CS346: Advanced Databases

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1 CS346: Advanced Databases Alexandra I. Cristea Data Security and Privacy

2 Outline Chapter: Database Security in Elmasri and Navathe (chapter 24, 6 th Edition) Brief overview of database security More detailed study of database privacy Statistical databases, and differential privacy to protect data Data anonymization: k-anonymity and l-diversity Why? A topical issue: privacy and security are big concerns Connections to computer security, statistics 2

3 Database Security and Privacy Database Security and Privacy is a large and complex area, covering: Legal and ethical requirements for data privacy E.g. UK Data Protection Act (1998) Determines for how long data can be retained about people Government and organisation policy issues on data sharing E.g. when and how credit reports, medical data can be shared System-level issues for security management How is access to data controlled by the system? Classification of data by security levels (secret, unclassified) How to determine if access to data is permitted? 3

4 Threats to Databases Databases faces many threats which must be protected against Integrity: prevent improper modification of the data Caused by intention or accident, insider or outsider threat Erroneous data can lead to incorrect decisions, fraud, errors Availability: is the data available to users and programs? Denial of service attacks prevent access, cost revenue/reputation Confidentiality: protect data from unauthorized disclosure Leakage of information could violate law, customer confidence Sometimes referred to as the CIA triad 4

5 Control measures Security is provided by control measures of various types Access control: affect who can access the data / the system Different users may have different levels of access Inference control: control what data implies about individuals Try to make it impossible to infer facts about individuals Flow control: prevent information from escaping the database E.g. can data be transferred to other applications? Control covert channels that can be used to leak data Data Encryption: store encrypted data in the database At the field level or at the whole file level Trade-off between security and ease of processing 5

6 Information Security and Information Privacy The dividing line between security and privacy is hard to draw Security: prevent unauthorised use of system and data E.g. access controls to lock out unauthorised users E.g. encryption to hide data from those without the key Privacy: control the use of data Ensure that private information does not emerge from queries Ability of individuals to control the use of their data Will focus on database privacy for the remainder 6

7 Statistical Databases and Privacy Statistical databases keep data on large groups E.g. national population data (Office of National Statistics) The raw data in statistical databases is confidential Detailed data about individuals e.g. from census Users are permitted to retrieve statistics from the data E.g. averages, sums, counts, maximum values etc. Providing security for statistical databases is a big challenge Many crafty ways to extract private information from them The database should prevent queries that leak information 7

8 Statistical Database challenges Very specific queries can refer to a single person E.g. SELECT AVG(Salary) FROM EMPLOYEE WHERE AGE=22 AND POSTCODE= W1A 1AA AND DNO=5 : 45,000 SELECT COUNT(*) FROM EMPLOYEE WHERE AGE=22 AND POSTCODE= W1A 1AA AND DNO=5 AND SALARY>40000 : 1 How would you detect and reject such queries? Can arrange queries where the difference is small SELECT COUNT(*) FROM EMPLOYEE WHERE AGE>=22 AND DNO=5 AND SALARY>40000 : 12 SELECT COUNT(*) FROM EMPLOYEE WHERE AGE>=23 AND DNO=5 AND SALARY>40000 : 11 8

9 Differential Privacy for Statistical Databases Principle: query answers reveals little about any individual Even if adversary knows (almost) everything about everyone else! Thus, individuals should be secure about contributing their data What is learnt about them is about the same either way Much work on providing differential privacy (DP) Simple recipe for some data types (e.g. numeric answers) Simple rules allow us to reason about composition of results More complex algorithms for arbitrary data Adopted and used by several organizations: US Census, Common Data Project, Facebook (?) 9

10 Differential Privacy Definition The output distribution of a differentially private algorithm changes very little whether or not any individual s data is included in the input so you should contribute your data 10

11 Laplace Mechanism The Laplace Mechanism adds random noise to query results Scaled to mask the contribution of any individual Add noise from a symmetric continuous distribution to true answer Laplace distribution is a symmetric exponential distribution Laplace provides DP for COUNT queries, as shifting the distribution changes the probability by at most a constant factor 11

12 Sensitivity of Numeric Functions For more complex functions, we need to calibrate the noise to the influence an individual can have on the output The (global) sensitivity of a function F is the maximum (absolute) change over all possible adjacent inputs S(F) = max D, D : D-D =1 F(D) F(D ) Intuition: S(F) characterizes the scale of the influence of one individual, and hence how much noise we must add S(F) is small for many common functions S(F) = 1 for COUNT S(F) = 2 for HISTOGRAM Female Male Bounded for other functions (MEAN, covariance matrix ) 12

