Dem democratic Accountability in Wales - A Comparative Study

Transcription

1 End of Award Report Parliamentarism, Devolution and Democratic Accountability: A Comparative Study 1. Background Devolution is commonly understood to be the transfer to a subordinate elected body, on a geographical basis, of functions previously exercised by ministers and the national parliament. It is also referred to as external decentralisation, to differentiate it from delegating responsibility within an existing structure of authority. In 1997, the populations of Wales and Scotland voted in favour of devolution, and, in Northern Ireland, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement - based on the re-establishment of devolved government - also received electoral support. In 1999, the Northern Ireland Assembly in Belfast, the Welsh National Assembly in Cardiff and the Scottish Parliament, Holyrood, in Edinburgh began their operations. One of the main purposes of the devolution programme was to facilitate political responsiveness to the people in their respective countries within the United Kingdom. Subsequently, openness, transparency and accountability have been central subjects in the devolution programme in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Democratic accountability entails both the legislature s representation of and responsiveness towards the electorate and the parliamentary control of the administrative system. Democratic accountability, as well as social welfare, has been substantially improved in most Western countries during the twentieth century. The new devolved national assemblies and parliaments, which were established in the UK in 1999, have had the opportunity to profit from the latest developments and allegedly best institutional practices among the Western democracies. Simultaneously, and paradoxically, with increasing democratic representation, more transparency and extensive new public management (NPM) reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, some signs show a decline in citizens interest in democratic accountability, i.e. decreasing party membership, low voter turn out, and reports of political communication practices in the newly devolved executives resembling the old fashioned Westminster/Whitehall features with spin doctors and lobbying, resulting in limited transparency. However, democratic governance is executed through a diverse set of instruments and procedures. Such arrangements may also vary over time and between different national, institutional and political settings. An important feature inherent in both the new public management reforms from the early 1980s as well as the devolution programme from the mid 1990s and onwards, has been the emphasis on using budgeting, accounting and performance information for increasing transparency and democratic accountability in politics and management. One of these new systems of accounting, Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB), recognises assets and liabilities (full accrual accounting) and entails the use of performance indicators and the incorporation of department objectives within budgets. In addition, it requires that management accounts align with financial accounting statements. RAB was implemented full-scale in the UK in

2 The preparation for this project started in 2000 as an idea to explore the role of management accounting in central governments. The project was sponsored for two years by the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) in The project later evolved into a more comprehensive examination of the role that management accounting is playing as part of the overarching modernising agenda of governments and, specifically, in the UK devolved parliaments of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. The project was awarded funding for three years as part of the ESRC Devolution and Constitutional Change Programme in (The international comparison with New Zealand and Norway was part of the CIMA sponsored project.) Our research project sought to establish to what extent - if at all - accounting contributed to greater democratic accountability within public management and the devolved parliaments in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The interdisciplinary research in this project has in particular utilised theories in public administration, accounting, organisation and sociology. While political scientists and economists often study given institutions and their relationships and effects, this project has focused on how accounting is affecting what is going on inside the devolved institutions. This entire area is novel, and presents an opportunity to study the role of management accounting in the implementation of the devolution policy that is one of the most significant changes in British public policy, and in the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy, in decades. This study has sought to shed more light on several dimensions of democratic accountability in the devolved model of democracy compared to the traditional Westminster model and other countries parliamentary models, such as presentation of relevant information and openness and accessibility for the participating actors. In this respect the parliamentary model of the devolved national assemblies and parliaments more resembles the Scandinavian model with proportional representation (PR), coalition governments and consensual seeking politics, than the traditional Westminster model with a First Past the Post (FPTP) election system and majority government. We have examined democratic accountability issues in a comparative research design that acknowledges the historical and institutional surroundings of the institutions in question. Therefore, this project also examined the comparative practices of New Zealand and Norway as benchmark cases for the devolved UK assemblies. (The international case studies were part of the CIMA sponsored project.) 2. Objectives The objective for the project was to study the role of accounting in informing and shaping the democratic accountability of actions of key actors in the devolved national assemblies and parliaments in the UK: Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Specifically, the aims of the project were as follows: 1. Develop a conceptual framework for understanding how devolution affects accounting for democratic accountability in devolved parliaments. (The conceptual framework that we developed is partly documented in the Public Money and Management paper of 2004 and more fully documented in the forthcoming CIMA Research Report in 2005.) 2. Investigate how key actors in the devolved institutions (executives, parliamentary committees and representatives) use budget information for democratic accountability. (This analysis has been documented in two academic papers were currently one is in review in Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal and one paper is to be submitted for review at another academic journal.)

