1 Why Do We Value Knowledge Author(s): Ward E. Jones Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct., 1997), pp Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: Accessed: 09/09/ :58 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact University of Illinois Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Philosophical Quarterly.
2 American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 34, Number 4, October 1997 WHY DO WE VALUE KNOWLEDGE Ward E. Jones At would seem that an account of why we value knowledge is a desideratum of any so-called 'theory of knowledge'. In the first two sections of this paper, I argue that a dominant approach to knowledge, which I call "epistemic instrumentalism," cannot account for the value we place on knowl edge. At the very least such accounts will have to be supplemented. In the remainder of the paper I defend two complementary explanations for the value of knowledge. One explains why we value other people's knowledge, while the other explains why we value our own knowledge. Both of these explanations are based, however, on prop erties of knowledge which are neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. The value of knowledge, I suggest, derives from contingent properties of knowledge. I conclude that not only epistemic instru mentalism, but furthermore the entire necessary and sufficient conditions ap proach to knowledge, will not be able to offer us an adequate explanation of the value we place on knowledge. I. The Value of Knowing In asking about the value of knowledge, I am not asking for the value of knowledge qua true belief. Knowledge is a type of true belief, and it should be uncontroversial that we do and should value true believing. I want to know why we value knowledge over 'mere true beliefs', those true beliefs which are not knowledge. Nor am I asking for the value of either the content or the concept of knowledge. I want to know about the value of the state of knowledge. Why is knowing a state which we want ourselves and others to be in Why is it a state which we prefer over mere true be lief There are other familiar ways of asking the same question: 'Why do we think knowing is important' 'Why do we care about knowledge' 'Why do we think it is better to have knowledge that p than to have a mere true belief that p' My question has two presuppositions. First, I am assuming that knowledge is dif ferent from, or something more than, mere true belief. This first claim is the basis of the entire search for the conditions of knowledge. If I am hit over the head with a cricket bat, thus resulting in a true belief B, B is not knowledge.1 The same holds for other types of belief-forming processes, like hypnosis, guessing, and clairvoyance. If it is possible that a true genuine belief can be brought about by such methods, then knowing is not merely true believing.2 A second presupposition is that we do value knowledge over mere true belief. A num ber of considerations suggest that this is true. Surely it is the high value we place on knowledge which has motivated the extraordinary volume of philosophical work which has gone into setting out the conditions for knowledge as opposed to 423
3 424 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY true belief. As Crispin Sartwell, defending the value of knowledge, writes: if knowledge is not the overarching episte mic telos with regard to particular propositions, why [has] such tremendous em. phasis.. been placed on the theory of knowledge in the history of philosophy, and just what function [does] that notion serve within that history If knowledge is not the overarching purpose of inquiry, then why is the notion important, and why should we continue to be concerned in normative epis temology above all with what knowledge is and how it can be achieved3 Even more telling than philosophical in fatuation is our unwillingness to endorse or applaud those who succeed in guessing. What is more, those who repeatedly guess tend to gain our disapproval, even though they may succeed at guessing. At the very least, we lose trust in their reliability as in formants. Even more than valuing others' knowledge, we value ourselves as knowers. For most (if not all) of my factual beliefs, I take it to be important that they are knowl edge and not lucky guesses. I want all of my beliefs to be true otherwise I would not believe them but I would also rather they be known beliefs than mere true beliefs. All this indicates not only a conviction that knowing is different from merely true believing, but also that it holds some value over and above merely true believing. Knowledge is not only distinct from but also more important than true believing. Given this, it would seem reasonable to demand from a theory of knowledge that it be able to explain why knowledge holds this value. In the next section, I will argue that a dominant approach to knowledge cannot give us such an account. II. Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Value of Knowledge The instrumentalist accepts a means/ends approach to analysis. He groups processes or acts according to their goals, and then evaluates these processes or acts accord ing to how well they achieve these goals. Ethical instrumentalists, or utilitarians, claim that the ethical goal of action is hap piness, and they accordingly evaluate an action by how effectively and/or by how much, happiness is achieved. The epis temic instrumentalist evaluates a belief forming process by its ability to bring about true beliefs. In accepting that a means/ends analysis is an appropriate approach to un derstanding knowledge, she accepts the following two claims: A. The end of belief-formation is to gain true beliefs. B. Justification is a means to attaining the end of true belief. Reliabilism is the simplest and most popular of the instrumental theories of knowledge. The reliabilist evaluates belief-forming processes with respect to how reliable they are, that is, by the ratio of true beliefs to false beliefs that they bring about. A reli able process is one which brings about true beliefs in some respectable percentage of cases. Reliable processes play the central role in distinguishing knowledge from other true beliefs: only a true belief brought about by a reliable belief-forming process qualifies as knowledge. Thus, what makes a true belief knowledge is the process that brings it about. If a true belief is the result of an unreliable process like guessing then it cannot, according to the reliabilist, be knowledge.4 For the reliabilist, justification is a property which reliable belief-forming processes bestow on the beliefs they bring about. An unreliable process may be able
4 WHY DO WE VALUE KNOWLEDGE / 425 to bring about true beliefs some of the time, but it can never justify them. A belief is justified if it is brought about by a reliable process, and any belief brought about by a reliable process is justified, whether it is true or not. Thus the reliabilist can say that if a justified belief is true, then it is knowl edge. So, in reliabilism, as in all epistemic instrumentalist theories, justification plays an instrumental role. It is a property of belief-forming processes. Belief-forming processes are justifying; they confer justi fication on the beliefs they bring about. We want justifying processes because we want true belief. Justification is our way of get ting to truth, since a justified belief has a higher chance of being true than an unjus tified belief. Given one belief, brought about by a reliable belief-forming process, and another, which was not so brought about, it is always a safer bet to rely on the former.5 The reliabilist conceives of belief formation as we might conceive of cross ing a river. In both cases we have a fixed goal: we want to end up on the other side of the river in the same way that we want to attain a true belief. The possible pro cesses of getting to the other side of the river, like the processes of gaining true belief, are various. To get across the river we might take a ferry, or swim the current, or shoot ourselves out of a cannon, and to gain a true belief we might use perception, testimony, clairvoyance, or guessing. These processes can be compared with re spect to how reliably they get us to our goal, and