1 T.C. Memo UNITED STATES TAX COURT DANIEL W. ROOD AND REBECCA ROOD, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No Filed April 25, A. Brian Phillips, for petitioners. Randall B. Childs, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION GOEKE, Judge: This matter is before the Court on respondent s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule Respondent contends that no genuine 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court (continued...)
2 - 2 - issue exists as to any material fact and that the determination to deny petitioners deduction for alimony payments should be upheld. The issue for decision is whether certain payments by petitioners qualified as deductible alimony in accordance with section 71(b)(1). For the reasons stated below, we shall grant respondent s motion for summary judgment. Background At the time the petition was filed, petitioners resided in Orlando, Florida. On June 3, 1995, Daniel Rood married Ida Wozniak in Orlando, Florida. No children were born of the marriage. In 2002 Mr. Rood and Ms. Wozniak filed a dissolution of marriage action in Orange County, Florida. During the course of their divorce proceedings Mr. Rood and Ms. Wozniak entered into negotiations regarding settlement. As part of these negotiations, Ms. Wozniak s attorney sent a letter dated December 17, 2002, to Mr. Rood s attorney proposing a settlement offer, including a provision whereby-- The Husband shall pay to the Wife the sum of $5, a month for as long as she continues to be enrolled at Rollins College to complete her degree as planned, but no longer than a period of five (5) years. 1 (...continued) Rules of Practice and Procedure.
3 - 3 - Thereafter, Mr. Rood s attorney sent a letter to Ms. Wozniak s attorney stating-- The following items have been proposed by my client [Mr. Rood] as also being agreeable to your client [Ms. Wozniak], revised as follows: * * * This amount of $5, per month for as long as the Wife continues to be enrolled at Rollins College to complete her degree as planned, but no longer than a period of sixty (60) months beginning thirty days after the entry of the Final Judgment, by way of income deduction order, is non-modifiable. On February 4, 2003, Mr. Rood and Ms. Wozniak entered into a marital property settlement agreement (MSA). Pursuant to the MSA Mr. Rood received the marital residence in exchange for a $100,000 payment to Ms. Wozniak. Furthermore, Mr. Rood had to pay Ms. Wozniak $100,000 toward equitable distribution of the marital assets. Moreover, paragraph 21 of the MSA states-- The Respondent/Husband shall pay non-modifiable lump sum alimony in the amount of $300, to the Petitioner/Wife at the rate of $5, per month for a period of 60 months, by Income Deduction Order, beginning thirty days after the entry of the Final Judgment. The divorce between Mr. Rood and Ms. Wozniak became final on February 18, 2003, upon a final judgment of dissolution of marriage (final judgment) issued by the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court for Orange County, Florida (county court). Paragraph 3 of the final judgment incorporates the MSA, and paragraph 7 of the final judgment states--
4 - 4 - The Husband shall pay to the Wife as non-modifiable lump sum alimony the sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($300,000.00) AND NO/100 DOLLARS payable monthly in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000) AND NO/100 DOLLARS beginning March 15, 2003, and continuing each month thereafter for sixty (60) months until paid in full. The said alimony shall be paid by Income Deduction Order to the Wife. Also included in the final judgment was a provision stating that the county court retains jurisdiction of the parties hereto and the subject matter hereof for the purpose of enforcement of obligations as between the parties. The county court also issued an income deduction order to Mr. Rood s employer. The income deduction order instructed Mr. Rood s employer to withhold amounts from Mr. Rood s paycheck and pay to the Florida Department of Revenue [n]on-modifiable lump sum alimony in the amount of $300, payable at the rate of $5, per month for sixty (60) months beginning March 15, 2003 until February 15, 2008 or until notified that said amount has been paid in full. Mr. Rood subsequently married Rebecca Rood. Petitioners filed a joint income tax return for the 2006 tax year claiming an alimony deduction of $60,063 for payments made to Ms. Wozniak during Respondent examined petitioners 2006 income tax return and determined that the payments were not deductible. Therefore, respondent determined a $21,442 deficiency in petitioners
5 - 5 - income tax. Petitioners timely filed a petition with this Court, and respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Discussion I. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is designed to expedite litigation and to avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Shiosaki v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 861, 862 (1974). A motion for summary judgment may be granted where the pleadings and other materials show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FPL Grp., Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 73, (2001). In all cases, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32, 36 (1993). However, the nonmoving party is required to go beyond the pleadings and by * * * [his] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); see also Rauenhorst
