10

11 As with other proposals relating to the location of hearings, the Staff Associations expect these to be subject to a cost-benefit analysis to justify their introduction. Fundamentally, we are not opposed to regionalising/nationalising hearings, but further analysis needs to be provided before we can provide further objective comment. Para 3.41 and Q22: This paragraph and question relate to introducing a lay member to the panel instead of a retired officer. The Staff Associations do not agree that the retired officer who sits on the panel ought to be replaced by a lay-member. In employment tribunals, the panel usually consists of a judge, a person representing the employer's organisation and a person representing an employee's organisation 9. Allowing a disciplinary panel to be made up of an independent, legally qualified Chair, a senior officer and a lay person would cause an imbalance to the judging panel in favour of the employer s side. Q23: Are there any practical reasons why dismissal with notice is justified in certain cases? The inclusion of the outcome of dismissal with notice is to ensure that the police officer procedures are in line with employment practice and to provide maximum flexibility to the misconduct panel. Similarly the inclusion of an extended final written warning provides the misconduct panel with flexibility when deciding outcome. There may be an occasion, for example, where an officer has a live final written warning and commits a minor misconduct matter which results in a misconduct hearing. The panel may decide that the officer should not be dismissed, yet would be prevented from issuing another warning unless it had the availability of an extended final warning (on one occasion only). The Staff Associations are concerned by the tone and use of language within paragraph 3.42, insofar as it places an unnecessary priority on taking a robust approach to police discipline. Whilst we fully accept the need for disciplinary 9 Employment tribunal hearings, Citizens Advice Bureau web page, accessed via ment_tribunal_hearings.htm on 19 January

12 processes and procedures to be robust, it is absolutely essential that they are fair, balanced and proportionate. Para 3.44: This paragraph suggests changing the language used in warnings where the conduct would not lead to dismissal. It proposes that a memo of correction could replace management advice and that a written corrective warning and a final corrective reprimand could replace current written warnings. The Staff Associations do not agree that these terms need to change. The ACAS code of practice on disciplinary and grievance procedures 10 uses these terms, or similar terms, in its procedures whether they lead to dismissal or not. The Staff Associations believe that adopting different (and not understood) terminology would only serve to create confusion and undermine public confidence in the police discipline system, and would not assist in harmonising the police officer and police staff systems. Q24: For how long should warnings remain on officers records? The Staff Associations would welcome clarification on the meaning of this question. ; Does it refer to how long a warning should remain live or how long it should remain on a personal record (as per Regulation 15 of Police Regulations) or both? ACAS guidance on disciplinary and grievance procedures advocates that records of warnings should be kept, but disregarded for disciplinary purposes, after a specified period. ; It suggests periods of six months for written warnings and twelve months for final written warnings. The current arrangements within the Police Conduct & Performance Regulations already exceed these timeframes and there does not appear to be any evidential base for proposals within the Chapman review to extend them. 10 Code of Practice 1: Disciplinary and grievance procedures, ACAS, (2009). [Accessed via on 19 January 2015] 12

13 Q25: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the principle of bringing together the staff and police disciplinary systems into one single system? Q26: What issues should the government consider before deciding whether it should implement options one or two? The Staff Associations do not believe that there is necessarily a need to bring police staff and police officer disciplinary systems into one via regulation. This is because the Police Staff Council s joint circular no already provides guidance on how the two systems should link together. There is no impediment to forces bringing their police staff discipline system in line with the regulated police officer system. There is therefore no reason in principle why a police officer and police staff member could not appear before a misconduct hearing together in the same way as two police officers facing allegations arising from the same incident could equally be dealt with at the same proceedings. This reinforces the Staff Associations view that the language in the system (i.e. written and final written warnings) is important and should be retained in order to assist with harmonising the police staff and police officer systems. Compelling police officers to answer IPCC questions: Q27: Which option for compelling police officers to answer IPCC questions do you think the government should pursue? The Staff Associations do not agree that there is any need to implement a power to ensure a robust link between the expectations, if not a duty, on officers to answer IPCC questions and sanctions for failure to do so. Providing three options for change, without first inviting consultation on the principle of introducing this change, is disingenuous and suggests there is little genuine desire to consult on this issue. The fundamental position here is that officers who are being treated as witnesses cannot be compelled to answer questions in interview. Any change to this would be a 11 Police Staff Council joint circular no. 68, Police Staff Council handbook: Part 3 guidance on police staff misconduct procedures, 2011, accessed via on 19 January

