New Solutions to Old Problems: A Non-partisan Approach to Immigration through Assimilation

Transcription

1 Jachec 51 New Solutions to Old Problems: A Non-partisan Approach to Immigration through Assimilation Kamil Jachec The topic of a proper governmental response to a new type of immigration problem in the last few decades has in recent years remained largely unsolved. This new approach to resolving this issue focuses on three key aspects of illegal immigration: economic effects, fiscal sustainability, and American identity. By using these three factors as a template for solving the issues, the author attempts to propose a new method for immigration policy. A Domestic Workers Program is suggested that encompasses the three major aspects under deliberation with an extrapolation of the expected findings and results that will benefit all parties involved in negotiations on the issue of illegal immigration. The policy, through subsidization, incentivizes firms to expand their labor force on a voluntary basis to include immigrants that function in the shadows of the U.S. economy. The end result means a decreased informal labor sector and stabilized if not rising wages, fiscal sustainability, and an improvement in American identity. This new approach to resolving the illegal immigration problem achieves Pareto optimality for all those willing to find a temporal solution for today s huddled masses. In this paper I will argue that the most important factor in designing an effective immigration policy for the United States of America is ensuring successful immigrant assimilation. I will begin by describing how recent immigration into the United States differs from past immigration and how this recent type of immigration influences the context of three main factors: economic prosperity, fiscal sustainability, and the elusive notion of an American Identity. Using recent studies on the effects of

2 52 The Orator immigration on these factors, I will then formulate an approach to designing an immigration policy focused on immigrant assimilation as the principle solution. Characteristics of the Immigration Debate: Rising A Conflict It is apparent that today s recent stream of immigration stands in stark contrast to the immigration of the 1920 s. As opposed to large influxes of European populations that could be regulated due to their vast distance from the host country, present immigrants are largely from Latin America; a region of the world that can be accessed through the United States of America s 2,000-mile-long southern boarder with Mexico 1. This contiguity of a shared land border that can be crossed on foot generates the problem that is at the core of the immigration issue: Illegality. With decreased means of travel, Latin American immigrants can enter the United States unregulated; even travel back and forth when necessary. Immigration has therefore deviated from its old attributes, and immigration policy when faced with this new dynamic must adapt to meet the latest required demands of public policy. With this new change in immigration patterns, the United States stands in a crisis where the status quo is no longer acceptable to the general public. Evidence of this can be seen through continual legislative backlashes that attempt to limit the number of immigrants from Latin America such as the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Acts of 2005 (HR 4437). 2 Introduced by House Judiciary Committee Chairmen F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-WI), the bill provided no road to lawful status for millions of undocumented noncitizens, made unlawful presence in the U.S. a crime and required 1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, Foreign Policy 141 (2004): U.S. House, Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, 109th Cong., 1st sess., H.R

3 Jachec 53 the construction of more fencing on the U.S.-Mexican border 3. This bill did not become law, and as a result, a compromise Immigration Reform Proposal was considered by the U.S. Senate as an attempt to address the issue of immigration once more. The compromise bill was initially critiqued as leading to the same results as HR 4437, with the small exception of temporarily reducing the size of the undocumented population by offering a legalization program to about 4 million immigrants 4. In 2007, President Bush issued his own immigration policy. The strategy focused on securing the United States borders, holding employers who hire illegal immigrants accountable, creating a temporary guest-worker program, and a component that provides a path to citizenship for undocumented workers 5. Although rather progressive in relative terms, President Bush s Immigration Reform proposal was not successful in rallying enough political capital to pass. These attempts to remedy the illegal immigration problem have so far resulted in failure. As a response to these legislative measures and to pressure congress, in the spring of 2007, immigrants themselves used protests and other demonstrations as their avenues of civic expression to rally across the U.S. in opposition. In places like Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Chicago, hundreds of thousands of marchers appeared to show support for immigrant solidarity 6. It 3 Joan Friedland, Monica Guzar, and Karen Tumlin, "House Passes Border and Immigration Enforcement Bill: Immigrants, Non-citizens, Even Citizens Face Unprecedented Assault on Rights," Immigration Law and Policy, December 22, Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, "Analysis of the Compromise Immigration reform Proposal Under Consideration by the U.S. Senate," Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law (2006), 5 George W. Bush, President Bush's Plan for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, State of the Union Address 2007, (accessed December 14, 2007). 6 CNN, "Thousands of Immigration Marchers rally Across U.S., CNN International, May 2, 2007,

