NO CR; NO CR NO CR; NO CR FILED NO CR

Transcription

1 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED NO CR; NO CR NO CR; NO CR FILED NO CR COURT OF AP l_n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT DALLAS AP.R PEALS CLELISA MATz RK, 5th DISTRICT RANALDO RAYMONE MORRIS, APPELLANT, v..,.. STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE. ON APPEAL FROM THE 203R 0 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS F P; F P; F P F P; F P APPELLANT'S BRIEF BRUCE ANTON STATE BAR NO SORRELS, UDASHEN & ANTON 2311 Cedar Springs Rd., Suite 250 Dallas, Texas (214) (214) facsimile Attorney for Ranaldo Raymone Morris

2 INDEX OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL APPELLANT DEFENSE COUNSEL AT TRIAL APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY ON APPEAL STATE'S ATTORNEY AT TRIAL STATE'S ATTORNEY ON APPEAL COURT Ranaldo Raymone Morris Nathan Kight Public Defender's Office 133 N. Riverfront Dallas, Texas Bruce Anton Sorrels, Udashen & Anton 2311 Cedar Springs Rd., Ste. 250 Dallas, Texas A. Novak Asst. District Attorney Dallas County 133 N. Riverfront Dallas, Texas Appellate Section Dallas County District Attorney 133 N. Riverfront Dallas, Texas Honorable Teresa Hawthorne 203rd Judicial District Court 133 N. Riverfront Dallas, Texas

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INDEX OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL... o ii TABLE OF CONTENTS iii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES... iv-vi STATEMENT OF THE CASE (CHRONOLOGY) VII-IX ISSUE PRESENTED STATEMENT OF THE FACTS... 1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT... o 2 ARGUMENT... 2 POINT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE... 2 Relevant Facts Standard of Review... 4 Preservation... 4 Analysis... 5 Conclusion PRAYER CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE lll

4 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGE Alabudi v. State, 2008 WL (Tex. App. - Dallas 2008)(not designated for publication) Alvarez v. State, 63 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) Brown v. State, 2010 WL (Tex. App.- Dallas 2010)(not designated for publication) Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, pet. ref' d)... 4 Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S (1997)... 4 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)(Kennedy, J., concurring) Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Crim. App.1993)(op. on reh'g), cert. denied, 511 U.S (1994)... 5 Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) Lavern v. State, 48 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist. 2001, pet. ref' d) 9 Machuca v. State, 2009 WL (Tex. App.- Austin 2009)(not designated for publication) Martinez v. State, 22 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)... 5 McDowell v. State, 2011 WL (Tex. App.- Austin 2011)(not designated for publication) McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849 (1992)... 7, 9 IV

5 Montgomery v. State, 819 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)... 4 Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref' d)... 6, 8 Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App.1998) (op. on reh'g), cert. denied, 526 U.S (1999)... 4 Nash v. State, 2010 WL (Tex. App.- Dallas 2010)(not designated for publication) Nunez v. State, 565 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)... 5 Pitcher v. State, 2010 WL (Tex. App.- Eastland 2010)(not designated for publication)... 8 Robinson v. State, 2010 WL (Tex. App.- Hous. [14 Dist.] 2010)(not designated for publication) Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) , 9 Steinberg v. State, 2002 WL (Tex. App. - Hous.[1 Dist.] 2002)(not designated for publication) Wilson v. State, 2009 WL (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2009)(not designated for publication) Zavala v. State, 1997 WL (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1997)(not designated for publication)... 8 CODES and RULES Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2)... 5 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS U.S. CONST. amend VIII 2-3 v

6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV TEX. CONST. art. 1, Vl

7 STATEMENT OF THE CASE (CHRONOLOGY) Fll CHARGE PLEA TRIAL BY JURY PLEA AGREEMENT VERDICT ON PUNISHMENT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL NOTICE OF APPEAL Unauthorized Possession of Firearm/Felon Offense date: January 20, 2011 Arrest date: January 21, 2011 Indictment: February 22, 2011 (CR1.7) Guilty (CR ) Waived (CR ) None 10 years TDCJ October 7, 2011 (CR ) 10 years TDCJ Filed November 7, 2011 (CR1.33) Overruled by Operation of Law October 14, 2011 (CR1.32) vii

