1 Psychology, Crime & Law, Plea bargaining and appraisals of eyewitness evidence by prosecutors and defense attorneys Kathy Pezdek* and Matthew O Brien Department of Psychology, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA, USA (Received 12 May 2012; final version received 6 November 2012) A sample of defense attorneys and prosecutors from matched California counties participated in a two-part study. Study 1A reports the results of a survey regarding how influential each of the 17 eyewitness factors is in affecting the accuracy of real eyewitness identifications. Generally, both attorney groups considered all eyewitness factors to be influential; on only 6 of the 17 factors were defense attorneys more likely than prosecutors to provide higher importance ratings. In Study 1B, the attorneys answered questions regarding their willingness to plea bargain after reading each of four scenarios in which (1) same- versus cross-race identification and (2) whether the perpetrator was familiar were experimentally manipulated. Both eyewitness factors influenced plea bargaining decisions, and effects were generally consistent for both attorney groups. Results confirm that plea bargaining decisions at least by defense attorneys are made in the shadow of the trial, and that appraisals of the strength of eyewitness evidence play a significant role in these decisions. Keywords: eyewitness identification; eyewitness memory; plea bargaining; in the shadow of the trial On 21 March 2012, Supreme Court of the United States, ruling on two cases, Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, determined that defendants have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote, Criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. In this ruling, the Supreme Court determined that not only do all defendants, including indigent defendants, have a right to effective counsel at trial as guaranteed by the 6th Amendment to the Constitution, but also, in light of the fact that the large majority of all cases filed are settled by plea bargaining, defendants have the right to effective counsel during plea negotiations as well. It has been estimated that in the USA, approximately 90% of cases are resolved through plea bargaining (Libuser, 2001). Regarding federal criminal trials, Higginbotham (2004) reported that the number of federal criminal trials has dropped from 14 to 15% of all criminal dispositions in 1976 to about 2% in 2002, and according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2005) between October 2004 and September 2005, 86% of all federal criminal cases filed were resolved with a guilty plea. So significant is this trend that the effect has been referred to as the *Corresponding author. # 2013 Taylor & Francis
2 2 K. Pezdek and M. O Brien disappearing trial (Higginbotham, 2004). Given this trend, and in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, it is increasingly more important to assess how attorneys resolve criminal cases rather than how juries do so. This two-part study focuses on how prosecutors and defense attorneys weigh the evidence in eyewitness identification cases (Study 1A) and specifically assesses how decisions relevant to plea bargaining are affected by two of these eyewitness factors (Study 1B). Eyewitness evidence is critical for solving crimes, and it is often the sole source of evidence for determining the perpetrator s identity. However, studies consistently report that eyewitness misidentifications are the leading cause of erroneous convictions (Huff, 1987; Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1996; Penrod & Cutler, 1999); eyewitnesses frequently identify the wrong individual, or they fail to identify the correct individual. There is a wealth of scientific research on the psychological factors that affect the accuracy of eyewitness memory. Reviews of this work include a meta-analysis by Shapiro and Penrod (1986), a two volume edited tome by Toglia, Read, Ross, and Lindsay (2006), recent articles by Wells, Memon, and Penrod (2006) and Wells and Olsen (2003), and chapters by Pezdek (2007, 2009). Most of this research has examined the factors that affect eyewitness memory and how this information influences jurors decision-making. The present study compared appraisals of the strength of eyewitness evidence by prosecutors and defense attorneys and assessed how decisions relevant to plea bargaining are affected by two of these eyewitness factors (Study 1B). There are important public policy implications of this research because in fact, it is attorneys who estimate the strength of the eyewitness evidence in real criminal cases and determine which cases will go to trial. It is generally assumed that parties strike plea bargains in the