3 3. Investigate how key actors in the devolved institutions (executives, parliamentary committees and representatives) use financial accounting information for democratic accountability. (This analysis has been documented in two academic papers, one published in Financial Accountability and Management in 2005 and one forthcoming in Irish Accounting Review in 2005.) 4. Investigate how key actors in the devolved institutions (executives, parliamentary committees and representatives) use performance measures and performance audits for democratic accountability. (This analysis is documented in the forthcoming CIMA Research Report in One planned paper documenting a comparative analysis has been postponed, see section No. 6 in the ESRC End of Award Report form.) 5. Enhance understanding on how devolution affects accounting and how the devolved parliament in Scotland and the national assemblies in Northern Ireland and Wales pursue democratic accountability. (This aim has been pursued through different means: We have presented papers at academic conferences; we have arranged a seminar in co-operation with the accounting profession (CIMA) and ESRC with a combined audience of interdisciplinary academics, MSPs, and members of the Civil Service for Scotland and Northern Ireland; we have published articles and written a research report for CIMA intended for the accounting profession; and we have published a paper in a journal, Public Money and Management, that addresses the academic, public sector accounting profession as well as the policy making audience. These groups were our targets for potential impacts of our research in the research proposal. We are currently also working together with New Zealand and American academics on documenting analyses and findings from our project in an academic book. The book proposal has been accepted by Routledge.) The project studied the annual financial budgeting, performance management and performance audit reporting processes, as well as the link/coupling between budgeting and reporting. Specifically, the research looked at the linkages between mission statements, objectives and targets in the planning processes and the use of performance measures and indicators in the reporting processes. 3. Methods The aim of the project was to study the role of accounting practices and controls in informing and shaping the democratic accountability of key actors in the devolved legislatures and executives in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. In order to study how devolution affected the use of accounting for democratic accountability, we collected data from several sources at each of the study settings and compared these different cases. Our main data sources were: Interviews of members of parliaments and national assemblies, government officials and members of central audit institutions. Non-participant observations of parliamentary committee meetings. Analysis of official planning documents and research reports. Monitoring of media coverage of the devolution process and devolved bodies. We compared five cases. New Zealand and Norway served as benchmark cases to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. All of the five cases are relatively small

