IWA AUTHENTICATION FUNDAMENTALS AND DEPLOYMENT GUIDELINES

Transcription

1 IWA AUTHENTICATION FUNDAMENTALS AND DEPLOYMENT GUIDELINES TECHNICAL BRIEF INTRODUCTION The purpose of this document is to explain how Integrated Windows Authentication (IWA) works with the ProxySG appliance, to explain differences between the two realms (IWA-BCAAA and IWA-Direct), and to provide guidelines for deployments and sizing. Table of Contents INTRODUCTION 1 HOW IT WORKS 2 Integrated Windows Authentication Overview 2 - Quick Overview 2 Kerberos - Detailed Overview 2 Obtaining Group Membership Information 4 Domain Controller Selection Mechanism 4 IWA-BCAAA 5 5 Kerberos 5 IWA-BCAAA: Service User Permission Requirements 6 IWA-DIRECT 6 6 Kerberos 7 IWA-Direct: User Permission Requirements for Joining a Windows Domain 7 PERFORMANCE 7 vs. KERBEROS 7 NETLOGON / MAXCONCURRENTAPI Tuning Options 8 IWA-Direct 8 IWA-BCAAA 8 SURROGATES (IP, COOKIE) 9 Proxy-IP Surrogates 9 Cookie Surrogates 10 IWA Performance Numbers 10 Authentications per Second 10 Throughput Differences 10 How We Measure These Numbers 11 BCAAA Server Sizing 11 RECOMMENDATIONS 11 ABOUT TECHNICAL BRIEFS 11 1

2 How It Works Integrated Windows Authentication Overview Integrated Windows Authentication (IWA) can provide a single sign on (SSO) user experience when configured correctly. Blue Coat has implemented two flavors of IWA: IWA-Direct and IWA-BCAAA. With IWA- Direct, the ProxySG appliance is able to join the domain directly. With IWA-BCAAA, the ProxySG appliance communicates with the BCAAA agent, which is usually installed on a domain member server. IWA uses credentials from the user s initial workstation log on. When configured correctly, domain users are not prompted for credentials, in both explicit and transparent proxy deployments. Users from any trusted domain can be authenticated. The supported authentication mechanisms are Basic, (NT LAN Manager), and Kerberos. Basic and must go to a Domain Controller (DC) to validate credentials and determine group membership. Kerberos is more scalable then ; ProxySG (IWA-Direct) or BCAAA (IWA-BCAAA) can directly validate Kerberos tickets. Basic is very scalable as well, since the ProxySG appliance is able to cache Basic credentials. For security reasons, however, the majority of the ProxySG appliance users no longer accept Basic credentials. Quick Overview is a password authentication protocol. IWA will prompt the user if no password was used at log in. If the current user is a domain user who logged in with a password, the browser won t prompt for a password: This assumes the realm was properly configured. Windows caches a hash of the user password entered on log in to the workstation. The password doesn t cross the wire. A different hash is sent every time. Incorporates a client nonce and a server nonce (random data). is less scalable than Kerberos. Two round trips are required between the client and BCAAA. The ProxySG appliance or BCAAA depending on the realm have to contact a DC (through Netlogon) on the final round-trip. Kerberos Detailed Overview The client obtains a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) when the user logs in to Windows. The KDC (Key Distribution Center) validates the client s username and password, and issues the TGT to the client. The client uses the user s password hash to decrypt the session key in the TGT. Figure 1: Kerberos overview Client recieves TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) Client authenticates to KDC with Username/Password TGT KDC Data (Encrypted with the KDC s key) KDC (Key Distribution Center) Session Data (Encrypted with the user s password hash) The client uses a Service Ticket to log in to Kerberized services. The KDC needs to know the Service Principal Name (SPN) of the service. The service trusts the KDC to validate user credentials. The KDC shares a key with the service: Symmetric encryption key In Active Directory (AD), this key is the service account s password hash The KDC associates the SPN with the key. 2