shadows of expected trial outcomes, a concept that dates back at least as early as Landes (1971). In keeping with this view, Burke (2007) and Pritchard (1986) reported that attorneys decisions regarding whether to plea bargain a case are largely based on their perceptions of the strength of the evidence against the defendant. This is consistent with both decision theory accounts of plea bargaining and economic models of plea bargaining (Covey, 2007; Kramer, Wolbransky, & Heilbrun, 2007). When perception of the evidence is weak, prosecutors are more likely to offer a plea bargain; when perception of the evidence is strong, defense attorneys are more likely to recommend a plea bargain. However, in a prominent article in the Harvard Law Review, Bibas (2004) argued that information deficits and cognitive biases also play a significant part of plea bargaining. In one such example, Goodman-Delahunty, Granhag, Hartwig, and Loftus (2010) reported that attorneys tend to be overconfident in their predictions of trial outcomes. Relevant to the present study, the presence of an eyewitness identification has been reported to reduce prosecutors desire to plea bargain and increase defense attorneys desire to plea bargain (McAllister, 1990). More recently, Flowe, Mehta, and Ebbesen (2011) reviewed archival data on dispositions in 725 felony cases of a California District Attorney s Office and found that a positive eyewitness identification was present more often in accepted than rejected cases (although only for acquaintance but not stranger identifications). These findings are important because eyewitness evidence is one of the more frequently encountered types of evidence in criminal cases. Wells et al. (1998) estimated that each year in the USA, eyewitness
3 Psychology, Crime & Law 3 evidence is the primary or sole evidence against the defendant in at least 77,000 criminal trials. What do we know about how accurately attorneys can determine variations in the strength of the eyewitness evidence? This question is even more important in light of the 2012 Supreme Court decisions because the Court s decision dictates that attorneys will have an even greater role in the plea bargaining decisions of defendants. In prior cases, courts have assumed that attorneys understand the factors that influence the fairness of identification procedures (Kirby v. Illinois, 1972; United States v. Wade, 1967). Both of these cases concerned the rights of defendants to have defense counsel present at a live lineup in light of the possibility that pretrial identifications can suggestively influence subsequent identifications at trial. However, the results of research studies that focused on attorneys knowledge of the factors that influence the fairness of identification procedures specifically, and eyewitness identification more generally, are less convincing. A number of studies have examined how well attorneys understand the specific factors that relate to the accuracy of eyewitness evidence (Brigham & WolfsKeil, 1983; Lindsay, MacDonald, & McGarry, 1990; Stinson, Devenport, & Kravitz, 1996). However, none of these studies included the scope of eyewitness factors now known to be significant, nor did these studies compare the knowledge and beliefs of prosecutors with defense attorney. On both points, a more recent study by Wise, Pawlenko, Safer, and Meyer (2009) is more useful. Wise et al. (2009) had prosecutors and defense attorneys with extensive criminal trial experience complete a survey that primarily focused on 13 statements assessing knowledge of eyewitness factors. The major finding was that prosecutors responded correctly to significantly fewer of the 13 eyewitness questions (M 6.07) than did the defense attorneys (M 10.10). Prosecutors were also less skeptical of eyewitness evidence than defense attorneys and less skeptical of jurors knowledge of eyewitness testimony. Based on these findings, we posit that if prosecutors (and defense attorneys as well) had more accurate knowledge about when eyewitness evidence is more likely to be weak versus strong, this would positively influence plea bargaining decisions and better protect the rights and liberties of individuals on both sides of the bar. This research includes a study with two parts a survey and an experiment to compare appraisals of the strength of eyewitness evidence by prosecutors and defense attorneys (Study 1A) and assess how decisions relevant to plea bargaining are affected by two of these eyewitness factors (Study 1B). A sample of 93 defense attorneys and 46 prosecutors from matched counties in California participated in both Study 1A and 1B. The attorneys had extensive experience practicing law and trying felony criminal cases in Superior Court. Study 1A reports