Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Sweden Background Report

Transcription

1 Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Sweden Background Report VIDHYA RAMALINGAM Executive Summary This report provides an overview of the development of counter-terrorism policies and policing in Sweden, and the impact these have had on minority communities in Sweden, particularly Muslim communities. The report presents existing research and information on demographics and socioeconomic contexts of ethnic minority communities, the development of a legal framework to address terrorism, the history of policy and policing with regard to counter-terrorism, the security context and attitudes towards counter-terrorism, and the political context surrounding migration, citizenship and terrorism. Part One outlines the history and current context of immigration and settlement of ethnic minority groups in Sweden, and provides a background on Sweden s demographics. In recent years, ethnic minorities, and Muslim communities in particular, have been a major focus of counter-terrorism measures and discourse in Sweden. This section provides an overview of Muslim migration to and settlement in Sweden, and the mixed and unfavourable outcomes for Muslims and other minority groups in the labour market, education and housing. It sets out recent data on ethnic and religious discrimination in Sweden, particularly towards Muslims after 9/11. Finally, this section outlines levels of cooperation between the government and Muslim civil society organisations, and notes that there have been high levels of cooperation; Muslim civil society organisations have also received generous funding from the state and Swedish foundations. Part Two details the key legislation used in relation to counter-terrorism in Sweden. Sweden was first confronted with acts of terrorism in the early 1970s, and the government introduced the first anti-terrorist legislation in It sets out the criminalisation of terrorist attacks, legal definitions of terrorism, and the institution of special laws on criminal responsibility for financing terrorism. This section furthermore discusses the legal framework for investigatory measures and surveillance, including the controversial FRA law which had allowed the National Defence Radio Establishment to monitor all phone and communications to and within Sweden without warrant, and, after heavy criticism, was amended in 2009

2 to improve privacy. Part Two ends with a discussion of checks and balances on counter-terrorism measures and laws. Part Three covers the policy context for counter-terrorism, providing an overview of the key policies in place to counter terrorism and violent extremism in Sweden. These include the Action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism, presented in December 2011, and Sweden s national counter-terrorism strategy, presented by the government in February This section presents the key institutional structures, including the structure of the Swedish Police Service, and roles and responsibilities in countering terrorism in Sweden. It then outlines mechanisms for accountability within for these structures, detailing parliamentary committees and consultations set up to scrutinise the work of the police and other institutions. The section ends with a discussion of police behaviour and incidences of police misconduct and discrimination in Sweden. Several key incidents have drawn attention to the problem of racial profiling by the police in Sweden. Part Four discusses Swedish experiences with terrorism, providing an account of terrorist incidents in Sweden since the early 1970s, when cases of Croatian separatist terrorism brought terrorism onto the political agenda. This section includes the numbers of arrests, trials and convictions for terrorism offences in Sweden, and details several key events in recent years that have contributed to increased concerns about terrorism. This includes the 2007 publication of a series of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, which sparked protests and violent threats towards Sweden and the cartoonist himself. The most recent significant terrorist attack on Swedish soil was the December 2010 suicide bombing in Stockholm, perpetrated by a Swedish citizen of Iraqi descent. This section also discusses perceptions of the threat of terrorism among the Swedish public. Part Five explains the political climate surrounding minority communities and counter-terrorism in Sweden, and how political parties have addressed issues concerning migration, citizenship, security and terrorism. Though Swedish politics has historically been characterised by consensus across party lines on the subject of immigration, and such issues have not been politicised, recent years have seen the perceived importance of immigration and terrorism as political issues grow. The emergence of the Sweden Democrats -an anti-immigrant party arguing for increased political attention to Islamist extremism and the threat posed by Muslim communities- in Parliament has not wavered the positions of mainstream parties on these issues. However, this section notes that the climate has become much harsher and the tough on crime card is more often played in election campaigns, and immigrants and Muslim communities in particular are often presented as problem communities in this respect. This shift in climate has significantly impacted ethnic and religious minorities in Sweden, and has had a particularly negative impact on Muslim communities, who have increasingly become the victims of suspicion and hatred, manifested in discrimination and violence. Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 2

3 This report draws upon existing research on the Swedish population, the development of migrant and minority communities, and in particular Muslim communities. It refers to official government communications and external analyses to paint a picture of the legal and policy approaches to counterterrorism and countering violent extremism in Sweden. Though there are Ombudsman statistics available on mistreatment by the police, and there has been some recent research to better understand attitudes and discriminatory behaviour within the police, more work must be done to assess the relationship between minority communities and the police. There has been little research directly on the impacts of counterterrorism measures on Muslim communities in Sweden, and this report lays the groundwork for future inquiries on this issue. Given the existing state of research, it is, however, clear that through a combination of persistent socio-economic disadvantage, shifts in the political climate on security and migrant communities, the occurrence of Sweden s first suicide bombing by an Islamist extremist, and increased government attention paid to Islamist extremism in Sweden, Muslim communities in Sweden have increasingly been subject both to suspicion and discrimination. Introduction This report presents an overview and background for inquiries into the development of counter-terrorism policies and policing in Sweden, and the impact these have had on minority communities in Sweden, particularly Muslim communities. In recent years, ethnic minorities and Muslim communities in particular have been a major focus of counter-terrorism measures and discourse in Sweden. As this report will demonstrate, Sweden is unique in a comparative perspective, given that the climate on issues of immigration has tended to be less harsh and less politicised than elsewhere in Europe, and that Sweden has historically had less direct experience with terrorism. However, recent events, including the controversial publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad and the occurrence of Sweden s first suicide bombing attack perpetrated by an Islamist extremist, have drawn heightened attention to and suspicion of Muslim communities as a perceived security threat. The report presents existing research and information on demographics and socio-economic contexts of ethnic minority communities, the development of a legal framework to address terrorism, the history of policy and policing with regard to counter-terrorism, the security context and attitudes towards counter-terrorism, and the political context surrounding migration, citizenship and terrorism. Part One: Population and Community Context 1.1 DEMOGRAPHICS This section outlines the history and current context of immigration and settlement of ethnic minority groups in Sweden, and provides a background on Sweden s demographics. Sweden is the largest of the Nordic countries. In May 2012, Sweden s population was 9.5 million (Statistics Sweden 2012). Sweden Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 3

4 was traditionally a country of emigration until World War II. Following the war, Swedish economic growth between 1950 and 1973 averaged 4 percent per year, with a significant demand for labour in manufacturing and the textile sector (Lemaître 2007). During the 1950s, Sweden invited immigrants to the country to make up for shortages in the labour market and most immigration in these years (and through the 1960s) was from other Nordic countries, with large flows of migration from Finland to Sweden. This was largely a result of the free Nordic labour market established in 1954, allowing any national of a Nordic country to move to another, establish residence there and seek employment without any official permits needed. Over this period, 550,000 Finns migrated to Sweden (Karan 2008). However, in the 1970s and 1980s, the nature and pace of immigration shifted from labour recruitment to the acceptance of migrants fleeing international crises. Since the 1970s, immigration to Sweden has been largely due to influxes of refugees and asylum seekers as well as family reunion cases. The ebbs and flows of Sweden s emigration and immigration over the last century are visible in Figure 1.1, depicting the post-war shift Sweden saw in migration. Figure 1.1: Sweden s immigration and emigration (in absolute numbers) Source: Bijl & Verweij (2012: 313) Shifts in immigration policy in Sweden can largely be attributed to shifts in the Swedish economy, with liberal immigration policies accompanying economic upturns and restrictions following economic downturns. The decline in economic and industrial growth over the 1970s in Sweden softened the need for foreign labour. The characteristics of migrants to Sweden changed dramatically through the 1970s, with migrants coming from non-european countries, the majority of refugees escaping wars, military coups and political instability in the Middle East, Africa and South America (Englund 2003). Sweden s immigrant population in the 1970s became dominated by refugees from Chile, Poland and Turkey. Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 4

5 Through the 1980s, much immigration to Sweden came from Chile, Ethiopia, Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East (Bevelander & Dahlstedt 2012). In the mid-1990s a wave of refugees escaping war in the former Yugoslavia arrived in Sweden, and, in 1994 alone, approximately 40,000 refugees from Bosnia were granted permanent residence in Sweden (Englund 2003). Since 2000, a comparatively high number of Iraqi refugees have sought asylum and settled in Sweden, perhaps a result of relatively liberal asylum rules. Since 1995, when Sweden became a member of the European Union, immigration from the rest of the EU and EEA has increased significantly. In 2012, 15.1 percent of the Swedish population is foreign-born and 19.6 percent of the population is Swedish-born with two foreign-born parents (foreign background) (Statistics Sweden 2012). Cumulatively, these statistics imply that 34.7 percent of the Swedish population is either foreign-born or have parents who are both foreign-born. Interestingly, the majority (58.9 percent) of the foreign-born population in Sweden are Swedish citizens. Individuals are entitled to citizenship and dual-nationality after five years of residence, or two years for Nordic citizens, which is granted without a language requirement. Swedishborn children are not, however, automatically granted Swedish citizenship, but may apply for citizenship before the age of 15 if their parents are long-term residents, or between years of age if they have lived in Sweden for three years. Statistics Sweden, an administrative agency supplying statistics, regularly assesses the demographic profile of Sweden, and a 2011 assessment of countries of origin of the foreign-born population indicates that the largest migrant groups today are from Finland, Iraq, Poland, the former Yugoslavia and Iran (Statistics Sweden 2011). Figure 1.2: Foreign-born persons in Sweden by country of birth, 2011 Foreign-born persons by country of birth (2011) Country Population Finland 166,723 Iraq 125,499 Poland 72,865 Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of 70,050 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 63,828 Bosnia and Herzegovina 56,290 Germany 48,442 Denmark 44,951 Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 5

6 Turkey 43,909 Norway 43,058 Somalia 40,165 Source: Statistics Sweden (2011) Over the last fifty years, the composition of Swedish society has changed significantly. There was, however, no comprehensive integration strategy articulated until the mid-1970s, when the official policy shifted from a focus on assimilation to 'integration.' In 1975 Sweden was officially proclaimed a multicultural society. The Swedish parliament adopted three goals for its immigrant and minority policies: jämlikhet, valfrihet, and samverkan (equality, freedom of choice, and cooperation) (Runblom 1994).The 1970s thus saw a policy of ethnic or cultural pluralism implemented, based on these three principles, which still characterise today's social policy towards immigrants. Equality was, and remains, a fundamental principle of the Swedish welfare state, and the aim was that immigrants have the same social and economic rights as all Swedes, and share the same obligations. The goal of freedom of choice implied that members of linguistic minorities must be able to choose the extent to which they acquire Swedish cultural identity and the extent to which they are to preserve and develop their original cultural identity (Blanck & Tydén 1995: 57). Finally, the objective of cooperation reflected the need for migrant groups and the Swedishborn population to work together, with mutual tolerance and solidarity (Karan 2008). Sweden began institutionalising various means of support for the cultural ambitions of immigrants. The Swedish Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen) of 1974 in the Swedish constitution encourages support for linguistic, religious, and cultural groups who prefer to maintain their characteristics (Runblom 1994). Swedish society witnessed a growth in support for journals and media accessible in immigrant languages and support for home-language instruction in public schools. By 1977, non-nationals with three years of residence were given the right to stand as candidates and vote in local elections at the municipal level. Qualifying for Swedish citizenship was made more accessible, for example through the Citizenship Act of 2001, which granted the right to dual citizenship, allowing foreign nationals to become Swedish citizens while keeping another nationality. Sweden today stands in stark contrast to the policies of its neighbouring Scandinavian countries. While immigrants to Denmark must sign a declaration vowing to fully integrate and adopt a Danish way of life, Swedish migration policy encourages immigrants to decide the extent of their own integration. Sweden s immigrant population has consistently been significantly higher than Danish figures, but Sweden continues to uphold its official emphasis on ethnic and cultural pluralism. In 1998, this approach was replaced by a more comprehensive integration strategy aimed at the whole population and a new central government agency, the Integration Board, was established to oversee Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 6