6 - 6 - v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157, 175 (2002); FPL Grp., Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 554, 560 (2000). Petitioners filed an affidavit and a response to respondent s motion for summary judgment. In petitioners response, they contend that the provisions in the divorce decree, MSA, and income deduction order providing for non-modifiable lump sum alimony should be interpreted as providing for rehabilitative alimony that would terminate upon Ms. Wozniak s death. Petitioners argue that a critical factor in determining whether a payment is deductible alimony is whether the payment is modifiable. Even though the divorce decree explicitly states that the payments are nonmodifiable, petitioners argue that the payments were in fact modifiable because the county court retained jurisdiction to enforce the MSA, and the MSA could be modified by an agreement by both the parties. Moreover, petitioners assert that Florida law considers the intent of the parties in determining the character of payments labeled as alimony, and the settlement negotiation letters between Mr. Rood and Ms. Wozniak leading up to the final judgment demonstrate that the payments should be classified as deductible rehabilitative alimony that would terminate upon Ms. Wozniak s death. Petitioners urge us to consider the settlement negotiation letters in determining
7 - 7 - the intent of the parties because they argue the Florida parol evidence rule requires examination of extrinsic evidence. II. History of Alimony Payment Deductions Under Section 71 Before 1984 section 71 required courts to consider a number of factors to determine whether certain transfers of money would be treated as alimony for Federal income tax purposes. Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d 842, 844 (6th Cir. 1996), aff g T.C. Memo Whether payments represented alimony or a property settlement was a question of intent. Id. at 845. Intent was to be ascertained from the agreement itself and from the surrounding facts and circumstances. Id. Congress amended section 71 in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No , sec. 422, 98 Stat. at 795, to eliminate the subjective inquiries into the intent and the nature of payments that had plagued the courts in favor of a simpler, more objective test. See Baker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo (citing Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d. at 845); H.R. Rept. No , Part II, at 1495 (1984), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, The objective test was necessary because State courts sometimes used the term alimony indiscriminately. Kean v. Commissioner, 407 F.3d 186, 190 (3d Cir. 2005), aff g T.C. Memo Congress eliminated any consideration of intent in determining the deductibility of a
8 - 8 - payment as alimony in favor of a more straightforward, objective test that rests entirely on the fulfillment of the explicit requirements set forth in section 71. Okerson v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 258, (2004) (citing Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d. at 845); Baker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo ; Nelson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo ; see also Rosenthal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo ( Whether or not the parties intended for the payments to be deductible to petitioner, we must focus on the legal effect of the agreement in determining whether the payments meet the criteria under section 71. ). III. Deductible Alimony Payments for Federal Income Tax Purposes Pursuant to section 215(a), there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to the alimony payments paid during an individual s taxable year. For purposes of section 215, the term alimony means any alimony (as defined in section 71(b)) which is includible in the gross income of the recipient under section 71. Sec. 215(b). Section 71(b)(1) defines alimony as any payment in cash if-- (A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse under a divorce or separation instrument,