4 countries compared to England. The UK and New Zealand have generally been at the forefront in implementing public management (NPM) reforms. For example: in 1992, New Zealand became the first country to produce financial statements on an accrual basis for its national government. In comparison, the UK implemented Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) in 2001 with full-scale implementation in Norway has been renowned for being a hesitant, incremental reformer. The Norwegian government first started experimentation with accrual accounting in The research design therefore also facilitated the scrutiny of potential effects of public management reforms and public management culture in general in order to identify the unique effects of devolution in the UK on the use of accounting for democratic accountability. Each country included within the research was examined as a single case study. The research incorporated the views of individuals (politicians, civil servants and audit officers), groups (meetings, committees, parties) and also examined relevant organisations (parliamentary, governmental and audit institutions). The data collected was predominantly qualitative: face-to-face interviews with key players within the parliaments were conducted, backed up by other documentation (non-participant observation of committee meetings, or transcripts of these meetings) and an analysis of policy papers. In identifying representatives for interview, we sought to select representatives with different party affiliations, position and experiences within the committees, as well as seeking a balance in age and gender. We narrowed the focus for our research to representatives from the audit, finance, educational and health committees. The interviewees were informed that their identities would not be revealed to any parties outside the research team in any subsequent publications from the project. During the project period we conducted more than 70 interviews in the five countries. (Due to the untimely death of one member of the research team, we conducted fewer interviews in New Zealand than planned. Also, the suspensions of the N.I. Assembly meant 18 fewer interviews were conducted there. See Section No. 10 in the ESRC End of Award Report form for more information.) We conducted most of the interviews in the UK during the devolved national assemblies first term with some follow up interviews in the second term. The interviews were tape recorded, transcribed and deleted. The interview guide (in English and Norwegian) is documented as an annex to the ESRC End of Award Report form. 4. Results 4.1 Main findings Our main findings can be summarised as follows: Members of the devolved parliaments and national assemblies have too much information and in general too little expertise on accounting and budgeting issues to process it. Therefore, due to this perceived problem of information overload, the parliaments and national assemblies rely on a division of labour in handling accounting information by committees and by specialisation using parliamentary advisors, committee clerks, researchers and audit institutions as buffers and filters of accounting information. This means that some representatives in a political system which relies extensively on division of labour between committees, parties, executives/parliament and government/opposition in the first place, may have difficulty scrutinising activities and plans.

5 Political representatives seldom have competence or interest in traditional accounting information. Therefore only a limited number of members of the devolved parliaments and national assemblies have clear/strong views on traditional accounting issues. When traditional financial accounting information is used in politics, it is often to support claims of financial misconduct. This may be efficient relative to the traditional division of labour in the political system, but it could also mean that certain important issues go unheeded by the political representatives at large. However, post-devolution budgeting and accounting processes are much more open and transparent than before devolution. In particular, there is now extensive scrutiny of financial affairs through the budget processes, and there are opportunities for questioning the executive and staging hearings in the devolved bodies. Albeit there is limited use of traditional accounting information, the use of performance information from general statistics, performance measurement and audit is extensively used by both the executives and the opposition. Even though many public sector reforms may be considered responsible for the enhanced supply of public sector performance information during the last years, much of the increased demand for performance information is related to the outworking of the devolution process. The study focused in particular on the processes of devolution in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales as individual case studies. Hence, each case is analysed separately here. 4.2 Northern Ireland In Northern Ireland, both political interviewees and other interviewees expressed a view that there was often too much irrelevant financial information available. A variety of reasons supporting this view were given. According to politicians, deliverers of this information used a scattergun approach instead of catering the information to a particular need, while non-politicians argued that they saw the politicians compulsion to have all information, regardless of its use, as problematical. There were divergent views as to how much impact devolution had had on the supply of performance information. Some argued that most of the relevant information was available, regardless of devolution, due to the many new public management reforms that had taken place. However, the majority of the interviewees stated that devolution had markedly affected openness and - possibly most significantly - the demand for performance information. A main theme of the responses of politicians, particularly outsider politicians (politicians who were not knowledgeable in accounting issues), to questions on the scrutiny of budget figures was that difficulties had arisen regarding scrutiny because of overly technical presentations. Furthermore, politicians were generally perceived as being more concerned with how much was being spent rather than on what the resources might achieve, with limited consideration being given to planning and performance issues. In terms of performance measurement and auditing, the study found views ranging from a belief that targets were set low and so were relatively easy to achieve, to the argument that only bad performance received any publicity. One politician