the results of a survey of the attorneys regarding how influential they thought each of 17 eyewitness factors was in affecting the accuracy of eyewitness memory and identification in realworld cases. This is a different question than that posed by Wise et al. (2009), who asked about the truth value ( generally true, generally false, or I do not know ) of statements regarding specific eyewitness factors. In Study 1B, the attorneys were presented four scenarios in which two specific eyewitness factors (1) same- versus cross-race identification and (2) prior contact or not were experimentally manipulated in a factorial design. After reading each scenario, they were asked four questions regarding whether they would plea bargain the case, the lowest/highest plea bargain they would offer/accept, and their estimate of the probability that the
4 4 K. Pezdek and M. O Brien defendant was guilty, and the probability that they would win the case if it went to trial. Study 1B experimentally assessed how these typical decisions related to plea bargaining are influenced by variations in the strength of two eyewitness factors, and the whether this pattern of results differs for prosecutors versus defense attorneys. Study 1A Methods Participant sample The data for this program of research were collected from county offices of the District Attorney and Public Defender in the state of California over a period of 18 months. Because the questionnaire in Study 1B included questions about sentencing, and sentencing guidelines vary by state in the USA, it was necessary to restrict data collection to one state. In the data collection phase, over a period of 18 months, , telephone, and postal mail were used to contact repeatedly, the head District Attorney and Public Defender in each of the 58 counties in California, to request the participation of the Deputy District Attorneys and Deputy Public Defenders in their county. Only the data from counties in which there were completed test materials from both the offices of the District Attorney and the Public Defender were included in this study. This was done to match the two samples, at least in terms of the counties in which they served. These included eight counties, contributing a total of 93 Deputy Public Defenders and 46 District Attorneys. Within each county, it was simply required that each participant had had felony trial experience. Participants were given the opportunity to complete the test materials online or using hard copies; most used the hard copy option. Power analyses were conducted using methods suggested by Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner (2007). The number of participants exceeded that required to detect effects with an estimated effect size of 0.25, a 0.05 and power On the questionnaire, each participant was asked four background questions. These questions, and the mean response for each by all prosecutors and defense attorneys, are presented in Table 1. On none of these four questions was there a Table 1. Background data demonstrating equivalence between prosecutors and defense attorneys. Question Prosecutors mean rating (SD) Defense attorneys mean rating (SD) Tests of significance (1) How many years have you been a trial attorney? (2) How many cases do you estimate you have tried? (3) In a typical year, how many of your cases involve eyewitness evidence? (4) In the last 5 years, what percent of your cases typically are settled through plea bargaining? (9.28) (10.98) t(135) (50.56) (78.10) t(134) (29.04) (28.97) t(94) (19.95) (19.22) t(132) 0.01 Note: There were no statistically significant differences between prosecutors and defense attorneys in this sample.
5 Psychology, Crime & Law 5 significant difference between the responses of these two groups, all t-values B1.00. This suggests that differences in the pattern of responses to the questions regarding assessments of eyewitness evidence cannot be attributed to differences in felony trial experience between the two groups. Questionnaire Each participant was provided one packet of test materials including those for both Study 1A and 1B. The questionnaire for Study 1A was placed at the end of the test materials to reduce the extent to which Study 1A responses sensitized respondents to the factors varied in the Study 1B scenarios. The questionnaire for Study 1A included a list of 17 eyewitness factors (see Table 2). The 17 factors were selected from the list of factors included in the meta-analysis of face recognition research by Shapiro and Penrod (1986) with the addition of several significant eyewitness factors reported more recently by Pezdek (2007). Participants were instructed to read each factor and, based on your general knowledge and experience, indicate how