Running head: MALPRACTICAL IGNORANCE 1. What is ignorance and what is malpractice? Drawing a responsible line. Chris H.J.

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1 Running head: MALPRACTICAL IGNORANCE 1 What is ignorance and what is malpractice? Drawing a responsible line. Chris H.J. Hartgerink Department of Methodology and Statistics Tilburg University

2 MALPRACTICAL IGNORANCE 2 What is ignorance and what is malpractice? Drawing a responsible line. Every researcher makes mistakes honest mistakes from ignorance and possibly dishonest mistakes resulting from malpractice. However, when can mistakes from ignorance also be considered malpractice? I propose that professional researchers should be expected to have a certain level of understanding and thoroughness in what they are doing, and some level of ignorance can therefore be categorized as malpractice through negligence. Malpractice spans several key facets, of which the most important facet for this discussion is that of carelessness within one s professional duty. Researchers try to find out how reality works by using the scientific method, and they have to be thorough in the process to approach the arcane truth the best they can. Carelessness shows that such thoroughness is lacking, and can have dramatic effects on the research outcomes (e.g., increases in false-positive rates, finding spurious effects), depending on the area the carelessness occurs in. Subsequently, we have to ask ourselves: are careless researchers fulfilling their professional duties properly? The answer is no the veil of ignorance originating from carelessness provides no protection from bad practice. Careful or careless? I think most readers can agree with the almost self-evident tenet "ignorant mistakes flowing from carelessness are to be considered malpractical," but when can we consider a researcher careless? In the end, one might consider a certain decision careless in light of his knowledge, while another might consider it a careful decision in light of his knowledge. I propose that researchers are sometimes fooled into believing they are careful through faults of logic, and I consequently propose a responsible demarcation and solution. I will illustrate these faults with the use of the dichotomization example. Even though this is an ideal example, I encourage application of the insights from this example to other situations I think it will be found readily generalizable. Dichotomization is a technique some researchers use to force a continuous

3 MALPRACTICAL IGNORANCE 3 independent variable (e.g., extraversion) into a discrete one. This has been shown to have dramatic effects on research results, but it is still used in the psychological literature. How can it happen that this technique has prevailed despite its major flaws? Faulty logic Firstly, a self-pertaining cycle of appeal to other researchers authority appears to occur. Fellow researchers use the technique in their practical research, which forms the proof that it is responsible to use this technique in one s own research. This proof is nothing more than a lack of responsibility on the researcher s side and shifts the burden of proof to a fellow researcher. Going down the rabbit hole, one might be able to find an actual argument at some point, but formulating the argument is the responsibility of the primary researcher not the reader. The lack of explicit argumentation shows the researcher was careless/not careful enough in his choice. This is apparent when pointed out, but many researchers do not seem to realize this appeal to authority is only as good as saying they just chose a technique. Subsequently, this combination of appeal to authority and shifting the burden of proof provides reasons for researchers to look no further in their argumentation, while it actually being an improper argument. Secondly, researchers provide fluency of a choice as an argument. In the case of dichotimization, the argument often is that the results would be more difficult to understand in light of a more difficult technique and therefore the easier dichotomized results are to be preferred. One of the major papers promoting the use of dichotomization explicitly proposes this as one of the major reasons to do so. In a more general sense, the choice that feels right is presupposed to actually be the right choice. After all, as a professional you know what is correct and what is not correct. Even though I use this heuristic in personal life, we owe the public more than our gut feeling as researchers. How does the degree to which something is agreeable to our former intuitions form an argument for its applicability? If multiple equally appropriate options are available, I would

4 MALPRACTICAL IGNORANCE 4 understand choosing the more fluent option but in this case there are clear reasons to not equate both options. Such personal fluency is not an argument and directly indicative of carelessness as a researcher he prefers what is known versus taking the time to learn the more appropriate. Responsibility An improperly argumented choice might still be the right one, but it requires proper argumentation to let other readers come to the same conclusion or at least steer them in that direction. The public is paying us as researchers to think and research, and if we provide them with faulty and careless logic in either of those, we are letting them down on one of the fundamental principles of their trust. How can such careless arguments arise and how can we identify them? I propose that taking responsibility is key, because it shows the validity of the researcher s choices from their perspective. This will also allow for demarcation between plain ignorance and carelessness. An ignorant researcher will take responsibility for his decisions and provide a compelling case from his perspective, but the argumentation will show to be (plainly) wrong. A careless researcher will most likely not even take responsibility for his decisions, because the malpractice through negligence will be apparent the careless researcher will realize this as well. Hence, responsibility allows for a demarcation between carelessness and ignorance. But how do we increase the feelings of responsibility amongst those who do not have these feelings intrinsically? Some researchers feel the moral obligation to the public, but there are enough researchers that do not. The current scientific process often happens behind closed doors, which works against actively taking responsibility during the research process, if such a moral obligation is lacking. This increases the chances of faulty logic peering through the cracks while doing research and only being found out when it is possibly too late: after the research has been conducted. This way researchers get too

5 MALPRACTICAL IGNORANCE 5 vested and possibly unwilling to admit their mistakes. In other words, the current system provides little incentive for taking responsibility; an incentive needs to be found to increase these feelings of responsibility. Inducing the urgency of taking responsibility can be increased by increasing accountability of the researcher or research team. This will increase quality of choices and where this does not happen, malpractice will show more easily in peer scrutiny of these choices. One possible solution is to open up the scientific process. This can increase active taking of responsibility, by increasing the accountability of individual researchers or research teams. Researchers themselves will then realize that appeals to authority, shifting the burden of proof and providing ease of use as an argument are no proper arguments. This will make them think twice, instead of once. Transparent research will also allow for more ongoing discussion, which is key to the progression of science. Such ongoing discussion will not only be about results, but also about the research leading up to it. Proper argumentation will then become more important, train researchers to be more aware of such proper logic and subsequently increase the argumentative properties researchers use. In other words, opening up the scientific process will encourage accountability and proper argumentation of choices, which will subsequently promote a vicious cycle of increased quality in such arguments through increased practice in rhetoric. Feelings of responsibility thus seem key to determining malpractice through negligence and counteracting it is suggested via increased accountability. Malpractice through negligence and ignorance can be distinguished by the degree to which researchers are willing to take responsibility. Ignorant researchers will take responsibility, and researchers who make choices from carelessness will be more hesitant to do so, because they know their negligence will show through. Thus, we see that malpractice through negligence can become apparent and that two key elements in this are accountability and responsibility. The only question that remains: are you ready to take responsibility for your choices?