6 complained that information was only received in briefings when they sought it out. Other respondents argued that performance data was still prey to departmental subjectivity. Almost all interviewees questioned on the source and quality of their performance information argued that the information could be easily improved, especially the information on targets. Many felt that the targets were too easily achieved and did not function as intended. One interesting point to note was that many Northern Irish politicians in the devolved parliament had local government experience. In local government, it is common to use league tables and comparisons. Hence, the devolved parliaments and national assemblies might have a relatively high competence in accessing, judging and debating performance information. Despite this, there was confusion surrounding the introduction of RAB. RAB was implemented in Northern Ireland in at the same time as the rest of the UK but whereas the rest of the UK enjoyed a three-year transitional period where RAB and cash-based appropriation accounts ran parallel to the other, Northern Ireland had a one-year transitional arrangement in place. Those who were conversant with the intricacies of RAB - even though it was clear from our interviews that a proportion were struggling with some of the concepts of it - were able to identify a range of potential benefits and drawbacks of it. However, outsider politicians, including chairs of committees, knew little or nothing about RAB. Overall, these two groups, while acknowledging disadvantages, were generally positive about the possible contribution of RAB. 4.3 Scotland For many Scottish parliamentarians, there is a huge amount of information, extending across many subjects, to make sense of. It ranges from electronic information, research papers, government policy papers, individual party policy papers, and unsolicited reports by parties seeking to influence opinions. In all of this, the accounting/financial aspects of decisions can be lost. There is a tendency instead to focus on narrative aspects of accounting information and avoid the financial figures. The dominant view of accounting, from the perspective of the groups interviewed, was that accounting was a very technical issue and mostly restricted to financial numbers. There was little awareness of RAB what it is, what it is intended to do, and how numbers have changed because of it. There were a small number of experts within the Scottish parliament who had the expertise to interrogate and challenge accounting information. This resulted in a restricted dialogue between two groups of experts: the providers of government accounting information and a small group of politicians with knowledge of public finances ( the insiders ). Many parliamentarians are reliant on the guidance of the insiders, or on advisers to specialist subject committees and to the parliament, to understand the implications of central government accounting. The issue of reporting performance was under development, with unofficial talks taking place between the Executive and the Scottish Parliament. A member of the Executive argued that much of the performance monitoring was undertaken by Audit Scotland and the Accounts Commission regarding audit. This audit was often

7 conducted as benchmarking, and the Executive was focussed on improving performance. There was, however, an overall opinion that public management reforms over the last years had increased the availability and use of performance information. 4.4 Wales There was a general feeling among politicians and civil servants that the Welsh Assembly and its associated bodies both produced, and were subjected to, a massive battery of targets. There was also unanimous agreement right across the political divide that the quantity, quality and transparency of information was far greater since devolution and that, in general, devolution had improved the accessibility of information. Civil servants involved in preparing the Welsh budget acknowledged that it might not be easy for the uninitiated (the outsiders ) to understand fully the figures contained within it. The extent to which the budgets could be considered user friendly, or even readable, by the politicians depended to a large extent on the politicians own educational backgrounds and experience, as well as on the availability of support from civil servants and colleagues. Certainly, most members interviewed did not consider themselves to be numerate, and hence sought help from others to interpret the accounting and budget numbers. A problem with performance information resulted from the fact that some statistics came top-down - that is, that certain statistics, like the census, were survey-based. This meant that it could be difficult to use these kinds of statistics as a basis for targets because, at the local level, the statistics could have low reliability. However, according to some of the interviewees, once a minister has set a target, it is inevitable that any failure against that target will be picked up by the opposition - for instance by researchers working for the opposition party - and will be used in the course of political debate. In a sense, this is a public form of accountability, as there are people waiting for the Executive not to achieve its targets and the media could be alerted to that information. 4.5 International comparison The New Zealand and Norway cases provided several insights with implications for the analysis of management accounting in the UK devolved institutions. Many of the trends in the UK cases, such as improved quantity and quality of performance information, information overload and reliance on experts and insiders, also were evident in New Zealand and Norway. Accounting information was found useful for the politicians largely when the information revealed new information or major deviations from plans. The international comparison documented three important issues. Firstly, budget and performance information was apparently perceived by politicians as more useful for democratic accountability than traditional accounting information. Secondly, politicians may be satisfied with cash-based accounting information for their purposes, but after experience with RAB, accrual accounting seemed to be preferred, at least in New Zealand. Thirdly, certain NPM reforms, including the introduction of performance management and RAB, seemed to be conducive to democratic accountability.