we can divide them into those processes which are reliable and those which are not. Reliable river-crossing pro cedures get us safely across the river most of the time just as justifying belief-forming processes get us true beliefs most of the time. Knowledge, for the reliabilist, is true belief brought about by a justifying pro cess. The comparable state in our river analogy would be that of being across the river having used reliable means. Getting across the river using the reliable ferry is like knowledge, while being lucky enough to get safely across by using the cannon is not. It is thus the process which distin guishes knowledge from true belief: knowledge is a true belief brought about by a justifying, or reliable, process.6 Now introduce the question of value. The reliabilist takes the goal of belief-formation to be true belief. The value of true belief is taken for granted. Justifying (that is, reli able) processes are valuable because they tend to end in true beliefs. So we could say that on a reliabilist account, we value truth intrinsically and reliable processes instru mentally. But where does this valuing of true belief and reliable processes leave knowledge If we care about justifying processes merely because they lead to true beliefs, then why should we value the true beliefs gained from justifying processes over the ones that are not so gained If truth is the goal of epistemic inquiry, then why do we care whether someone gets her be liefs via a reliable method or via an unreliable method Again, if justification is only important because it gets us to truth, then why do we value justified true beliefs over any other true beliefs When we ask about the value of knowl edge over mere true belief, we are asking not about belief-forming methods but about their products. We have clear reason to care about reliable methods of belief-formation, and the reliabilist is right to emphasize them. But it is unclear, on reliabilism, why we should divide the desired products of belief-formation, true beliefs, into those which were brought about by reliable meth ods and those that were not. The epistemic instrumentalist gives us no way of evalua tively dividing true beliefs into those which have been brought about by justifying methods versus those which have not. To
5 426 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY imagine a limiting case, we are given no reason to, or no account of why we might, put more value on a true belief brought about by a method which results in 51% true beliefs over a true belief brought about by a method which results in 49% true be liefs. If the methods involved were equal in cost and non-truth utility, we would all say that, given a choice of methods, we should use the 51 % method. But that choice is easily explainable in terms of our valu ing true beliefs and the methods which most often get them for us, and does not give us an explanation as to why we should value knowledge over true belief. It may look as though I'm just poking reliabilism in a tender place, for it has long been asked where the reliabilist sets the lower limit to statistical reliability. Is the cut-off at 51% Or is it at a much higher level, say at 90% It is hard to see how intuitions are going to help us draw the line, but that is not my present worry. I'm asking an evaluative question, a ques tion about our concerns and what epistemic phenomena we care about. Even if the reliabilist objects that the border between unreliable and reliable methods will nec essarily be fuzzy, the significant question remains: why would we value a true belief brought about by a 60% reliable method over one brought about by a 40% reliable method Or a belief brought about by a 70% method over one brought about by a 30% method Or even a belief arrived at using a 99% method over one arrived at using a 1% method In short, given the reliabilist's framework, there is no reason why we should care what the method was which brought about a true belief, as long as it is true We value the better method, because we value truth, but that does not tell us why we value the true beliefs brought about by that method over true beliefs brought about by other less reliable ones. Returning to the river analogy may be helpful here. For the reliabilist, belief forming methods are like river-crossing methods; they are merely instrumental in gaining the real goal of true belief. But this gives us no account of why we value the state of being safely across the river hav ing used a reliable method. We think that it is important to get safely across the river, and given that goal we value reliable pro cesses because they help us achieve that goal. But this has left out any explanation of why we value being safely across the river having used a reliable method over being safely across the river having used an unreliable method. The reliabilist can not evaluatively distinguish between these two states. For him, processes are only means to a desired end of true belief.7 It might be suggested that we value true beliefs arrived at by justifying methods i.e., knowledge because such success makes those methods more reliable. The problem with this suggestion is that if there is a fact of the matter about how reliable a method is then using that method to arrive at another true belief won't change the reli ability ofthat method. If the generalization 'method M is 95% accurate' holds, then using M to form another true belief will not change that accuracy. Alternatively, it could be suggested that the fact that I have knowledge shows me that the process I used to form a true belief is reliable. One problem with this suggestion is that suc cess in belief-formation does not say anything about how reliable my belief forming processes are. I have no access to the truth of my belief other than by the methods which I use to justify it. Any as sessment of the truth of a belief depends ultimately upon the reliability of some be lief-forming process.8 Furthermore, such an account makes the value of knowledge unduly parasitic on the value of justifying processes. Surely we value knowledge
6 WHY DO WE VALUE KNOWLEDGE / 427 independently of the fact that knowledge shows us which processes we are using are reliable. Nevertheless, though this sugges tion fails, it is not too far off the target. The account I ultimately defend is not dis similar. The present suggestion is right insofar as it identifies an indicative value for knowledge, giving it a role in our epi stemic lives beyond the search for true beliefs and the methods which get them for us. Note, however, that once we give jus tification an indicative value, we will have gone beyond the two tenets of epistemic instrumentalism. I have been discussing the reliabilist in particular, but I should reemphasize that I consider the reliabilist to be representative of the epistemic instrumentalists. Laurence Bonjour, a coherentist, writes: If epistemic justification were not conducive to truth in this way, if finding epistemically justified beliefs did not substantially increase the likelihood of finding true ones, episte mic justification would be irrelevant to our main cognitive goal and of dubious worth... Epistemic justification is therefore in the fi nal analysis only an instrumental value, not an intrinsic one.9 And Paul Moser, a foundationalist, writes: Epistemic justification is essentially related to the so-called cognitive goal of truth, in sofar as an individual belief is epistemically justified only if it is appropriately directed toward the goal of truth.10 Both comments reveal a commitment to epistemic instrumentalism. Instrumentalism in the theory of knowledge is consistent with internalism (foundationalism and coherentism) as well as externalism (e.g., reliabilism). The internalists see justification as dependent upon evidence, grounding, and inference, but like the reliabilists they may still hold that justification has value only insofar as it gets us to our epistemic goal of true belief. The claims of this sec tion apply to any instrumentalist theories of knowledge. The internalist instrumentalist takes justifying evidence to be valuable because it leads to true beliefs. But this gives us no account of why we value true beliefs based on strong evidence over true beliefs