4 54 The Orator was evident that regardless of the kind of proposals that were debated in the House and Senate, illegal immigrants were here to stay. In my initial policy model, I seek to address the effects of illegal immigration and exclude other objectives such as humanitarian/moral, social, and cultural issues not being addressed here. Immigration policy should promote human rights, be inclusive of refugees and asylum seekers, and be attentive towards family reunification to maximize utility in the society. The policy should promote ethnic diversity, and be aware of the political capital available in a constantly changing political climate so that the policy may be agreed upon by the demos and placed into action. However, I argue that whatever additional measures are placed into practice, the position of this paper must serve as the core remedy to illegal immigration. I seek to answer the following question: What certain aspects must an immigration policy include to ensure economic prosperity, fiscal sustainability, and the notion of an American Identity? Approach and Background: Using Recent Studies as a Template for Policy Formulation In order to begin to formulate a policy, it is important to understand the three characteristics that define my approach: Economic prosperity, fiscal sustainability, and American identity. When designing a policy, we must be sure that no burden is disproportionately placed on a certain demographic of society, such as low-income or low-skilled labor, while attempting to remedy labor shortages present in the economy. By ensuring economic prosperity for all income groups in society, we avoid the possibility of creating an economic underclass amongst citizens already here who must carry the largest brunt of the cost. To ensure constant or increasing living standards for citizens (accessed December 14, 2007).

5 Jachec 55 already present, we must also work to ensure that illegal immigrants themselves have equal access to compete in the market so that they themselves do not become an underclass removed from tools such as insurance, access to credit, and subsidies for investments in human capital, all of which contribute to social mobility. A policy that can ensure constant domestic living standards for citizens while incentivizing immigrants to come out of the shadows will be recognized as a success. The next characteristic of our approach that must be addressed is fiscal sustainability. A new public policy towards immigration must ensure that with equal-use of public goods comes equal-payment for those goods by those who benefit. Illegal immigrants, although subject to taxes such as sales tax or property tax, are not subject to payroll taxes or taxes dealing specifically with documented work. As a result, allowing illegal immigrants to use public goods that are non-rival and nonexcludable to the general public such as national defense, public schools or public roads without ensuring equal payment into the system is not egalitarian. Limiting the use of public goods by a specific class is unattainable due to a lack of ability to enforce such a policy; and is undesirable regardless. Therefore, incentivizing undocumented workers to come out of the shadows and pay equally into the system would ensure a successful externality of the new public policy that I am attempting to create. The third characteristic, the idea of an American Identity, must also be kept in the public consciousness when designing a policy. American Identity is a relative term. Its definition changes between individuals. Without an exact definition, the elusive qualities of such a notion are hard to address. However, we can minimize the relative change on the notion of American Identity by increasing assimilation rates and decreasing illegal immigration. By using these two complementary strategies, we can ensure minimal change in the American residual self image. In order to create a policy that deals with these new challenges, I begin by focusing on the economic impacts of the

6 56 The Orator present immigration issue. The current debate surrounding the economic impact of illegal immigration rests on the questions of whether immigrants disproportionately affect low-income workers compared to the rest of society. Research by two economists, David Card and George Borjas, represent the two different schools of thought on the economic impact of immigration. Card argues that although immigration has a strong effect on relative supplies of different skill groups, the local labor market outcomes of low skilled natives are not much affected by supply shocks 7. He argues that local industry absorbs immigrant-induced supply shocks. Figure 1 located in the appendix explains this phenomenon using a simple diagram of supply and demand. Essentially, as (a) the supply of labor increases, causing wages to fall and employment to rise, (b) the demand, generated for products by the influx of newly arrived immigrants, increases for products pressuring wages to increase and immigrants to be absorbed into the labor market. This results in an overall increase in employment. The wages of native dropouts relative to native high school graduate has remained nearly constant since This means that the impact of immigration on low-skilled labor markets is either not negative at all, or at most minimal. David Card has also studied natural experiments on the economic impact of immigrants in the labor market by studying the impact of the Mariel Boatlift in 1980 and its effects in Miami. He comes to the conclusion that the Mariel Boatlift had essentially no effect on wages or employment outcomes of non- Cuban workers in the Miami labor market 9. This assumes that supply and demand effects are at work, and that there is no adverse shock resulting in wage suppression for a particular group of citizens. To sum up the results of Cards studies, the 7 David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad? UC Berkeley (2005): Ibid., 25 9 David Card, The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43, no. 2 (1990): 255