8 4.6 Conclusion Devolution has unequivocally improved democratic accountability in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, resulting in more openness, consultation and scrutiny of national issues than before devolution. Even though some improvement in accountability may be due to general NPM reforms over the last 20 years or so that have increased the supply of accounting information, devolution has increased the demand and salience for this information in the three UK countries. The devolved UK parliaments all share a preoccupation with targets; the general perception that the concept of accounting is narrow and purely concerned with financial matters; and a desire for more performance information. There also is evidence in this study to suggest that many parliamentary representatives in the UK devolved institutions depend on accounting experts (such as government accountants, auditors, advisors) and interest groups to help them interpret the accounting information available to them. However, these practices were also evident, and partly deemed efficient, in the international comparisons. 5. Activities The research team has had 10 project meetings: 9 April 2002 (Edinburgh), 4 September 2002 (Dublin), 3 March 2003 (Belfast), 17 June 2003 (Edinburgh), 25 September 2003 (Edinburgh), 9 10 December 2003 (Belfast), 14 May 2004 (Edinburgh), 8 October 2004 (Oslo), 13 December 2004 (Edinburgh), and 29 March 2005 (Edinburgh). Members of the research team have attended several seminars and workshops on devolution arranged by the ESRC Devolution programme and other parties. Members of the research team organised a track on Devolution at the European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management (EIASM) International Conference on Accounting, Auditing and Management in Public Sector Reforms, Oslo, 7 9 October The University of Edinburgh hosted an ESRC/CIMA New Public Sector research seminar September This seminar was an engagement with the profession (CIMA) in providing an interdisciplinary platform for researchers on devolution (economists, accountants, political scientists, social policy and public management specialists). The seminar was attended by several officials from the Northern Ireland and Scottish Executive and by Des McNulty, Convener of the Finance Committee from the Scottish Parliament. (A special issue of Financial Accountability and Management edited by Professor G. Jan Van Helden was published in 2005 and included the best papers presented at the event including papers on devolution.) 6. Outputs So far the project has produced the following outputs (for a list of works in progress, see Section No. 2 in the ESRC End of Award Report form):

9 Papers published in academic journals: Ezzamel, M., N. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and J. Pallot (forthcoming Summer 2005). Accounting, accountability, and devolution: A study of the use of accounting information by politicians in the Northern Ireland Assembly s first term. Irish Accounting Review. Ezzamel, M., N. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and J. Pallot (2005). Conflict and rationality: Accounting in Northern Ireland s devolved assembly. Financial Accountability and Management, 21(1): Ezzamel, M., N. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and J. Pallot (2004). Has devolution increased democratic accountability? Public Money and Management, 24(3): Johnsen, Å. (2002). Devolusjon og det nye skotske parlamentet: En kommentar. Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, 18(1): Presentations of papers at academic conferences and seminars: Ezzamel, M., N.S. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and J. Pallot (2004). Conflict and Rationality: Accounting in Northern Ireland s Devolved Assembly. Invited presentation given by Noel Hyndman at the Certified General Accountants (CGA) Ontario, Accounting Research Centre, University of Ottawa, Canada. 24th November Ezzamel, M., N.S. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and J. Pallot (2004). The Development of New Budgets in the UK Devolved Governments: Education and Health. Paper presented at the European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management (EIASM) International Conference on Accounting, Auditing and Management in Public Sector Reforms, Oslo University College, Oslo, 7 9 October Ezzamel, M., N.S. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and J. Pallot (2004). Planning and Budgeting in the UK Devolved Governments: Education and Health. Paper presented at the European Accounting Association Congress in Prague, 1 3 April Ezzamel, M., N.S. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and J. Pallot (2003). Rationality and conflict: Accounting in the devolved Northern Ireland Parliament. Paper presented at the Chartered Institute of Management Accountant (CIMA) New Public Sector Seminar, The University of Edinburgh, September, Ezzamel, M., N.S. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley, and J. Pallot (2003). Accounting and Accountability in a New Parliament: Modernisation in Practice. Paper presented by Irvine Lapsley as an invited plenary lecture for 9th Biannual Conference on Comparative International Governmental Accounting Research (CIGAR), Bodø Graduate School of Business, Norway, June Ezzamel, M., N.S. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley, and J. Pallot (2003). Accounting, Accountability and Devolution: Early Evidence from the Northern Ireland Assembly. Paper presented for the IAFA Annual Conference, Dublin, Ireland, May 2003.