which were guessed. The instrumentalist's resources are all-in-all too sparse to ac count for why we value knowledge over mere true belief, so he ends up giving us an account of what knowledge is without giving us an account of why it is a goal in and of itself. The instrumentalist's starting point leads him to conceive of knowledge as something which falls out of inquiry, a mere by-product of the attempt to gain true beliefs. If it is true that we value knowl edge over mere true beliefs, then there must be more to the story than this. The instru mentalist has left something out. III. Finding a Value for Knowledge I have argued that, by themselves, the two basic premises of epistemic instrumen talism give us no reason to think that knowledge should be valued over mere true belief. This is so in spite of the fact that these two premises of instrumentalism are prima facie quite plausible. There are two distinct responses we can make to this argument. (1) One is to ac cept that we either do not or should not value knowledge, exclaiming with Feyera bendian animation that we should let people get their true beliefs any way they please. This response would imply that philosophers, as well as most everyone else, have been deluded into thinking that knowledge is something to be valued over mere true belief. (2) Alternatively, we can agree with the long-standing tradition that knowledge is an important epistemic goal, and then conclude that instrumentalism is inadequate insofar as it can give nation of this fact. no expla For some, intuitions about epistemic instrumentalism may outweigh intuitions about the value of knowledge over mere
7 428 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY true belief. I am sympathetic to those who feel inclined to take option (1) and reject the value of knowledge. Yet this seems hasty at this point. We have not yet tried to find the source of the value of knowledge, and ipso facto we have not yet established that the source of the value of knowledge is incompatible with instrumentalism. We have only established that the instrumen talist framework will not, by itself, account for the value of knowledge. The possibility remains, at this point, that the explanation of the value of knowledge is compatible with instrumentalist approaches. I will ar gue that this is, in fact, true, that the correct account of the value of knowledge is com patible with epistemic instrumentalism. If I am right, then instrumentalism is not wrong, but merely inadequate. What bare instrumentalism does not pro vide, and what an explanation of the value of knowledge needs, is an account of the function of knowledge. Knowledge is valu able because it serves some function that mere true belief, or mere true believers, cannot. A functional explanation of the value of knowledge would show how pos sessing knowledge does something for us or other believers, something that mere true belief cannot. Both David Armstrong and Colin McGinn suggest that the answer may be easy. We merely have to recognize that knowers are better informants. Armstrong writes: The man who has mere true belief is unreli able. He was right this time, but if the same situation crops up again he is likely to get it.. wrong,h And McGinn, writing agrees: some years later,... if someone is certified as a knower, then you can rely upon that person's beliefs in forming your own beliefs about the world_ Someone who knows can be depended upon on other occasions.12 For the reliabilist, the difference between knowledge and mere true belief is that the knower has used a reliable method to get her beliefs. Armstrong and McGinn, who are both reliabilists, suggest that knowers are more reliable than those who have mere true belief. We value knowledge because knowers make testimony a more reliable process of belief-formation. A knower can be trusted because she will (most likely) use reliable methods again. Unfortunately, this account faces the same objections of the last section. Relia bilism can give us an account of why we value justifying belief-forming processes and true beliefs, but not knowledge. We can see that this is so once we divide in stances of testimony into two types. One sort of testimony occurs when a person tells us what he already believes. Here, however, a true believer is just as depend able as a knower, as long as he has true beliefs. A knower is not more dependable than a mere true believer with respect to their true beliefs. A second sort of testi mony occurs when we ask a person to go find out or discover some set of facts for us. In this case what matters is not the witness's belief system,13 but what meth ods she will use. If I send someone out to discover the breeding habits of nuthatches, I am concerned not with her presently-held beliefs, but with the belief-forming pro cesses that she will use in her investigation of nuthatches. Indeed, she may have lots of knowledge, and have in the past used very reliable belief-forming methods, yet still not know what methods are reliably used in investigations of nuthatches. Nei ther type of testimony, then, gives the instrumentalist reason to value knowledge over mere true belief. Armstrong and McGinn may retort that once we know that someone is a knower, we know that she tends to use (or at least has used) justifying processes to get her
8 WHY DO WE VALUE KNOWLEDGE / 429 beliefs. Knowledge, they will say, indicates the use of justifying processes. This is right, but (as we have already seen) the epistemic instrumentalist has left out this indicative function of justification. On his own account of knowledge, the instrumen talist must admit that we can identify knowers good informants only if we can tell that they used justifying methods to get their beliefs. We can recognize that they are knowers only if we can recognize that they used justifying methods. This leaves us needing an account of how we can tell that someone has used justifying methods, and thus is a knower and good informant. In other words, if testimony provides a value of knowledge because knowers are good informants, then we need to be able to identify knowers. A mecha nism for identifying knowers is not incompatible with epistemic instrumental ism, but nor is it provided by epistemic instrumentalism. What we need for a testimonial account of the value of knowledge is an account of how we can tell that a knower is a knower. Edward Craig has recently pro vided us with such an account. Craig begins with a claim about the value of knowledge, maintaining that the value of knowledge should provide the basis for the analysis of knowledge. We take some prima facie plausible hypo thesis about what the concept of knowledge does for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having that role would be like, what conditions would govern its application.14 The function of knowledge is suggested first, and the conditions for knowledge are what ever allows a belief to fulfill that function. The concept of knowledge arose because of the need for, and more importantly, to recognize, reliable informants. the need To put it briefly and roughly, the concept of knowledge is used to flag approved sources of information [i.e., informants].15 Knowers are good informants, and the conditions for knowledge are the condi tions for being, and being recognizable as, a good informant. It is not just that we are looking for an infor mant who will tell us the truth about p; we also have to be able to pick him out, distin guish him from others to whom we would be less well advised to listen.16 Craig's search for the characteristics of knowledge begins there. Knowers have true beliefs and a property X: "X is any detectable property which has been found to correlate [in a lawlike manner] with holding a true belief as to whether p."17 Knowers are those who we can tell have true beliefs. Knowers have a true belief whether p, and a property which leads us to think that they have a true belief whether p. Knowledge in the state of nature is knowledge fulfilling its original function, and the characteristics of knowledge which allow it to fulfill that function are the characteristics which make knowledge im portant to us. The concept of knowledge arose so that we could identify those from whom we can gain true beliefs. The originality of Craig's approach is that throughout his analysis he never loses sight of the value of knowledge. His description of knowledge in the state of nature includes precisely the characteristics which make knowledge valuable, and his theory of knowledge is intended to tell us what knowledge is by telling us why we value knowledge. Knowledge is more valuable than true belief because knowers show us that they (most likely) have a true belief that p. What is important about knowers is that they their sleeves. Craig spends wear their true beliefs on a significant amount of time criticizing the necessary and sufficient con ditions approach to knowledge. It is easy to see the reason for this. His third condition