3 KDC Service Ticket Example The SPN in Figure 2 is HTTP/bluecoat.com. Client presents TGT, requests Service Ticket KDC Trust/Service Key Client recieves Service Ticket Figure 3: Client service ticket request and receipt KDC The service ticket is encrypted with the Service Key and the Session Key. The client uses the Session Key (from the TGT) to decrypt the ticket. HTTP/bluecoat.com Service Figure 2: KDC service ticket example A user wants to authenticate to HTTP/bluecoat.com. The user presents his TGT to the KDC, and requests a service ticket. The KDC validates the TGT, then looks up the service key associated with the SPN. The KDC generates a service ticket and sends it to the client. Ticket Data (Encrypted with the user s Session Key) Service Data (Encrypted with the Service s Key) Service Session Key Figure 4: Session key decryption Decrypt with Session Key Service Ticket Service Data (Encrypted with the Service s Key) Note: The client will cache the service ticket. By default, the ticket is cached for 10 hours, although that setting can be changed in AD group policy. The client will not renew a cached service ticket until it expires, or until the user logs in to Windows again. Since the ticket contains group memberships, the user s groups won t get updated until the client gets a new ticket. This means the ProxySG appliance won t learn about group membership changes until the client gets a new ticket. If an administrator makes a change to AD group membership and then logs the user out of the ProxySG appliance, the ProxySG appliance won t pick up the group membership change until the client gets a new ticket (for example, logs out of Windows and then logs back in). Since gets new group memberships from the DC on each authentication, doesn t have that problem. 3

4 The client presents the service ticket to the service. The service decrypts the service ticket. The service ticket identifies the user. Windows service tickets also contain group membership information. The IWA service (ProxySG appliance for IWA-Direct or BCAAA for IWA-BCAAA) can authenticate the user without contacting an external server. The Kerberized service uses GSSAPI (Generic Services API) to validate the Service Ticket. The service ticket is validated without going off-box. A Windows Service Ticket contains group membership information. Windows can generate an access token without going off-box. There is no longer a Netlogon bottleneck. Login with Service Ticket SERVICE Service calls GSSAPI to decrypt and validate service ticket Service Ticket Service Data (Encrypted with the Service s Key) Figure 5: Login with Service Ticket Login with Service Ticket The following illustration shows a Kerberos login HTTP/bluecoat.com Service Figure 7: Authentication Service calls GSSAPI Obtaining Group Membership Information The method for obtaining the group memberships is the same for IWA-Direct and IWA-BCAAA. After authenticating the user, the realm receives a Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC). The PAC contains the group memberships. If Basic or credentials were used, then the PAC is created by the DC and automatically provided to the realm after successful authentication. If Kerberos credentials were used, then the PAC is embedded in the credential. Service Ticket Response from KDC Ticket Data (Encrypted with the user s Session Key) Service Data (Encrypted with the Service s Key) Service Session Key Client presents TGT, requests Service Ticket Client recieves Service Ticket Login with Service Ticket KDC Trust/Service Key This page contains a summary of the different group types and they ways in which they may be used: aspx Groups are included in the PAC based on the server that is doing the authentication (IE: BCAAA or the ProxySG). The page linked above indicates where different group types can be used for authorization. The PAC that it receives will contain all of the user s universal groups, but will only contain global groups from the joined domain forest, and only domain local groups from that domain. Service Ticket Service Data (Encrypted with the Service s Key) Figure 6: A Kerberos Login Process HTTP/bluecoat.com Service The technical reasons for that have to do with where the different group types are stored in AD. Domain Controller Selection Mechanism The ProxySG appliance (IWA-Direct) or the BCAAA server (IWA-BCAAA) queries an SRV record in DNS and sends an LDAP ping pack to the DCs that it finds. The LDAP ping is a small LDAP-over-UDP packet. 4

5 In SGOS and later, customers can optionally specify a preferred and alternate DC, and the ProxySG appliance will always use those. If neither is available, then it will fall back to using an LDAP ping. IWA-BCAAA This section describes how and Kerberos authentication work in an IWA-BCAAA deployment. Figure 8 shows how IWA-BCAAA processes requests. come into the ProxySG appliance and are forwarded to BCAAA. BCAAA invokes SSPI (a Windows API), and Windows forwards the request to a DC over the Netlogon Secure Channel (Schannel) for credential validation. Both IWA-Direct and IWA-BCAAA use Schannel to validate credentials, and both are therefore subject to its limitations. same time, it can t send the second request to the DC until it receives a response to the first request. Kerberos Prior to accessing the ProxySG appliance, the user logs into the local domain and obtains a TGT from the KDC. The user attempts to access a URL that requires authentication; the ProxySG appliance sends a challenge asking for Kerberos credentials. KDC OCS BCAAA User logs in to Windows and obtains TGT BCAAA (MaxConcurrentAPI=1) User requests a page from OCS. SG challenges for Kerberos credentials Figure 9: Kerberos Authentication with IWA-BCAAA: ProxySG challenges for credentials DC (MaxConcurrentAPI=1) Figure 8: Authentication with IWA-BCAAA Schannel (One at a time) The client workstation obtains a Service Ticket from the KDC: The Service Ticket is generated based on the authentication challenge URL. The challenge URL identifies the service. The challenge URL depends on the authentication mode. The Service Ticket is presented to BCAAA. Schannel is often a bottleneck for authentication. That s because in a typical scenario, the BCAAA server can only have one Schannel request outstanding at a time, as represented by the MaxConcurrentAPI=1 text in the above diagram (This value could be modified. See Netlogon / MaxConcurrentAPI Tuning Options in this document). For example, if BCAAA receives two requests at the 5