8 STATEMENT OF THE CASE (CHRONOLOGY) F CHARGE PLEA TRIAL BY JURY PLEA AGREEMENT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL NOTICE OF APPEAL Possession Controlled Substance PG2 (MDMA) with intent to deliver Offense date: January 20, 2011 Arrest date: January 21, 2011 Indictment: April13, 2011 (CR2.19) Guilty (CR ) Waived (CR ) Open (CR ) October 7, 2011 (CR ) 40 years TDCJ October 14, 2011 (CR2.44) October 14, 2011 (CR2.43) Vlll

9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE (CHRONOLOGY) F CHARGE PLEA TRIAL BY JURY PLEA AGREEMENT Possession Controlled Substance PG3 (Alprazolam) with intent to deliver Offense date: January 20, 2011 Arrest date: January 21, 2011 Indictment: April13, 2011 (CR3.10) Guilty (CR ) Waived (CR ) Open (CR ) JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE October 7, years TDCJ (CR ) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL NOTICE OF APPEAL October 14, 2011 (CR3.36) October 14, 2011 (CR3.35) lx

10 STATEMENT OF THE CASE (CHRONOLOGY) F CHARGE PLEA TRIAL BY JURY PLEA AGREEMENT Possession Controlled Substance PG3 (Dihydrocodeinone) with intent to deliver Offense date: January 20, 2011 Arrest date: January 21, 2011 Indictment: April13, 2011 (CR4.8) Guilty (CR ) Waived (CR ) Open (CR ) JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE October 7, years TDCJ (CR ) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL NOTICE OF APPEAL October 14, 2011 (CR4.31) October 14, 2011 (CR4.30) X

11 STATEMENT OF THE CASE (CHRONOLOGY) Fll CHARGE PLEA TRIAL BY JURY PLEA AGREEMENT Possession Marijuana, less than five pounds, more than four ounces Offense date: January 20, 2011 Arrest date: January 21, 2011 Indictment: April13, 2011 (CR5.8) Guilty (CR ) Waived (CR ) Open (CR ) JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE October 7, years State Jail (CR ) MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL NOTICE OF APPEAL October 14, 2011 (CR5.31) October 14, 2011 (CR5.30) Xl

12 ISSUE PRESENTED THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ASSESSING MORRIS A MAXIMUM AND/OR EXCESSIVE SENTENCE IN EACH CAUSE. STATEMENT OF FACTS Ranaldo Raymone Morris ("Morris"), the Appellant, was charged with four counts of possession of controlled substances and one charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, all arising from one arrest. Morris entered a plea of guilty to all charges without the benefit of a plea bargain. (RR9). He waived a jury trial in each case and agreed that they could all be tried together. A pre-sentence report was prepared and a substance abuse evaluation was conducted. At the plea hearing, Morris stated that he was working, had a family and was requesting probation. (RR12, 13, 16). Morris admitted his involvement in the drug operation at the house where the arrest occurred. (Rl7-19,29-30). He was extensively cross-examined about his prior conviction for murder-a charge for which he received a six-year sentence. (RR14, 20-25). 1

13 At the conclusion of Morris's testimony, the trial court assessed punishment on the five counts as follows: 40 years, 1 20 years, 2 10 years, 3 2 years, 4 all to run concurrently. These appeals are taken therefrom. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT When determining the length of a sentence, the trial court is charged with the duty of ensuring that the sentence is not grossly disproportionate to others who are similarly situated. In the instant matter, the trial court has not ensured proportionate sentences for Morris's offenses. Therefore, Morris's sentences must be vacated. ARGUMENT POINT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ASSESSING MORRIS A MAXIMUM AND/OR EXCESSIVE SENTENCE IN EACH CAUSE. The sentence imposed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and article 1, section 19 of the Texas 1 (Case No. Fll-25846)(CR ). 2 (Case Nos. Fll (CR ) and Fll (CR )). \Case No. Fll-25845)(CR ). \Case No. Fll-25850)(CR ). 2

