Rafael Leal-Arcas a a Centre for Commercial Law Studies (CCLS), Queen Mary,

Transcription

1 This article was downloaded by: [Universitätsbibliothek Bern], [rafael leal-arcas] On: 27 August 2013, At: 07:59 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: Registered office: Mortimer House, Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK International Affairs Forum Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: The BRICS and climate change Rafael Leal-Arcas a a Centre for Commercial Law Studies (CCLS), Queen Mary, University of London, Lincoln's Inn Fields, London, WC2A 3JB, UK Published online: 27 Aug To cite this article: International Affairs Forum (2013): The BRICS and climate change, International Affairs Forum To link to this article: PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content ) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at Electronic copy available at:

2 International Affairs Forum, The BRICS and climate change Rafael Leal-Arcas* Centre for Commercial Law Studies (CCLS), Queen Mary, University of London, Lincoln s Inn Fields, London WC2A 3JB, UK The impact of BRICS countries on climate change will be considerable, just as the impact of climate change on BRICS countries will be as well. BRICS countries have called on developed countries to do more to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and negotiated emissions targets that are on an equitable level. Meanwhile, China has set goals for clean energy and energy security through its five-year plan, and is the leading producer of wind turbines and solar panels. Without efforts from the BRICS to curb greenhouse gases, climate change mitigation will prove very difficult. Keywords: climate change; BRICS; Kyoto Protocol; greenhouse gas emissions The Kyoto Protocol places the responsibility of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions only with developed countries (i.e., Annex I countries) as if they were the only countries guilty of causing climate change, when in fact the whole world is collectively responsible for this. In the early 1990s, developed countries decided to take the lead in combating climate change. Twenty years later, the climate change situation has changed. Instead of asking only Annex I countries to reduce GHG emissions, I would argue that a more effective (and presumably fairer) way to tackle climate change today is by bringing on board the major GHG emitters, irrespective of their GDP, and asking them to reduce their GHG emissions in an equitable manner without ignoring the historic responsibilities on the part of developed countries. Why? Because the Kyoto Protocol s stipulation that only Annex I countries reduce their GHG emissions does not reflect today s ortomorrow s climate change reality, nor is it acting fast enough to reduce GHG emissions at the agreed levels. According to the latest statistics released by the International Energy Agency (IEA), global CO 2 emissions rose by 4.6% in 2010, after a sharp fall in 2009 because of the 2008 financial crisis, especially in the Trans-Atlantic region. Emissions in Annex I countries increased by 3.3% in 2010, whereas emissions in non-annex I countries continued increasing very rapidly, at 5.6% (IEA, 2012). Given the transnational nature of climate change, the current situation is similar to a diagnosis of cancer with metastasis. It is not therefore enough to ask only Annex I countries to reduce their GHG emissions if the aim is to solve the climate change issue. This means the BRICS countries are part of the solution to climate change mitigation. Climate change will have a significant impact on the BRICS. Conversely, the expected impact of the BRICS on climate change is considerable. The size and rate of growth of the BRICS economies, of their energy demand, of their energy imports (for instance, in the * r.leal-arcas@qmul.ac.uk 2013 Center for International Relations Electronic copy available at:

3 2 R. Leal-Arcas case of China and India), and of their atmospheric emissions of various types make these countries essential major partners in any regional or global discussions relating to climate change or the production and consumption of energy. For example, China s coal-powered economic engine is overwhelming. In 2005, China produced 35% of the world s steel, compared to just 13% in 1996 (Economy, 2007). A business-as-usual situation is not conducive to sustainable development either at the national or international level. If China continues on its business-as-usual path, predictions are that by 2030 its GHG emissions will grow twice as fast as emissions from all the 34-member Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Brahic, 2007). Moreover, according to the IEA, even China s per capita emissions will grow so much that they will reach the same level as the average of the developed countries (IEA, 2011). At the same time, as a vice-minister of the Chinese State Environmental Protection Administration put it, China s economic miracle will end soon because the environment can no longer keep pace (Byrnes, 2006). The BRICS position traditionally has been that global climate change mitigation must be addressed principally by wealthy industrial nations, which have not only the wealth and technology to provide solutions, but also the moral responsibility to do so because they have produced perhaps as much as 80% of the GHG emissions to date. However, some developing countries seem to be accepting they have to contribute to climate change mitigation, e.g., China. Other BRICS are also making efforts. The more vulnerable they are to climate change, the greater incentive there is for the BRICS to accept binding GHG emissions cuts. If the Kyoto commitment is not enough to solve the problem, developed countries should do more about GHG emissions reductions before they ask developing nations for commitment. Large developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil will not commit internationally to material reductions in their GHG emissions in the absence of some comparable commitment by, say, the US. Conversely, the US has not participated in the Kyoto Protocol, and will not agree to mandatory GHG emissions reductions targets due to concerns about a loss of competitive advantage, relative to developing countries that are not subject to the same obligations. This is a circular argument, bringing to mind the age old question: what comes first, the chicken or the egg? The US is not willing to ratify an international multilateral environmental agreement on GHG emissions reduction unless and until developing countries (especially China) are on board. On the other hand, the BRICS will only agree to being on board if the US complies with the Kyoto Protocol first. Regardless of what the US Congress does or does not legislate in climate change issues, with EU GHG emissions probably having peaked and US GHG emissions possibly having done so as well (at least for the foreseeable future), the fate of Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1 resides increasingly with the actions of China, Brazil, India, and the other large developing country emitters. Conceivably, the US would eventually accept a Kyoto-like approach if means could be found to involve developing countries (mainly the BRICS) with specific obligations. However, the politics of negotiating subsequent steps and a long-term target for GHG emissions reduction are fraught with difficulty as was obvious at the 2009 COP-15 in Copenhagen, where the US and the EU accused China of forcefully obstructing progress in the negotiations (Helm & Hepburn, 2009; Leal-Arcas, 2012). A question of equity and economic growth Not only are developing countries such as China unlikely to assume binding obligations until industrialized countries have actually met some initial targets, but their potential Electronic copy available at:

4 International Affairs Forum 3 assumption of obligations would raise the difficult question of equity. With per capita CO 2 emissions from fossil fuels in the US about four times those of China and 20 times those of India, questions of equity loom large when long-term limits are considered. That said, Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC expressly states that: The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. 2 This clearly means that all countries share responsibilities, although at different levels. Nevertheless, limited progress on this issue has occurred. Starting with the COP-13 in Bali in 2007 and culminating at the 2010 COP-16 in Cancún, developing countries enthusiastically embraced a plan for voluntary accession to limits and reduction crediting in the forest sector (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD) program), predicated, however, on financial support from developed countries. On the financial aspect, the UNFCCC reminds us that [p]olicies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. 3 At the same time, the BRICS are watching this environmental negotiation process to ensure that it helps them cope with climate change without threatening their hopes of economic growth, which is a right that every country has, albeit the hope is green economic growth. If a given climate policy means the reduction of economic growth, that policy will most likely have no future. Officials are beginning to consider the possibility that a world climate change agreement might not be merely a crude attempt to cut off their economic growth, but rather a possible source of help in dealing with the air pollution that is emerging as a major threat to public health. For instance, the health costs of air and water pollution in China account for an estimated 4.3% of the nation s GDP (World Bank and State Environmental Protection Administration of the People s Republic of China, 2007). Moreover, 16 of the world s 20 most polluted cities are in China (OECD, 2010). Pollution in Beijing is six times higher than in New York City (Economy, 2007). The ideal situation would be to have both developing nations on board and the US Senate ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This is currently unrealistic. We need to find a compromise. Rich countries generally favor the idea of placing more responsibility on key developing country emitters such as China and India, whereas developing countries (and the EU, but for other reasons) continue to favor an approach that would implement a second phase of the Kyoto Protocol, which allows them to opt out of GHG emissions reductions if these pose a threat to development. In fact, authorities from the BRICS have emphasized that the key to success in climate negotiations lies in commitments by rich countries to slash GHG emissions and boost funding to developing countries in the form of aid and the promotion of clean technology. The BRICS have concerns over emissions commitments because they expect GHG emissions levels to continue rising for some time. In fact, over the past decade, China s GHG emissions have more than doubled. This means that the EU s proposal to raise the bloc s target for cutting CO 2 emissions would have a limited impact on global warming, given that any benefit would be easily offset by the BRICS rise in GHG emissions. Energy efficiency Notwithstanding what has been mentioned above, since the 2010 COP-16 in Cancún, China s attitude to combating climate change has been remarkable, and it has taken

