Escape from Politics. Ms. Elizabeth Panasiuk, BA (Psychology), MA (Psychology), MA (Philosophy)

Transcription

1 1 Escape from Politics Ms. Elizabeth Panasiuk, BA (Psychology), MA (Psychology), MA (Philosophy) Is there Crisis of Democracy in Canada? Voting is often thought to be the minimum requirement for citizenship, and on this measure, Dr. Whitaker is correct in saying there is a decline in political participation and democratic citizenship. In the 2000 federal election, voter turnout was recorded at 61%. This, shockingly, is the lowest recorded turnout in a federal election since Confederation. Indeed the rate might have been even lower as such figures are calculated based on registered, rather than eligible voters. The decline toward this nadir has been gradual but steady since 1988, and the responsibility for decline in this basic civic practice seems to lie, as Dr. Whitaker points out, in the hands of young Canadians. Does a decline in voting mean there is a flight from politics? Should voting rates be considered an indicator of the legitimacy of a thriving democracy? Well, not necessarily. After the February 15 th protests, the New York Times said that now there are two superpowers in the world. On one side there is the U.S. military machine. On the other side, there is international public opinion. This past Saturday March 22 nd 2003, gathered in protest against the Iraq war in Montreal, in Toronto, in Halifax, in both Ottawa and Vancouver, and in Edmonton. Such numbers don t seem to signify an indifference to or flight from politics Certainly, Dr. Whitaker does suggest that one explanation for the decline in basic civic practices, such as voting, is that young Canadians are finding their own avenues, outside of the formal parliamentary system, for political involvement. The revival of protest as an increasingly mainstream form of political participation began with the anti-globalization movement and the

2 2 events in Seattle, Quebec City, and Kananaskis. Now, with respect to the war in Iraq, Canadians seem to be placing more faith and confidence in such political channels than in their parliamentary representative to have their voices heard. Why isn t this interest and enthusiasm for politics translated into civic action within formal democratic domains, such as voting? Some might argue that a failure to vote, for young Canadians, is a political statement, rather than simply a consequence of apathy or disinterest. Many young Canadians believe that by voting for candidates they find unappealing just to vote they are perpetuating a system that fails to offer its citizens a proper political choice an ultimately undemocratic system. Other young Canadians express this same sentiment by showing up at the polls and spoiling the ballot some have even gone so far as eating it. However, even if this rationale explains a small percentage of those who fail to participate in formal politics, we still must ask why it is that young Canadians are fleeing from traditional democratic politics. Whitaker s Explanation Dr. Whitaker suggests that democratic decline in the body politic can be attributed to several structural phenomena. He indicates, first, that both culture and community have become increasingly fragmented, and we no longer have a sense of a common good necessary for democratic politics. Second, globalization has placed limitations on governments and moved many significant decisions out of the deliberative sphere to a place where our politicians have little accountability for the decisions that are made. The Right has created an economic constitution by way of trade agreements that not even governments, let alone citizens, have full control over. Finally, the Left too has constitutionalized politics and commandeered traditional politics of negotiated agreement in their pursuit of social rights. In constitutionalizing politics, Dr. Whitaker claims both Right and Left remove issues from the deliberative arena, shrink the space for democratic compromise and negotiation, and put it out of reach of democratic accountability.

3 3 Together, according to Dr. Whitaker, these features of contemporary society explain why today almost half of Canadians live outside the conventional body politic. I, however, want to suggest that perhaps all of the above are symptomatic of a deeper illness in politics: a lack of trust, which may be a more fundamental reason for the decline in democracy than the constitutionalization of politics. Dr. Whitaker doesn t completely neglect issues of trust, in that he points out that one of the results of the constitutionalization of politics, particularly by the Right, results in an antigovernment mentality, which stems from general cynicism and distrust. However, I think his analysis may benefit from a discussion of how a failure of social and institutional trust might have a more profound role in the decline of democracy than his remarks indicate. The absence of this from public life, I argue is warranted, and hence the flight from traditional parliamentary democracy is perhaps a reasonable response to our inability to maintain trust in our institutions. Trust Trust has been the focus of significant critical interest over the past decade, and has become an important concept in understanding relations in civil society. Civil society is the world of associations in which we rely on each other and pursue freely chosen goals together. In essence, it is the world of trust. Various theorists from Robert Putnam to Francis Fukuyama have discussed trust as an essential part of civic participation, and as a central concept in social capital theory. Trust can be understood as an expectation of honest, transparent, and reciprocal behaviour. It is crucial to social cooperation in several ways. It ensures that we don t have to worry about free riding (those that happily enjoy their democratic rights, but fail to fulfill any of their civic responsibilities), allows us to develop habits of cooperation, disposes us to step forward to help others achieve their ends, and builds reciprocity. A corollary of trust then, is allowing oneself to be vulnerable to others. And in trusting we must accept that there is a risk for potential harm, but sustain the hope that in doing so, cooperation and reciprocity will be fostered.