13 Data Anonymization The idea of data anonymization is compelling, has many applications For Data Sharing Give real(istic) data to others to study without compromising privacy of individuals in the data Allows third-parties to try new analysis and mining techniques not thought of by the data owner For Data Retention and Usage Various requirements prevent companies from retaining customer information indefinitely E.g. Google progressively anonymizes IP addresses in search logs Internal sharing across departments (e.g. billing marketing) 13

14 Case Study: US Census Raw data: information about every US household Who, where; age, gender, racial, income and educational data Why released: determine representation, planning How anonymized: aggregated to geographic areas (Zip code) Broken down by various combinations of dimensions Released in full after 72 years Attacks: no reports of successful deanonymization Recent attempts by FBI to access raw data rebuffed Consequences: greater understanding of US population Affects representation, funding of civil projects Rich source of data for future historians and genealogists 14

15 Case Study: Netflix Prize Raw data: 100M dated ratings from 480K users to 18K movies Why released: improve predicting ratings of unlabeled examples How anonymized: exact details not described by Netflix All direct customer information removed Only subset of full data; dates modified; some ratings deleted, Movie title and year published in full Attacks: dataset is claimed vulnerable Attack links data to IMDB where same users also rated movies Find matches based on similar ratings or dates in both Consequences: rich source of user data for researchers Unclear how serious the attacks are in practice 15

16 Case Study: AOL Search Data Raw data: 20M search queries for 650K users from 2006 Why released: allow researchers to understand search patterns How anonymized: user identifiers removed All searches from same user linked by an arbitrary identifier Attacks: many successful attacks identified individual users Ego-surfers: people typed in their own names Zip codes and town names identify an area NY Times identified user as 62yr old widow Consequences: CTO resigned, two researchers fired Well-intentioned effort failed due to inadequate anonymization 16

17 Last time: generalities about security, privacy; case studies privacy Next: Anonymisation, de-identification, attacks 17

18 Models of Anonymization Interactive Model (akin to statistical databases) Data owner acts as gatekeeper to data Researchers pose queries in some agreed language Gatekeeper gives an (anonymized) answer, or refuses to answer Send me your code model Data owner executes code on their system and reports result Cannot be sure that the code is not malicious Offline, aka publish and be damned model Data owner somehow anonymizes data set Publishes the results to the world, and retires The model used in most real data releases 18

19 Objectives for Anonymization Prevent (high confidence) inference of associations Prevent inference of salary for an individual in census Prevent inference of individual s viewing history in video Prevent inference of individual s search history in search All aim to prevent linking sensitive information to an individual Prevent inference of presence of an individual in the data set Satisfying presence also satisfies association (not vice-versa) Presence in a data set can violate privacy (e.g., STD clinic patients) Have to consider what knowledge might be known to attacker Background knowledge: facts about the data set (X has salary Y) Domain knowledge: broad properties of data (illness Z rare in men) 19

20 Utility Anonymization is meaningless if utility of data not considered The empty data set has perfect privacy, but no utility The original data has full utility, but no privacy What is utility? Depends what the application is For fixed query set, can look at maximum or average error Problem for publishing: want to support unknown applications! Need some way to quantify utility of alternate anonymizations 20

21 Definitions of Technical Terms Identifiers uniquely identify, e.g. Social Security Number (SSN) Step 0: remove all identifiers Was not enough for AOL search data Quasi-Identifiers (QI) such as DOB, Sex, ZIP Code Enough to partially identify an individual in a dataset DOB+Sex+ZIP unique for 87% of US Residents [Sweeney 02] Sensitive attributes (SA) the associations we want to hide Salary in the census example is considered sensitive Not always well-defined: only some search queries sensitive In video, association between user and video is sensitive One SA can reveal others: bonus may identify salary 21

22 Tabular Data Example Census data recording incomes and demographics SSN DOB Sex ZIP Salary /21/76 M , /13/86 F , /28/76 M , /21/76 M , /13/86 F , /28/76 F ,000 Releasing SSN Salary association violates individual s privacy SSN is an identifier, Salary is a sensitive attribute (SA) 22

23 Tabular Data Example: De-Identification Census data: remove SSN to create de-identified table Remove an attribute from the data DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 M ,000 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 F ,000 Does the de-identified table preserve an individual s privacy? Depends on what other information an attacker knows 23

24 Tabular Data Example: Linking Attack De-identified private data + publicly available data DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 M ,000 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 F ,000 SSN DOB /21/ /28/76 Cannot uniquely identify either individual s salary DOB is a quasi-identifier (QI) 24

25 Tabular Data Example: Linking Attack De-identified private data + publicly available data DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 M ,000 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 F ,000 SSN DOB Sex /21/76 M /28/76 M Uniquely identified one individual s salary, but not the other s DOB, Sex are quasi-identifiers (QI) 25