14 Constitution. 5 See U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV; TEX. CONST. art. 1, 19. The sentence further transgresses the Due Process Clause to the United States Constitution and the Due Course oflaw Clause of the Texas Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; TEX. CONST. art. 1, 19. Relevant Facts Morris was indicted for five offenses ansmg from one transaction: Unauthorized Possession of Firearm by a Felon; Possession of Controlled Substance PG2 (MDMA); Possession of Controlled Substance PG3 (Alprazolam); Possession of Controlled Substance PG3 Dihydrocodeinone; Possession of Marijuana, in an amount greater than four ounces. Morris entered a plea of guilty to each offense. (RR1.9). At sentencing, the judge assessed maximum sentences on the gun charge (ten years), the marijuana charge (two years state jail); the Alprazolam charge (twenty years); the Dihydrocondeineone charge (twenty years) and 40 years on the MDMA charge. The prosecutor's offer was five years in prison on all the charges except the marijuana charge, for which Morris was offered two years. (CR22; RR13). 5 See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 1.09 ("Cruelty forbidden"). 3

15 . The pre-sentence report indicates that he has a family to support, a supportive family and aged. (PSR3). 6 Further, he was cooperative with the authorities and fully accepted responsibility. (RR1.15). Standard of Review This Court reviews a sentence imposed by a trial court for an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). When the standard of review is abuse of discretion, the record must contain some evidence to support the decision made by the trial court. Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, pet. ref' d). The reviewing court should not reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the "zone of reasonable disagreement." Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S (1997); Montgomery v. State, 819 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Preservation The normative rule is that to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion. TEX. R.APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249,265 (Tex. Crim. App.1998) (op. on reh'g), cert. denied, 526 U.S PSR - Pre-sentence Report 4

16 (1999). Further, the trial court must have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining party must have objected to the trial court's refusal to rule. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2). Preservation of error is a systemic requirement that this Court should review on its own motion. Martinez v. State, 22 S.W.3d 504, 507 n. 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 151 (Tex. Crim. App.1993)(op. on reh'g), cert. denied, 511 U.S (1994). Analysis The range of punishment available for the charged offense of Unauthorized Possession offirearm by a Felon is 2-10 years confinement; Possession of Controlled Substance PG2 (MDMA) is 5-99 years or life confinement and a $10,000 fine; Possession of Controlled Substance PG3 (Alprazolam) is 2-20 years confinement; Possession of Controlled Substance PG3 Dihydrocodeinone is 2-20 years confinement; Possession of Marijuana in an amount greater than 4 oz. is 180 days to two years confinement in the state jail. As a general rule, a sentence within the proper range of punishment will not be disturbed on appeal. See Jackson, 680 S.W.2d at 814; Nunez v. State, 565 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion by assessing maximum punishments in four of the cases and 40 years in the other. While Morris concedes that the sentences are within the respective statutorily authorized ranges, it is apparent 5

17 from the record that this sentence is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement and constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Montgomery, 819 S.W.2d at 391. In light of Morris's record, the trial court should have exercised restraint in sentencing. The trial court sentenced Morris to confinement primarily because of his prior offense of murder, for which he served and discharged a six-year sentence. The record reflects the trial court's overemphasis to this end: You see, my philosophy since I've been on the bench is to help as many people as I can. I don't like to send people to prison, but here's what I've seen with you, here's what I don't understand. You've got a six-year sentence on a murder case. So, you know, your attorney wants me to break the cycle. Well, the cycle I'm going to break is not the cycle he's going to break. I'm going to break the cycle of people getting light sentences and getting out and picking up five cases: one a first-degree case, one a gun case. (RR ). This diatribe by the trial court took place after the State had gone well beyond the confines permitted regarding Morris's prior conviction. (RR1.28, 30-31). In light of the explanatory factors, the trial court's sentencing determination is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement even though it falls within the statutory range. A narrow exception to the general rule that a sentence within the statutory limits is not excessive, cruel, or unusual is recognized when the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Alvarez v. State, 63 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); see Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529, 542 (Tex. 6