9 - 9 - (B) the divorce or separation instrument does not designate such payment as a payment which is not includible in gross income under this section and not allowable as a deduction under section 215, (C) in the case of an individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the payee spouse and the payor spouse are not members of the same household at the time such payment is made, and (D) there is no liability to make any such payment for any period after the death of the payee spouse and there is no liability to make any payment (in cash or property) as a substitute for such payments after the death of the payee spouse. If a payment satisfies all of these factors, then the payment is alimony; if it fails to satisfy any one of these factors, then the payment is not alimony. Jaffe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo In this case, that subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) are all satisfied is not in dispute. The issue before us is whether petitioners payments to Ms. Wozniak satisfy subparagraph (D) of section 71(b)(1). In prior cases considering the same question, the courts have applied the following sequential approach: (1) the court first looks for an unambiguous termination provision in the divorce decree; (2) if there is no unambiguous termination provision, then the court looks to whether the payments would terminate at the payee s death by operation of State law; and (3) if State law is unclear, the court will look solely to the divorce decree to determine whether the
10 payments would terminate at the payee s death. See Kean v. Commissioner, 407 F.3d at 191; Fithian v. United States, 45 Fed. Appx. 700, 701 (9th Cir. 2002); Lovejoy v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 1208, (10th Cir. 2002), aff g T.C. Memo ; Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d at ; Leventhal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo While we will consider State law when there is no unambiguous termination provision in the divorce decree, we will not engage in the very sort of subjective inquiry that had prompted the 1984 revision of section 71. Hoover v. Commissioner, 102 F.3d at 846. Therefore, when State law is ambiguous as to the termination of payments upon the death of the payee, we will not engage in complex, subjective inquiries under State law; rather, we will read the divorce instrument and make our own determination based on the language of the document. Id.; see also Fithian, 45 Fed. Appx. at 701. In this case, both the MSA and final judgment provide that Mr. Rood was to make non-modifiable lump sum alimony payments to Ms. Wozniak. Neither document makes any reference to whether the obligation to make the payments would terminate upon the death of Ms. Wozniak. Because the divorce documents are silent as to whether the obligation to make the payments would terminate upon Ms. Wozniak s death, we turn to Florida law to answer that question.
11 In a dissolution of marriage action, the Florida trial court is vested with broad discretion to achieve equity when dividing property between the parties and when granting alimony. Estate of Gary v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo (citing Kaylor v. Kaylor, 466 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)). Florida recognized three types of alimony in permanent periodic, rehabilitative, and lump-sum alimony; the trial court may award alimony in any combination thereof. Fla. Stat. Ann. sec (1) (West 2006); Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d 327, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Permanent alimony is an allowance for the support and maintenance of a spouse during his or her lifetime. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The obligation for periodic alimony afforded by a final divorce decree terminates upon the death of the payee spouse. See In re Estate of Freeland, 182 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1965); Van Boven v. First Nat l Bank in Palm Beach, 240 So. 2d 329, 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Rehabilitative alimony has been defined as alimony paid for the purpose of rehabilitating the spouse to whom it is awarded, such as, financially supporting an ill spouse until health is restored, or financially supporting a spouse until he or she can be trained for employment, or in some circumstances, until the spouse has a
12 reasonable time to recover from the trauma of the dissolution. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d at 329. Furthermore, the test for determining whether alimony provisions are nonmodifiable lump-sum alimony is as follows-- A lump-sum alimony award discharges the payor from further liability for the recipient party s support. An award of lump-sum alimony vests in the recipient at the time of the final decree of dissolution and is not subject to defeasance or modification. Lump-sum alimony is essentially payment of a definite sum and is in the nature of a final property settlement; hence, an award of lump-sum alimony creates a vested right which survives death and is not terminable on the recipient party s remarriage. [Filipov v. Filipov, 717 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).] See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1980); Newsome v. Newsome, 456 So. 2d 520, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d at 328. Although an existing vested interest is not as a general matter necessary for an award of lump-sum alimony, the fact of granting a lump-sum award in the final judgment itself actually creates a vested right in the receiving party which is neither terminable upon a spouse s remarriage or death nor subject to modification. Hannon v. Hannon, 740 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201). Thus, in awarding lumpsum alimony, the court is effectually deciding that the particular amount awarded should not be modified; instead it should be made absolute--i.e., placed beyond