7 Jachec 57 demand curve also shifts out 10. As newly arrived immigrants arrive and generate a demand for food, entrepreneurs open up new restaurants for them. Essentially, the economy restructures and the market works. Geroge Borjas on the other hand argues that as immigrants move into a region, they push native workers out, so the total effects of an influx has to be measured at an aggregate national level. Borjas estimates that between 1980 and 2000 the labor supply increased by eleven percent due to immigration, and as a result, reduced the wage of the average native worker by 3.2 percent 11. He emphasizes the relative difference between different groups in society, claiming that high school dropouts saw a reduction in wages of 8.9 percent, 4.9 percent for college graduates, 2.6 percent for high school graduates, and an insignificant change for workers with some college degree. However, Borjas acknowledges that he cannot explain the differences between these groups and notes himself that this adverse effect neglects long-run capital adjustments in the economy to meet the growing supply of low-skill labor that can be complementary to the importance of high-skill immigration as an engine of innovation. Borjas concludes that further study is required, including a study of potential benefits that immigrants impart on a host country. To Card, Borjas study does not seem significant. Card s reasoning lies along the lines that the unskilled labor pool is shrinking in the U.S. as the average skill attainment level increases, noting that in percent of the work force in metropolitan areas came from dropouts, in 2000 only 18 percent were 12. Other economists have also critiqued Borjas findings. 10 Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration equation, The New York Times, July 9, 2006, d=1&_r=1 (accessed December 7, 2007). 11 George J. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market, The Quarterly journal of Economics 118, no. 4 (2003): Lowenstein 2006.

8 58 The Orator Giovanni Peri, an Italian economist, argues that immigrants and natives differ in terms of skill, formal education, work experience, and cultural-specific abilities 13. This means that they are not perfect substitutes for labor. Also, Peri states that Borjas does not acknowledge that as immigration increases the labor supply, it also increases the real return to physical capital. This means that as the demand for labor increases it makes capital more profitable since both are complementary for production. The end result is an outcome that is more positive than negative. These two approaches lead us to conclude that immigration policy with open borders does not drastically segment society and create an underclass beyond a significant doubt. However, this does not mean that advocacy for an open border is the solution to illegal immigration, because of two other concerns: fiscal sustainability, and American identity. I now focus on the second characteristic of immigration, fiscal sustainability. Creating a border would create a situation where demand for public goods would increase faster than supply (construction of new schools, roads, etc) could respond to. In this case, public goods must be given time to accommodate new increases in population, whether those increases are the result of natural births in the population or as a result of immigration. Fiscal sustainability means ensuring that with equal-use of public goods comes equal-payment for those goods, which would require resources from the population to be expanded in order to ensure that public goods are being supplied to the growing population. For example, immigration accounts for virtually all of the national increases in public school enrollment over the last two decades and is a main driving force behind the need for health insurance 14. This exemplifies the need for equal-payment equal-use policies when formulating a solution. 13 Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri. Rethinking the Gains from Immigration: Theory and Evidence from the U.S., Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2006): Steven A. Camarota, "Immigrants in the United States-2002: A Snapshot of America's Foreign-Born Population, Center for Immigration Studies (2002),

9 Jachec 59 However, immigration can be extremely beneficial to alleviating budgetary problems. Immigration reduces the cost of public goods such as national defense, which are of a fixed cost to the population. In this case, as the population increases, the amount that must be paid per individual decreases. The interest on public debt and veteran s benefits can also be paid for by taxes collected from the spending and living costs of immigrants who may not have even been in the country when these debts were accumulated. Immigrants tend to also use less income transfer programs such as welfare. Fewer than three percent of immigrants receive aid from programs such as food-stamps 15. This combined with the fact that most illegal immigrants who enter the country are of working age and are seeking work, and therefore do not burden the public school system; harnessing the potential of illegal immigrants to become legal U.S. workers can benefit the entire domestic population s fiscal situation. The next characteristic that must be examined is the notion of an American Identity, specifically analyzing the assimilation process of immigrants. Analyzing educational attainment and the ability that it has to raise incomes, the children of immigrants exhibit above average levels of educational attainment, even for those whose fathers have a much lower level of schooling than the fathers of their native born counterparts 16. The Pew Hispanic Center also notes that language assimilation is quite successful in Latin households 17. This data is summarized in Table 1 in the appendix. Only four percent of Latin households are English dominant in the first generation, this figure increases to 46 percent by the second generation, and 78 percent by the third generation. However, combining English dominant households and bilingual households, we see that the majority of households are fluent in English in the second generation. The best description of language assimilation can be seen by the dramatic 15 Lowenstein Card 2005, Pew Hispanic Center, "Survey Brief: Assimilation and Language," The Henry J. Kaiser family Foundation (2004).