18 App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref d); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, (199l)(Kennedy, J., concurring); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, (1983); McGruderv. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313,316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849 (1992). Such is the case here where the trial court has attempted to re-sentence Morris on his previous murder conviction for which he already completed a sentence. In Solem, the Supreme Court identified three criteria to be used to evaluate the proportionality of a particular sentence. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. They are (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the punishment, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions. Also see, Alvarez, 63 S.W.3d at (articulating these criteria). In a proportionality analysis, the reviewing court must first make a threshold comparison of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence.!d. The gravity of the offense should be considered in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society and the culpability of the offender.!d. Following Solem, the Supreme Court again addressed the proportionality analysis in Harmel in v. Michigan, supra. Harmelin somewhat modified the Solem test. However, seven justices still supported an Eighth Amendment prohibition against grossly disproportionate sentences. 7

19 .Most Texas courts today apply the Fifth Circuit test enunciated in McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992). Pursuant to that test, the court initially makes a threshold comparison of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence, and then asks whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Only if gross disproportionality is found does the court then compare the sentence under consideration to sentences received for similar crimes in other jurisdictions. Comparing the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence compels the conclusion that the sentence violated constitutional constraints. When making such a comparison the reviewing court must judge the gravity of the offense in light of the harm caused or threatened to society and the offender's culpability. Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d at 542. In the present offense, the circumstances demonstrate that Morris engaged in no violent or extreme activity. But see e.g., Pitcher v. State, 2010 WL (Tex. App.- Eastland 2010)(not designated for publication)(court found 75-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate stating, "[i]rrespective of the fact that appellant does not have any prior convictions, the gravity of the offense he committed against his four-year-old biological daughter was extreme and heinous."); Zavala v. State, 1997 WL (Tex. App. -Corpus Christi 1997)(not designated for publication)(court upheld 45-year sentence where 8

20 defendant "beat the victim several times with the handle of a cane and brandished what appeared to be a knife during the course of the robbery."). Morris was cooperative with the authorities and fully accepted responsibility for his conduct. (RR1.15, 32). Furthermore, Morris shared his culpability with his co-defendants. (RR ). Such factors raise an inference that Morris's sentences are grossly disproportionate. McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316. Upon the determination that Morris's sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense, this Court should go on to consider the remaining Solem factors.!d. In light of Morris's explanatory factors, the trial court's sentencing determination is surely outside the zone of reasonable disagreement even though it falls within the statutory range. Moreover, simply comparing the sentence imposed in this case to other sentences imposed for the same or similar offense in this and other intermediate appellate jurisdictions confirms gross disproportionality. Lavern v. State, 48 S.W.3d 356, 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist. 2001, pet. ref'd). Morris pleaded guilty to possession of one gram or more but less than four grams of 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, possession of28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of Alprozalam with intent to deliver, possession of28 grams or more but less than 200 grams of Dihydrocodeinone, possession of marijuana and 9

21 possession of a firearm. (RR1.9)(CR2.19; CR3.10; CR4.8; CR5.8; CR1.7). Giving Morris a40-yearprison sentence for this drug possession and the maximum sentences for the remaining convictions is excessive and disproportionate in light of facts surrounding the offense. Offenders charged with the same or similar offense have not received 40-year sentences. See e.g., Alabudi v. State, 2008 WL (Tex. App. -Dallas 2008)(not designated for publication)(appellant "convicted of (i) unlawful possession with intent to deliver two hundred grams or more, but less than four hundred grams of cocaine, (ii) unlawful possession with intent to deliver one gram or more, but less than four grams of methamphetamine, and (iii) unlawful possession of four grams or more, but less than two hundred grams of methylenedioxy methamphetamine. The trial judge sentenced appellant to twelve years' imprisonment and assessed a $1500 fine in each case."); Wilson v. State, 2009 WL (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2009)(not designated for publication)( appellant entered an open plea of guilty to four indictments charging possession of a "controlled substance (methylenedioxy methamphetamine) of more than four but less than four hundred grams, possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) ofless than one gram, and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine) of more than four but less than two hundred grams. The indictments related to the marijuana and the cocaine ofless than 10