10 Ezzamel, M., N.S. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley, and J. Pallot (2003). Use of accounting in politics: Has devolution in the UK increased democratic accountability? Presentation at the School of Management, Agder University College, Norway, 7 May Ezzamel, M., N.S. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and J. Pallot (2002). Devolution, parliamentarism and democratic accountability: A comparative study of accounting in politics. Paper presented for the 6th International Research Symposium on Public Management (IRSPM VI), The University of Edinburgh, 8 10 April, Research reports: Ezzamel, M., N. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley, J. Pallot and S. Scarparo (2005, forthcoming). Management Accounting, Devolution and Democratic Accountability. CIMA Research Report. London: Chartered Institute of Management Accountants. Research memos: Hyndman, N.S. and G. Martin (2002). Analysis of the devolved institutions planning and budgeting documents. Research Memo. Practitioner oriented publications: Ezzamel, M., N. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and S. Scarparo (2005). Resource accounting and budgeting. Financial Management, June: Ezzamel, M., N. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley and S. Scarparo (2005). Money matters: Devolution and Resource Accounting and Budgeting. Devolution Briefing No. 23. London: Economic and Social Research Council. Ezzamel, M., N. Hyndman, Å. Johnsen, I. Lapsley, J. Pallot and S. Scarparo (2003). Accounting in politics. CIMA Research Update, (September): 2 3. Articles in newspapers: Johnsen, Å. (2003). Saken maktutrederne glemte. Newspaper article in Dagsavisen (Norway), 16 October Johnsen, Å. (2003). Politikk og regnskap. Newspaper article in Bergens Tidende (Norway), 13 March Impacts It is difficult to assess the impacts for practice of this research, also because the process of publication and dissemination still is ongoing. However, members of the research team have been witnesses in parliamentary committee meetings and seminars in Scotland (see also Section No. 7 in the ESRC End of Award Report form). For example: Irvine Lapsley was invited to the Scottish Parliament Finance Committee Awayday to discuss Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB), in August Irvine Lapsley gave evidence to the Finance Committee of the Scottish Parliament in May 2004 (Stage 1) and November 2004 (Stage 2) of the budget. The evidence given by Irvine Lapsley at these meetings was cited in numerous newspapers. Åge Johnsen participated 22 March 2005 in a Finance Committee seminar on budgeting and performance targets. This may indicate a certain degree of

11 relevance of the research and findings for some of the main target groups for this research. It is too early to assess the academic impact because our first academic paper was published last year (in 2004). However, this paper has already been cited in an academic journal article once. Moreover, the planned publication of an academic book from the project, published by Routledge, shows a certain degree of academic as well as commercial interest. 8. Future Research Priorities The process of devolution and the introduction of RAB are both fairly new concepts. In particular, it is difficult to gauge the success, or failure, of RAB. The implementation of RAB in the UK started as recently as in There is a need for both to be re-assessed in the future. Throughout the course of this research, the participants frequently identified a concern with information overload. This is due to the improved availability, greater relevance and greater quantities of accounting information being available to political representatives of devolved parliaments in the UK. This problem may have been a relatively big problem in the implementation stages of the new devolved national assemblies and parliaments in the UK, but further research could scrutinise whether this problem has been dealt with or endures. There is also a perceived threat that a greater demand for openness and accountability, coupled with technological advances, might create a system of political insiders and outsiders, and accounting experts versus naïve users. This tendency may create additional information asymmetry that some groups know more than other groups in a system already permeated with division of labour and specialisation. Further research could analyse if problems related to information asymmetries have been increased by the new accounting technology and models, in particular due to the perceived complexity of RAB. The challenge for accounting professionals is to ensure that all players within the devolved parliaments are able to both comprehend and to effectively harness this information for the benefit of their institutions and their constituents. Future research could analyse whether the introduction of new accounting models and planning processes have been accompanied by adequate training of relevant user groups in the political and administrative system. Otherwise, new and enhanced formal models for delivering democratic accountability may, in the worst case, end up creating democratic deficit in the longer run.