10 60 The Orator decline in Spanish dominance. 72 percent of households are Spanish dominant in the first generation, which falls to 7 percent by only the second generation! By the third generation, virtually all traces of Spanish dominance are gone. Luis Fraga and Gary Segura also explain that by 2002 there were 4,464 Latino s serving in elective office 18. Of these numbers, 36 percent held office at the school board level while another 34 percent served at the municipal level, showing that Latino s are not only assimilating but are politically assimilating as well. Increasing the opportunities of Latino immigrants allows them to experience higher levels of economic attainment, investment in human capital, and social inclusion 19. Providing opportunities for language acquisition and access to credit and insurance markets can increase the assimilation rate of Latino immigrants. This assimilation leads to higher incomes, and assuming that immigrants are positively selected, can lead to even higher incomes than those of the native born population. This leads to the conclusion that assimilation is taking place, and can be catalyzed further through appropriate public policy. Proposed Policy: Assimilation at the Heart of the Solution The background information allows us to conclude that immigration does not create disproportionate economic inequality and can lead to constant if not rising incomes for all citizens. We can also conclude that fiscal sustainability for increased demand for public goods will be sustainable by bringing undocumented workers out of the shadows and into activities that allow for full taxation relative to the rest of the public to occur. The third characteristic of immigration, American identity, confirms that assimilation does occur and can be inclusive in a 18 Luis R. Fraga and Gary M. Segura, "Culture Clash? Contesting Notions of American Identity and the Effects of Latin American Immigration," Perspectives 4, no. 2 (2006): Ibid., 285.

11 Jachec 61 public policy to ensure minimal deviation from the public s collective definition. Therefore, under these conditions an Immigration Policy centered around increasing opportunities for immigrants through methods of assimilation can act as a positive policy conclusion to not only diminish illegal immigration in the long-run but to ensure that the criteria of the three stipulated characteristics are met. This can be done through a Domestic Workers Program. Undocumented workers can attain a formal Workers Visa without fear of expatriation, which will allow them to work under the freedoms currently available to the rest of the population. Where they work and how is decided by the firms under the same laws and market incentives that govern the rest of society. However, the state issues an incentive structure to firms that they may choose to engage in. Essentially, as a firm hires more individuals who have a Workers Visa, the payroll tax for their American employees decreases. As more immigrants are hired, who are now legally entitled to work, the payroll tax for their On Visa group increases. The amount each payroll tax increases or decreases is called the incentives ratio, defined as the number of visa workers over the total labor force in percent form. This percent is then subtracted from the original payroll tax for U.S. citizens and added onto the payroll tax for employees hired under the worker visa system. This creates incentives under a costbenefit analysis for firms to hire a certain portion of their labor who have worker visas to save money on their payroll taxes. The state can create different incentives ratio s for different sectors as well, to target sectors of the economy with labor shortages. An example of this sort of incentives structure can be seen in Table 2 located in the appendix. Initially there are 100 American workers or formal labor including all those who are eligible to work and do so within a firm. As a firm chooses to hire immigrants who are under the Worker Visa Program, their total payroll cost begins to decrease from $200 to $ with 90 American workers and ten on the Worker Visa system. This