9 430 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY on knowledge, property X, is a detectable property which correlates with the posses sion of a true belief. It takes very little imagination to think of a knower who is bent on keeping her knowledge secret, and goes to great lengths to hide property X from us. Craig has an answer prepared for this type of counterexample: the concept of knowledge has evolved. It has, in his words, 'objectified' to a point where the nature of the concept no longer precisely reflects the function it originally served.18 The objectification of the concept of knowledge means that there are no neces sary and sufficient conditions on knowledge. Because of objectification, what originally made the concept of knowl edge valuable for highlighting good informants is not identical with what leads us to call a believer a knower. We are willing to call persons knowers (in, for example, a thought experiment) even though their possession of knowledge is not in practice detectable. Objectification means that the characteristics which make a belief knowledge might not be the same characteristics which make knowledge valuable. In giving his function-based analysis of the concept of knowledge, Craig has to step outside of the necessary and sufficient conditions approach. In do ing so he suggests a point I will develop in the next section of this paper: the source of the value of knowledge will not be found in the necessary conditions for knowledge. As an explanation of why we value knowledge, however, Craig's account has a shortcoming which it shares with all testi monial accounts of the value of knowledge. Testimony can, at best, only account for the value we place on knowledge in other people. Yet we value knowledge not only in others but also in ourselves. We think that knowledge is an important state for us to be in, more important than being in the state of mere true belief, and any account of knowledge will be inadequate insofar as it is unable to account for this value. While it is true that testimony can give us an ac count of why we value other person's knowledge, it is of no help in explaining why we value our own knowledge. Craig might respond that we value our selves as knowers insofar as we value ourselves as informants. Surely we do value ourselves as informants, but does this value match the value we place on our knowledge It is not clear that it does. I value my knowledge beyond, and for rea sons besides, my ability to inform other people ofthat knowledge. Indeed, Craig's account is particularly worrisome given his repeated use of the 'state of nature' meta phor. Certainly in Hobbes' state of nature, lacking any amount of altruism, we would not value ourselves as informants for oth ers. Even if Craig's testimonial story of the third-person value of knowledge is plau sible, it will have to be supplemented with another explanation before we can under stand the first-person valuing of knowledge. The explanation I will look at now provides just that balance. In the Meno, Plato writes: Now this is an understanding of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful of nothing but good, but... they do not care to remain long, and therefore are not of much value until they are fastened by a reasoned understanding of causes... But when they are bound, in the first place, they attain to be knowledge... And this is why knowledge is more honor able and excellent than right opinion...19 Various internalist accounts of knowledge have followed him, proposing that someone who knows that p understands why she has the belief that p. This proposed property of knowledge has been called the 'internalist's intuition'.20 The internalist's intuition (hereafter I/I) is an attempt to enunciate an idea implicit in all internalist theories of
10 WHY DO WE VALUE KNOWLEDGE / 431 knowledge. Known beliefs get their status at least partly from the subject's own awareness of why they are and should be believed. Knowers are aware of either the causal processes which brought about their known beliefs or of some support or grounding for their known beliefs. A knower's awareness of how her belief came about has played a role in her adoption and retention of that belief. Those who find I/I appealing feel that there is something missing from all exist ing externalist theories of knowledge, something which internalists have long defended. The externalist framework leaves out the knower's viewpoint, his awareness of his own beliefs and how they have arisen. This constitutes a difference between knowledge and mere true belief which the pure externalist, with her lim ited vocabulary of causes and processes, cannot capture. In inference and testimony, for example, knowledge is the result of one belief of which we are aware an evi dential beliefbringing about another. In perception and, perhaps, memory, knowl edge is partly the result of an awareness of and belief in the causal pathway lead ing up to the belief. The substance of I/I is that a knowing subject is aware (to a lesser or greater extent) of the sources, origins, grounding, or support for his known be liefs. When a belief fulfills I/I, we know why we believe it. We can see that I/I explains the value we place on knowledge if we look at the in dicative value of the evidence we have for beliefs. Evidence is not just a way to get to true beliefs, but is also an indicator or sign of true beliefs. It is by looking at a proposition's support or grounds indeed, by looking at how the belief came about that we pronounce on its truth. If belief in a proposition is deemed to be warranted or justified, then we proceed to call the proposition true; that is, we believe it. By the same token, if we want to check on the truth of a belief which we already have, we check its justification. As Roderick Firth writes, beliefs do not come labeled true and false.... To the extent that we are rational, each of us decides at any time t whether a belief is true, in precisely the same way that we would decide at t whether we ourselves are, or would be, warranted at t in having that belief.21 This is too strong: it is not true that we must always have a sign for truth. In optimal cases of perception, don't we just see that some fact obtains And don't we some times just check the truth of our perceptual beliefs by looking again However, the point remains that our awareness of the source of a belief does play a role in the formation and retention of beliefs. This is true even in conscious perception. We are aware that, for example, we are seeing rather than hearing that something obtains. This is why when I re member a perceptual belief, I remember how I formed the belief. I remember, for example, not only that the people behind me in the restaurant last night were eating garlic bread, but also that I smelled it (rather than, say, saw it or tasted it or heard them talk about it). I can check the truth of that belief today because I can re call the justification for it; I can remember that I smelled it. This can only be done if I still have some grasp of why I have the belief at all. That is, beliefs can often be checked only if I/I is fulfilled. My belief that the couple behind me were eating gar lic bread fulfills I/I because I am aware of why I believe it, namely that I smelled it. Furthermore, it is because I am aware that I smelled the garlic bread that I now trust, to the extent that I do, that the belief is true. The justification for my perceptual belief that p, which is that I smelled that p, is an indication to me of p's truth.