12 Annex: Interview Guide in English and Norwegian Questions in the Parliamentarism, devolution and democratic accountability: A comparative study project Spørsmål i prosjektet «Parlamentarisme, desentralisering og demokratisk styring: En sammenligning» Note: The questions are framed for politicians. Note: Spørsmålene er formulert med tanke på When used in interviews with civil servants politikere. Når spørsmålene blir stilt til ansatte and advisors they will have to be tweaked by i forvaltningen og til rådgivere/eksperter, må the interviewer. For example, question 3 spørsmålene tilpasses formålet av refers to the amount and quality of information intervjueren. For eksempel: Spørsmål 3 received. When asked to civil servants and handler om mengden og kvaliteten på advisors, this should refer to the amount and informasjon som blir mottatt. Når spørsmålet quality of information provided. Similar blir stilt til ansatte i forvaltningen må adjustments will have to be made for a spørsmålet rette seg mot informasjon som blir number of the other questions. gitt. Lignende tilpasninger må bli gjort for flere andre spørsmål. Introduction Innledning 1 How long have you been involved (worked) in the public sector? What is the nature of the roles you have occupied over this period of time? On accountability 2 What do you understand by accountability? What does the term mean to you? Can you give me an example? Provision of general and accounting information 3 Is the amount and quality of information you receive sufficient for your needs? 4 What would you classify as accounting information? Can you give me some examples? Who would you look to for clarification if the accounting information were presented in a very technical way? 5 Who are the main users of accounting information within the Assembly/ Parliament? Who are the main users of the accounting information outside the Assembly/ Parliament? 6 How would you assess the performance of the systems in the Assembly/Parliament in providing the information you need? Are there any ways these could be improved? In what ways? If these systems are not the most effective way for you to access the information, what alternatives do you use? 1 Hvor lenge har du arbeidet i/med offentlig sektor? Hva slags typer jobber/roller har du hatt i løpet av denne perioden? Om ansvar og regnskapsplikt 2 Hva forstår du med regnskapsplikt? Hva betyr dette begrepet for deg? Kan du gi noen eksempler? Tilgjengelighet på generell informasjon og regnskaps/styringsinformasjon 3 Er mengden og kvaliteten på informasjonen som du mottar evt. gir, tilstrekkelig for dine behov? 4 Hvordan vil du dele inn regnskaps/styringsinformasjon? Kan du gi noen eksempler? Hvem ville du gå til for å få hjelp dersom informasjonen som blir presentert er veldig teknisk eller uforståelig? 5 Hvem er de viktigste brukerne av regnskaps/styringsinformasjon i Stortinget? Hvem er de viktigste brukerne av regnskaps/styringsinformasjon utenfor Stortinget? 6 I hvilken grad synes du Stortingets styringssystemer gir deg den informasjonen du trenger?, evt. i hvilken grad synes du at du gir Stortinget den informasjonen som politikerne trenger? Kan dette forbedres, og i så fall hvordan? Hvis disse systemene ikke er de mest effektive måtene for deg til få tilgang til evt. gi informasjon, hvilke alternativer bruker du? 7 Do you think the personalities of some of 7 Synes du at enkelte personligheter i

13 the key figures in the Assembly/Parliament have an impact on the way in which the system operates? If so, how? If not, why do you think this is the case? 8 Have there been changes in the information provided to you over the period since devolution? Has it improved (or not)? In what ways? Would these changes have occurred anyway regardless of devolution? Stortinget har innvirkning på hvordan systemet virker? I så fall, hvordan? Hvis ikke, hvorfor tror du det er slik? 8 Har det skjedd endringer i informasjonen som blir gitt til deg evt. som du gir, siden 1999? Har det blitt forbedret eller ikke?