14 very serious erosion of fundamental freedoms which would, if implemented, undoubtedly result in challenge and litigation. There is no evidence to support the contention that change is necessary. Police officers do, on many occasions, answer IPCC questions. The area in which officers often choose to provide statements, written by themselves rather than permit the IPCC to draft their statements for them after interview, are those in which the officers have used force resulting in death or serious injury, and when their actions and use of force is the focus of the investigation, and where they are at risk of becoming suspects rather than witnesses. In almost no cases, of which the Staff Associations are aware, have officers in such a situation refused to provide a statement as an alternative to answering questions. In no case has a jury at an inquest commented on the process to the effect that it has hindered the inquest proceedings. In the recent Mark Duggan inquest, the jury was specifically asked by the coroner to comment on the post incident process including the fact that officers had provided their evidence in statements and not answered questions in interview, and it declined to do so. The lawful killing verdict implicitly said that the jury was satisfied that the process by which officers had provided their evidence did not undermine their integrity. In effect, that the process followed was fit for purpose. The Staff Associations view is that it is quite wrong to describe an officer choosing to provide their own statement in preference to one being prepared by the IPCC as not co-operating with the investigation. Whilst a failure to provide any statement when asked to by the IPCC might be so described, it is wrong, and the cause of some friction, when an officer may simply be following the guidance contained within the Authorised Professional Practice Armed Policing Post Deployment section headed, Providing Accounts, which was issued by the College of Policing and updated as recently as September There are very few examples within criminal law of a compulsion to assist investigators when there is a risk of prosecution. One of the rare examples is in investigations conducted by the Health & Safety Executive, for example into an accident at work resulting in death. Here, whilst Health & Safety investigators have a power to compel individuals to answer questions and to produce documents, the legislation also provides a protection to the individual so compelled that nothing said 14

15 by them, or produced by them, can be used against them in any criminal proceedings. The Staff Associations contend that this situation is entirely different to the IPCC investigating a death following police contact as the Article 2 requirement underpinning the investigation is to be able to identify when force used is not justified and to bring proceedings against the individual concerned. If the purpose of the investigation was restricted to establishing what actually happened in order to prevent re-occurrence in the future (as in an H&SE investigation) then such a power might be appropriate. But it would not be appropriate in an Article 2 investigation. The Staff Associations point out that many of the officers subject to IPCC investigations following a death are volunteers, e.g. firearms officers. It is not fanciful to suggest that should there be an obligation on officers to answer questions by investigators there would be a direct impact on the number of officers volunteering for such duties. This would not be in the public interest. The Staff Associations can cite a number of examples in which immediately after interview as a witness, the IPCC has then served an officer with a notice under Regulation 15/16 changing their status to suspect, or have invited an officer to interview as a witness and then criminally cautioned the officer. The IPCC s current policy is to serve a pre-prepared letter on an officer attending interview as a witness, or to verbally warn them, that whilst their status at present is as a witness, the officer s actions are subject of the investigation and their status could change [see IPCC Police Witness Policy]. It is simply not reasonable to ignore this hybrid status and to criticise, or limit the officer from, taking a cautious approach. The Staff Associations urge the Government to recognise the hybrid status of officers subject of an IPCC Article 2 investigation and not to pursue any of the options set out in the paper. Strengthening Protections for Police Whistleblowers: Q28. To what extent do you agree that the IPCC should have the power to manage the early stages of an investigation brought to their attention directly by a whistleblower before informing the force? 15

16 The Staff Associations recognise the position as described in paragraph 4.11 whereby some officers choose not to come forward because of the fear of disciplinary action or other detrimental treatment. Officers can already choose to report concerns direct to the IPCC as it is a prescribed person for the purpose of the public interest disclosure protections within the Employment Rights Act. What is proposed is to allow an investigation by the IPCC into a conduct matter raised by a whistleblower with the IPCC, without that matter first being recorded by the force, and to allow the IPCC control over the early stages of the process. This might be considered to provide the whistleblower with more confidence that the investigation will be carried out properly, without the inevitable desire to justify the position which might be felt with an internal investigation. An external investigation may also provide the whistleblower with better protection in terms of confidentiality. However, the Staff Associations would be concerned to ensure that the rights of those who are subject to such investigations are protected. Q29. How should cases reported by whistleblowers to the IPCC which fall below serious and sensitive be dealt with? The proposal is that matters will continue to be dealt with by the force if they are assessed as being less serious and sensitive, or if they are personal grievances or HR matters. Guidance could be included as to how internal wrong-doing investigations should be dealt with, for example the presumption that they should be investigated by a different department, and that there should be confidentiality. Q30. To what extent do you agree the introduction of sealed investigations will increase the ability of the IPCC to carry out investigations and prevent the possibility of collusion, destruction of evidence or pressure being applied to an investigation? The proposal to introduce sealed investigations could provide additional protections as set out, and could also assist in keeping the identity of the whistleblower confidential. However, the Staff Associations would be concerned to ensure 16