13 the powers of the trial judge to change it. Id. Where a decree awards an allowance in gross, even though it is made payable in installments, the right becomes vested in the payee, and the obligation of the payor has every element of finality. Id. at Petitioners invite us to consider extrinsic evidence in determining the nature of the payments. However, the 1984 congressional amendments to section 71 as well as our judicial precedents make clear that we should not engage in subjective inquiries in determining whether the obligation to make payments under a divorce decree would terminate upon the death of the payee spouse. The intent of the parties is irrelevant in determining whether such an obligation would terminate at death. Therefore, we do not consider the settlement negotiation letters. Florida law is clear that the obligation to pay lump-sum alimony granted in a divorce decree does not terminate upon the death of the payee spouse. The MSA, the final judgment, and the income deduction order all order Mr. Rood to pay nonmodifiable lump-sum alimony to Ms. Wozniak. Moreover, petitioners payments in this case cannot be rehabilitative alimony because there is no specific finding by the trial court regarding the need for rehabilitation or a plan to do so and thus the payments are not tied to any specific rehabilitative purpose. Kirchman v. Kirchman, 389 So. 2d at 330. The payments were for the sum of $300,000 at the
14 rate of $5,000 per month until paid in full. Accordingly, we find that the payments were for a definite sum and in the nature of a final property settlement and therefore were lump-sum alimony payments under Florida law--the payments would not terminate upon the death of Ms. Wozniak and are therefore nondeductible. Petitioners cite Filipov v. Filipov, 717 So. 2d at 1082, Newsome v. Newsome, 456 So. 2d at 522, and Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201, for the proposition that the nature of the payments should be determined by whether the final judgment is modifiable. However, in Canakaris, the court merely indicated that it may expressly retain jurisdiction to terminate lump-sum alimony installment payments upon the death of a spouse when the parties agree to such a provision in a property settlement agreement. In this case, the parties agreed that the lump-sum alimony payments were nonmodifiable. Moreover, in Filipov and Newsome, the courts were deciding whether payments were periodic alimony or lump-sum alimony when the payments were vaguely defined in the divorce documents. In this case, all three agreements state that the payments were nonmodifiable lump sum alimony. Petitioners arguments to the contrary are rejected.
15 Finally, even if Florida law was unclear concerning whether the payments at issue were lump-sum alimony, when State law is ambiguous, we look only to the express language in the divorce documents to determine whether the payments would terminate upon the death of the payee. Looking only to the divorce documents, we find that petitioners payments qualified as lump-sum alimony and the obligation to pay them would not terminate upon the death of Ms. Wozniak. IV. Conclusion Petitioners have failed to designate any specific facts in dispute that would indicate that there is a genuine issue for trial. Therefore, we conclude that there is no issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Under Florida law, the payments at issue were made pursuant to an obligation to pay lump-sum alimony. Florida law is clear that the obligation to pay lump-sum alimony does not terminate upon the death of the payee spouse. Therefore, petitioners $5,000 monthly payments in 2006 are not deductible alimony for purposes of section 71. To reflect the foregoing, An appropriate order and decision will be entered.
PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE. T.C. Summary Opinion 2007-137 UNITED STATES TAX COURT MICHELE K. GARNER AND ROGER ALLEN
T.C. Memo. 1999-340 UNITED STATES TAX COURT VIRGINIA M. MARTEN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent DAVID E. LANE AND DONNA P. LANE, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Price v. Teaford, No. S0908-04 CnC (Norton, J., Mar. 23, 2005) [The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the accompanying
T.C. Memo. 2015-103 UNITED STATES TAX COURT MOHAMMAD A. KAKEH AND TONI L. KAKEH, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 10728-13L. Filed June 2, 2015. Thomas Kevin Spencer,
T.C. Memo. 2003-87 UNITED STATES TAX COURT TIMOTHY DEAN STRONG, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent STRONG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., A MINNESOTA CORPORATION, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER
T.C. Memo. 2015-26 UNITED STATES TAX COURT RICHARD E. SNYDER AND MARION B. SNYDER, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent RICHARD E. SNYDER AND MARION SNYDER, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER
T.C. Memo. 1999-30 UNITED STATES TAX COURT JOHN C. AND KAROL BOWDEN, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 11152-95. Filed February 1, 1999. David P. Leeper, for petitioners.