6 IWA-BCAAA: Service User Permission Requirements BCAAA 5.5.x requires the Act as part of the operating system privileges for IWA. If the ProxySG appliance will be used for Kerberos Constrained Delegation, the Impersonate users privilege is required, too. KDC OCS BCAAA Client requests Service Ticket for challege URL Service Ticket is presented to BCAAA Figure 10: Kerberos Authentication with IWA-BCAAA: Client provides service ticket to ProxySG BCAAA validates the Service Ticket without consulting a DC. Validation is performed with Windows SSPI API. Services Provider Interface, similar to GSSAPI. BCAAA 6.1 does not need the Act as part of the operating system or Impersonate users privileges to do IWA or Kerberos Constrained Delegation. IWA-Direct This section describes how and Kerberos authentication works in an IWA-Direct deployment. Figure 12 shows how IWA-Direct processes requests. come in to the ProxySG appliance and are forwarded to a Domain Controller (DC) over the Netlogon Secure Channel (Schannel) for credential validation. Both IWA-Direct and IWA-BCAAA use Schannel to validate credentials, and both are therefore subject to its limitations. The Service key is the password hash of the BCAAA service user. If running as a local system, this is the machine account password. Users ProxySG (MaxConcurrentAPI=1) Schannel (One at a time) Server (MaxConcurrentAPI=1) KDC OCS BCAAA BCAAA validates Service Ticket and sends authentication result to SG Figure 11: Kerberos Authentication with IWA-BCAAA: SG validates service ticket Figure 12: Authentication with IWA-Direct Schannel is often a bottleneck for authentication. That s because the ProxySG appliance with IWA-Direct in SGOS 6.3 and SGOS 6.4 can only have one Schannel request outstanding at a time, as represented by the MaxConcurrentAPI=1 text in Figure 12 (In SGOS , this is the default value, however it could be increased. See Netlogon / MaxConcurrentAPI Tuning Options in this document). For example, if the ProxySG appliance receives two requests at the same time, it can t send the second request to the DC until it receives a response to the first request. 6

7 Kerberos Prior to accessing the ProxySG appliance, the user logs in to the local domain and obtains a TGT. The user attempts to access a URL that requires authentication. In response, the ProxySG appliance sends a challenge, asking for Kerberos credentials. GET Service Ticket for sg.example.com KDC Log in with Kerberos Service Ticket (Includes Group Memberships) Figure 13: Kerberos Authentication with IWA-Direct Shared Key (Machine account password) IWA-Direct sg.example.com The client workstation obtains a Service Ticket from the KDC. The Service Ticket is generated based on the authentication challenge URL. The challenge URL identifies the service. The challenge URL depends on the authentication mode. The Service Ticket is presented to the ProxySG appliance. The ProxySG appliance validates the Service Ticket without consulting a DC. Validation is performed with GSSAPI, which is part of the MIT Kerberos library that has been ported to SGOS. Service key: If the explicit proxy/load balancer feature has NOT been configured in the IWA-Direct realm (the typical scenario), the service key is the ProxySG appliance s machine account password. Otherwise, the service key is the password hash of the load balancer user. This allows multiple ProxySG appliances to share the same service key, as it allows the key to be tied to a user s password, rather than a machine account password. IWA-Direct: User Permission Requirements for Joining a Windows Domain The account used to join the ProxySG appliance to the domain needs sufficient rights to add workstations to the domain. A regular user account will work if you re only joining a few workstations/sgs. Microsoft allows regular Domain User accounts to join up to 10 workstations to the domain by default. More information can be found here: If the user wants to pre-create the ProxySG s computer account, they may do so. However, if they do that, then the user account they use to join the domain must have sufficient rights to modify the computer object. (That is no different from joining Windows boxes to the domain using a pre-created machine account.) After the ProxySG has joined the domain, it will forget the user credentials that were supplied during domain join. Those credentials are used only to create/modify the ProxySG s machine account object. After domain join, all access to AD will use the machine account credentials. For both authentication and VPM browsing, the ProxySG s machine account does not need any more privileges than a normal machine account for a Windows box. The customer should not grant extra privileges to the ProxySG s machine account unless they re planning to set up EMAPI or Kerberos Constrained Delegation. That account should never have Domain Admin privileges. Performance vs. Kerberos Kerberos will perform better than. (challenge/response) authentication requires two round-trips between browser and BCAAA. 7