12 62 The Orator eventually meets equilibrium when 75 American workers and 25 Worker Visa immigrants are hired. This equilibrium results in $12.50 being saved by the firm from the payroll tax scheme. At this point, hiring more immigrants under a work visa will result in fewer savings. Employers are incentivized due to the possible savings from the payroll incentives scheme, and employees are incentivized because their work is now safeguarded by all labor laws and is formal, which accredits them to benefits of formal labor such as access to credit, insurance, and other forms of social spending via firm or state. Again, the incentives ratio can be adjusted to a point where policy deems most effective depending on conditions. By creating an incentives ratio that saves the company more money than the wage gap between an illegal worker and a legal worker, the firm will have no incentives to keep illegal workers hired in informal occupations. Another example of this can be seen in table 4 in the appendix. Now assume a firm has hired ten undocumented workers along with 100 American workers. According to Table 3, we see that the total payroll cost for all labor is now $ instead of the original $200, a ratio that saves a firm $10.85 if five workers are moved from the informal to the formal sector. This means that for every one worker moved, the company saves $2.17 for every worker hired from the informal sector into the formal sector. Assuming the wage gap between the informal sector and formal sector in that particular labor market is $1, the firm receives a net gain of $1.17 for every worker hired under the current conditions per hour of work employed. A path to citizenship under the guidelines that a worker has maintained a credible work record under a work visa would be available after a period of five years. The state would also provide subsidized retraining programs for the small percentage of American workers who may be affected as the market restructures, and English language courses for immigrants who are beginning to assimilate through their exposure to the American workforce in a setting were they are the minority. This

13 Jachec 63 program would have to be advertised and explained to the general population to ensure symmetrical information and that immigrants are made aware of the potential benefits that this program entails. Expectations Under this program, firms have an incentive to now hire under formal conditions in order to receive the benefits of a decreased payroll tax for their other employees who are citizens. In terms of economic characteristics, no underclass is created in the domestic population and most of the program is subsidized by the state. However, illegal immigrants may now emerge from the shadows and participate in society, ensuring that they have access to necessities such as credit and insurance markets, school subsidies and scholarships for their children, and any firm-related benefits from documented work. This ensures that undocumented workers, who are now documented, have the ability to properly increase their living standards, as well as their children s. Also, the threat of deportation now absent, immigrant s wages cannot be artificially reduced through fear and market forces can be allowed to operate. Analyzing this program s effect on the fiscal budget, it is noticeable that although the state incurs some cost, the gain from the increased population emerging out of the shadows, which is now taxable, is projected to surpasses the amount the state subsidizes the firms. Also with rising living standards as a result of assimilation and access to credit, insurance, and human investment markets, documented immigrants can pay more into the system over time as their incomes rise. By incentivizing illegal immigrants to become documented, it can be ensured that equal-use of public goods is met with equal-payment for those goods, especially income-transfer programs such as welfare. Analyzing the impact of this program on American identity, it becomes evident that by incentivizing firms to hire along this incentives structure, illegal immigrants are exposed to a

14 64 The Orator workplace dominated mostly by American Citizens. This should increase the rate of assimilation amongst those immigrants, especially if attaining a job by an employer requires immigrants to move to areas outside of their enclaves. Decreasing enclaves increases the costs of future migration, and therefore reduces chain migration. The five-year path to citizenship also means that immigrants may be cycled through firms, starting as documented workers under a Worker Visa then moved into the other category of American Workers assuming they are competitive enough and the firm has the incentive to hire them under the new terms. If this occurs, it would be at the expense of an American worker who will have to be hired elsewhere or retrained. This cycle of assimilation ensures that documented workers are siphoned into the workforce slowly while allowing other documented workers to then replace them, while providing retraining opportunities for workers who may change occupations as the market restructures. Conclusion By using increased assimilation methods through a Domestic Workers Program the state can ensure that the effects of undocumented immigration on the economic prosperity of both domestic and illegal individuals are positive. No one demographic of society carries all the costs of immigration while an underclass in the shadows is eliminated. Fiscal sustainability is ensured through the taxable workers who are now hired in the formal sector, and as a result have access to markets that can provide social mobility. This acts as an engine to assimilation complementary to the program proposed. With assimilation occurring and the proper mechanisms in place to regulate the supply of documented workers through the incentives ratio, the utility of the population as a whole can increase without drastically reshaping the Identity of America.