26 Tabular Data Example: Linking Attack De-identified private data + publicly available data DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 M ,000 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 F ,000 SSN DOB Sex ZIP /21/76 M /28/76 M Uniquely identified both individuals salaries [DOB, Sex, ZIP] is unique for lots of US residents [Sweeney 02] 26

27 Tabular Data Example: Anonymization Anonymization through row suppression / deletion DOB Sex ZIP Salary * * * * 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 M ,000 * * * * 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 F ,000 SSN DOB Sex ZIP /21/76 M Cannot link to private table even with knowledge of QI values Missing values could take any permitted value Looses a lot of information from the data 27

28 Tabular Data Example: Anonymization Anonymization through QI attribute generalization DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 M 537** 50,000 4/13/86 F 537** 55,000 2/28/76 * 537** 60,000 1/21/76 M 537** 65,000 4/13/86 F 537** 70,000 2/28/76 * 537** 75,000 SSN DOB Sex ZIP /21/76 M /28/76 M Cannot uniquely identify row with knowledge of QI values Fewer possibilities than row suppression E.g., ZIP = 537** ZIP {53700,, 53799} 28

29 k-anonymization k-anonymity: Table T satisfies k-anonymity with respect to quasiidentifier QI if and only if each tuple in (the multiset) T[QI] appears at least k times Protects against linking attack k-anonymization: Table T is a k-anonymization of T if T is a generalization/suppression of T, and T satisfies k-anonymity DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 M ,000 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 F , T DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 M 537** 50,000 4/13/86 F 537** 55,000 2/28/76 * 537** 60,000 1/21/76 M 537** 65,000 4/13/86 F 537** 70,000 2/28/76 * 537** 75,000 T

30 k-anonymization and queries Data Analysis Analysis should (implicitly) range over all possible tables Example question: what is the salary of individual (1/21/76, M, 53715)? Best guess is 57,500 (average of 50,000 and 65,000) Example question: what is the maximum salary of males in 53706? Could be as small as 50,000, or as big as 75,000 DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 M 537** 50,000 4/13/86 F 537** 55,000 2/28/76 * 537** 60,000 1/21/76 M 537** 65,000 4/13/86 F 537** 70,000 2/28/76 * 537** 75,000 30

31 Homogeneity Attack Issue: k-anonymity requires each tuple in (the multiset) T[QI] to appear k times, but does not say anything about the SA values If (almost) all SA values in a QI group are equal, loss of privacy! The problem is with the choice of grouping, not the data DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 M ,000 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 F ,000 Not Ok! DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 * 537** 50,000 4/13/86 * 537** 55,000 2/28/76 * 537** 60,000 1/21/76 * 537** 50,000 4/13/86 * 537** 55,000 2/28/76 * 537** 60,000 31

32 Homogeneity Attack Issue: k-anonymity requires each tuple in (the multiset) T[QI] to appear k times, but does not say anything about the SA values If (almost) all SA values in a QI group are equal, loss of privacy! The problem is with the choice of grouping, not the data For some groupings, no loss of privacy DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 M ,000 1/21/76 M ,000 4/13/86 F ,000 2/28/76 F ,000 Ok! DOB Sex ZIP Salary * , * , * , * , * , * ,000 32

33 Homogeneity Intuition: A k-anonymized table T represents the set of all possible tables T i s.t. T is a k-anonymization of T i Lack of diversity of SA values implies that for large fraction of possible tables, some fact is true, which can violate privacy DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 * 537** 50,000 4/13/86 * 537** 55,000 2/28/76 * 537** 60,000 1/21/76 * 537** 50,000 4/13/86 * 537** 55,000 2/28/76 * 537** 60,000 SSN DOB Sex ZIP /21/76 M

34 l-diversity l-diversity Principle: a table is l-diverse if each of its QI groups contains at least l well-represented values for the SA Frequency l-diversity: for each QI group g, no SA value should occur more than 1/l fraction of the time DOB Sex ZIP Salary 1/21/76 * 537** 50,000 4/13/86 * 537** 50,000 2/28/76 * 537** 60,000 1/21/76 * 537** 55,000 4/13/86 * 537** 55,000 2/28/76 * 537** 65,000 Even l-diversity has its weaknesses: an adversary can use machine learning techniques to make inferences about individuals 34

35 Summary Concepts in database security: integrity, availability, confidentiality Statistical databases, and differential privacy to protect data Data anonymization: k-anonymity and l-diversity Identifiers, Quasi-identifiers, sensitive attributes Recommended reading: Chapter: Database Security in Elmasri and Navathe A Firm Foundation for Private Data Analysis, Cynthia Dwork k-anonymity, V. Ciriani, S. De Capitani di Vimercati, S. Foresti, and P. Samarati 35

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