11 432 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY We might say that conscious perception fulfills I/I because we monitor the justifi cation for our beliefs.22 Consciousness gives us some grasp of why we form our beliefs. Later, that monitoring can be used to check the truth of the beliefs, again play ing an indicative role. In both cases, it is because I/I is fulfilled that we can scruti nize our perceptual beliefs. We do so via the support we have for those beliefs. Be liefs which fulfill I/I are valuable because when I/I is fulfilled we have some grasp of the source or grounds of our beliefs, and that gives us an indication of their truth. Our grasp of a belief's justification gives us an indication of its truth value, and de termines the extent to which we should trust the belief. Beliefs which fulfill I/I are more valuable because they bring their justification with them, and when that justi fication is there we can check their truth. Firth is right that beliefs tend to show their truth value only via their justification, and thus only if they fulfill I/I. When my be lief that p fulfills I/I, I know why I believe that p is true. We saw that Craig's testimonial account of the value of knowledge explains the fact that we value other persons' knowledge, but it does not explain the value I place on my own knowledge. The value I place on myself as an informant does not match the value I place on my possession of knowl edge. I/I accounts have the exact opposite virtue. The first-person story looks plau sible: I value my own knowledge because when I have knowledge I have some grasp of the warrant for that knowledge, and thus have some indication of that belief's truth. I want to have knowledge and not just mere true beliefs, because I prefer having beliefs which I monitor, beliefs whose personal warrant is open to me. The correlative third-person story is not as credible. I/I by itself cannot account for the third-person value we place on knowledge. I have no real reason, other than altruism, to be happy that the source of your belief is open to you. It is more plausible that the value I place on your having knowledge rather than mere true belief derives from my ability to gain true beliefs from you. This takes us back to a testimony account like the one we have seen Craig offer. I/I may be a source of the value of knowl edge, but like Craig's testimonial account, it is not a necessary condition on knowl edge. There are numerous counterexamples to I/I, cases in which although the subject is a knower, she is not aware of the grounds or sources of her belief. My belief that my name is Ward is surely knowledge, and yet I have no idea of the source of, or evidence for, that belief. Common ex amples of forgotten knowledge, like historical dates, present the I/I theorist with the same problem. The accuracy of the belief leads us to want to call it knowledge, and yet I may have no awareness of evi dence for the belief. Whether or not it is a source of the value of knowledge, I/I, like Craig's property X, is not a necessary char acteristic of knowledge. IV. Contingent Properties as the Source of Value An I/I account of the value of knowledge, I have suggested, nicely complements Craig's testimonial account. The I/I account tells us that we value our own knowledge because when we have knowledge we know why we believe it. Craig's account tells us that we value others' knowledge because when they have knowledge we can tell that they have it. Together these two accounts offer a plausible explanation of the value of knowledge over mere true belief. A prominent feature of both Craig's and the I/I account of the value of knowledge is that the properties of knowledge they are based on are not necessary properties of knowledge. Since Edmund Gettier's "Is
12 WHY DO WE VALUE KNOWLEDGE / 433 Knowledge Justified True Belief",23 theory of knowledge has notoriously (but deservedly) gained a reputation for being overly concerned with the necessary con ditions for knowledge. The goal of such searches is an elucidation of what all cases of knowledge have in common. The final product would tell us what conditions must hold before anyone is a knower. We would have found a reductive account of knowl edge, we would know what the fact S knows that p consists in. The methodology of the necessary and sufficient conditions approach primarily involves thought experiments in which we, as users of the concept knowledge, are led to declare that some subject either knows or does not know that p. By discovering the properties which must be present be fore we attribute knowledge, it is thought that we will grasp what knowledge is. Since a theory proposing necessary and/or sufficient conditions is rejected in the face of any counterexample, counterexamples have enormous power in such an approach. If a case of knowledge is possible without C, then C is not a necessary condition on knowledge; if a believer possesses A, B and C without possessing knowledge, then A, B and C are not sufficient for knowledge. Facing this prospect, theorists of knowl edge have tended to make their theories more and more sparse. This is especially evident in prominent instrumentalist theo ries, like Goldman's causal and reliabilist theories and Nozick's counterfactual theory. These theories are not as vulner able to counterexamples, but in order to be so they have sacrificed informative content. The resulting theories have, as Ayers has written, an 'almost superhuman aridity'. Even if one of these theories tells us the necessary conditions on knowledge, we will not know all that much about knowledge. All this should make us more open to the possibility that the explanation of the value of knowledge will come from contingent characteristics of knowledge, like Craig's property X or I/I. In the past thirty years, many theories have been discarded in the face of counterexamples. This move was justified as long as we were only looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. But in doing so we have thrown away some important contingent characteristics of knowledge. The theories we threw out did not include necessary conditions for knowledge, but the possi bility remains that they did include aspects which we value about knowledge. They included characteristics which, while not necessary to knowledge, were important to knowledge and important to us. Craig makes precisely this point in discussing the belief requirement for knowledge. If it can be argued that belief is not a necessary condition for knowledge, then belief will make no appearance on the final balance sheet... [We] can try to talk about it, just so long as the audience is prepared to listen to such periphera, as of something which very often accompanies knowledge. But when [we are] asked for the real outcome of the busi ness, the analysis, anything not strictly a necessary condition simply vanishes without a trace. Of all its deep centrality nothing whatever remains it could be as inciden tal as the fact that nearly all knowers are less than 150 years old.24 Further divisions of the properties of knowledge need to be made. We need to distinguish more than those that are nec essary from those that are unnecessary. We also need to distinguish between those that are valuable and those that are not, and the two distinctions may cut across each other. The value of knowledge, I suspect, lies in its contingent properties, in properties which are not present in all cases of knowl edge. We need to go and look again at the contingent properties of knowledge, and find the ones we value. We should now try to get the baby back from the bathwater.
