ITS and New Services. Niels Agerholm. Pay As You Speed -Intelligent Speed Adaptation & Perspectives on Usage Based Insurance

Transcription

1 ITS and New Services Niels Agerholm Pay As You Speed -Intelligent Speed Adaptation & Perspectives on Usage Based Insurance Niels Agerholm Assistant Professor

2 Agenda The road safety problem What matters regarding safety and car driving? One promising solution: Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) The Danish ISA trial Pay As You Speed (PAYS) Additional perspectives on Usage Based Insurance (UBI) Summary

3 The road safety problem EU: 30,500 fatalities /year (2011) Positive development USA: 33,000 fatalities /year (2011) Positive development Worldwide: 1.3 million fatalities and 50 million injured/year Negative development expected 2.4 million in 2020

4 What matters regarding safety and car driving behaviour? Prevention of: Speeding Drink-driving No seatbelt use These 3 are often combined in case of fatalities

5 Why is speeding dangerous? Increase in speeding increases brake distance to the 2 nd power Reduces the chance of reaction in time Increases speed variation substantially Increase the damages in any collision enormous Increase in speed raise the fatality risk to the 4 th power An example: Speed limit: 50 km/h Actual speed: 55 km/h Increased fatality risk: 45% (Elvik 2009)

6 But are we driving too fast? Urban share of speeding Rural share of speeding Denmark 61% 72% Finland na 64% Norway 46% 45% Sweden 53% 55% (Eksler et al. 2009)

7 One promising solution: Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) System that help the driver to avoid speeding ISA can be: Informative: inform about the current speed limit Warning: warn the driver if speeding Recording: record the driving behaviour Incentive: rewards/punish driving behaviour Intervening: make speeding impossible (They can be combined)

8 More about ISA ISA is tested positively in more than 30 field trials worldwide (15 to >4,000 cars) Speeding reduced significant in all trials Speed variation decreased as well General positive attitude to ISA Fatality risk decreased by 20-37% (Várhelyi 1996, Biding & Lind 2002, Carsten & Tate 2005)

9 But Decreasing effect over time The more intervening, the less acceptance Only the green drivers in the trials Almost complete absence of young novice drivers (young novice drivers are up to 11 time more dangerous than their parents generation) (Brems & Munch 2008)

10 To test ISA on the young drivers were incentives required

11 Pay As You Speed (PAYS) Informative, warning and recording ISA + incentives Up to 30% discount on insurance rate ~ /year Field trial car owners (target: 300) months

12 On Board Unit (OBU) GPS antenna behind the rear mirror Display and loudspeaker placed in the air nozzle GPS/GPRS unit with a stored digital speed limit map 30 You are speeding

13 Function of PAYS Activation level: Speed limit + 5 km/h If speeding, warnings appeared every 6 seconds The 3 rd and subsequent continuous warnings resulted in penalty points The more speeding the more penalty points/warning Each penalty point reduced the discount on the insurance rate with 0.07

14 Floating Car Data (FCD) from PAYS 153 vehicles Distance driven: 2.8 million km 380 million records

15 25,0% Good effect but no learning 20,0% Proportion of distance driven above the speed limit + 5 km/h for 1.5 months periods 15,0% 10,0% 5,0% 0,0% (Lahrmann et al. 2012)

16 Other central effects Transportation time remained unchanged The high (and low) speeds decreased in numbers Speed variation decreased substantially i.e. more space for more cars Congestion-reducing effect

17 Local ambassadors as role models 10 aldermen responsible for road safety were asked to drive as ambassadors 4 said Yes 1said No 5 said Yes but did not allowing follow-up The 4 participating aldermen were afterwards interviewed

18 Speed limits are important regarding road safety said the aldermen. However You should not be the one who slow down all traffic, because you comply with all regulations. You must also get forward. In many situations you are doing positive by depressing the accelerator and get away fast and give way for the next car. In these cases I think it (ISA) become annoying. (Alderman 1) I will like to keep the freedom to speed. Should have left 10 minutes before. I am newer late it is the worst thing It is unacceptable. Drove too fast from City A to City B and had to listen to this thing. However it (speeding) is not what I am doing normally. (Alderman 2) You can t make me drive with such a device. I will have my freedom! And because I have an easy conscience. I do not feel like a road hog. (Alderman 3)

19 Another experince It is one of the reasons why I think it is such a good system. I was I would not say aggressive but a fast one one who left from home late and gave the time as excuse for speeding. You had to reach the meeting at time. I have changed my behaviour. If I am stressed now, it is home. Then I have 39 minutes to reach the office or maybe 40, but not more. Drive nice and easy. Do not have to overtake trucks or the similar. Only these who are driving 78 km/h There is time for overtaking. You know you can do it. (Alderman 4) (Lahrmann et al. 2012b)

20 ISA - summary ISA with incentives has good effect on driving No lasting effect Only green drivers can be reached voluntary If the red drivers shall be reached it is necessary to use the stick carrots don t help!

21 From PAYS to a more general view on Usage Based Insurance (UBI)

22 Perspectives on UBI: what s to measure? Well-founded connections with injury accident risk: The distance driven High speed Time of day/year But also speed variation has substantial effect on road safety

23 Speed variation matters Speed variation increases much with increased speed The higher speed variation the higher risk Both lower and higher speeds increase risk (Salusjärvi 1981, Finch et al. 1994, Nygaard 1999, Bagdadi & Várhelyi 2011)

24 Perspectives on UBI: How to influence the driver? The more present feedback, the better effect In PAYS the effect from the incentives given in real time worked better than incentive given later Another ISA trial found these effect sizes: On a display during the trip (86%) After the trip (27%) Monthly feedback (18%) (Lahrmann et al. 2012, Hattem & Mazurick 2005)

25 Perspectives on UBI: What about commercial drivers? Effects from black boxes and from In-Vehicle Data Recorders: Feedback without sanctions has no effect Work-related sanctions are necessary Classic case: The Police in Tennessee had problem with traffic accidents among their officers. They started to record driving behaviour Feedback: Only recording: no effect Recording and dialog with colleague: no effect Recording and dialog with an inspection team: virtual no accidents i.e. full effect (Larson 1980, Toledo et al. 2008)

26 Research on Aalborg University Intelligent Speed Adaptation ( ) Large-scale FCD trial (2010-) 420 cars Individual risk index Full-automatic GPS-based parking payment More info on

27 Summary Speeding is a central cause for traffic accidents ISA can reduce speeding substantial ISA is not on the marked despite good effects ISA don t attract drivers who need it most Even significant economic incentive can t change this Speeding but also speed variation are suitable measures to focus on regarding UBI Direct feedback to the driver improve the effects on driving behaviour Forget systems without some possibilities for sanctions they have little effect on road safety!

28 Thank you Niels Agerholm Traffic Research Group Aalborg University