influential you think each factor is in affecting the reliability of eyewitness memory and identification in real-world cases. They responded to each factor on a 1 (minimally influential) to 7 (most influential) scale and were encouraged to use the full range of the response scale. Results and discussion The mean responses to each of the 17 eyewitness factors by prosecutors and defense attorneys are provided in Table 2. First, the mean rating of how influential each factor was considered to be were generally high. On the 7-point scale, all but three of the 28 mean ratings presented in Table 2 were above 4.00, the mid-point of the scale. The three exceptions were two ratings by prosecutors of the influence of not following a double blind procedure (#15) and post-event information (#16), and one rating by defense attorneys regarding the confidence expressed by the eyewitness (#10). The mean responses per item by prosecutors and defense attorneys were next compared with a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Results of the MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate main effect for responses given by the two attorney groups on the 17 eyewitness factors, Wilks l 0.46, F(17, 109) 7.65, pb0.001, and h Post hoc comparisons (two-tailed) were conducted using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level on each of the 17 eyewitness factors. On 8 of the 17 items, there was a significant difference between ratings of how influential the factor was considered to be by prosecutors versus defense attorneys. On two of these factors, the prosecutors thought that the factor was more influential than did the defense attorney. These two factors are confidence expressed by the eyewitness (#10) and the number of independent eyewitnesses who do identify the defendant (#11). On six of these factors, the prosecutors thought that the factor was less influential than did the defense attorney. These six factors are cross-race identification (#4), time delay to identification (#7), composition of the lineup used and possible lineup bias (#14), double blind procedure (#15), post-event information (#16), and contamination introduced in a police interview with eyewitness (#17). Responses to question 14 are especially interesting in light of court findings that attorneys
6 6 K. Pezdek and M. O Brien understand the factors that influence the fairness of identification procedures (Kirby v. Illinois, 1972; United States v. Wade, 1967). Responses to question 14 suggest that attorneys do recognize the influence of fair identification procedures, but that defense attorneys rate the potential biasing influence of these identification procedures significantly higher than do prosecutors. Table 2. Assessments of prosecutors and defense attorneys in Study 1A regarding how influential each of the 17 eyewitness factor is in affecting the reliability of eyewitness memory and identification in real-world cases, scale from 1 (minimally influential) to 7 (most influential). Statement Prosecuting attorney mean rating (w/sd) Defense attorney mean rating (w/sd) Tests of significance (1) Exposure time to the perpetrator s 5.95 (0.96) 5.54 (1.18) t(131) 2.03 face (2) Distraction of multiple suspects 4.86 (1.05) 5.21 (1.23) t(131) 1.62 present (3) Visible weapon 4.89 (1.33) 5.26 (1.46) t(131) 1.42 (4) Cross-race identification of the 4.20 (1.67) 5.42 (1.30) t(131) 4.59* eyewitness and perpetrator (5) Perpetrator was wearing a hat 4.98 (1.50) 5.10 (1.37) t(131) 0.48 and/or sunglasses (6) Distance, lighting and possible 5.68 (1.29) 5.75 (1.22) t(131) 0.31 obstructions to view (7) Time delay from the incident to 5.00 (1.57) 5.80 (1.18) t(130) 3.27** the time of the first ID (8) High level of stress during the 4.66 (1.61) 5.48 (1.63) t(130) 2.73 incident (9) Whether the eyewitness had 6.35 (1.09) 5.91 (1.13) t(129) 2.12 previously seen the perpetrator (10) The confidence expressed by the 4.80 (1.59) 3.38 (2.10) t(131) 3.93* eyewitness (11) Number of independent 6.25 (.99) 5.14 (1.81) t(130) 3.79* eyewitnesses who do ID defendant (12) Number of independent 4.70 (1.97) 5.07 (1.78) t(131) 1.07 eyewitnesses who do not ID defendant (13) Whether the eyewitness is 5.75 (1.38) 5.91 (1.03) t(131).75 intoxicated/sober (14) Composition of the lineup used 4.68 (1.54) 5.47 (1.21) t(131) 3.24** and possible lineup bias (15) Officer administering lineup or 2.66 (1.64) 5.10 (1.44) t(130) 8.77* showup knows who the suspect is (16) Post-event information from 3.77 (1.72) 5.39 (1.21) t(131) 6.28* other witnesses, media, etc. (17) Contamination introduced in police interview with eyewitness 4.86 (1.70) 5.70 (1.27) t(130) 3.17** Note: Bonferroni correction applied to p-values to protect against alpha inflation. *pb0.001; **pb0.05.