7 integration efforts throughout society. In 2012, the Minister of Integration is responsible for carrying out and developing integration policy, but Sweden has, in recent years, incorporated integration policy as part of all policy areas ( mainstreaming ). In 2008, the goals for Swedish integration policy were set out (Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality 2009): An effective service for receiving and introducing new arrivals; More people in work, more entrepreneurs; Better results and greater equality in schools; Better language skills and more adult education opportunities; Effective anti-discrimination measures; Positive development in urban districts where social exclusion is high; Common basic values in a society characterised by increasing diversity. The overall emphasis of the government s approach to integration is to increase the supply and demand of labour, and to create equality in schools. Education and employment have been designated the key focal points for Swedish integration policy. The Swedish approach follows the logic that the main barrier to integration is inability to obtain jobs, poor education, and poverty, and that better employment leads to better integration. Much of Sweden s integration work is carried out by the Ministry of Employment. Sweden has also, in recent years, transformed its immigration policy to allow employers to identify the immigrant workers whom they need, building in safeguards to give preference to Swedish and EU citizens. According to the 2011 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which ranks European integration policies according to best practices and European standards, Sweden s migration policies scored the highest of all 28 European countries in all six categories of integration policy measured. 1.2 MUSLIMS IN SWEDEN In recent years ethnic minorities, and Muslim communities in particular, have been a major focus of counter-terrorism measures and discourse in Sweden. This section focuses in on Muslim communities in Sweden to lay the groundwork for an assessment of the impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities. It is challenging to find specific data on the Muslim population in Sweden, due both to regulations dictating collection of data on religious affiliation in Sweden, as well as the lack of distinction made in Swedish integration policy between ethnic and religious groups. There are no official statistics on faith in the Swedish population, as information on religious belonging is generally considered private or unimportant, and rarely included in questionnaires and surveys. Another key issue is, of course, the lack of comfortable definition of Muslim, and what characteristics or practices fall under this category. Otterbeck (2010) notes that the term Muslim is often problematically used in Sweden as if it were the only, or prime, identity of people with a Muslim family history. Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 7

8 Estimations of the Muslim population in Sweden have ranged from estimates between 250,000 and 400,000 (Larsson 2007) to a recent estimate by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life of 451,000 people, or 4.9 percent of the population, in 2010 (Pew Research Center 2011). It is estimated that onethird of the Muslim population is made up of children and infants (Anwar et al. 2004). Otterbeck (2010) estimates that the number of converts to Islam in Sweden is between 5,000 and 10,000. Though Sweden has a smaller Muslim population than countries like the UK, Germany and France, Sweden s Muslim population is forecasted to grow significantly in the next 20 years. Recent research from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life indicates that the Muslim population in Sweden is projected to more than double in size in 20 years. The Muslim share of the population is projected to increase by 5 percentage points, from 4.9 percent in 2010 to 9.9 percent in 2030 (Pew Research Center 2011). Goran Larsson (2006) has argued that the Muslim community is a term which should be used with caution, and with the recognition that it is a collective label for a large number of different communities. It has tended to be described in both public and academic debates as a religious community, despite the reality that many Muslims in Sweden may be secularised. The Swedish Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities (Samarbetsnamnden for statsbiddraf till trossamfund, SST) notes that one-third of Muslims in Sweden claim that they are practicing, which is defined by the Commission as following the prescribed laws of Islam and visiting mosques or praying on a daily basis (Larsson 2007). According to the same source, two-thirds of Muslims can be considered secular, which the Commission characterises as, for example, not following laws of Islam and believing in a separation between religion and state. In Sweden, data on religious affiliation is collected by religious communities, like the Swedish Muslim Council (Sveriges Muslimska Råd), which will be discussed further below (EUMC 2006) Migration and settlement of Muslim communities Muslim migration to Sweden was essentially non-existent before the 1960s, and according to official statistics, Sweden had only 15 individuals of Muslim faith in 1930 (Karlsson & Svanberg 1995, cited in Otterbeck 2010). The first Islamic organisation was formed in 1949 by Muslim immigrants, and was called Turk-islamföreningen i Sverige för religion och kultur (The Turk-Islamic Association in Sweden for the Promotion of Religion and Culture) (Otterbeck 1998). This organisation was formed by Tatar migrants from the Baltic countries, and was, for many years, the only Swedish Muslim migrants association. This was followed by a minor Sufi circle and the Ahmadiyya movement groups formed in the 1950s. It is since the 1960s that the Muslim population in Sweden has grown, as immigrants arrived both from the Middle East and, particularly in the 1990s, the former Yugoslavia. The first wave of Muslims immigrants arrived from the 1960s through to 1985, primarily migrating from Turkey and the Balkans (Otterbeck 2010). These early arrivals of Muslims largely settled around the largest cities, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo, and largely consisted of single men recruited by Swedish companies. As a result of the economic crises in the early 1970s, Swedish immigration policy was tightened, making it more Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 8

9 difficult to enter Sweden for employment (Bevelander 2004), and Muslim migration was largely characterised by family reunification. However, since the late-1980s, refugees and asylum seekers, many of Muslim background, have dominated migration to Sweden. Bevelander (2004) estimates that at least 150,000 of the 400,000 individuals who sought refuge in Sweden from 1984 to 2001 have a Muslim family background. Otterbeck (2010) notes that particularly high numbers of Muslim migrants came as refugees from Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania. Iranian immigrants became a significant group in Sweden following the 1979 revolution in Iran and the war between Iran and Iraq. The Somali community and Bosnian community grew in the 1990s as conflicts erupted in Somalia and the Balkans. Sander (2004: 223 cited in Larsson 2007) notes that 150,000 people from the former Yugoslavia applied for asylum in Sweden between 1990 and 1993, including a large proportion of Muslims. The majority of Muslims who immigrated to Sweden have settled in Sweden s three largest cities, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo. 1.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA ON ETHNIC GROUPS Sweden is widely understood to be a success story for immigrant integration, with the Swedish model known to represent equality and prosperity. Sweden has consistently been ranked at the top of the MIPEX (Nielssen et al. 2007, MIPEX 2011). One of the central goals of integration approaches in Sweden has been to ensure full employment for all Swedes and migrants, and to increase political participation of immigrants. However, despite these favourable frameworks for integration, Sweden has seen some mixed social outcomes for migrant communities in Europe. It is widely acknowledged by government reports that immigrants to Sweden face structural discrimination in the labour market, housing market, mass media, the political system, legal system, educational system, and in welfare services (Karan 2008). In general, immigrants perform less well than native Swedes on many of these key areas; however the results for different immigrant groups are by no means uniform. For example, the Iranian community in Sweden is generally highly educated (Larsson 2007). It is generally understood that Bosnians are doing well in the Swedish labour market, while Iraqis have not done well (Bevelander & Lundh 2007). The statistics for the same groups living in different regions also reveals stark differences. For example, 69 percent of Iraqi men are employed in Järfälla while only 13 percent of them are employed in Sandviken. Nearly 94 percent of women from Bosnia-Herzegovina are employed in Sigtuna, whereas only 40 percent of them are employed in Landskrona (Otterbeck 2010). These differences may be explained by the structure of the local economy, as well as local attitudes towards migrant communities, and a number of other factors. Regardless of these diverse statistics, it is generally agreed that people with a Muslim Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 9

10 background are often significantly disadvantaged with regards to housing, education and the labour market. Because there is no official data in Sweden specifically on Muslims, it is difficult to paint a picture of Muslim experiences across key areas like health, housing, employment and education. Otterbeck (2010) notes that migrants from Muslim-majority countries have arrived largely during the last two decades, have had difficulties finding jobs and have settled in areas with the cheapest housing. Language skills are thus difficult to acquire due to lack of contact with native Swedish speakers Labour market These adverse conditions in Sweden are reflected in the unemployment rates of the foreign-born, which deteriorated over the nineties and still remain high. Sweden has been among countries with the highest unemployment rates among the foreign-born in Europe (Englund 2003). Though the labour market has improved radically in Sweden over the last several decades, inequalities between foreign-born and Swedish-born workers remain rife. A 2003 report by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (Englund 2003) demonstrates that the Swedish labour market is heavily segregated in terms of ethnicity, noting in particular that African-born and Asian-born migrants are the groups most likely to be unemployed or subjected to discrimination in the Swedish labour market. In 2009, the employment rate for people aged years and born in Sweden was 81 percent, compared with 65 percent for persons born abroad. Around 60 percent of foreign-born persons who had studied for two years at tertiary level had a skilled job. The corresponding figure for university-educated persons born in Sweden was 90 percent (Ministry of Employment 2011). Muslim communities, in particular, face high rates of unemployment, segregation and are increasingly targets for Islamophobia and discrimination (EUMC 2006). Figure 1.3: Proportion of people employed , native and foreign-born aged years, percent and index Source: Ministry of Employment (2011: 56) Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 10

11 Despite high levels of citizenship among the foreign-born population, equality in and integration into the Swedish labour market remains low. The possible factors underlying these different outcomes are numerous, and have been explored by a number of researchers and academics (see Englund 2003). Otterbeck (2010: 108) argues that a substantial Muslim population developed in the late 1980s in Sweden, coinciding with recessions in the early 1990s and more recently, and this created a permanent unemployment problem. It is important to note that the conditions of migration and immigration status held by various migrant groups can have a significant impact on ability to gain entry to the labour market. Many Muslim migrants to Sweden did not arrive as labour-based migrants, but as asylum seekers and family reunification migrants, meaning that many Muslim migrants were not as well prepared for the transition to a new labour market. Given that many Muslims lacked the language skills and knowledge of the country, the adjustment periods for new migrants has been long. In addition, the prevalent gender stereotypes about Muslim men and women further impact upon the achievement of Muslims in the labour market, regardless of whether the individuals are foreign-born or Swedish-born, fostering discrimination against them in the work environment (Otterbeck 2010) Education Segregation in the Swedish labour market mirrors segregation within the Swedish school system. In 2003, the Swedish government commissioned the National Agency for School Improvement to improve conditions in schools in socially and ethnically segregated areas, where there are often high concentrations of low-achieving students, the majority of whom have foreign backgrounds (Expo Foundation 2004). Independent Muslim schools, which provide religious education together with broader curriculum, are also increasingly being established in Sweden. Figure 1.4: Percentage of the population who have started Swedish higher education by the age of 25 by background, Source: Ministry of Employment (2011: 46) Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 11