14 Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) 9 Do you see any benefits/drawbacks in the introduction of resource accounting/resource budgeting in relation to the nature of the accounting information you receive and use (or will receive and use)? What are these? Performance/audit information 10 To what extent is organisational performance information important to you in your role? 11 With regard to performance information, what information do you receive and use? Where does it come from? Is it presented in a way that is useful to you? How do you feel it could be improved? 12 Given the major changes in the way in which public services have been managed over the last 20 years (prompts: Financial Management Initiative, Next Steps, Citizen s Charter, Service First, Modernising Government), how do you think these initiatives have affected the type of performance information that is produced and used? 13 To what extent has access and openness of accounting information and performance information on public services changed with devolution? Do you think that any such changes are as a result of devolution, or would they have occurred in any case? Budget issue questions 14 Do you think that there is sufficient consultation in the budget process in the Assembly/Parliament? Regnskapssystemet 9 Synes du det ville vært en fordel om statsregnskapet var blitt ført og presentert på samme måte som vanlige bedriftsregnskaper blir ført og presentert i forhold til din bruk av slik informasjon? Hvilke fordeler er dette? Resultatstyring og forvaltningsrevisjon 10 I hvilken grad er informasjon om organisasjoners resultater (i vid forstand) viktig for deg? 11 Med hensyn til resultatinformasjon, hva slags informasjon mottar evt. gir og bruker du? Hvor kommer denne informasjonen fra? Blir denne informasjonen lagt fram på en måte som er nyttig for deg? Hvordan synes du dette kan bli bedre? 12 Gitt de mange reformene som har funnet sted i offentlig sektor de siste 20 årene (ramme-budsjettering, mål- og resultatstyring, nytt økonomireglement i staten, serviceerklæringer, effektivisering/modernisering/ fornyelse), hvordan tror du slike tiltak har påvirket resultatinformasjonen som blir produsert og brukt? 13 I hvilken grad har innsyn og åpenhet i regnskaps- og styringsinformasjon i offentlig tjenester endret seg (siden 1999)? Tror du disse eventuelle endringene har skjedd som følge av spesielle forhold, eller ville de ha skjedd uansett? Budsjettering 14 Synes du det er tilstrekkelig åpenhet og uttalelsesmuligheter i budsjettprosessen i Stortinget? 15 Is the budget scrutinised rigorously? 15 Blir budsjettet studert grundig? 16 Is the budget presented in a format that is suitable for your needs? 17 Has the budget process improved over time? What are the best aspects of the whole process? Has it got worse? What are the worst aspects of the process? 18 Would you say that the budget process is similar to what happens at Westminster? Sundry questions 19 Do you think that the greater local focus the Assembly/Parliament provides has improved the flow of information? Is information accessible? 16 Blir budsjettet lagt fram i en form som er passende for dine behov? 17 Har budsjettprosessen blitt forbedret over tid? Hva er de beste forholdene ved denne prosessen? Hva har blitt verre? Hva er de verste forholdene ved disse prosessene? 18 Mener du budsjettprosessen i Stortinget er lik den som er i Westminster? Andre forhold 19 Er regnskaps/styringsinformasjon lett tilgjengelig? 20 What further changes do you expect in 20 Hva slags endringer forventer du vil

15 terms of accounting information and performance information in the future? 21 Is there anything you think we have missed? komme når det gjelder regnskaps- og resultatinformasjon i fremtiden? 21 Er det noen forhold du synes vi har oversett?