7 Psychology, Crime & Law 7 These results are not directly comparable to those of Wise et al. (2009) because in the previous study, attorneys were asked about the truth value ( generally true, generally false, or I do not know ) of statements regarding specific eyewitness factors, and the results were reported in terms of accuracy rates comparing the results reported in the relevant research literature. In that study, defense attorneys were generally more knowledgeable than were the prosecutors, and Wise et al. concluded that differences in prosecutors and defense attorneys knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony may even be greater today (p. 1277). In the current study, we specifically did not access accuracy. Rather, attorneys were asked based on their general knowledge and experience, how influential each factor was in affecting eyewitness memory in real-world cases. There are two principal findings. First, with only the three exceptions mentioned above, generally, both prosecutors and defense attorneys considered all of the eyewitness factors to be influential in affecting eyewitness memory in real-world cases. Second, on the majority of the 17 items, ratings by prosecutors and defense attorneys did not differ. However, when there were differences between the ratings of prosecutors and those of defense attorneys, higher ratings of influence were more likely to be reported by defense attorneys than prosecutors. Several previous studies have compared prosecutors with defense attorneys on their knowledge and beliefs about the role of various factors in eyewitness identification accuracy. Comparing their more recent findings with those of Brigham and WolfsKeil (1983) a quarter of a century prior, Wise et al. (2009) concluded that differences in prosecutors and defense attorneys knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony may even be greater today (p. 1277). In both studies, it was reported that prosecutors were significantly less knowledgeable than defense attorneys on almost every issue. The results of Study 1A are more encouraging; prosecutors and defense attorneys were more consistent in their ratings of the role of eyewitness factors. Both prosecutors and defense attorneys considered most of the 17 eyewitness factors to be influential in affecting eyewitness memory in real-world cases, and, when there were differences between the ratings of prosecutors and defense attorneys, higher ratings of influence were only modestly more likely to be reported by defense attorneys than prosecutors. Study 1B Study 1B extends the findings on perceptions of the strength of eyewitness evidence to other relevant decisions in the criminal justice process. Whereas Study 1A assessed how influential prosecutors and defense attorneys considered various eyewitness factors to be in affecting the accuracy of eyewitness memory and identification in real-world cases, Study 1B experimentally assessed how typical decisions regarding plea bargaining by prosecutors and defense attorneys are influenced by variations in the strength of two of these eyewitness factors. These two factors are (1) same- versus cross-race identification and (2) whether the eyewitness had had prior contact with the perpetrator (i.e. familiar) or not (i.e. unfamiliar). After reading each scenario, attorneys answered four questions regarding their estimate of the probability that the defendant was guilty (question 1), the probability that they would win the case if it went to trial (question 2), whether they would plea bargain the case (question 3), and the lowest/highest plea bargain they would offer/accept (question 4). Winning was
8 8 K. Pezdek and M. O Brien defined as getting a guilty verdict for prosecutors and an acquittal for defense attorneys. Only questions 3 and 4 specifically ask about plea bargaining. However, we questioned whether the defendant was considered to be guilty and whether they would win the case if it went to trial to assess the extent to which plea bargaining decisions were made in the shadow of the trial. The cross-race effect is one of the strongest factors associated with identification accuracy (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Meissner and Brigham (2001) reviewed 39 studies on cross-race identification and reported that eyewitnesses were 1.4 times more likely to identify correctly previously viewed own- than other-race faces. Furthermore, selection of the wrong suspect was 1.56 times more likely with other- than same-race individuals. The cross-race effect has also been observed to be consistent across a wide age range (Pezdek, Blandon- Gitlin, & Moore, 2003). The second eyewitness factor that was manipulated in the Study 1B scenarios was whether the eyewitness had previously seen the perpetrator. It would seem a matter of common sense that eyewitnesses would be more likely to identify correctly someone they had seen before than someone they had not seen before. And, in fact, at least one court has held the exclusion of an eyewitness expert harmless when the witness claimed to have been familiar with the defendant and seen him on a daily basis for well over a year, Hagar v. United States. Inthe familiar condition in Study 1B, the scenario included this sentence: The clerk was a 22-year-old Hispanic male who, at the scene of the crime, told the police that he had seen the robber a couple of times in the neighborhood last summer. Study 1B assesses the extent to which prosecutors and defense attorneys consider this statement of casual familiarity indicative of actual prior contact and predictive of eyewitness identification accuracy. Relevant to Study 1B is the question of whether individuals can assess the accuracy of eyewitness statements from brief written scenarios