12 1.3.3 Housing As mentioned earlier, Muslims in Sweden are largely concentrated in the three largest cities, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo, though there are also Muslim communities in medium-sized cities across Sweden (Otterbeck 2010). By 2003, Muslims had formed at least one association in as many as 112 of the 290 Swedish municipalities (Otterbeck 2004). Through the 1960s, a number of large-scale building projects created suburbs with apartments originally meant for the working class. However, migrant communities, and many Muslim migrants, have come to occupy these apartments, transforming the ethnic and religious composition of suburbs outside the major cities (Otterbeck 2010). Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo, in particular, have suburbs which are almost entirely populated by migrant and Muslim populations. Housing segregation remains a major concern in Sweden. According to Bevelander (2004), it is highly likely that non-european migrants will live in a neighbourhood with other migrants and few native Swedes. However, Scandinavian immigrants are more likely to live among majority native populations. Housing segregation has wider impacts on both minority and majority populations in Sweden. Otterbeck (2010) sets out several main effects. The first is that it becomes more difficult for migrant communities to connect with the networks of the majority population, thus making it more difficult to get jobs. On the converse side, for native Swedish populations there are fewer opportunities to grow up in diverse neighbourhoods, thus perpetuating misunderstanding and false perceptions. In neighbourhoods with high concentrations of minorities, such as Rinkeby in Stockholm and Rosengard in Malmo, the situation has created a dialect called Rinkebysvenska (Rinkeby-Swedish) and Rosengardsvenska (Rosengard-Swedish) respectively. The dialect is not held in high esteem in the labour market, and individuals who live in these neighbourhoods and speak these dialects are often stigmatised in wider society (Otterbeck 2010). The 2004 report of the Swedish Integration Board shows that ethnic residential segregation has intensified in large cities and is evident also in smaller cities. In a 2004 survey, however, only 15 percent of the migrant population questioned suggested that they had been discriminated against in the housing market (Swedish Integration Board 2004). The Integration Board is now planning to use discrimination testing to establish the extent of direct discrimination. According to the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen 2010), for several years, there has been a clear connection between ethnic and economic segregation in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. In neighbourhoods with almost exclusively visible minorities, barely 30 percent of working-age residents earned their own living in People with incomes below the relative poverty line (60 percent of the median income) were heavily overrepresented in these neighbourhoods (Socialstyrelsen 2010). Overall, the 2010 National Board of Health and Welfare Social Report demonstrates that youths, single mothers and immigrants, especially new arrivals and those from non-european countries, run a high risk of poverty and are concentrated in housing areas with high levels of poverty. Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 12

13 1.4 PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES There has been surprisingly little research carried out on the general public s attitudes towards counterterrorism measures; however, there have been several surveys carried out to assess public attitudes towards increased surveillance by authorities. The controversial legislation on wiretapping implemented and amended in 2009 has been met with much public opposition, as will be discussed further in Part Two. According to a poll carried out by Swedish research institute Sifo, 51 percent of Swedes stood against the law in August 2008, when the legislation was proposed (Aftonbladet 2008). Though there has been less research on attitudes towards counter-terrorism measures specifically, over the past 40 years Swedish public confidence in political institutions has decreased from its once exceptionally high level. In recent years, Swedish voters express low confidence in these institutions, specifically when it comes to political parties (Rydgren 2002). As will be discussed in Part Three, attitudes towards the police have also been changing in recent years, as the public has lost confidence in the police, particularly in neighbourhoods where incidences of discrimination and bigotry by the police are frequent. 1.5 ETHNIC/RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION In recent years in Sweden, immigrants are more frequently framed by the media and politicians as a source of social problems. While Swedish politicians have for decades proudly promoted the banner of multiculturalism, the ideologies behind these policies do not necessarily translate directly to popular sentiment. Throughout the 1990s, a majority of Swedish voters were in favour of reducing the number of asylum seekers, peaking at 65 percent in These attitudes declined slightly over the course of two decades, reaching 45 percent in 2007 (Rydgren 2010: 65). Data on the voting population from the International Social Survey Program indicates that Swedish voters are just as opposed to immigrants and immigration as voters in other Western European countries. Swedish voters were just as likely as the average European to agree with the statement immigrants contribute nothing to the economy and more likely to agree with the statement immigration causes crime (Rydgren 2010: 66). The EUMC indicated that these statistics had changed very little by 2000 (Rydgren 2010). By 2000, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) estimated that Sweden had the second highest level of racial and extreme-right violence in Europe, after Germany (Lööw 1998; Pred 2000). Despite these negative outlooks, anti-immigrant and asylum seeker sentiments have declined over the last decade. Recent statistics from the SOM Institute indicate that Swedes were more positive about immigration and refugee reception in 2010 than any other year since the Institute began its investigation in the early 1990s (Lindohf 2010). On the European Social Survey chart mapping anti-immigrant attitudes across Europe in 2002, Sweden is notably the lowest of all European countries, averaging 44 on a 100- point attitudinal scale (European Social Survey 2002). However, Dahlstrom and Esaiasson (2009) question these depictions of Sweden as the most tolerant by indicating that measures of attitudes Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 13

14 towards specific policy proposals clearly suggest that the general public supports more restrictive immigration policy. However, levels of trust among and between citizens remains, in a comparative perspective, very high (Rothstein 2004), and support for welfare state policies also remains high despite increasing ethnic and religious diversity (Svallfors 2006). Today, the public debate on immigration and integration in Sweden is often framed with reference to Muslims despite the fact that Muslims make up a minority of migrants to the country /11 and attitudes towards Muslims in Sweden There have been some studies to suggest that 9/11 had a significant impact on attitudes and behaviour concerning particular minorities in Sweden. The strongest evidence for attitude change comes from survey data presented by the Research Group for Social and Information Studies (Forskningsgruppen for Samhalls och Informationsstudier) (FSI 2001), based on a continual survey of a variety of topics, including attitudes towards immigrants. Based on this data, the figure below demonstrates that 9/11 broke a positive trend in attitudes towards immigrants, causing the number of those positive towards immigration to drop from 51 percent to 33 percent in surveys given from September 11 through to the end of the month. Figure 1.5: Percentage of respondents who were positive toward immigrants in 2001 Source: Aslund & Rooth (2005) Numerous official reports have claimed that some minorities were subjected to increase abuse after 9/11, including the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia s general European overview of the issue (Allen & Nielsen 2002). Though levels of physical violence were relatively low, verbal abuse and harassment were indexed highly. Visual identifiers were an important determinant of targets of aggression; people who look Muslim rather than those who actually self-identify as Muslim. This report Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 14

15 (Allen & Nielsen 2002) noted that Sweden shared the experiences of other countries concerning the situation following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. According to a December 2004 GfK Custom Research Survey (cited in EUMC 2006: 34), 75 percent of respondents in Sweden agreed that Muslims living in Sweden today are viewed with suspicion. This was the highest level recorded for Western European nations in the survey. The Living History Forum and the National Council for Crime Prevention carried out a survey of 10,600 pupils in the upper level of compulsory education and upper secondary school. This report, called the Intolerance Report, demonstrated that 7.7 percent of students had some degree of intolerance towards Muslims, and 14 percent had a very high degree of intolerance towards Muslims (EUMC 2006; see Living History Forum & Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention 2004). In a 2003 study, Larsson found that after 9/11, two-thirds of Muslim respondents reported that they had more frequently become the victims of threats or discrimination, in most cases verbal abuse. He found that both practicing and secularised Muslims were targeted, particularly those fitting stereotyped images of what Muslims look like. Larsson argues that an appearance affiliated with Islam or perceived similarities to the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks were key determinants of who was subject to abuse (Larsson 2003). Media studies and surveys have shown that, in public debates, Islam and Muslims are often perceived as being different and non-swedish. Furthermore, research has indicated that, when journalists report on Islam and Muslims, they often focus heavily on violence, war and conflict (see Hvitfelt 1998). Larsson (2006) stresses that though it is difficult to demonstrate a clear relationship between negative media coverage and public opinion, there is a striking correspondence between the approach to Muslim communities in television content and attitudes of Swedes towards Muslims. The Swedish Integration Board in published a report indicating that two-thirds of those surveyed felt that Islamic values are not compatible with the values of Swedish society. 54 percent responded negatively to the statement that Swedish Muslims are like Swedes generally and 37 percent were opposed to mosques being built in Sweden (Larsson 2007). An overall assessment of Integration Barometer results in 2007 indicates that attitudes in Sweden related to racism and xenophobia had worsened significantly. In three out of four measurements used to examine Islamophobia in Sweden, there was a worsening of attitudes. Six out of ten people still rejected the idea of restricting the immigration of Muslims, although this proportion diminished significantly during A minority (16 percent) are totally convinced of the need to limit the immigration of Muslims to Sweden. There was a reduction in the proportion of those who dissociate themselves from the idea of wishing not to move to an area where there are a lot of Muslims. The percentage of Swedes who answered that the number of Muslims in the country creates feelings of alienation for Swedes increased. As mentioned earlier, Muslims are often understood in terms of a religious community, regardless of internal diversity. A Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 15

16 large proportion of the population (40 percent) are distrustful of people who are thought to practice Muslim faith. A majority (55 percent) express a reluctance to move to an area mainly inhabited by Muslims (Integration Barometer 2007). Studies of Sweden s youth indicate that intolerance towards certain groups is widespread. In 2010, the Living History Forum conducted a survey on levels of tolerance among upper secondary school students. The survey indicated that about 20 percent of students held intolerant opinions towards homosexuals, Jews, Muslims, Roma and migrants (Government Communication Skr. 2011/12:44). Those with negative attitudes were primarily male, and students on vocational programmes or with lower-educated parents. The survey also demonstrates that Islamophobia is particularly widespread among young men with a Swedish or Christian background, while anti-semitism was prevalent among young men with a Muslim background (Government Communication Skr. 2011/12:44). Issues of intolerance are complex, and attitudes towards and between minority groups in Sweden may be affected by international conflicts and political events that take place abroad. Attitudes toward minority groups must be seen in the light not only of relations within Sweden, but in light of global conflicts as well. The European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (EUFRA) has shown that the increased focus on counter-terrorism after 9/11 has led to Muslims being increasingly perceived as violent (EUMC 2006). The all too frequent linking of Islam, extremism and terrorism has generated negative prejudices against Muslim communities Discrimination towards Muslims Aslund and Rooth (2005) argue that, despite increased public hostility and experiences of verbal abuse towards Muslims in Sweden following 9/11, the attitude shift did not manifest in greater labour market discrimination towards Muslims. This argument has been contested by other research which posits that Muslims in Sweden have disproportionately been the recipients of discriminatory behaviour in the labour market and other areas (see Ahmed & Hammarstedt 2008; Rooth 2010). It is important to note that there are significant differences between discrimination experienced by different Muslim ethnic groups within Sweden. For example, according to the EUFRA, 33 percent of Sub-Saharan African Muslims experienced discrimination in Sweden, compared to only 10 percent of Iraqi Muslims (EUFRA 2009). Discriminatory behaviour manifests in different ways, ranging from mistreatment in schools to employers not complying with equality legislation. In Sweden in December 2004, the Ombudsman for Ethnic Discrimination published recommendations based on legislation focusing on ethnic or religious clothing, and the right to vacations and leave of absence from work on religious holidays. The review by the Ombudsman showed that 28 out of 30 central government authorities did not comply with the law (EUMC 2006). Though Sweden ranks the highest in the MIPEX s (2011) assessment of antidiscrimination legislation, discrimination remains a major issue in Swedish society. Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 16