13 434 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY The suggestion that contingent condi tions provide the value of knowledge will not be uncontroversial. Derek Parfit has re cently stated that if a fact F consists in a set of further 'lower-level' facts, then the value of F will derive from those lower level facts.25 For Parfit, the fact that a person survives over time 'consists in' a set of psychological and physical facts con tinuing over time. [T]he fact of personal identity is distinct from these fact about physical and psychological continuity. But, since it just consists in them, it is not an independent or separately obtain ing fact... [F]acts about people cannot be barely true. Their truth must consist in the truth of facts about bodies, and about vari ous interrelated mental and physical events.26 The fact of personal identity is not the same fact as these psychological and physical facts, but it is nothing over and above these facts either. Once we know that the lower level facts about psychological and physical continuity obtain, then all that we learn when we discover that the higher-level fact of personal identity obtains as well, is that a concept applies. "My only new informa tion," Parfit writes, "is about our language." Given this relation, he continues, the im portance of the higher-level fact will derive solely from the importance of the lower level facts: "If one fact consists in certain others, it can only be these other facts which have rational or moral importance." Personal continuity consists in psychologi cal and physical continuity, and likewise all the value of personal continuity derives from the value of psychological and physical continuity. If there are necessary and sufficient con ditions for knowledge, then it is plausible that, as in personal identity, the fact that S knows that p will consist in these other facts. The higher-level fact of knowledge obtains when and only when the lower level facts obtain; it is not the same fact, but it is a dependent and inseparable fact. 50 the situation in knowledge is analogous to what Parfit thinks it is in personal conti nuity. However, I suggest that his conclusions about the location of value do not hold in the case of knowledge. If S knows that p, then this fact consists in certain lower-level facts, the set SI. These facts are the neces sary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. The possibility is open, nonetheless, for there to be other facts, the set S2, any of which often (or sometimes) obtain when 51 obtains. S2 might be brought about by SI, or SI might be brought about by S2. Or both S1 and S2 might brought about by a separate set of facts. In each case, it is possible that although knowledge does not consist in any of the facts in S2, they are, at times, present when knowledge obtains (and ipso facto when SI obtains). The facts in S2 might then be thought of as contin gent properties of knowledge. Can a fact which is often but not always present when knowledge is present be said to explain the value of knowledge I value going to fairs because I have fun when I go to them, even though I can distinctly remember occasions when I got sick on the rides and did not have any fun at all. The fact of my having fun at fairs is respon sible for the value I place on fairs, but my having fun is only a contingent property of my attending them. Knowledge is like fairs. We value them both even though we do not always get what we want from them. Perhaps this is not at all surprising. The thought that the value of knowledge is to be found only in the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge derives from a very particular, static view of the nature of the phenomenon. If the concept knowledge is not a necessary-and-sufficient conditions concept, but is, say, a family-resemblance concept, then there will be no necessary and-sufficient conditions from which the value can come.27 Alternatively, if Craig's
14 WHY DO WE VALUE KNOWLEDGE / 435 claim that our concept knowledge has changed over time is at all plausible, then we have reason to believe that the original purpose which the concept served no longer holds. And again, if the naturalized epistemologists are correct in treating knowledge as a natural kind, then the same point follows. Even if we were able to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for an instantiation of the natural kind knowl edge, it would be surprising, to say the least, if it also turned out that every instance of knowledge possessed the characteristics which we found important. It is not clear, given certain possible accounts of what knowledge is, why we should think that every instance of knowledge would turn out to be valuable. The possibility now emerges that there are beliefs which count as knowledge even though we do not care whether it is knowl edge or not. This is not an unhappy consequence. On the contrary, surely we are not at all concerned with the epistemic status of some of our knowledge. If I have knowledge of some historical date without remembering why I believe the date, then is the fact that this is knowledge all that important The same is true of a great deal of our knowledge of what we call 'trivia'. Is it important that the knowledge we have of trivia is knowledge and not mere true belief28 These are the sort of beliefs, of which there are surely many, we are will ing to call knowledge even though we do not see any importance in their being knowledge and not just mere true belief. If there are such beliefs, then whatever facts are responsible for the value of knowledge are contingent properties of knowledge, properties which are not present in every instance of knowledge. It will be objected that if the value of knowledge derives from contingent prop erties of knowledge, then we do not, really, value knowledge. We value knowledge which-also-fulfills-i/i or -which-also fulfills-craig's-property-x. I see no reason to deny this. Even if there are cases of knowledge which we do not value, it does not follow that the concept knowledge does not serve some purpose for us, nor that most cases of knowledge are important, nor that knowledge does not remain 'the over arching purpose of inquiry'. Discovering that contingent properties provide the value of knowledge should not lead to pro nouncements that knowledge tout court is not, after all, important. I have not here provided a justification for declarations analogous to those made by Parfit regard ing persons. Both Craig and Ayers think that the nec essary and sufficient conditions approach should be abandoned. I disagree. My sug gestion that we pay more attention to the contingent properties of knowledge is not intended as a replacement for the search for necessary and sufficient conditions on knowledge. The necessary and sufficient conditions approach has an important goal to tell us what must be true in order for there to be knowledge, what properties (if any) must hold before we apply the con cept knowledge in a given situation. That goal is and has been worthwhile, in spite of the fact that the results may not tell us why we value knowledge. We should con tinue to search for features of knowledge, but as well as worrying about which fea tures are necessary, we should worry about which are valuable. Both projects are well worth doing in the theory of knowledge. V. Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Openness of Knowledge In the past two sections, I have looked at and defended two explanations of the value of knowledge. Edward Craig begins with the plausible thesis that a source of the value of knowledge lies in testimony, and he builds an analysis of knowledge on that