17 protection of the rights of any individual officers who are the subject of the allegations. Q31. At what points in the process do you think a whistleblower should have a right to feedback? Failure to consult whistleblowers fully during the investigation and to keep them updated as the investigation proceeds are common complaints by individuals who are whistleblowers. The Staff Associations suggest that feedback should be provided at the following points in the process at least: On receipt of the complaint On the decision being made as to who will conduct the investigation On the decision being made as to whether there will be any criminal or misconduct investigation On the decision being made as to whether there will be any criminal or misconduct charges At the conclusion of any criminal or misconduct process At the conclusion of the investigation into the wrongdoing On any action taken in respect of individuals On any proposed organisational changes such as policy changes On a 4 weekly basis (if there has been no report during the previous 4 weeks) Q32. For each of the issues set out above, please state whether a whistleblower should, or should not, have a right to be consulted by the IPCC. The Staff Associations consider that a whistleblower should have the right to be consulted at each of the stages referred to in the question. Q33. To what extent do you agree with the proposal to give whistleblowers the opportunity to request an independent review of any decision that they have a case to answer regarding their conduct? The Staff Associations support this proposal. The provisions of the Employment Rights Act which protect whistleblowers are highly technical and complex and, in our experience, can be difficult for forces to apply. The ability to request a review by an independent legally qualified chair will assist forces in understanding their obligations 17

18 and in ensuring that whistleblowers are not subjected to unlawful detrimental treatment. The existence of the right to request an independent review might also reassure officers considering blowing the whistle that they will not be subject to unlawful discipline. The proposal is that the right to request an independent review should apply to any individual who has blown the whistle in the twelve months preceding the allegation against them. However, there is no such time limit in the protection afforded by the Employment Rights Act. We suggest that a right to request a review should not be time limited in this way. The time which has passed since the disclosure was made is one of the factors which the legally qualified chair should take into account when conducting the independent review. Q34 To what extent do you agree or disagree that the identity of a police whistleblower should be protected by law? A lack of confidence in the confidentiality of the process is, in our view, one of the central concerns of officers who are considering blowing the whistle and one of the factors which prevents officers from doing so. The Staff Associations support the proposal to keep the identity of whistleblowers confidential. We note that many forces policies already contain assurances in this regard, but these assurances are often not carried through in practice. The guidance should provide concrete suggestions as to how this may be achieved. Q35 Are there circumstances where guidance should recommend that prosecutors consider the SOCPA provisions for police whistleblowers with information about serious criminality in their force? We note that the power to offer immunity already exists but is used extremely rarely. The Staff Associations would support guidance making forces more aware of this power and encouraging consideration of its use in appropriate cases. Wider awareness of the power might encourage more whistleblowers to come forward. The Role and Powers of the IPCC: The Staff Associations would welcome further discussions with the Home Office and other stakeholders on the future structure and remit of the IPCC. 18

19 The proposals in the consultation document seek to give more power and responsibility to Police and Crime Commissioners to handle and resolve complaints at a local level. It must therefore follow that consideration should be given to wider structural reform of the police complaints system, including the role of the IPCC. The Staff Associations suggest that there should be an examination of whether a democratically elected Police and Crime Commissioner should be responsible for having oversight of the complaints system in their force, including the power and responsibility to commission investigations where the PCC believes it is necessary. Such a fundamental review could examine a range of issues including; the commissioning of investigations; reducing bureaucracy in the system, and the funding of the complaints system. The consultation questions are, in our view, too narrow and do not consider the possibility of broader more sweeping reforms which could increase complainant and police officer confidence, reduce bureaucracy and cost, and provide local accountability. The Staff Associations would welcome the opportunity of engaging with the Home Office and other key stakeholders to explore opportunities to improve the police complaints system. 19