4 4 Trust can be distinguished into two broad kinds: (1) particularized trust which is trust of those who are most similar to you (family, religious or ethnic group) and (2) generalized trust, which is trust that extends beyond such boundaries to strangers. Particularized trust poses the danger of creating identity groups that insulate themselves from outsiders, and decreases the likelihood that conflicts will be resolved through cooperation and reciprocity. Most appropriate to the functioning of a healthy democracy is generalized trust which, theorists like Eric Uslaner suggest, allows us to build large interdependent networks and institutions that will hopefully embody that trust. This brings us to the distinction between social trust and institutional trust. Although basic social trust (trust of others in your community or your group, whether voluntary associations, or those in your identity group) is typically warranted, I think Canadians are legitimately wary of placing trust in institutions. Whitaker s Explanations and Trust Dr. Whitaker s structural explanations for the decline in democracy might be better understood in terms of a warranted deficit in institutional trust. 1. First, Dr. Whitaker claims that globalization has ensured that our governments no longer have the power to protect their citizens from its complex and pervasive effects. The Right, by creating economic constitutions via global trade agreements, have ensured that state governments have signed away political power to corporations, which are not democratically accountable. Trust is implicated in globalization in two ways. First, because we are more interdependent, we are more vulnerable. Moreover, the increasing interdependencies are so complex we cannot monitor and assess all the factors that come together to bear on our lives. Our only recourse in an increasingly complex world is to shift the burden onto institutions and the systems that are in place, and to do this we need to have trust in them.

5 5 A second way in which trust is implicated in globalization is that due to globalization, economics begins to pollute and flood the political process. Multi-national corporations have an unprecedented power and influence on governments, and our governments have practical needs to respond to these global economic forces. The perception of many citizens is that business interests are more urgent, or enjoy more political attention, than the interests of the polity at large. Mark Warren suggests that the conditions for trusting political institutions are that they require effective means for (a) gaining information about, (b) monitoring, and (c) disciplining public officials. The corporatization of politics and the complexities of a globalized economy make it quite difficult to foster institutional trust in citizens, and rightly so. The object of trust in democratic political institutions is the set of institutional rules that ensure that conflicts are dealt with inclusively and transparently. That is, trust, at this level is institutionalized in the laws and rules governing relations. Because many of the laws that comprise our economic constitutions were crafted behind closed doors, with little or no input from citizens, sometimes with those very same citizens protesting en masse outside of heavily guarded gates, young Canadians don t have much warrant for institutional trust. It seems that these individuals have not fled politics, but perhaps have correctly perceived that traditional parliamentary channels are no longer open given the opacity of these processes, which led to the serious contamination of the political process by corporate interests. You can t have trust in governmental institutions whose power to consider and act to foster the well-being of its citizens is limited because of its commitment to ensuring profits for corporations. 2. Second, Dr. Whitaker claims that the legalization of politics on the left by embedding social rights in the constitution, places them out of the reach of democratic deliberation and accountability, thus contributing to the flight from traditional politics.

6 6 Using the example of aboriginal groups, he writes that: Rights as trumps can be very effective weapons in winning courtroom battles. Yet the adversarial mentality fostered in the courtroom may also polarize political opposition. It certainly does little to build the kind of mutual trust between Aboriginals and non-aboriginal society that would favour the compromises and tradeoffs necessary for livable and durable accommodations. I am sympathetic to Dr. Whitaker s view of how using rights to win courtroom battles may lead to a deficit in mutual trust between Aboriginals and non-aboriginals, or other identity groups. However, I think it is important to note that the relationship between the legalization of social rights and trust is more complex. Indeed, Dr. Whitaker anticipates this when he writes that: rights become a refuge or protective haven for those fleeing the insecurities of politics. We need to also recognize that the rise of rights talk and the emphasis on rights over parliamentary politics is a sign of the lack of trust on the part of historically excluded groups and a desire to find security, refuge, and power in laws. Legal institutions and their associated rights play a crucial role in the creation and fostering of social trust between identity groups and wider society, just as they simultaneously may hamper the creation of mutual trust between groups. It is reasonable and warranted to expect mistrust from members of identity groups given a history of conflict or oppression. If we recognize the legitimacy of group-based mistrust we ll be ready to recognize some associations as contributing to democratic life even when they re premised on such mistrust. They can be legitimate associational responses to social injustice. Further, I suspect that the re-invigoration of institutional trust between individuals who do not primarily identify with alienated or distrustful identity groups and the traditional democratic institutions to which they have longstanding links would have important implications in this regard. If the members of groups who are accustomed to mistrust witness an increase in trust in a

7 7 broader context, perhaps they would be moved to try to establish relationships based on that elevated level of trust. Individuals and groups depend on code when they cannot trust, but we also don t want to permanently replace code with trust. In pluralist democracies like Canada, we should expect a fruitful tension between political procedures such as legalization of social rights and discursive democratic practices. Certainly, discursive solutions to problems require some level of background trust, which in turn relies on shared understandings and practices. Perhaps the trust we need to cultivate is trust in the discursive process. Conclusion Political participation is ultimately underwritten by trust and for this reason alone democracy cannot do without trust. Trust may motivate us, in the absence of legalized politics to cooperate, respect the law, and reciprocate, and to refrain from acting out of self-interest or uncritical attachment to identity groups. Trust may motivate us also to participate in public life. However, you can t build a democratic society on trust alone. You need institutions, but institutions that are held together by cooperation and reciprocity and belief in legitimacy. We need an institutional setting in which trust has meaning.