17 The Chancellor of Justice in Sweden keeps records of cases of incitement to hatred, which can include incidents fuelled by anti-muslim sentiment. The Discrimination Ombudsman in Sweden has, over the years, had several cases of discrimination in the labour market against Muslim women because of veiling (EUMC 2006). It is, however, difficult to find concrete evidence and data on the experiences of Muslims in the Swedish labour market. Agerström and Rooth (2008) have assessed prejudice against Arab Muslims, and have noted that employers tend to associate Arab Muslim names with negative traits like incompetence, laziness, and others in comparison to Swedish sounding names (Agerström & Rooth 2008). Since 2006, BRÅ, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, has collected statistical data on Islamophobic crimes, which were defined by BRÅ as hate crimes in which the victim must be a Muslim, or must be perceived by the offender as a Muslim (BRÅ 2008). 1.6 COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE BETWEEN MINORITY GROUPS AND GOVERNMENT Otterbeck (2010) notes that different levels of Swedish society have started to include Muslim organisations in various ways, noting that Swedish legislation and multicultural policies have resulted in higher levels of structural inclusion. Established civil society organisations are increasingly including Muslims and cooperating with Muslim organisations; for example, the scout movement and various Church organisations have led on this. Sveriges Muslimska Råd, the Muslim Council of Sweden (SMR), is a lobby group which was formed in 1990 by two umbrella organisations, United Islamic Parishes in Sweden (Förenade islamiska församlingar i Sverige) and the Muslim Association of Sweden (Sveriges Muslimska Förbund). Its main objective is to help Muslims become more integrated in political and social life in Sweden. Other important Muslim NGOs are Muslim Youth of Sweden, Swedish Muslim Women Forum, and Swedish Islamic Academy. Interestingly, though Sweden is one of the most secular countries in Europe, nearly eight out of nine citizens pay a membership fee to a religious organisation. Most Christian groups are members of Sveriges Kristna Råd (the Christian Council of Sweden), which frequently invites Muslim leaders to participate in activities. Interfaith activities involving Muslim organisations are growing; an example is the Dialogue Group, Jews Christians Muslims, which was formed in 1991 (Otterbeck 2010). Many churches in Sweden have established dialogue partners from Muslim communities. State recognition has been key to the growth of Islamic organisations in Sweden. Since 2000, the State and the Swedish Church split, introducing new legislation and the creation of a legal category for registered denominations. A registered denomination can have its members fees collected through the taxation office. Some Islamic organisations have applied and have been recognised by the State. Before the split, the Swedish Church was officially favoured but now other denominations, including Islamic organisations, have a strong lobby (Otterbeck 2010). Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 17

18 The state has, in recent years, attempted to provide the same services for Muslims as are provided for other religious and faith groups in health care, prisons and the military. For example, state support is now offered to provide imams for the armed forces and prisons, just as priests are. As this recognition of Islamic traditions by Swedish bureaucracy takes place, there are some groups seeking the further institutionalisation of religion, like imam-education at Swedish universities, in order to improve the ability of Muslim communities to meet the requirements of government regulations. Political parties and their sub-groups have increasingly collaborated with organised Muslim groups. Interestingly, the Christian sub-groups of many mainstream political parties have been the most involved. For example in recent years the Muslim Council of Sweden has collaborated with a sub-group of the Social Democrats (called the Christian Social Democrats Broderskapsrörelsen), initiating a range of seminars and meetings bringing together hundreds of politicians and Muslim activists, as well as training on Swedish democratic traditions and Islam (Otterbeck 2010). The Politisk Islamisk Samling (Political Islamic Coalition) was formed as a sister organisation aiming to successfully incorporate Muslims aiming to become politicians in the Social Democrats. One particularly successful organisation formed in 2008 is Swedish Muslims for Peace and Justice (Svenska muslimer för fred och rättvisa), which focuses on the promotion of peace and safety in Sweden and internationally. In its first year of existence, the organisation was praised widely by Swedish authorities, including Minister for Trade Ewa Björling, who stated that the organisation offer[s] a testimony to the will of the younger generation to systematically tackle major and difficult challenges. Moreover, this Muslim peace movement sets a good example to the entire Muslim world, since its members come from both Sunni and Shi'a families (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). The organisation developed out of a project in 2006 called Muslim Peace Agents, which sought to train 100 Muslim Peace Agents, or individuals promoting positive interaction between Muslim and non-muslim communities, by visiting, informing and working with schools, associations, companies and authorities (Fredsagenterna 2006). Given the institutional discrimination and inequality facing many immigrant groups in Sweden, it is vital to investigate immigrant activism as a reaction to this socio-economic situation, and whether collective organisations of immigrants have autonomy to exert influence on their own conditions of existence. Castles and Davidson (2000) have noted that corporatist structures in Sweden were designed to include ethnic groups in decision-making processes. Corporatism is the cooperation of interest organisations and the state in the process of formulating and implementing public policy. Karan (2008) furthermore argues that Swedish corporatism has structured the ways in which migrant communities can act with reference to social, political and economic rights. Although the structural opportunities encourage migrants to mobilise, they can end up creating static ethnic identity group representations. The structural requirements of becoming a licensed immigrant organisation can create obstacles for autonomy and create negative effects on democratic processes (Karan 2008). Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 18

19 Karan (2008) has argued that the bureaucracy and structures in place to receive funding for minority group activism has meant that national organisations of migrants need to accept and apply the policies stated by the government in order to receive funds. She argues that in this sense, these organisations become a governmental office, a special branch where they become responsible for implementing the policies and agendas set by the government (Karan 2008: 187). Thus, according to Karan (2008), national organisations of immigrants lose the opportunity to act as independent and autonomous entities representing the interests of immigrants and checking the power of the state, as they are forced to implement policies set from above in order to receive funding. Muslim groups have generally organised in ways and models which mirror other types of group activism in Sweden, for example, local level groups have joined umbrella organisations in order to get state support through the Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities (Nämnden för statligt stöd till trossamfund, SST), which was set up in 1971 to award state grants. Though Karan (2008) notes the potential pitfalls of migrant organisations fitting these models, Otterbeck (2010) has observed that when conflicts have erupted involving Muslim communities or negative representation of Muslims in Sweden, dialogue and new forms of cooperation have ensued as a result of the plethora of Muslim community organisations and groups that have received funding in Sweden. According to Otterbeck (2010), despite expressions of discontent and hostility towards Muslims, collaborations are taking place to normalise the Muslim presence in Sweden. Though there have been few cases involving Islamist terrorism in Sweden, the country s first suicide bombing attack, in a pedestrian area in Stockholm on 11 December which will be discussed in Part Four- ignited a strong civil society and Muslim community response. Among the religious responses, Imam Abd al-haww Kielan, chairman of the Swedish Islamic Communion, condemned the attack and noted that the act was entirely against Islam, and Imam Hassan Moussa of the central Mosque in Stockholm condemned it as a criminal act of terror. Among the civil society responses, nearly 100 people assembled the day after the attack for a peaceful demonstration organised by Swedish Muslims for Peace and Justice to condemn the violence. Part Two: Legal Context Counter-terrorism measures in Sweden take place within the framework of international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law. In its government communication Sweden s national counterterrorism strategy (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73), the government notes that at the heart of its counter-terrorism policy is the principle that threats can be combated legitimately only by using methods that belong to an open, democratic and legally secure society. The strategy notes that international law, the rule of law and openness are key principles for all counter-terrorist activities in Sweden. Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 19

20 Swedish courts have universal jurisdiction over terrorist offences and attempts at terrorism, and tend also to have authority when dealing with other types of punishable terrorist acts committed abroad (Council of Europe 2008). There are no legal differences between processing criminal proceedings for terrorist offences and other serious crimes, as individuals suspected of terrorist offences are granted the same rights as those charged with other serious crime. Those suspected of terrorism in Sweden are, for example, granted the right to a public defence counsel (Council of Europe 2008). Terrorist offences are defined in the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences (2003:148). Terrorism is also regulated through the Act on Criminal Responsibility for the Financing of Particularly Serious Crime in Certain Cases (2002:444), and the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Public Provocation, Recruitment and Training concerning Terrorist Offences and other Particularly Serious Crime (2010:299). The following sections set out the key legislation involved in Sweden s counterterrorism work. 2.1 KEY LEGISLATION First anti-terrorist legislation Sweden was first confronted with acts of terrorism in the early 1970s, when a series of violent incidents involving Croatian separatism raised counter-terrorism as a politically salient issue. It was in December after the hijacking of a plane flying from Gothenburg to Stockholm by Croatian separatists, the Croatian occupation of the Yugoslav consulate in Gothenburg, and the assassination of the Yugoslavian ambassador- that a commission headed by then-cabinet minister Carl Lidbom presented a report concluding that Sweden needed a Terrorist Act (Hansén 2007). The government subsequently introduced its first anti-terrorist legislation in 1973 (1973: 162), titled the Law on specific measures to prevent certain violent crimes with international background. The law was intended to serve as emergency legislation for only one year, given that it was born in the wake of these specific acts of violence carried out in Sweden, it continued to be in place for two years. This law did not explicitly define terrorism; however, it did introduce a new concept of the presumed terrorist, defined as any foreigner who belongs to or works for an organisation or group which can be expected to use violence, threat or coercion (Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law 2008b). Following the two years this law was in place, several minor alterations were made and these provisions transferred to the Aliens Acts of In May 2002, the government approved two anti-terrorism laws, the first implementing the UN Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and the second adopting the 2001 EU Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. Sweden signed, but did not ratify, the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. However, by this time there was still no Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 20

21 comprehensive definition for terrorism laid out in Swedish legislation (Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law 2008b) Criminalising terrorist acts It was in June 2002, when Sweden fulfilled the commitments ensuing from the European Union Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, that for the first time terrorist acts were both defined and criminalised. The Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Crimes came into effect in July 2003 and classified certain crimes as terrorist acts when they are committed against countries, their institutions, or their citizens with the aim of intimidating, or of altering or destroying political, economic or social structures (SFS 2003: 148, cited in Privacy International 2010). The Act contains a list of certain actions that may lead to penalties under the Swedish Penal Code or other statutes. According to the Act, examples of acts that constitute terrorist offences were listed as murder, kidnapping, sabotage, hijacking, spreading poison or a contagious substance, and unlawful handling of chemical weapons. The penalty for terrorist offences was set as imprisonment for a maximum of ten years, or for life. Any attempt, preparation or conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence, or failure to disclose such an offence, is also deemed an offence under this Act. If it is not possible to prove special intent, regular criminal law in the Penal Code presides (FCO 2005). Acts that that are not punishable under this law, for example if they were committed before its implementation, can be punishable under provisions concerning murder and other crimes against life, or concerning offences involving public danger. In December 2010 new terrorism legislation, The Act on Criminal Responsibility for Public Provocation, Recruitment and Training concerning Terrorist Offences and other Particularly Serious Crime, came into effect. The Act criminalises public provocation of and recruitment to terrorism, as well as the organisation of training camps and dissemination of knowledge about dangerous methods for terrorist purposes, which had not been specified in the original legislation from 2003 (Office for the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2011) Legal definitions of terrorism Definitions of terrorism in Sweden have remained ambiguous over the years. The Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Crimes is based largely on the European Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism. Despite having terrorist legislation in place prior to this Framework Decision, Sweden used the EU Framework Decision as a blueprint for terrorist legislation and altered its conception of terrorism substantially to make it correspond directly to the EU definition (Transnational Terrorism 2008b). As noted above, the 2003 Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Crimes notes types of offences which constitute terrorism under Swedish law, including murder, manslaughter, gross assault, kidnapping, Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 21