T.C. Memo. 2007-53 UNITED STATES TAX COURT LLOYD T. ASBURY, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.A., Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 13589-05. Filed March 6, 2007. Lloyd T. Asbury (an
T.C. Memo. 2012-264 UNITED STATES TAX COURT PAUL A. BILZERIAN AND TERRI L. STEFFEN, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 3648-98. Filed September 12, 2012. Paul A. Bilzerian
PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE. T.C. Summary Opinion 2001-156 UNITED STATES TAX COURT RONALD W. RAMEY AND JONI J. RAMEY,
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE CIVIL ACTION INSURANCE COMPANY, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO NORTH AMERICAN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY NO. 96-4053
T.C. Memo. 2014-106 UNITED STATES TAX COURT WHISTLEBLOWER 10949-13W, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 10949-13W. Filed June 4, 2014. Sealed, for petitioner. Sealed,
STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM - DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS - PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING QUALIFIED STATUS OF A DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER I. INTRODUCTION The State Employees Retirement System
Presented by: Heather L. Apicella In A Dissolution Of Marriage Proceeding The Court May Grant The Following Forms Of Alimony: Bridge-The-Gap Rehabilitative Durational Permanent, or Any Combination Of These
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION v. No. 96-CV-4598 PATRICIA M. CURRY KELLY, et al., Defendants.
T.C. Memo. 2015-47 UNITED STATES TAX COURT BALVIN ANTHONY MCKNIGHT, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 20844-13. Filed March 16, 2015. Balvin Anthony McKnight, pro se.
T.C. Memo. 2010-235 UNITED STATES TAX COURT GARY LEE COLVIN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 17167-09L. Filed October 26, 2010. Gary Lee Colvin, pro se. Chris Sheldon,
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A13-0824 In re: Life Insurance Policy No. 1642947-2,
JOINT SIMPLIFIED DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS BOTH PARTIES NEED TO BE PRESENT This brochure is being provided to you along with the necessary forms for filing a joint simplified
Case 1:09-cv-21435-MGC Document 208 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/01/2011 Page 1 of 6 E. JENNIFER NEWMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Case No. 09-21435-Civ-COOKE/TURNOFF vs. Plaintiff
No. 3--05--0771 Filed June 6, 2007. IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2007 COLLEEN ALLTON, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Will
DIVORCE GUIDANCE IN HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (813) 828-4422 ECONOMIC ISSUES REGARDING MARRIAGE AND DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE ASSETS
INFORMATION ON DIVORCE IN FLORIDA CAN YOUR MARRIAGE BE SAVED? Are you sure your marriage cannot be saved? Before you take any legal steps to end your marriage, you may consider possible ways to save it.
T.C. Memo. 2015-190 UNITED STATES TAX COURT DONALD LEE DUNNIGAN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 3702-14. Filed September 28, 2015. Donald Lee Dunnigan, pro se. Alicia
In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION THREE GARY GERVICH, Deceased and ) No. ED94726 DEBORAH GERVICH, ) ) Appeal from the Labor and Appellant, ) Industrial Relations Commission ) vs.
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 2004-14-02 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR ORANGE AND OSCEOLA COUNTIES, FLORIDA AMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER RE: FAMILY MEDIATION PROVIDING FOR MANDATORY
T.C. Memo. 2013-149 UNITED STATES TAX COURT LORI M. MINGO AND JOHN M. MINGO, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 17753-07, 21906-10. Filed June 12, 2013. Harold A. Chamberlain,
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 10-3272 In re: JOHN W. HOWARD, Debtor NOT PRECEDENTIAL ROBERT O. LAMPL, Appellant VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. On Appeal from the United States District
ILLINOIS INDEPENDENT TAX TRIBUNAL JOHN E. AND FRANCES L. ROGERS, ) Petitioners, ) ) v. ) 14 TT 153 ) Judge Brian F. Barov ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT ) OF REVENUE, ) Respondent. ) ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x In re: : THIERRY P. DELOS : BK No. 08-11548 Debtor Chapter 7 : STACIE L. DELOS, Plaintiff : v. : A.P.
T.C. Memo. 2011-78 UNITED STATES TAX COURT KURT SOLLBERGER, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 9458-08. Filed April 4, 2011. Brian G. Isaacson, for petitioner. Daniel
NO. XXXXXX IN THE MATTER OF IN THE DISTRICT COURT THE MARRIAGE OF JOHN DOE, Petitioner TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS AND JANE DOE, Respondent 231ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT AGREED FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE On the day of
Case 2:06-cv-02026-CM Document 114 Filed 03/10/09 Page 1 of 10 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS ) METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE ) COMPANY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) CIVIL ACTION v.