15 436 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY claim. A knower has a true belief and some detectable property X which has a lawlike correlation with having true beliefs. It is important that other people be knowers, because when a subject knows that p she is (often) a good informant with respect to p. Her knowledge is open to us. I also con sidered an explanation of the value of knowledge based on the internalist's intu ition. Knowers who fulfill the internalist's intuition are aware of the support for our source of their known beliefs. It is impor tant for us to be in a state of knowing, because when we know that p we have (of ten) some grasp of why we (should) believe that p. My knowledge is open to me. Both accounts see knowledge as 'showing it self. My knowledge indicates that it is knowledge, both to me and to other people. Both are also based on contingent proper ties of knowledge, and thus will be missed by theorists who have limited themselves to looking among necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. We can now see why epistemic instru mentalism cannot provide any account of the value of knowledge. In the second sec tion of this paper, I outlined the two basic tenets of epistemic instrumentalism. They were (i) that the goal of belief-formation is true belief, and (ii) that justification is valuable insofar as it gets us to true be liefs. Both are in disagreement with my explanation of the value of knowledge. The first tenet of epistemic instrumentalism may be true of the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, but it is wrong in a fuller account of knowledge. The goal of belief-formation is not just true belief, but also knowledge. The first indication that epistemic instrumentalists are leaving out the value of knowledge is that they take only true beliefs to be the goal of belief formation. For if knowledge has more value than mere true belief, then knowledge itself must be a goal of belief-formation. It must be that we seek knowledge as well as true beliefs. This brings out the differ ence between the study of epistemic rationality and the study of knowledge, a difference which is hidden by epistemic instrumentalism. Instrumentalists say that a belief-forming method is rational if it tends to bring about true beliefs. Knowl edge, they add, is a true belief brought about by such a method. Even if such an analysis of rationality is right, the analysis of knowledge is at best incomplete.29 A full understanding of knowledge requires that we take more than an instrumental approach. Secondly, justification is not merely in strumentally important; it is also indicatively important. The epistemic instrumentalist notices only the instrumental role that jus tification plays in getting us true beliefs. The accounts I have defended emphasize that justification is more than a way of get ting to true beliefs. If we are aware of the justification for a belief, then we know why we believe it. An awareness of justifica tion, that is, allows us to assess the beliefs we already have. Additionally, if other people can see that our beliefs are justi fied, then we are reliable informants. In accepting testimony and the internalist's in tuition as sources of the value of knowledge, we come to appreciate the noninstrumental value of justification. A means/ends analysis is not adequate for a full understanding of knowledge. Instru mentalism detaches means from ends in order to evaluate differing means to the same end. Instrumental evaluations of knowledge cleave the product of belief formation which is a true or false belief from the process of belief-formation. But if I/I is an important property of knowl edge, then one thing we value about knowledge is that its justification comes with it, that a knower is aware of the ori gins of, or the support for, her known beliefs. A known belief tends to carry its
16 WHY DO WE VALUE KNOWLEDGE / 437 is support with it after it is formed. What important about knowledge is that it tends not to come separated from the process which forms it. None of what has been said provides evidence against epistemic instrumental ism. As a contender in the search for the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, epistemic instrumentalism may be the best approach available. Neverthe less, understanding the value of knowledge will require that we see knowledge, as well as justification, noninstrumentally. Instrumentalist theories differentiate known beliefs from true beliefs by the means through which they are attained. A known belief is a true belief brought about by a certain favored subset of belief-forming Wadham College, Oxford processes. Instrumentalism uses the means of belief-formation as the criterion for dif ferentiating true belief from knowledge. In doing so, such theories separate the means from the ends in belief-formation, and give the means only instrumental value. The result is that even though we are given rea son to value good belief-forming processes and the true beliefs they effectively achieve, we are given no explanation of our valuing true beliefs when they are achieved by reliable means over true beliefs achieved by unreliable means. As long as the goals of belief-formation do not include knowl edge itself, and as long as the means to gaining these goals are merely means, then epistemic instrumentalism can give us no account of why we value knowledge.30 Received April 15, 1997 BIBLIOGRAPHY Armstrong, David (1973). Belief, Truth, and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ayers, Michael (1990). Locke Volume I, London: Routledge. Bonjour, Laurence (1980). "Externalist Theories of Knowledge," Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. V, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bonjour, Laurence (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brewer, Bill (1997). "Foundations of Perceptual Knowledge," American Philosophical Quarterly 34:1, pp Craig, Edward (1990). Knowledge and the State of Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Firth, Roderick (1981). "Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55. Foley, R. (1987). The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gettier, Edmund (1963). "Is Knowledge Justified True Belief", Analysis. Goldman, Alvin (1976). "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 73, pp Goldman, Alvin (1979). "What is Justified Belief", in Justification and Knowledge, (ed.) George Pappas, Dordrecht: Reidel. Lycan, William (1988). Judgement and Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McGinn, Colin (1984). "The Concept of Knowledge," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. IX, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Moser, Paul (1985). Empirical Justification, Dordrecht: Reidel. Parfit, Derek (1995). "The Unimportance of Identity," in H. Harris (ed.) Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Plato (1953). The Dialogues of Plato Vol. 1, translated by B. Jowett, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