8 After the second round-trip, the BCAAA server (or the ProxySG appliance for IWA-Direct) has to contact a DC to validate the user s password and retrieve a Windows access token that contains the user s group memberships. Kerberos Requires only one round-trip, and doesn t require the BCAAA server (or the ProxySG appliance for IWA-Direct) to contact a DC. The client will contact the KDC to retrieve a service ticket that will be presented to BCAAA (or the ProxySG appliance for IWA- Direct). Once retrieved, it will be cached for typically 10 hours. (See Kerberos - Detailed Overview on page 2.) BCAAA (or the ProxySG appliance for IWA-Direct) can validate the Service Ticket without contacting a DC, because the ticket is encrypted with a key that BCAAA shares with the KDC. The Service Ticket also contains a list of the user s groups, so BCAAA (or the ProxySG appliance for IWA-Direct) doesn t need to contact a DC to retrieve authorization information. Authentication is successful when BCAAA (or the ProxySG appliance for IWA-Direct) successfully decrypts and validates the ticket. Kerberos is one of the best solutions to scalability problems. Unfortunately, it s not widely (or well) understood, and therefore tends to be under-utilized. Kerberos is a solid, scalable authentication protocol. It is faster and more secure than. Netlogon / MaxConcurrentAPI Tuning Options As described in How It Works on page 1, Netlogon can be a bottleneck. Netlogon is a Windows service that process authentication requests (both incoming and outgoing). Windows maintains a Netlogon Secure Channel to one DC from each domain needed. By default, Netlogon will process only one authentication request at a time. If BCAAA (IWA-BCAAA) or ProxySG appliance (IWA-Direct) receives requests faster than the DC processes them, the requests will back up at BCAAA or at the ProxySG appliance. The MaxConcurrentAPI setting controls the number of concurrent requests that can be processed by Schannel. This parameter can be modified to support a larger number of Schannel connections. However, it is important to know that this parameter must be changed on all DCs (since there isn t a way to guarantee that the BCAAA server or the ProxySG appliance will always use the same DC), and on the BCAAA server and the ProxySG appliance (with SGOS and later). Modifying only one side of the communication will not work. DC (MaxConcurrentAPI=10) Schannel (Ten at a time) Figure 14: IWA Authentication with increased MaxConcurrentAPI settings IWA-Direct BCAAA (MaxConcurrentAPI=10) The ProxySG appliance with IWA-Direct (SGOS 6.3 and SGOS 6.4) is using a hard-coded MaxConcurrentAPI=1 setting. This means the setting cannot be modified. The ProxySG appliance with IWA-Direct (SGOS and later) offers the option to modify MaxConcurrentAPI settings using the command max-secure-channel-requests. In addition to that, you can also specify preferred DCs (a primary and a backup DC) using the command preferred-dc so that the ProxySG appliance can use the nearest DCs with the lowest response time. IWA-BCAAA Changing the MaxConcurrentAPI setting does work for IWA-BCAAA, and is fully transparent to BCAAA. There are a few organizations where Microsoft has recommended modifying this parameter to increase authentication performance. The biggest challenge is that this change is also required on the DCs (including trusted domain DCs), and that s probably why some organizations are not willing to implement this change. 8