22 and the spreading of poison or contagious substances, when the act in question may seriously damage a state or an intergovernmental organisation and the intent is to: Seriously intimidate a population or a group of population; Unduly compel a public authority or an intergovernmental organisation to perform an act or abstain from acting; Seriously destabilise or destroy fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures in a state or in an intergovernmental organisation. There has been some concern voiced by NGOs in Sweden over the definition of terrorism, arguing that such a definition could prevent lawful political protest or allow for the arrest, detention and trial of lawful political activists (Transnational Terrorism 2008b). Some Swedish organisations, including the Swedish Helsinki Committee (now Civil Rights Defenders), have recognised the lack of clarity provided by this definition. In an appeal to the Swedish government, the Swedish Helsinki Committee (Civil Rights Defenders) has also argued that the Act does not clarify the lines between politically-motivated violence and terrorism (IHF Annual Report 2004, cited in Privacy International 2011) Financing and recruitment to terrorism In recent years it has become a priority to make Swedish government agencies more effective in the pursuit of financing of terrorism. The government has increased resources to the Financial Intelligence Unit of the National Criminal Police and has expanded the possibilities for the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority to intervene and impose sanctions (Ministry of Justice 2001/12:73). Demands on companies to counter and report the financing of terrorism have been tightened, and international sanctions have been modified in recent years. In 2002, a special law on criminal responsibility for financing terrorism was brought into effect, thereby implementing the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The Act covers the collection, provision or receipt of funds or other assets with the intention of or knowledge that they would be used to commit a serious crime. Attempt to finance terrorism is a punishable offence, with maximum six years penalty, unless the act is punishable with the same or a more severe penalty under the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences, in which case a maximum sentence of life imprisonment applies (Council of Europe 2008). Banks and financial institutions are also legally obligated to examine transactions suspected to involve funds used to finance terrorism, and must report such transactions to the police. If a terrorist offence has been committed via business activities, a corporate fine (maximum of SEK 10 million) may be imposed on the individuals involved (Council of Europe 2008). The Act on Measures against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (2009:62, cited in Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73), known as the Money Laundering Act, sets out new measures to prevent business and financial activities from being exploited Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 22

23 for money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The regulations were further tightened in the Payment Services Act (2010:751, cited in Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73), which entered into force on 1 August 2010, making higher demands on these companies. Furthermore, property that has been used or intended to be used to carry out or finance terrorist activity may be forfeited by the state Investigatory measures and surveillance Investigatory measures employed by the state include searches of premises, the seizure of objects, apprehending and arresting a person, telecommunications interception or intrusive surveillance, and other measures. An initial act from 1952 once regulated communications surveillance and wiretapping in Sweden, and was extended on a yearly basis. Covert camera surveillance was regulated similarly through the Act on Secret Camera Surveillance. However, in 2003 the scope of the 1952 Act was extended to cover terrorist crimes. This Act was soon abolished and replaced by the new legislation on Certain Serious Crimes (vissa samhällsfarliga brott) (Privacy International 2011). There are several provisions on investigatory measures, including three acts, in force until 31 December 2013, which contain special provisions on secret surveillance used to prevent, stop and investigate serious crime, to be implemented with court approval if police suspect a crime: The Act on Electronic Eavesdropping (2007:978), the Act on Measures to Prevent Certain Particularly Serious Crimes (2007:979) and the Act on Measures to Investigate Certain Crimes that are Threats to Society (2008:854). The Act on Measures to Investigate Certain Crimes that are Threats to Society notes that court approval is required for secret camera surveillance, communications surveillance, and wiretapping. Suspects that have been monitored must be informed about the surveillance after its termination. Though the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) has sought to extend its powers to override the requirement of court approval, in May 2006 Parliament decided to postpone discussion on a specific bill allowing telephone tapping and bugging, insisting that safeguards against abuse of power be introduced into the bill (Privacy International 2011). However, in 2008, the controversial FRA Law (FRA-lagen) was passed by Parliament. The National Defence Radio Establishment (Försvarets Radioanstalt, FRA) is the national authority for signals intelligence, which supplies intelligence to the government, the Swedish Armed Forces and state-owned companies (FRA 2012). Until this point, the FRA could only listen to radio transmissions and did not have the authority to monitor and analyse Internet data traffic. The FRA needed approval from a parliamentary committee on military intelligence affairs and was only permitted to tap into communications through pattern analysis and key word searches, and [was] not be entitled to target specific individuals (Privacy International 2011). The FRA law was a legislative package introduced as anti-terrorism legislation which, before it was amended in 2009, authorised the FRA to wiretap all telephone and Internet traffic that crosses Swedish borders, without a court order. With this law, the FRA was given permission to use data mining software Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 23

24 to search for sensitive key words in all phone and communications passing through cables or wires across the country's borders. The law gave the FRA a mandate to search for external threats, including military threats, IT security, ethnic and religious conflicts, among others (Privacy International 2011). This legislation was controversial and sparked protests, including from youth organisations of political parties in the ruling government. Many major Swedish newspapers spoke out against the law, along with lobbying organisations like the Swedish Union of Journalists and the Swedish Bar Association, as well as telecom and internet companies like Google (O Mahony 2007). Given this criticism and debate, the government proposed an amended bill improving on privacy in the FRA law, including a provision that the FRA must seek permission and court approval for every act of monitoring. The amendment was approved and came into effect in December The Ministry of Justice recently circulated a communication proposing an additional amendment titled The Police Service s access to signals surveillance in defence intelligence activities (Ministry Communication DS 2011:44, cited in Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73) for comment. The new amendment proposes that the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) and the National Criminal Police again be given the possibility of giving targeted surveillance assignments to the FRA without court approval. The amendment is proposed to enter into force in October POWERS TO DEPORT INDIVIDUALS The 1973 Terrorist Act, the law on special measures to prevent certain acts of violence with international background, made it easier to expel foreign citizens from Sweden and to refuse admission on the basis of a suspicion or presumption of connections to terrorism. In 1975 this law was made permanent, and, since then, Sweden has continued to host laws aimed specifically at foreign citizens to protect Sweden against political terrorism. In 1991 the Act Concerning Special Control with Respect to Aliens was passed, and this Act noted that suspicion was to be based not simply on affiliation with particular organisations, but on individual assessments to be made by Säpo. Foreigners already residing in Sweden can also be expelled under the Act concerning Special Controls in Respect of Aliens if a court assessment deems that there is reasonable fear that the individual will commit or be complicit in a terrorist offence. This process obviously requires possibilities for control and appeal, and, in 2010, an expanded right of judicial review was implemented to allow courts to examine cases with security elements as it does other aliens cases (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73). The Swedish government has considered proposals to make it possible to revoke the Swedish citizenship of individuals, if they have supplied false information in their citizenship application in order to conceal terrorist offences or links. However, no proposal as such has been implemented (see Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73 for details). Individuals who intend to support terrorism or plan attacks from Sweden are not given asylum or residence permits in the country, and these security aspects are examined in every Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 24

25 application. Foreigners may be refused a residence permit on the grounds of serious criminality or with reference to national security. Foreigners who are not granted a residence permit are normally refused entry or expelled from Sweden; however, according to current law, this would never be enforced when it is presumed that the individual would be in danger of the death penalty, corporal punishment, torture, or other inhuman or degrading treatment in the return country. However, exceptions may be made if the individual has committed an exceptional offence or conducted activities that have endangered national security (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73). 2.3 CHECK AND BALANCES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM LAWS The Swedish authorities are bound by internationally-sanctioned human rights frameworks, including prohibition of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation, disappearance, torture and other degrading treatment, arbitrary arrest and denial of a fair public trial. In the past several years, reported human rights issues in Sweden included incidents of use of excessive force by police; extended isolation and restricted exercise for persons in pre-trial detention; government surveillance; and interference (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour 2011). In 2011, there were many reports that the police used excessive force, with 5,373 reports of police misconduct reported during the year (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour 2011). Approximately 17 percent of these cases involved reports that officers had used more violence than required in the situation. The 2011 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Sweden does, however, note that civilian authorities effectively check the national police and Säpo, and that government authorities have effective mechanisms in place to investigate and deal with abuse or corruption (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour 2011). The Equality Ombudsman registers and handles complaints filed against the police. However, a 2011 report by the Centre Against Racism (Centrum mot rasism) noted that there is a distinct lack of public confidence and trust in the state mechanisms dealing with police misconduct. As will be discussed in Section Five, among those in the public who are aware that the Equality Ombudsman exists, many believe that notifying the Ombudsman will lead to no changes (Centre Against Racism 2011). With regard to detention, one issue in Sweden has been restrictive conditions for prisoners in pre-trial custody, with the Swedish Prison and Probation Service noting that approximately 45 percent of pre-trial detainees were subject to extended isolation or restrictions on exercise and mail delivery (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour 2011). In July 2011, the Justice Ombudsman created a new unit to focus on developing alternative options to incarceration for some offenders, as well as improving the treatment of juvenile offenders, and serving as the National Preventative Mechanism called for by the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture. Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 25

26 The Swedish constitution provides the right to a fair trial, and this right has largely been enforced by an independent judiciary. Though trials in Sweden generally are public, in cases regarding national security trials may be closed to the public. As mentioned earlier, laws regarding the expulsion of foreigners require possibilities for control and appeal, and as of 2010, the court has been given the right to examine cases with security elements as it does other aliens cases. Every year the government gives a written account to Parliament of the application of the Act concerning Special Controls in Respect of Aliens to allow for scrutiny by the governing parties. When it comes to surveillance, critics have taken issue with the use of investigative measures like wiretapping and camera surveillance by the FRA. Human rights organisations, including the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, expressed concern in 2006 over increased use of surveillance techniques and lack of protection of peoples right to privacy. Since January 2008, a governmental agency called the Commission on Security and Integrity Protection (SÄKINT) is mandated to supervise the use of secret investigative measures by crime-fighting agencies, as well as the use of personal data by Säpo. The Commission has a maximum of ten members appointed from a set of candidates proposed by all parties represented in Parliament. The chair must be or have been a permanent judge, or possess equivalent legal experience. The Commission makes regular inspections and provides recommendations to crime-fighting agencies on necessary changes in activity to ensure compliance with all regulations (SÄKINT 2012). Individuals may request the Commission to check whether he or she has been subject to surveillance, and the Commission is obliged to provide this information (SÄKINT 2012). The government submits a report to Parliament every year with details of all surveillance conducted. The Civil Rights Defenders has argued that the Swedish state s surveillance methods lack a sound legal framework and transparency. The CRD has called for an independent assessment of the necessity and effectiveness of secret surveillance methods used in Sweden (Privacy International 2011). However, the government has argued that secret camera surveillance, wire surveillance, and wiretapping are all efficient tools for investigating terrorist and other serious crimes. There is some evidence to support the argument that wiretapping is effective. For example, in 2006, after extensive wiretapping and scrutiny of Internet traffic, Säpo and the British police joined forces to take action against a number of individuals in Sweden suspected of financing and promoting international terrorism (BBC 2006). An inquiry has been appointed to evaluate how the Acts on surveillance have been applied and analyse whether the regulation of secret surveillance should be amended; this inquiry is due to report its findings in 2012 (see Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73 for details). Part Three: Policy and Policing Context Through the late 1960s, terrorism was not a particularly salient issue for Swedish policy makers. It was not until the early 1970s that Säpo created a counter-terrorism department, and the term terrorism was not indexed in parliamentary publications until 1971 (Hansén 2007). Hansén (2007) argues that it was a new Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 26