T.C. Memo. 2010-18 UNITED STATES TAX COURT GINN DOOSE, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 29738-08L. Filed February 1, 2010. Ginn Doose, pro se. Catherine G. Chang, for
RENDERED: MARCH 13, 2015; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2014-CA-000056-MR RAMONA SPINKS, EXECUTRIX OF THE WILL OF BENJAMIN SPINKS, DECEASED APPELLANT APPEAL
T.C. Memo. 2007-35 UNITED STATES TAX COURT ARTHUR W. & RITA C. MILLER, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 24308-05L. Filed February 8, 2007. Arthur W. and Rita C. Miller,
PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE. T.C. Summary Opinion 2014-48 UNITED STATES TAX COURT ANDREW LEWIS HAVARD, Petitioner v.
Divorce in Florida CAN YOUR MARRIAGE BE SAVED? Before you take any legal steps to end your marriage, you should make sure that you have tried all possible ways to save it. Do you want professional help
T.C. Memo. 2015-178 UNITED STATES TAX COURT GARY WAYNE RODRIGUES, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 27277-11L. Filed September 10, 2015. Gary Wayne Rodrigues, pro se.
T.C. Memo. 2010-254 UNITED STATES TAX COURT THOMAS M. AND DONNA GENTILE, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 14226-08. Filed November 18, 2010. R determined a deficiency
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT JANUARY TERM 2012 WHALEY FERNANDES, Appellant, v. Case No. 5D10-3741 VALERIE J. FERNANDES, Appellee. / Opinion filed April 20, 2012
2012 IL App (1st) 111507-U SIXTH DIVISION November 30, 2012 No. 1-11-1507 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances
IT IS ORDERED as set forth below: Date: April 30, 2014 Barbara Ellis-Monro U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge IN RE: UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION ERIC CORTEZ WADE,
T.C. Memo. 2014-184 UNITED STATES TAX COURT VANNEY ASSOCIATES, INC., Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 25684-11. Filed September 11, 2014. Thomas Martin Regan, for petitioner.
United States Bankruptcy Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division Transmittal Sheet for Opinions for Posting Will this opinion be Published? YES Bankruptcy Caption: In re: Ronald W. Ruhl Bankruptcy
Marital Settlement Agreement Sample Document IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR COUNTY, FLORIDA IN RE: The Marriage of CASE NO: Petitioner,, and Respondent., MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Page 1 of 8 SEPARATION AGREEMENT (Without Minor Children of the Marriage) This is an important legal document, and you may want to get the advice of an attorney. Read this agreement carefully and completely
T.C. Memo. 2007-127 UNITED STATES TAX COURT JANET MARIE WILSON, Petitioner, AND KENNETH E. WILSON, Intervenor v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 7509-05. Filed May 21, 2007. Steven
Main Document Page 1 of 6 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA IN RE CASE NO. 512-bk-03367-RNO STEVEN RICHARD ALECKNA JAIME SUE ALECKNA CHAPTER 7 Debtors ***********************************
The court incorporates by reference in this paragraph and adopts as the findings and orders of this court the document set forth below. This document was signed electronically on November 12, 2008, which
PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 7463(b),THIS OPINION MAY NOT BE TREATED AS PRECEDENT FOR ANY OTHER CASE. T.C. Summary Opinion 2012-74 UNITED STATES TAX COURT CHARLES GRANT BEECH AND ELIZABETH
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CAROSELLA & FERRY, P.C., Plaintiff, v. TIG INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-2344 Memorandum and Order YOHN,
T.C. Memo. 2013-187 UNITED STATES TAX COURT STAFFMORE, LLC, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 13101-12. Filed August 15, 2013. respondent. Thomas J. Profy IV and John
Case: 14-11921 Date Filed: 02/25/2015 Page: 1 of 8 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 14-11921 Non-Argument Calendar D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-22917-MGC UNITED
T.C. Memo. 2014-170 UNITED STATES TAX COURT BRIAN HAMMERNIK, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 30398-12. Filed August 21, 2014. Brian Hammernik, pro se. Richard Charles
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 15-1100 FRANCIS J. GUGLIELMELLI Appellant v. NOT PRECEDENTIAL STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT HELEN CARROLL, Appellant, v. STUART G. ISRAELSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Thomas Jeffrie Carroll, STUART G. ISRAELSON