9 Figure 15 shows a scenario in which the MaxConcurrentAPI settings have not been changed on the DC of a trusted domain. In this case, there are no performance gains for users who belong to Domain B, but only for users who belong to Domain A. Users from Domain B BCAAA: Domain A (MaxConcurrentAPI=10) Proxy-IP Surrogates The caching problem is often solved by using the Proxy-IP authentication mode. Switching to Proxy-IP mode in the example above would cut down on the number of requests by a factor of 10, since the ProxySG appliance only needs to authenticate the first connection from each client. Note: A detailed discussion about how each authentication mode works goes beyond the scope of this document. Details are available in the SGOS Administration Guide. DC: Domain B (MaxConcurrentAPI=1) Schannel (One at a time) DC: Domain A (MaxConcurrentAPI=10) Schannel (Ten at a time) Figure 15: IWA Authentication with misconfigured MaxConcurrentAPI settings Surrogates (IP, Cookie) The use of surrogates can help to dramatically lessen the authentication load on the ProxySG appliance, and in turn, the DC. This is especially critical when is used with an explicit proxy. Modern browsers will often open 10 or more concurrent connections to the ProxySG appliance when loading a single Web page; the ProxySG appliance must authenticate each of those connections. When using, the ProxySG appliance can t cache user credentials as it does with Basic authentication. Each new connection therefore results in an authentication request that is forwarded to a DC, as shown in Figure 16. Client using Explicit Proxy GET cnn.com (10+ New Connections) Figure 16: IWA Authentication without surrogates 10+ DC However, it s not always possible to use Proxy-IP mode. Proxy-IP mode won t work for multi-user systems such as Citrix, nor will it work for users behind a network address translation (NAT) device. Furthermore, using the IP address as the credential isn t very secure, since IPs are easily spoofed. That s why a short surrogate cache interval is recommended. In proxy chaining deployments, it is still possible to use IP surrogates at the parent proxy by looking at the X-Forwarded-For header instead of the source IP address. The following policy tells the ProxySG appliance to use the X-Forwarded-For header as IP surrogates: <Proxy> authenticate.credentials.address( $(request.header.x- Forwarded-For) ) This requires the child proxy to set the X-Forwarded-For header and to populate it with the client IP address. If the child proxy is a Microsoft ISA or TMG server, the cloud authentication connector can be used to set this header field. Other proxies like the ProxySG appliance are able to do this without additional software. Note: Another option in proxy chaining environments could be to use Kerberos constrained delegation, which should work with ISA or TMG. However, no research has been performed on this setup 9

10 Cookie Surrogates Another solution is to use origin-cookie-redirect. The Origin-cookieredirect can be used with an explicit proxy, but an exception has to be made for unintercepted HTTPS connections. Here s an example: <Proxy> http.connect=yes authenticate(iwa_realm) authenticate. mode(proxy) authenticate(iwa_realm) authenticate.mode(origincookie-redirect) The above policy will authenticate each HTTP CONNECT request without using a surrogate. HTTP CONNECT requests are sent by browsers in explicit proxy mode. Their purpose is to tell the proxy server that the browser wants to set up an SSL tunnel with the origin content server (OCS). The ProxySG appliance can t redirect HTTP CONNECT requests because they only contain a hostname, rather than a full URL for the requested resource at the OCS. If the ProxySG appliance were to redirect the request, it wouldn t be able to redirect the client back to the originally requested resource. The above policy will authenticate all requests, except HTTP CONNECT requests, using a cookie surrogate. Depending on the number of HTTPS connections in the example above, the policy could result in a nearly ten-fold drop in authentications. IWA Performance Numbers Authentications per Second For an IWA realm, functionality is the most important attribute. Most IWA customers still use, rather than Kerberos or Basic. performance is about the same between IWA-BCAAA and IWA- Direct in SGOS 6.3 and 6.4 on a ProxySG (but slightly different on all other platforms, see Throughput Differences below for more details). When BCAAA is running on a member server (as it is nearly always deployed), it is able to process about authentications per second, which matches the performance of IWA-Direct when using a ProxySG The authentications-per-second number is representative of an optimal environment. Those numbers were generated in an environment where a domain with a single DC was used, the DC was a single hop away from the BCAAA server (very low network latency), and the DC was not being used by any other network services. It is unlikely that a customer could achieve the same throughput in a production environment, unless they can guarantee that all of the aforementioned factors always match the lab environment where the tests were performed. Note: The performance numbers were generated using the default MaxConcurrentAPI settings. The authentications-per-second number represents a best-case scenario. It is unlikely that such throughput could be achieved in a production environment. The actual performance of in production depends on how quickly the customer s DC is able to service authentication requests. DC performance is the single largest factor that affects throughput, and that can vary widely. It is difficult to predict how DCs will perform in each customer environment, because several factors can affect performance. In some environments, some DCs might perform substantially better than others. Some of the major factors affecting DC performance are discussed in this document. We have not performed any performance tests with MaxConcurrentAPI=10 so far. The number of authentications-persecond will definitely increase, but probably not by a factor of 10. This document will be updated as soon as we have run tests with modified MaxConcurrentAPI settings. Throughput Differences The difference between IWA-BCAAA- and IWA-Direct- in terms of throughput (using the default MaxConcurrentAPI settings) is, on average, 82%. In other words, the throughput with IWA-Direct- is about 82% of the numbers with IWA-BCAAA- (exception: ProxySG , where the performance is about the same for both methods). The difference between IWA-BCAAA-Kerberos and IWA-Direct-Kerberos in terms of throughput is close to 90%. In other words, the throughput with IWA-Direct-Kerberos is about 90% of the numbers with IWA- BCAAA-Kerberos. 10