27 type of crime that emerged onto the Swedish and international stages in the late 1960s, with new experiences associated with Croatian separatism, and PLO activities and Palestinian factions, that caused a shift in security policy making. It was only after the Croatian occupation of the Yugoslav consulate in Gothenburg and the assassination of the Yugoslavian ambassador that counter-terrorism became a politically salient issue in Sweden (Hansen 2007). As noted in the sections above, Parliament passed the first Terrorist Act in 1973, which was a policy innovation at the time. After 11 September, 2001, a series of conventions and instruments were adopted within the UN and the EU to combat terrorism, many with the aim of facilitating international judicial and police cooperation in preventing terrorism. Sweden has since then instituted a series of specific legislation on terrorism and developed its authorities dealing specifically with terrorism, for example the Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council and the National Centre for Threat Assessment, the structure and function of which are detailed in Section Sweden, like many European countries, has grappled with shifts in the nature and scope of violent extremist threats within and outside state borders. During the 1990s, right-wing extremist organisations connected to terrorism came to light, particularly following the murder of union activist Björn Söderberg. Following massive damage during the EU summit in Gothenburg in 2001, the focus shifted to leftautonomous groups. A suicide bombing in Stockholm on 11 December 2010, which will be discussed in detail in Section Four, and the attacks in Oslo and on Utøya (Norway) on 22 July 2011 certainly demonstrated the importance of continuous and long-term preventive work in the Nordic region. Given the shifting terrains of violent extremism, the Swedish government has in recent years sought to collect as much knowledge as possible on contemporary forms of violent extremism. In 2008, the government commissioned the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention and Säpo to map the occurrence of violent political extremism, including a significant focus on the autonomous movement and right-wing extremism. The July 2009 report which followed demonstrated that several neo-nazi groups that advocate violence are active within the White Power movement in Sweden. In addition, the report noted that the left-wing autonomous movement contains a number of individuals who see the rule of law and the market economy as hostile and believe that violence is a legitimate means of changing society. The study found that the majority of violent extremists are boys and young men aged 18-23, accounting for nearly 1,000 people in total (Säkerhetspolisen & Brå 2009). The study estimated that, though violent extremist groups in Sweden have a limited growth potential, there is a risk in both the autonomous left and the White Power environment that smaller groups of very radical activists can commit serious politically-motivated crimes. The study also concluded that, compared to other countries like Denmark and Germany, Swedish extremist activists are more violent, and that Swedish White Power groups are more likely to possess arms (Säkerhetspolisen & Brå 2009). Further to this report (Säkerhetspolisen & Brå 2009), in 2010 the government commissioned Säpo to describe violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden (Säkerhetspolisen 2010). According to this report, presented in December 2010, approximately 200 individuals were identified as actively Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 27

28 participating in violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden, including those who have been radicalised in Sweden and those who have taken part in violent acts in other countries in 2009 or later. The report found that most of these individuals are male, although ages and backgrounds vary, and at least 80 percent of these individuals are connected with one another, mainly in the form of friendship relations. These individuals are reported to be based largely in Sweden s three largest cities, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo. Both studies have led to an overarching conclusion by the government that though democracy is wellestablished in Sweden, and the number of people active in violent extremism is limited, there are reasons to believe that anti-democratic attitudes are gaining an unprecedented foothold among some groups, particularly young people (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44). Government strategy has been based on the argument that different forms of violent extremism emerge from similar environments, based on a black-and-white and conspiratorial view of the world in which conflict and the glorification of violence are central, regardless of whether the aim is an ethnically homogenous or an Islamist society (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44). Based on this perspective, and the notion that Swedish democracy cannot be taken for granted, the Swedish government has emphasised the need for measures to strengthen the democratic system in order not only to prevent individuals from joining violent extremist movements, but to prevent these movements from establishing themselves KEY POLICI ES IN COUNTER- TERRORISM AND COUNTER- RADICALISATION Action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism In December 2011, the Swedish government presented its first action against violent extremism, which falls under its national counter-terrorism strategy, and sets out the measures which the Swedish government has already taken and intends to take in order to strengthen awareness of democracy and safeguard it. Intended to be implemented in , the action plan (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44) contains measures to increase knowledge about violence-promoting extremism, to discourage individuals from joining violence-promoting extremist groups and to facilitate for those who have already joined to leave such groups. It also contains measures to strengthen the structures for cooperation and measures to counter the breeding grounds for ideologically-motivated violence. The overarching aim of the action plan is to safeguard democracy and prevent individuals, particularly young people, from developing attitudes that contravene basic democratic values, and hence to make society more resistant to violence- promoting extremism. The word extremism is used here to describe movements, ideologies or people who do not accept a democratic social system (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44). The concept of violence-promoting extremism is interpreted based on the description used by Säpo in their report on violence-promoting Islamist extremism (Säkerhetspolisen 2010). According to this description, a person is said to be violent if he or she is deemed repeatedly to have displayed Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 28

29 behaviour that not just accepts the use of violence but also supports or exercises ideologically motivated violence to promote something (Säkerhetspolisen 2010). According to Säpo, violence-promoting extremism manifests in three main ideologies in Sweden: the autonomous movement, the White Power movement and Islamist extremism. According to Säpo research, individuals who feel discriminated against can be motivated to join a violent sub-culture. Discrimination is therefore noted as a priority area for the government. However, other than legislation on discrimination and the creation of the Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination, as well as funding allocated to civil society organisations, the action plan does not detail other initiatives to tackle discrimination, though the action plan itself (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44) notes with few details that an investigator has been appointed to propose how to make work against xenophobia more effective and will report by 26 October The focus of this action plan is not crime prevention in the traditional sense as the broader national counter-terrorism strategy, which will be detailed later in this section, covers crime prevention with more targeted measures. The action plan takes a more holistic approach in order to engage a larger part of society in the prevention of violent extremism. The plan sets out measures to strengthen democracy in general, to prevent violence-promoting extremism, and to safeguard democracy against violencepromoting extremism. Measures to promote democracy The first set of measures aim to promote a vigorous democracy where individuals have the opportunity to influence decisions that affect their daily lives, and where citizens are brought close to political decision-making (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44). This has been implemented through measures to stimulate active participation at the local level. For example, in cooperation with the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, IT tools have been developed to improve the dialogue between citizens and the authorities, to make the decision-making process more transparent and accessible. The government has also incorporated measures to initiate dialogue on the fundamental values of society, particularly targeting young people. In February 2010, the government adopted the bill A policy for civil society (Government Bill 2009/10:55), which set out several measures to enhance the work of civil society organisations. In 2011, the government tasked the National Board for Youth Affairs, a Swedish government agency that works to ensure that young people have access to welfare and ability to influence, with the allocation of funding to civil society organisations whose activities enhanced the democratic values of young people. National youth organisations were allocated SEK 235 million (EUR 26.7 million) in 2011 (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44). The government has also funded a programme involving participation guides who encourage local residents, primarily young people and women, to participate in civil society initiatives. Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 29

30 Schools are also seen to play a central role in heightening awareness and understanding of democratic principles. Beyond the focus on respect for human rights in the new Education Act (2010:800), the government has initiated a project to combat discrimination and bullying in schools. The National Agency for Education was tasked by the government to evaluate the effects of anti-bullying methods. The government has also set aside funding specifically to improve attitudes toward gender equality in schools, and the National Agency for Education implements pupil training in schools on gender, honour issues, and sex and personal relationships. The Living History Forum has been given the task of informing society about the Holocaust and the crimes against humanity committed, and what lessons can be learnt. The organisation has developed educational materials and working methods for use by schools. Policies to reduce youth unemployment have also been set out under the umbrella of the action plan, and the government has invested in the creation of more summer jobs for school students, and fresh start jobs for people who have been away from the labour market for any reason (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44). Measures to prevent violent extremism The second set of measures involves targeted work to prevent violent extremism. Much of this work is carried out by the Swedish Police and Säpo, but the broader aim is to involve other sectors of society. The National Police Board has initiated a project funded by the European Commission, aimed at increasing knowledge and improving working methods used to discover violent radicalisation. The project has developed methodologies and an educational programme and, in its second phase, these programmes will be implemented. The police have furthermore piloted the establishment of special police liaison officers as a link between the police and those organising demonstrations and rallies, with the aim of avoiding misunderstandings and creating joint strategies for how rallies are policed. The police are also taking special measures to combat hate crime. For example, the Stockholm County Police s Hate Crime Unit trains staff on how to deal with hate crime victims, with the overall aim of increasing the number of indictments for hate-motivated crimes (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44). In addition to police activities, several civil society initiatives are highlighted as part of the official government strategy, including EXIT, which runs initiatives and services to support individuals who have disengaged from the neo-nazi movement. Also mentioned is Passus, a programme to help individuals who want to leave criminal gangs (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44). International cooperation is also listed as a key measure, moving beyond national efforts and recognising that extremism has become a global phenomenon and must be addressed through global cooperation. The measures listed in the Swedish action plan include Swedish development work, helping to reduce poverty, as well as cooperation that stimulates employment abroad. Beyond development work, Sweden participates in several international networks, including the Radicalisation Awareness Network (established by the European Commission in September 2011) and the Policy Planners Network on Countering Radicalisation and Polarisation, which was set up by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue in Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 30

31 The action plan goes on to list a range of other measures including increased protection for elected representatives, the implementation of social task forces for young people who are at risk of becoming criminals, and measures against football-related public order disturbances. The plan sets out 15 new measures to be implemented from (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44): Support to civil society organisations for activities that strengthen the democratic values of young people (National Board for Youth Affairs). Broader dialogue with faith communities on democracy promotion work (Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith Communities). Spreading of methods and training material to strengthen the democratic values of young people (Living History Forum). Inquiry on initiatives to combat xenophobia and similar forms of intolerance. Spreading of knowledge and methods concerning radicalisation to professional groups that may come into contact with extremism (Inquiry). Study on how young people can be steeled and protected against the influence of anti-democratic messages via the Internet (Swedish Media Council). Special knowledge-enhancing initiatives for children and young people to combat anti-semitism and Islamophobia. Multidisciplinary research on democracy (Swedish Research Council). Collaboration on preventive work to combat violent extremism at local level (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions). Support to civil society organisations or activities for defectors (National Board for Youth Affairs). Survey of threats and violence against elected representatives (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention). Study on the conditions for elected representatives (Statistics Sweden). Study on preventive methods in other countries (Swedish National Defence College). Greater international cooperation against radicalisation. Spreading of examples of successful methods to prevent violent right-wing extremism in the EU Sweden s national counter-terrorism strategy In a communication to the Parliament in February 2012, the government presented a national counterterrorism strategy (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73), building on and updating the view presented in February 2008 in the National strategy to meet the threat of terrorism (Govt. Communication 2007/08:64). The government set out its starting points, objectives and directions in counter-terrorism, as well as an overview of the measures already taken, started or planned to address these challenges. The Swedish strategy against terrorism is set out in three main areas of work addressing three goals; to prevent Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 31