22 one gram each contained an enhancement paragraph alleging that appellant had prior convictions that allowed him to be punished for those state jail felonies at a third degree felony level." Appellant received a sentence of "ten years' confinement on each of the charges related to the marijuana and the cocaine under one gram,... twenty years' confinement on the other cocaine charge and also on the methylenedioxy methamphetamine offense. The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently."). See also, Ex parte Garcia, 2007 WL (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)(not designated for publication)("applicant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver in count one, possession of methylenedioxy methamphetamine with intent to deliver in count two, and possession of marihuana in count three. Applicant was sentenced to, respectively, ten years, ten years, and two years state jail years' imprisonment."); Steinbergv. State, 2002 WL (Tex. App.- Hous.[1 Dist.] 2002)(not designated for publication)(appellant "pled guilty without an agreed recommendation to one indictment alleging possession with intent to deliver between four and 200 grams of methamphetamine, a second indictment alleging possession with intent to deliver between four and 200 grams of 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine, and a third indictment alleging delivery of between 200 and 400 grams of methamphetamine. The trial court assessed punishment at 25 years in 11

23 prism~ in each cause and assessed a $1,000 fine only in the third cause."); McDowell v. State, 2011 WL (Tex. App.- Austin 2011)(not designated for publication)( appellant pleaded guilty to possessing more than four grams of 3,4- methylenedioxy methamphetamine and sexual assault (for which he was on deferred adjudication community supervision for 10 years) and was sentenced to 11 years for the sexual assault after the violation and 10 years for the possession); Robinson v. State, 2010 WL (Tex. App. - Hous. [14 Dist.] 2010)(not designated for publication)( appellant received "sixteen years' confinement for possession with intent to deliver over 400 grams of dihydrocodeinone and to ten years' confinement for possession with intent to deliver between 28 to 200 grams of alpazolam."); Nash v. State, 2010 WL (Tex. App. - Dallas 2010)(not designated for publication)(appellant received "twenty years' imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction, five years' imprisonment for the possession with intent to deliver cocaine conviction, and two years' confinement in a state jail facility for the possession of marijuana and possession with intent to deliver alprazolam convictions."). The extensive sentence of 40 years has been reserved for offenders who are not similarly situated. See e.g., Machuca v. State, 2009 WL (Tex. App. - Austin 2009)(not designated for publication)( defendant received a 40-year sentence 12

24 after being convicted of possessing more than four grams of 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine with intent to deliver); but see, Brown v. State, 2010 WL (Tex. App. -Dallas 201 O)(not designated for publication)( appellant "pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver cocaine in an amount of 200 grams or more but less than 400 grams, possession of marijuana in an amount of five pounds or less but more than four ounces, and possession with intent to deliver 3, 4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but less than 400 grams.... the trial court found appellant guilty of the offenses and sentenced appellant to ten years' imprisonment for the cocaine offense, 180 days' confinement in a state jail facility for the marijuana offense, and five years' imprisonment on the 3, 4- methylenedioxy methamphetamine offense."). Conclusion At the time of Morris's plea, his co-defendant, Doyal Tyson, had received probation and his other co-defendant, Clayon Turner, was scheduled for trial. (RR ). Morris stated that he was willing to testify against co-defendant Tyson at trial. (RR1.15, 32). In light of the mitigating circumstances surrounding Morris's alleged crime and the more lenient sentences imposed upon offenders who also were convicted of drug crimes, the trial court's decision to assess a 40- year sentence and four maximum sentences resulted in a sentence that is disproportionate to the gravity 13

25 of the offense committed by Morris. Consequently, Morris's sentence violates the United States and Texas Constitutions. Morris's sentence should be vacated and Morris should be remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing. PRAYER WHEREFORE, premises considered, Appellant prays that this Court will remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. Respectfully submitted, BRUCE ANTON STATE BAR NO Cedar Springs Rd., Suite 250 Dallas, Texas / / facsimile Attorney for Ranaldo Ramone Morris 14

26 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that a true and correct copy of Appellant's brief was served on the Appellate Section, Dallas County District Attorney's office, 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., Dallas, Texas via regular mail and electronic filing on the 18th day of April, BRUCE ANTON 15