11 Blue Coat Systems Inc. Corporate Headquarters Sunnyvale, CA EMEA Headquarters Hampshire, UK APAC Headquarters Singapore How We Measure These Numbers The base traffic pattern is the same for all the tests, but the number of connections is different on each platform, in order to load the machine to what we consider its peak, at 70% CPU. The base traffic pattern is: Explicitly proxied The same cache hit rate (20% of requests are cache hit/40 cache miss/40 non-cacheable) Using varying objects that average to a 12k object size Each client connection pipelines 10 requests BCAAA Server Sizing With current servers, hardware is not a limiting factor. Often when we max out Schannel, the BCAAA server s CPU is hovering around 10% - 15%. As a result, we no longer have any BCAAA server hardware recommendations. The hardware is more likely to matter in cases in which MaxConcurrentAPI has been increased, or Kerberos is being used, although we don t have any performance test numbers for these cases. Recommendations Authentication Mechanism: Use Kerberos instead of whenever possible. Surrogates: Use surrogates whenever possible. Consider using X-Forwarded-For header based surrogates in proxy chains. Use IWA-BCAAA instead of IWA-Direct if the following conditions exist: is used for authentication AND The MaxConcurrentAPI settings have been modified AND Surrogates cannot be used The customer is not willing to upgrade to SGOS or later In case the customer has performance issues with : Discuss modifying the MaxConcurrentAPI settings option. If customers are not willing to modify MaxConcurrentAPI settings, using nltest.exe (from the Windows resource kit) is another option. Nltest.exe can tell you which DC BCAAA is using for Schannel, and will allow you to forcibly switch to a DC that you specify. Some customers run nltest.exe in a cron job each night to ensure their BCAAA servers are always using the fastest DCs. SGOS or later and IWA-Direct can be used to specify a preferred DC. Another solution is to create multiple IWA-BCAAA realms on the ProxySG appliance, and to deploy a BCAAA server for each realm. Incoming requests can be authenticated by one realm or the other by client subnet, HTTP header, or some other criteria known prior to authentication. About Technical Briefs Technical briefs are designed to illustrate the features and capabilities of Blue Coat products. By describing generic solutions, technical briefs provide a foundation that Blue Coat customers can use to understand how Blue Coat products can be used to solve specific problems. These technical briefs are not intended to solve customer-specific requests; if you need a customized solution to address a specific concern, contact Blue Coat Professional Services at professionalservices@bluecoat.com Blue Coat Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Blue Coat, the Blue Coat logos, ProxySG, PacketShaper, CacheFlow, IntelligenceCenter, CacheEOS, CachePulse, Crossbeam, K9, the K9 logo, DRTR, Mach5, Packetwise, Policycenter, ProxyAV, ProxyClient, SGOS, WebPulse, Solera Networks, the Solera Networks logos, DeepSee, See Everything. Know Everything.,, and BlueTouch are registered trademarks or trademarks of Blue Coat Systems, Inc. or its affiliates in the U.S. and certain other countries. This list may not be complete, and the absence of a trademark from this list does not mean it is not a trademark of Blue Coat or that Blue Coat has stopped using the trademark. All other trademarks mentioned in this document owned by third parties are the property of their respective owners. This document is for informational purposes only. Blue Coat makes no warranties, express, implied, or statutory, as to the information in this document. Blue Coat products, technical services, and any other technical data referenced in this document are subject to U.S. export control and sanctions laws, regulations and requirements, and may be subject to export or import regulations in other countries. You agree to comply strictly with these laws, regulations and requirements, and acknowledge that you have the responsibility to obtain any licenses, permits or other approvals that may be required in order to export, re-export, transfer in country or import after delivery to you. v.tb-iwa-deployment-guide-en-v1b