32 the emergence of terrorism; to pursue terrorist attacks; and to prepare for the eventuality of a terrorist attack occurring nevertheless (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73). The strategy is divided into three sections; threats to Sweden, starting points in the fight against terrorism, and objectives and measures. Sweden s national counter-terrorism strategy notes that in the Swedish context, neither the White Power, autonomous, nor Islamist extremist movements currently pose a serious threat to the democratic system. However, the threat from individuals travelling from Sweden to conflict areas and training in armed combat, as well as actors inspired by Al Qaeda, are noted as still constituting a threat. The strategy also notes that the threat from terrorism has changed in recent years, with an increased risk of attacks by people acting alone. Openness and transparency are claimed to be defining characteristics of Sweden s approach to counterterrorism. The starting points outlined in the current strategy are enhancing security through effectiveness and the rule of law; operating through means that are acceptable in an open and democratic society; and prioritising national and international cooperation and collaboration (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73). Figure 3.1: Main starting points for counter-terrorism in Sweden Main starting points for counter-terrorism in Sweden Respect for human rights and our constitutional rights and freedoms. Action must be taken with full respect for these fundamental rights and freedoms. Society should avoid branding any particular group and should develop dialogue to promote mutual awareness and understanding. Maintenance of the rule of law. Legal security. Proportional application. Effectiveness and flexibility. Openness and transparency are watchwords. Insight, supervision and control. A robust society with a good capability for recovery. Some of our rights and freedoms are inviolable and some of them may be restricted in law under certain specific conditions. The laws must be clear and accessible to the general public so that the restrictions of rights are predictable. Private individuals, companies and others must be protected from criminal attacks on life, health, freedom, integrity and property. Every single measure must be in proportion to the purpose of the measure. It must be possible to adapt measures to the threat as it develops over time. How society meets the threat of terrorism must be stated as clearly as possible without risking harm to national security, law enforcement activities and private individuals. There must be acceptable and reliable functions for insight, supervision and independent scrutiny of activities. The protection of installations, functions and people must be given priority and be adapted to relevant assessments of risk, needs and other matters. At the same time, reasonable accessibility must be maintained. The principle Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 32

33 of responsibility, which means that the party that bears responsibility in normal conditions also bears it in a crisis, is the starting point. National collaboration. International cooperation. Promote our fundamental values and democracy. The responsible authorities in society must cooperate and collaborate in order to effectively achieve the objectives. International cooperation is an important precondition for counterterrorism and Sweden actively supports further and extended cooperation. By promoting democracy, tolerance, dialogue and participation we can generate resistance to intolerance, discrimination and exclusion. Source: Ministry of Justice (2011/12:73) Measures for preventing terrorist attacks Much of the preventative work outlined in this strategy is focused on countering particular activities threatening Swedish security, rather than on the arguments and ideas that are used to justify such actions. The national strategy thus aims to move beyond law-enforcement measures and set out activities to be conducted by other actors in society like schools, social services, municipalities and voluntary organisations. Among the key measures to prevent the emergence of terrorism is the national action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism (discussed above). Though, as will be discussed later in this section, public confidence in Säpo is often noted as being higher than ever in recent years, there are variations across age, social class, and ethnicity in the trust people have for the police. The second set of preventative measures includes activities intended to build and improve trust and establish cooperation between citizens and the state, a series of measures which is largely carried out as part of the police crime-prevention work through dialogue and contact-promoting activities. Säpo aims to maintain a visible presence in a context where there may be people, especially young people, drifting into circles of violence. For example, the Police Service is to initiate a pilot scheme consisting of social teams for young people who risk becoming criminals. After holding consultations with the police and other agencies involved, the Board of Health and Welfare is to develop a risk-assessment manual to be able to better identify young people who are at risk of being recruited to criminal networks, or want to leave destructive networks. The police have set up special dialogue police as a link between police commanders and the organisers of various ideological and other groups, including the White Power movement. The aim is to facilitate open dialogue with those at risk of being attacked, or other actors like municipalities, social services, and parents' associations. The increased presence of the police in social media and other forums on the Internet has been initiated to allow greater visibility, accessibility and better information. Police in-service training courses in preventing violent extremism will also be produced. In addition, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service is working to identify people, groups and phenomena that are signs of ongoing recruitment to violent extremism in the prison and probation Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 33

34 environment, work that was strengthened under the Prisons Act (2010:610) (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73). The counter-terrorism strategy stresses the involvement of the community, including civil society organisations, private individuals and others. As noted in the action plan (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:44), the government provides funding for organisations that conduct activities in opposition to discrimination, racism and similar forms of intolerance. For example, the government provides funding for civil society organisations like Exit Fryshuset, which provides support for individuals leaving the White Power movement. The importance of the Internet and social media is mentioned, though there is little elaboration of measures taken in this domain. The counter-terrorism strategy prioritises international cooperation, seeking a well-developed international regulatory framework for preventing and combating terrorism. Sweden has contributed actively to UN and EU strategies and action plans, including the United Nations Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288) adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2006 (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73). International action includes general initiatives to combat poverty, develop stable democracies, and solve conflicts abroad. Through this work, the Swedish Armed Forces play an important role in Sweden s counter-terrorism strategy. Measures for pursuing terrorist attacks The Government has increased the financial resources of Säpo and other parts of the Swedish police, and the police are responsible for making contributions to law-enforcement work in pursuing terrorist attacks. Cooperation is a key element of the measures taken to pursue terrorist attacks. The National Task Force (NTF) is the most important resource for the police in handling situations such as an ongoing terrorist attack or hostage situation. The NTF is a paramilitary tactical unit which cooperates closely with the National Centre for Assessing Terror Threats, the Security Police and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. Effective cooperation between these bodies allows the NTF to continually adapt itself, as it receives situation overview reports and immediately shapes its capacity based on the transfer of knowledge and resources across these bodies. The government is currently in the process of increasing NTF access to immediately-available transport resources through the Swedish Armed Forces (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73). The NTF also holds training courses on the handling of suspected explosive substances or operations in mass transport. Furthermore, the Counter-terrorism Cooperative Council was initiated in 2005 to bring together Swedish agencies that carry out certain functions to counter terrorism, with the aim of bettering coordination of their activities. At present the Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council includes the following 14 agencies: the Swedish National Economic Crimes Bureau, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, the Swedish Coast Guard, the Swedish Migration Board, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the National Criminal Police, the Swedish Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 34

35 Radiation Safety Authority, Säpo, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish Transport Agency, the Swedish Customs and the Swedish Prosecution Authority. A cross- agency national specialist function has been established to trace, secure, confiscate and return proceeds made from crime, including the financing of terrorism (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73). As mentioned above, international cooperation is also a key element of Sweden s counter-terrorism strategy. Säpo represents Sweden in a number of multilateral bodies and cooperation groups, including the Club de Berne and the Counter-terrorism Group (CTG). Sweden also participates in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body formed in 1989 to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. The counter-terrorism strategy furthermore outlines a number of measures to improve knowledge and intelligence about suspects and environments in which perpetrators operate. Säpo has carried out evaluation of the terrorist attacks in Norway in July 2011, as well as the suicide attack in Stockholm in December 2010, to improve its own methods. Preparing for the eventuality of an attack The measures preparing for the eventuality of a terror attack aim to ensure protection for individuals and for essential functions, IT systems and installations (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73). Preparing also involves being able to manage the consequences of an attack effectively. Important measures include reducing the risk that dangerous chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances are used in terrorist attacks and improving the consequence management of such an incident. Civil society response capabilities have been strengthened through the formation of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in January The MSB is responsible for coordinating and supporting tasks required in accident protection and civil defence. A Crisis Management Coordination Secretariat has also been established to support the government in crisis management. The counter-terrorism strategy also includes measures to increase the control of firearms, explosives and substances that can be important components of explosives. There is, furthermore, a focus on strengthening IT security. For example, the FRA has developed a technical detection and warning system for essential services and infrastructure. The FRA also provides penetration tests, network mapping and technical advice to government agencies and state-owned companies. It furthermore delivers training courses and technical demonstrations to wider society (Ministry of Justice 2011/12:73). Many of the methods proposed in the counter-terrorism strategy to prepare for the eventuality of a terror attack involve measures to improve cross-sectoral planning and exercises. The 2010 Säpo report on violence-promoting Islamist extremism (Säkerhetspolisen 2010) concluded that there are approximately 200 individuals in Sweden involved in violent Islamist extremist activities. In this report, the largest threat identified was returnees who come to Sweden after being in training camps or involved in violent acts abroad, for example in Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Säpo has been working Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 35

36 to identify individuals planning to travel to training camps and engaging in prevention dialogue, as well as speaking to those suspected of returning from such travel. 3.2 KEY INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Sweden has a national police service, which involves over 23,000 employees and reports directly to the Ministry of Justice (National Police Board 2005). The Swedish Police Service is organised into 21 police authorities, with each county constituting a police district. Local police boards determine the structure of each police authority, which means that the organisation of the police may vary by county. The Stockholm County Police is the largest of the police authorities in Sweden, with approximately 5,000 officers (Polisen 2012). Distinct from these 21 police authorities is the Swedish Security Service (Säpo), which works across five areas of activity; counter-espionage; counter-terrorism; protection of the constitution; protective security; and dignitary protection. The National Police Board (NPB) is the supervisory authority for the police service, headed by a National Police Commissioner appointed by the government. The NPB determines how funds are allocated to the police authorities, and is also responsible for coordinating border controls, international police work, central police records and planning police responses to special incidents (National Police Board 2005). In Sweden, the operational measures specifically to combat terrorism are dealt with by a number of agencies and authorities responsible to the government. However, Säpo is the authority with the main responsibility for preventing the planning and implementation of terrorist acts, and for implementing the Terrorist Act since its inception. There has been some debate in Sweden as to whether this is the best way of organising counter-terrorism, with arguments that perhaps Säpo should be complemented by more agencies outside the police, or replaced by an organisation that works across the ministries to make counter-terrorism more effective (Transnational Terrorism 2008a). However, it is important to note that other parts of the police service are also involved in some counterterrorism work, particularly in crisis situations. The Special Operations Division at the National Criminal Police deals handles air and seaport security, as well as the transport of nuclear materials or weapons (Council of Europe 2008). There is also a national task force within the National Criminal Police whose main responsibility is combating acts of terrorism. In addition, a number of departments external to the police do support counter-terrorism measures. The Prosecution Office for National Security processes all terrorist cases investigated by Säpo. The Swedish National Economic Crimes Bureau investigates economic crimes, including the financing of terrorism, and coordinates anti-economic crime measures. In addition, the Swedish Financial Supervision Authority oversees financial institutions and issues regulations to combat financing of terrorism (Council of Europe 2008). Finally, under a new act that came into effect in 2006, the Swedish Police Service may request help Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 36