NOTICE Decision filed 10/15/15. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same. 2015 IL App (5th 140227-U NO. 5-14-0227
PRIVATE RULING 9131023 "This document may not be used or cited as precedent. Section 6110(j)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code." Dear * * * This is in reply to a letter dated October 30, 1990, and subsequent
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BROWN COUNTY, NEBRASKA KARMA L. MEYER, vs. Petitioner, Case No. CI00-19 DECREE OF DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE MICHAEL D. MEYER, Respondent. DATE OF FINAL HEARING: June 1, 2001. DATE
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION
RENDERED: JULY 9, 2004; 10:00 a.m. TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth Of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2003-CA-001285-MR HORACE B. SMITH, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF VICKIE L. RICE APPELLANT APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON
West Virginia Divorce Laws Selected West Virginia Divorce Laws 48-5-103. Jurisdiction of parties; service of process. (a) In an action for divorce, it is immaterial where the marriage was celebrated, where
[Cite as Hume v. Hume, 2014-Ohio-1577.] COURT OF APPEALS KNOX COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SANDRA HUME, nka PRESUTTI : JUDGES: : : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Sheila
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION INTO DIVORCE LAW: THE BASICS OF OHIO DIVORCE LAW By BETH SILVERMAN, J.D. How can a marriage be terminated in Ohio? There are two primary ways to terminate a marriage: Dissolution or
Opinion issued August 12, 2004 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas NO. 01-03-00062-CV D. B., Appellant V. K. B., Appellee On Appeal from the 311th District Court Harris County, Texas
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON January 18, 2005 Session IN THE MATTER OF: THE ESTATE OF LUCILLE JOHNSON HILL, Deceased Direct Appeal from the Probate Court for Henry County No. 2108 Hansel
2:09-cv-14271-LPZ-PJK Doc # 13 Filed 06/24/10 Pg 1 of 6 Pg ID 53 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION v. Plaintiff, CASE NO. 09-14271 HON.
MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res
BOARD OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION EUGENE K. CANZANO CHAIRPERSON RICHARD KRAUS VICE-CHAIRPERSON -- SANGEETA BHATIA CLIFF CANNON TOM MOUTES JOHN R. MUMMA MICHAEL A. PEREZ ROBERT SCHOONOVER MARGARET
Case: 09-60402 Document: 00511062860 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/25/2010 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit F I L E D March 25, 2010 Charles
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED October 6, 1998 Marilyn L. Graves Clerk, Court of Appeals of Wisconsin NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will
Case 3:07-cv-01180-TEM Document 56 Filed 04/27/2009 Page 1 of 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION JAMES E. TOMLINSON and DARLENE TOMLINSON, his wife, v. Plaintiffs,
CITY OF SAN JOSE DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN Joinder of the Plan in Marital Dissolution Matters and Requirements for Conforming Domestic Relations Orders This document provides information about the Deferred
CONSENT OF BOARD OF MANAGERS RETIREMENT PLAN OF NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION AND PARTICIPATING SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES PROCEDURES GOVERNING QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDERS As Amended Effective June 16,
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT (FILED: November 19, 2014) BENJAMIN R. STRAUSS, in his : capacity as Executor of the Estate of : Charles M. Strauss : : vs.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND JOAN FALLOWS KLUGE, Plaintiff, v. Civil No. L-10-00022 LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA Defendant. MEMORANDUM Plaintiff, Joan Fallows
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS KEITH M. CAURDY, Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED January 30, 2014 v No. 312247 Lenawee Circuit Court Family Division CATHY JO CAURDY, LC No. 11-036424-DO Defendant-Appellant.
Case 0:10-cv-00772-PAM-RLE Document 33 Filed 07/13/10 Page 1 of 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA Ideal Development Corporation, Mike Fogarty, J.W. Sullivan, George Riches, Warren Kleinsasser,
T.C. Memo. 2014-21 UNITED STATES TAX COURT ALVAN L. BOBROW AND ELISA S. BOBROW, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 7022-11. Filed January 28, 2014. Alvan L. Bobrow and