and whether findings from written scenarios generalize to real criminal cases. Lindholm (2008) had police detectives, judges, and laypeople to judge the accuracy of eyewitness statements from their videotaped responses or from transcripts. Participants were actually more accurate evaluating the eyewitness statements when this information was in writing rather than videotaped. Together with results reported by Pezdek, Avila-Mora, and Sperry (2010), these findings suggest that the use of brief written crime scenarios in Study 1B does not restrict the generalizability of the findings to real criminal cases. Methods Participants and design The same 93 Deputy Public Defenders and 46 District Attorneys who participated in Study 1A also participated in Study 1B. Study 1B is 2 (prosecutor vs. defense attorney) 2 (familiar vs. unfamiliar suspect) 2 (same-race vs. cross-race identification) mixed factor design with only the first factor varied between subjects. Four different versions of a crime scenario were drafted in which the conditions of familiarity (the eyewitness had seen the suspect previously or this was not mentioned)
9 Psychology, Crime & Law 9 and cross-race condition were varied. The four scenarios were identical except for the slight wording changes required to vary these conditions. Procedures and experimental materials Each attorney read four versions of a crime scenario. The order of presenting the scenarios was counterbalanced across participants; four of the possible 24 orders for arranging the four scenarios were randomly selected and approximately equal numbers of participants received each presentation order. After responding to each scenario, instructions directed attorneys to turn the page and not return to scenarios they had completed. The scenarios described a store robbery in which identification by one eyewitness was the only evidence against the defendant. One version of the store robbery scenario is presented in the Appendix; this is the crossrace condition with a familiar suspect. Because in 1977 California enacted a Statutory Determinate Sentencing Law, it was necessary to construct scenarios that specifically allowed for a discrete range of plea bargaining options (e.g. no weapon, no physical harm). After reading each scenario, attorneys were asked to respond to four questions in light of the facts presented. The four questions are specified in Table 3. Results and discussion Initial analyses were conducted to assess whether the order of presenting the four scenarios significantly affected responses to each question. Individual ANOVAs were conducted on each of the three dependent variables (responses to questions 1, 2, and 3) using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels. In none of these analyses was there, a significant main effect of order or interaction of order by attorney group. The fact that none of the findings varied as a function of the order of presenting the scenarios minimizes concerns that the findings were affected by demand characteristics resulting from the use of a within subjects design. Following each scenario were the same four questions. Separate analyses were conducted on responses to questions 1, 2, and 3 as a function of the 2 (prosecutor vs. defense attorney)2 (familiar vs. unfamiliar suspect) 2 (same-race vs. cross-race identification) mixed factor design of the study, using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels. Post hoc simple effects tests followed all significant interactions using Tukey s HSD tests. The means (and standard deviations) for all conditions for all four questions are presented in Table 3. Question 1: In the above scenario, what do you think is the probability that the defendant is guilty? Specify on a scale from 0 to 100%. In the 222 ANOVA conducted on responses to question 1, all three main effects were significant and all in the direction consistent with expectations. Prosecutors (M 0.85, SD 0.15) were more likely to think that the defendant was guilty than were defense attorneys (M 0.37, SD 0.21), F(1, 134) , pb 0.001, and h Estimates of the probability that the defendant was guilty were higher in the same-race (M 0.63, SD 0.18) than cross-race condition (M 0.60, SD 0.18), F(1, 134) 14.42, p B0.001, and h And, estimates of the probability that the defendant was guilty were higher with familiar (M 0.66,
10 10 K. Pezdek and M. O Brien Table 3. Mean response (with SD) for each of the four questions in Study 1B, for prosecutors and defense attorneys in the same- and cross-race conditions for familiar and unfamiliar suspects. Prosecutors Defense attorneys Familiar Unfamiliar Familiar Unfamiliar Question Same-race Cross-race Same-race Cross-race Same-race Cross-race Same-race Cross-race 1 In the above scenario, what do you think is the probability that the defendant is guilty? Specify on a scale from 0 to 100% (13.50) (12.68) (16.72) (17.05) (22.13) (21.00) (20.63) (20.01) 2 In the above scenario, what is the probability that you would win this case if it went to trial? Specify on a scale from 0 to 100% (19.47) (18.86) (21.22) (23.63) (20.48) (20.55) (21.80) (21.94) 3 In the above scenario, what is the probability that you would offer (prosecutor) /recommend (defense attorney) any plea bargain to the defendant? Specify on a scale from 0 to 100% (36.22) (36.62) (29.50) (33.11) (27.59) (26.42) (24.68) (27.22) 4 a From the list of seven potential plea bargain offers specified below, circle the very lowest offer you would offer (prosecutor)/highest offer you would recommend (defense) to the defendant in this scenario a Values presented for Question 4 represent the proportion of prosecutors and defense attorneys who indicated that they would offer a plea bargain above the mode for their attorney group.