37 from the Swedish Armed Forces to counter terrorism. These requests are subject to approval by the government. 3.3 ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS In 1987, the Cabinet formed a parliamentary committee, the Säpo Committee, to scrutinise the work of Säpo. It was during the formation of this body that the then-justice Minister noted that Säpo had been overlooked while the rest of the Swedish Police had undergone major reforms in the 1980s (Hansén 2007). Few political initiatives to change policies related to Säpo had been taken over the years. Today, the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, the Chancellor of Justice and the Swedish National Audit Office exercise regular supervision of government agencies and officials, including Säpo and other parts of the Swedish Police. These bodies can carry out investigations on their own initiative or investigate complaints made by individuals (Säkerhetspolisen 2008). Parliament holds annual consultations to receive information about the activities of Säpo, and, as mentioned in Part Two, the Swedish Commission on Security and Integrity Protection (SÄKINT ) has been set up with parliamentary governance. This commission supervises the use of covert surveillance by law enforcement agencies, as well as associated activities and the processing of personal data by Säpo. On individuals requests, the commission is required to check whether the individual has been the subject of covert surveillance or subject to processing of personal data. Civil society organisations have also taken on the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of counter-terrorism measures. For example, Charter 2008 is a Swedish NGO working to promote the prevention of violations of law and abuses in the War on Terror (Kawesa 2011). 3.4 LEVELS OF TRUST IN POLICE AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS Public confidence in the Swedish Security Service is often noted as being higher than ever before in recent years, as evident in a 2010 confidence survey conducted by the SOM Institute, based at the University of Gothenburg (cited in Säkerhetspolisen 2010). According to the survey, 44 percent of Swedes have a very high or fairly high level of confidence in the Service, compared to 38 percent in Among young people, the rate is even higher. The Service currently ranks as the eight most trusted public bodies in Sweden (Säkerhetspolisen 2010). However, according to Westin and Nilsson (2009), there are large variations across age, social class, ethnicity and degree of urbanisation in the trust the people have for the police. Charles Westin was commissioned by Säpo in 2009 to conduct a study of attitudes and behaviour in the Swedish Police, as well as levels of public confidence in the police. Overseeing the activities of police in Skåne, Östergötland and Gävleborg, Westin assessed the police force and made suggestions for changes. His study (Westin Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 37

38 and Nilsson 2009) demonstrates that older people in rural areas have greater confidence in the police than young people with foreign backgrounds in urban, segregated neighbourhoods. Westin and Nilsson (2009) furthermore notes that prominent incidents of bigotry and racial profiling by the police can have major impacts on public confidence in the police, particularly when picked up by local and national media. For example, the police in Rosengard, a neighbourhood in Malmo with a particularly high density of migrant and minority communities, had particularly high levels of bigoted speech and unprofessional conduct. The national media had amplified these stories of unprofessional conduct, damaging confidence in the police across the country, at least temporarily (Westin and Nilsson 2009). Recent research on police culture in Scandinavia demonstrates cynicism, pessimism, sexism, racism, homophobia, and intolerance of all who are perceived to be different (Høigård 2011; and see Zedner 2004, Bowling & Foster 2002). Though racial profiling has traditionally not been a term often used in the Swedish context, several key incidents have brought the problem to the limelight and have inflamed tensions between police and local minority communities (Kawesa 2011). Several cases of racial profiling within the police force against Somalis have been presented in a report by the Centre Against Racism (Centrum mot rasism), which demonstrated that Somali men tend to be under suspicion in public places and singled out as potential terrorists. Somali men were disproportionately the victims of stop-and-search practices and extra airport security measures (Centre Against Racism 2011). According to the Equality Ombudsman, the majority of complaints filed against the police regard discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, followed by disability and gender. Most of the complaints against the police involve situations where ethnic minorities reported worse treatment than an ethnic Swede might have (Kawesa 2011). However, another key finding of research carried out by the Centre Against Racism is a lack of confidence in the structures in place to report violations by the police (Centre Against Racism 2011). In its 2011 report, the organisation noted that, among those who know that the Equality Ombudsman exists, many minorities believe that notifying the Ombudsman will lead to no changes. There is a distinct lack of trust in public institutions designed to collect incident reports and address discrimination, particularly those related to discrimination within security services. In response to increasing tensions between police and Muslim communities, as well as the increase of anti-muslim hate crimes, Swedish police have sought to specifically enhance their cooperation with Muslim communities; for example a 2008 consultation meeting was held between law enforcement agencies and Muslim community representatives and NGOs (OSCE 2008). In 2007 the Stockholm County Police Authority was involved in the creation and implementation of an educational strategy to improve attitude and behavioural issues and disseminate methodologies in dealing with hate crimes for the entire county police force. The Stockholm County Police Authority also implemented a one-day training programme for employees who come into direct contact with the victims of hate crime (OSCE Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 38

39 2008). However, this cooperation has focused largely on addressing hate crime and handling of violence against Muslim communities, rather than on improving police attitudes and discriminatory behaviour towards Muslims. Part Four: Security Context Sweden has had few experiences with terrorism in recent years compared to its Western European counterparts. Many of the major incidences over the last 50 years involved acts carried out on Swedish soil due to political turmoil abroad. These include the 1971 murder of Yugoslavia s ambassador in Sweden, carried out by Croat activists in Stockholm. In 1972, a domestic flight was hijacked on Swedish territory by Croat activists demanding that the persons convicted of the previous murder of the Yugoslavian ambassador be released from prison. In April 1975 the West German embassy in Stockholm was attacked, with the perpetrators demanding the release of RAF leaders imprisoned in West Germany. On 28 February 1986 the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme was murdered on a public street, a case which was never been solved (Hansén 2007). By the mid-1990 s, extreme right-wing groups had grown in numbers, and movements such as the National Socialist Front, the Swedish Resistance Movement and the Aryan Brotherhood committed acts of violence against individuals and damaged property. However, no member of these movements has ever been accused of terrorism. At the other end of the spectrum, the left-wing Autonomous Network focused primarily on animal rights in its early years, but has focused on anti-globalisation acts in recent years. Though the Autonomous Network has grown increasingly violent, no member has ever been accused of terrorism. Focus on terrorism as a security issue in Sweden was elevated during the 1970s but declined during the 1980s. Though terrorism again began to garner public and political salience during the 1990s, it was the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 which instigated a shift in Swedish security measures. The subsequent attacks in Spain in 2004 and in the United Kingdom in 2005 have contributed to the heighted attention devoted to terrorism. According to Van Leeuwen (2003), the discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism in Sweden is very much formulated by journalists, politicians, academics and other researchers. He argues that the Security Service still participates relatively little in the public discourse (Van Leeuwen, 2003). 4.1 NUMBER OF ARRESTS AND TERRORIST CONVICTIONS Since 2001, Swedish courts have examined very few criminal cases relating to terrorism. Sweden has had low-profile experiences with terrorism, and yet remains at risk. Two events in late 2010 drew attention to Sweden as a potential staging area for terrorist attacks: a suicide bomber who died in a failed attempt in Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 39

40 downtown Stockholm, and a group of terrorists who travelled from Sweden to Denmark in order to carry out an attack against a Danish newspaper. Figure 4.1: Numbers of arrests, trials and convictions for terrorism-related offences in Sweden ( ) Numbers of arrests, trials and convictions for terrorism-related offences Number of arrests Number of trials Number of convictions Source: Europol EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports ( ) Over the last five years, several key events have contributed to the increased concern about terrorism in Sweden. In 2007, Swedish artist Lars Vilks portrayed the Prophet Muhammad as a dog in a series of cartoons published in several Swedish newspapers; the international gaze turned to Sweden as protests erupted and condemnations were issued by governments including those of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Following the publication, the security levels surrounding one newspaper which published the cartoons, as well as Vilks himself, were heightened. In November 2010, an al-shabaab fighter named Abu Zaid appeared in a propaganda video; speaking in Swedish, he urged Muslims in Sweden to kill Vilks and to move to Somalia. In May 2010, Vilks' home was attacked with Molotov cocktails and two brothers of Swedish-Kosovar origin were convicted of arson for carrying out the attacks (Office for the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2011). During the past few years, terrorist networks have showed an increased interest in carrying out attacks in Sweden, potentially due both to Vilks' cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed and Sweden's military presence in Afghanistan. Most recently, five individuals were arrested (four in Denmark and one in Sweden) on 29 December 2010 for conspiracy to commit terrorist crimes. The individuals, four of whom were Swedish citizens or residents, were arrested for plans to attack the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which had originally published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005 (Office for the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2011). In October 2010, Säpo raised the National Threat Advisory to elevated for the first time, equating to a shift from level two to three on an escalating scale of five. This shift followed information from the National Center for Terrorism relating to specific threats against Sweden. Shortly afterwards, on 11 December 2010, a car bomb device was detonated and Sweden's first ever suicide bomber attempted to carry out an attack in a crowded pedestrian area in Stockholm. Authorities believed that the bomber Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 40

41 prematurely triggered one of his pipe bombs while on a side street next to Sweden s crowded pedestrian area. The bomber, a 28 year-old Swedish citizen of Iraqi descent, Taimour Abdulwahab al-abdaly, was killed, and two people were injured in an act that was deemed the first suicide attack related to Islamist extremism in the Nordic countries. Authorities are still looking into trips the bomber undertook to Syria and Iraq, and determining whether al-abdaly acted alone. In 2010, Säpo noted an increased activity threat from individuals who were planning, supporting or financing terrorist attacks in areas of conflict abroad. A Säpo report (Säkerhetspolisen 2010) on violencepromoting Islamist extremism concluded that the largest threat identified was returnees who come to Sweden after being in training camps or involved in violent acts abroad, for example in Somalia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Säpo has been working to identify individuals planning to travel to training camps and engaging in prevention dialogue, as well as speaking to those suspected of returning from such travel. According to estimates by Säpo, it is believed that there are approximately 20 individuals from Sweden engaged in violence or in terrorism training camps abroad, for example in Somalia and Pakistan (Office for the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2011). The National Threat Advisory in Sweden has remained elevated since October According to government reports to Parliament, the use of secret surveillance has increased considerably in recent years (Privacy International 2011). By 2008, the number of instances of communications surveillance had almost doubled those in earlier years. In 2010, the Swedish courts denied 36 permits and issued 3,349 permits for wiretapping and camera surveillance, which was an increase of 51 percent from 2009 (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour 2011). 4.2 PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT OF TERRORISM In the years immediately following 9/11, there were a number of opinion polls examining public attitudes towards the risk of terrorism. One study (Holmberg & Weibull 2002) of the perceived threat of terrorism in October 2001, led by the SOM Institute and involving a random sample of the Swedish population, revealed that terrorism was the most worrying threat referred to when asked the question What do you believe is most worrying for the future?. The Eurobarometer data from Autumn 2001 demonstrated that 83 percent of the Swedish sample was personally afraid of terrorism (European Commission 2002). Another study (Bennulf 2002) undertaken after 9/11 asked a sample of Swedish respondents about levels of worry concerning various violent and life-threatening hazards. Terrorism ranked third in this study, rating an average of 2.5 on a scale of worry from 1 to 5, falling between a rather high level and a level of worry neither high nor low. A study by Lindkvist et al. (2002) found that the perceived threat of terrorism had rapidly increased following 9/11. However, Sjöberg (2005) argues that the Swedish public was alarmed about terrorism immediately following 9/11, but that the public quickly became less alarmed by June According to Sjöberg s Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 41

42 study in 2005, women tend to be believe there is a greater risk of terrorism than men, along with the elderly and people with lower levels of education. Figures highlight the results of Sjöberg s study, drawing a distinction between perceived general threat (risk to others and society as a whole) and perceived personal risk (threat to one s self). Figure 4.2: Gender differences, personal and general terrorism risk Source: Sjöberg (2005) Figure 4.3: Age differences, personal and general terrorism risk Source: Sjöberg (2005) Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Background Report 42