15 Jachec 65 Appendix Table 1: Primary Language Among Latinos, by Generation in the U.S. Generations in the United States 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation English 4% 46% 78% Dominant Bilingual Spanish Dominant

16 66 The Orator Table 2: Domestic Workers Program Incentives Ratio = # of Visa Workers/ Total Labor Force. *Ratio added to the Payroll tax for On Visa workers and subtracted from American workers. W=Wage, T=Payroll Tax, #W = Number of Workers within Respective Classification Incentives Ratio = Visa Worker/Total Labor Force Original Payroll Tax - Ratio=New Tax for Americans Original Payroll Tax + Ratio=New Tax for Visa Worker Wage=$20 per hour W=Wage; T= Payroll Tax; #W= Number of workers within respective classification On American Visa Number of Workers Payroll Tax 10% 10% Payroll Tax Cost of a Worker Every Hour W x T $2 N/A Cost of Worker Group (W x T) x #W $200 N/A Cost for all Labor $200 Number of Workers Payroll Tax 9.90% 10.10% Payroll Tax Cost of a Worker Every Hour W x T $1.98 $2.02 Cost of Worker Group (W x T) x #W Incentive Ratio = 0.0% Incentive Ratio = 0.1%

17 Jachec 67 Cost for all Labor $ Number of Workers Payroll Tax 9.80% 10.20% Payroll Tax Cost of a Worker Every Hour W x T $1.96 $2.04 Cost of Worker Group (W x T) x #W $ $40.80 Cost for all Labor $ Number of Workers Payroll Tax 9.75% 10.25% Payroll Tax Cost of a Worker Every Hour W x T $1.95 $2.05 Cost of Worker Group (W x T) x #W $ $51.25 Cost for all Labor $ Number of Workers Payroll Tax 9.70% 10.30% Payroll Tax Cost of a Worker Every Hour W x T $1.94 $2.06 Cost of Worker Group (W x T) x #W $ $61.80 Cost for all Labor $ Incentive Ratio = 0.2% Incentive Ratio = 0.25% Incentive Ratio = 0.3%

18 68 The Orator Number of Workers Payroll Tax 9.60% 10.40% Payroll Tax Cost of a Worker Every Hour W x T $1.92 $2.08 Cost of Worker Group (W x T) x #W $ $83.20 Cost for all Labor $ Number of Workers Payroll Tax 9.50% 10.50% Payroll Tax Cost of a Worker Every Hour W x T $1.90 $2.10 Cost of Worker Group (W x T) x #W $95.00 $ Cost for all Labor $200 Incentive Ratio = 0.4% Incentive Ratio = 0.5% Table 3: Effects on Undocumented Workers On American Visa Number of Workers Payroll Tax 10% 10% Payroll Tax Cost of a Worker Every Hour W x T $2 N/A Cost of Worker Group (W x T) x #W $200 N/A Cost for all Labor $200

19 Jachec 69 American On Visa Illegal Workers Number of Workers Payroll Tax 9.95% 10.05% Payroll Tax Cost of a Worker Every Hour W x T $1.99 $2.01 Cost of Worker Group (W x T) x #W Cost for all Labor $ Informal Wage = 19$, Wage gap = 1$, Incentives Ratio =.05% (Rounded) Bibliography Borjas, George J. "The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 4 (2003): Bush, George W. "President Bush's Plan for Comprehensive Immigration Reform." State of the Union Address es/immigration.html. Camarota, Steven A. Immigrants in the United States-2002: A Snapshot of America's Foreign-Born Population. Center for Immigration Studies (2002). Card, David. "Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?" UC Berkeley (2005).. "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43, no. 2 (1990): Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law. "Analysis of the Compromise Immigration reform Proposal Under Consideration by the U.S. Senate." Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law (2006).

20 70 The Orator miseanalysis_ pdf. CNN, "Thousands of immigration marchers rally across U.S." CNN International, May 2, ests/index.html. Fraga, Luis R., and Gary M. Segura. "Culture Clash? Contesting Notions of American Identity and the Effects of Latin American Immigration." Perspectives 4, no. 2 (2006): Friedland, Joan, Monica Guzar, and Karen Tumlin. "House Passes Border and Immigration Enforcement Bill: Immigrants, Non-citizens, Even Citizens Face Unprecedented Assault on Rights." Immigration Law and Policy, December 22, Huntington, Samuel P. "The Hispanic Challenge." Foreign Policy 141 (2004): Lowenstein, Roger. "The Immigration equation." New York Times, July 9, pagewanted=1&_r=1. Ottaviano, Gianmarco and Giovanni Peri. "Rethinking the Gains from Immigration: Theory and Evidence from the U.S." Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2006). Pew Hispanic Center. "Survey Brief: Assimilation and Language." The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2004). U.S. House. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of th Cong., 1st sess., H.R