5 4 R. Leal-Arcas increasingly strong action to improve its energy efficiency, at both the national and subnational level. For example, China has set a 2020 carbon intensity target as part of its national policy, and is taking aggressive steps to implement it. 4 Moreover, China has prepared a five-year plan ( ) that is the clearest indication of its determination to become a clean energy powerhouse. This five-year plan puts emphasis on economic and industrial restructuring toward a greener, more efficient, and lower carbon economy. As part of this five-year plan, China is developing regional domestic carbon trading programs and is also experimenting with emissions taxes. There are both environmental and economic advantages and disadvantages to energy efficiency. Regarding the advantages, energy efficiency not only implies no GHGs, it saves money, it cannot be exported off-shore, and it has more potential than any other alternative. However, the disadvantages are that one must pay upfront as an investment, the oil industry wants more consumers to spend more energy, and there are tax incentives for energy use. Climate change is one of the key drivers for China s fundamental shift. Investment in clean energy in China rose 30% in 2010, to US$51.1 billion by far the largest figure for a single country and represented more than 20% of the total global investment of US $243 billion, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (Kanter, 2011). China s climate policy is largely motivated by factors other than concern about global warming, including energy security, the need to reduce local and regional atmospheric pollution from coal combustion that has caused serious health problems, and international competitiveness. It has pushed development of renewable energy technology to become the market leader in production of wind and solar technology, and adopted aggressive fuel economy standards for motor vehicles. The BRICS today are amongst the largest GHG polluters in the world. Without their efforts, climate change mitigation will be very difficult in the near future. Positive steps are already happening: China is not only the largest GHG emitter, but the leading producer of wind turbines and solar panels. This aggressive move into renewable energy markets shows China s commitment to contribute to climate change mitigation. Let us hope that such efforts from the BRICS will continue with the help of the West. Notes 1. Article 2 of the UNFCCC stipulates that: The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 2. Emphasis added. 3. Article 3.3 of the UNFCCC. 4. For an official view of China s position on climate change, see State Council Information Office (2012). Notes on contributor Dr Rafael Leal-Arcas is Reader in Law, Queen Mary University of London (Centre for Commercial Law Studies), United Kingdom. He is a Marie Curie COFIT Senior Research Fellow, World Trade Institute (University of Bern). He holds a PhD (European University Institute, Florence); JSM

6 International Affairs Forum 5 (Stanford Law School); LLM (Columbia Law School); MPhil (London School of Economics and Political Science). He is a member of the Madrid Bar. Dr Leal-Arcas is author of the books Climate Change and International Trade (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013); International Trade and Investment Law: Multilateral, Regional, and Bilateral Governance (Edward Elgar, 2010); and Theory and Practice of EC External Trade Law and Policy (Cameron May, 2008). References Brahic, C. (2007, April 25). China s emissions may surpass the US in Retrieved from Byrnes, S. (2006, December 18). The man making China green. New Statesman. Economy, E. (2007, September October). The great leap backward?. Foreign Affairs, 86, 5. Helm, D., & Hepburn, C. (2009). The economics and politics of climate change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. IEA. (2011). China s per capita emissions match the OECD average in World Energy Outlook Retrieved from IEA. (2012). CO 2 emissions from fuel combustion 2012 highlights. Retrieved from org/publications/freepublications/publication/name,4010,en.html Kanter, J. (2011, January 26). China, once suspect on emissions, is rapidly becoming a clean-energy power. The New York Times. Leal-Arcas, R. (2012). The role of the European Union and China in global climate change negotiations: A critical analysis. Journal of European Integration History, 18(1), OECD. (2010). Cities and climate change. Paris: Author. State Council Information Office. (2012). China s policies and actions addressing climate change. Retrieved from World Bank and State Environmental Protection Administration of the People s Republic of China. (2007, February). Cost of pollution in China: Economics estimates of physical damages. Retrieved from Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf