Impacts of a national government s social cash transfer program on violence against adolescent girls and boys: Evidence from Zimbabwe

Transcription

1 Impacts of a national government s social cash transfer program on violence against adolescent girls and boys: Evidence from Zimbabwe Tia Palermo with Sudhanshu Handa, Amber Peterman, David Seidenfeld & the Zimbabwe Transfer Project Evaluation Team SVRI Forum, 2015 Stellenbosch, South Africa Results are preliminary please do not cite without permission

2 Zimbabwe Transfer Project Evaluation Team Principal Investigators: David Seidenfeld (AIR) Sudhanshu Handa (UNICEF & UNC) Billy Mukamuri (Centre of Applied Social Sciences CASS) Other contributors: AIR: Andi Coombes, Thomas de Hoop, Cassandra Jessee, Leah Prencipe, Hannah Reeves, Rosa Castro Zarzur FAO: Silvio Daidone UNC: Sarah Abdoulayi, Gustavo Angeles, Garima Bhalla, Mary Jane Hill UNICEF Office of Research Innocenti: Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo

3 Motivation: Focus on Cash Transfers Explosion in SSA: >120 programs across Africa, ~30 long-term development programs in 20 countries (Garcia & Moore 2012) 2010: ~ half of African countries (21) had a UCT 2014: nearly doubled to 37 countries (Gentilini et al. 2014) Reviews of what works to facilitate healthier youth transitions in low-middle income countries: cash transfers as promising interventions (McQueston et al. 2013; Pettifor et al. 2012) Emerging evidence: cash transfers potential to affect intimate partner violence (IPV), however focus is on partnered women (>=15 years) (Bobonis et al. 2013; Haushofer & Shapiro, 2013; Hidrobo et al. 2015; Hidrobo & Fernald 2013; Perova 2010)

4 Why might violence against youth be different? Violence type Sexual violence/ transactional sex School based violence: authorities, peers/bullying Physical violence inside household Intimate partner violence Causes & pathways Exposure to unsafe environments, poverty Exposure to institutions Norms, stress, time use, poverty Dating, marriage, gender norms, stress, poverty, alcohol

5 Transfer Project (TP): Overview Who we are: Community of research, donor and implementing partners focus on coordination in efforts and uptake of results UNICEF, UNC-Chapel Hill, Save the Children, National Governments What we do: Provide rigorous evidence on of government-run largescale (unconditional) SCTs Motivation: Income poverty has highly damaging impacts on human development Cash empowers people living in poverty to make their own decisions on how to improve their lives Where: Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

6 Zimbabwe Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) Implementation: Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (MPSLSW) & UNICEF Zimbabwe technical support Targeting: Food-poor and labor constrained households Transfer amount: USD per month (~20% of baseline household consumption) Coverage: At midline survey, 55,500 households in 20 districts; Currently 69,000 households. Program design: Unconditional (no co-responsibilities to receiving cash)

7 HSCT Evaluation Design Design: District Matched Case Control (3 Treatment, 3 control) with 90 wards (60 Treatment and 30 control) Surveys: 2013 (baseline), 2014 (midline), 2016 (endline) Instrument: Household surveys with additional private interviews with same sex enumerators for up to 3 youth (ages at baseline) Baseline Sample size: N=3,063 households and N=1,600 youth (approx. 800 youth/wave) Attrition: Household attrition is 14%, no evidence of differential attrition, use Inverse Probability Weights for overall attrition. Mixed methods: Nested qualitative longitudinal & process evaluation for operational performance of HSCT.

8 Outcome Indicators Physical violence: slapped, pushed, hit with a fist, kicked, beat with an object (12 months) Severe physical violence: hit with a fist, kicked, beat with an object (12 months) Lifetime forced sex: ever pressured, tricked or forced to have sex OR first sex was pressured, tricked or forced Sexual violence: pressured, tricked or forced to have sexual intercourse/perform other acts (12 months asked at midline only) Transactional sex: ever given/received money/gifts/favors for sex (Lifetime)

9 Modeling Probit regression models reporting marginal effects Use difference-in-difference models (DD) Control for baseline individual, household, community characteristics Uses only panel households Cluster standard errors at district-ward level Weights adjust for: 1) probability of appearing in sample (among all eligible youth in any given household) and 2) household overall attrition

10 Balance at baseline of violence outcomes Control (n=245) Baseline Treat (n=548) Control (n=250) Midline Treat (n=554) p-value* Lifetime forced sex month sexual violence Lifetime transactional sex month Physical violence month Slapped/pushed month Punched/kicked month Threatened knife/gun month Severe physical violence *Tests for differences between T & C at baseline

11 Program Impacts: DD models Outcome Forced sex (lifetime) Sexual violence (12-month cross-sectional) All youth (N=1597) Females (N = 801) Males (N = 796) ** - - (-2.563) ** - - (-2.058) Any physical violence (12-month) ** (1.019) (2.502) (-0.704) Severe physical violence (12- month) (1.041) (0.720) (1.096) Transactional sex (lifetime) (1.235) (1.114) (0.851)

12 Perpetrators among those experiencing physical violence (last experience) Controls, Baseline Controls, Midline Treatment, Baseline Treatment, Midline

13 Summary and next steps Some evidence of reduced sexual violence, further analysis needs to focus on pathways No impacts on physical violence overall, but: Increases in less severe violence among girls? Most common perpetrators: relatives, peers & authority figures Many limitations (small sample, selection of youth) Longer term data collection needed (endline in May/June 2016) Analysis of qualitative data

14 For more information Transfer Project website: Briefs: New (as of February 2015): Methodological brief on adolescent modules Methodological brief violence Brief on education impacts Facebook: Tia Palermo,

15 Acknowledgements The Zimbabwe HSCT Evaluation is being conducted by the American Institutes for Research (AIR), under contract to UNICEF, with funding from the Cooperating Partners UNICEF, Department for International Development (DfID), the European Union (EU), Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), Kingdom of the Netherlands, Embassy of Sweden/Sida. The Principal Investigators for the overall evaluation are David Seidenfeld (AIR) and Sudhanshu Handa (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; UNC). The Zimbabwe-based Principal Investigators are Mr. Sydney G. Mhishi of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare (MPSLSW) and Billy Mukamuri of CASS.

16 Works cited Works cited Bobonis, G., M. Gonzalez-Brenes, and R. Castro Public Transfers and Domestic Violence: The Roles of Private Information and Spousal Control. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (1): Cluver L, Boyes M, Orkin M, Pantelic M, Molwena T, & Sherr L. (2013). Child-focused state cash transfers and adolescent risk of HIV infection in South Africa: a propensity-score-matched case-control study. The Lancet Global Health, 1(6), e362-e370. Garcia M., & CMT Moore. (2012). The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in sub-saharan Africa. The World Bank. Gentilini U, et al. (2014). The State of Social Safety Nets Report # World Bank, Washington DC. Haushofer, J., and J. Shapiro Welfare Effects of Unconditional Cash Transfers: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Kenya. Working Paper. Hidrobo, M., and L. Fernald Cash transfers and domestic violence. Journal of Health Economics 32 (1): Hidrobo, M., Peterman, A. and L. Heise The effect of cash, vouchers and food transfers on intimate partner violence: Evidence from a randomized experiment in northern Ecuador. Working paper. McQueston K, Silverman R, & A Glassman. (2013). The Efficacy of Interventions to Reduce Adolescent Childbearing in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic Review. Studies in Family Planning, 44(4): Pettifor A, Macphail C, Nguyen N, & Rosenberg M. (2012). Can Money Prevent the Spread of HIV? A Review of Cash Payments for HIV Prevention. AIDS Behav. 16(7): Perova, E Buying out of abuse: how changes in women's income affect domestic violence.

17 Table A1. Youth background characteristics Baseline 12-month follow-up Control Treatment Control Treatment Female Age (years) Enrolled in school Household size (log) Female household head Age of household head Widowed household head Divorced/Separated household head Highest grade of household head Distance to primary school (km) Mudzi UMP Binga Hwange Chiredzi