17 438 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Sartwell, Crispin (1992). "Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief," Journal of Philosophy. Weiskrantz, Larry (1986). Blindsight, Oxford: Oxford University Press. NOTES 1. Unless, of course, B is something like the belief that I have just cricket bat. been hit over the head with a 2. For a dissenter, see Sartwell (1992). Sartwell argues that since both true belief and knowledge are the goals of epistemic inquiry, they must be identical. The major flaw in Sartwell's argument is in never considering the possibility that there may be more than one such goal. 3. Ibid., pp See Goldman (1976). 5. For this reliabilist view of justification, see Goldman (1979). Some reliabilists, like David Armstrong (and, at times, Goldman himself), have resisted introducing justification. 6. Thanks to Bill Newton-Smith for suggesting the river analogy. 7. The same point can be made comparing knowers to mere true believers. Why should we value the person who made it across the river on the ferry over one who made it across the river using a cannon 8. See Section III for more discussion of this point. 9. Bonjour (1985), p Moser (1985), p Armstrong (1973), p McGinn (1984), p Except for her beliefs about what belief-forming processes are best. 14. Craig (1990), p Craig (1990), p Craig (1990), p Craig (1990), p Craig (1990), Section X. 19. The translation is Jowett's. See his Plato (1953) 97e-98a. 20. I first heard this phrase from Bill Brewer; see his (1997). His formulation is, however, different from mine. Michael Ayers provides a substantial defense of the internalist's intuition, in Ayers (1990), especially chapters 15 and 21. An earlier statement of something like I/I can be found in Bonjour (1980). Notice that Plato's notion of a belief's being 'bound' does not play a role in I/I. 21. Firth (1981), p It is helpful to epistemologically compare the phenomenon of blindsight, which does not fulfill I/I, to conscious perception, which does. For the comparison, see Ayers (1990), Vol. I, p For blindsight, see Weiskrantz (1986). 23. Gettier (1963). 24. Craig, p. 14.
18 WHY DO WE VALUE KNOWLEDGE / See Parfit (1995), p take it that the 'importance' of a fact is not significantly different from the 'value' of a fact. 26. Parfit (1995), pp Ayers (1990), Vol. I, chapter 15 defends a family resemblance account of the concept of knowledge. 28. I am not making a point about the value of the content of trivia (which is by definition unimportant), but about the value of whether our belief in trivia counts as knowledge. 29. For an instrumental account of epistemic rationality, see Foley (1987). 30. Thanks to Michael Ayers, T. W. Child, Martin Davies, Miranda Fricker, David Mackie, W. H. Newton-Smith, Stina Nordenstam, Tom Stoneham, and Bernard Williams.
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Book Review Jason Bridges The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality, by Robert Audi. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. xvi + 286. H/b $65.00, P/b $29.95 [THIS IS
Michael Lacewing Personal identity: Physical and psychological continuity theories A FIRST DISTINCTION In order to understand what is at issue in personal identity, it is important to distinguish between
The John Locke Lectures 2009 Being Realistic about Reasons T. M. Scanlon Lecture 3: Motivation and the Appeal of Expressivism The cognitivist view I have been defending has two important features in common
THE TAKEOVER PANEL 2001/15 OFFER BY WPP GROUP PLC ("WPP") FOR TEMPUS GROUP PLC ("TEMPUS") 1. The Takeover Panel met on 31 October to hear an appeal by WPP against the Panel Executive's refusal to allow
RoME Version 2009 "I'll Be Glad I Did It" Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires Elizabeth Harman Word Count: 4,499 I. Two Puzzles We use I ll be glad I did it reasoning all the time. For example,
Integrated Skills in English ISE II Reading & Writing exam Sample paper 2 Your full name: (BLOCK CAPITALS) Candidate number: Centre: Time allowed: 2 hours Instructions to candidates 1. Write your name,
Subject area: Ethics Title: Injustice causes revolt. Discuss. 1 Injustice causes revolt. Discuss. When we explain phenomena we rely on the assertion of facts. The sun rises because the earth turns on its
ON EXTERNAL OBJECTS By Immanuel Kant From Critique of Pure Reason (1781) General Observations on The Transcendental Aesthetic To avoid all misapprehension, it is necessary to explain, as clearly as possible,
Sorensen on Unknowable Obligations Theodore Sider Utilitas 7 (1995): 273 9 1. Access principles Vagueness in the phrase can know aside, the principle of Access An act is obligatory only if its agent can
Laura Katharine Norwood Freshman Seminar Dr. Golden 10/21/10 Modern Science vs. Ancient Philosophy Daniel Gilbert s theory of happiness as presented in his book, Stumbling on Happiness, has many similarities
Identity and Needs in the Modern World: Roles of Orality and Literacy 15 th Inuit Studies Conference, Paris, Oct. 26, 2006 An overarching goal in Inuit communities is to maintain Inuit culture as a dynamic
Split brains, teletransportation, and personal identity phil 20229 Jeff Speaks February 14, 2008 1 What is a theory of personal identity?....................... 1 2 Parfit s example of teletransportation........................
Samples of Opening Paragraphs for a Short Philosophy Paper For Illustrative purposes only In what follows, you'll read 3 samples of opening paragraphs. The last example is a whole paper (on a topic totally
Moving on If you re still reading this, congratulations, you re likely to be in the minority of traders who act based on facts, not emotions. Countless others would have simply denied the facts, and moved
Locke s psychological theory of personal identity phil 20208 Jeff Speaks October 3, 2006 1 Identity, diversity, and kinds............................. 1 2 Personal identity...................................
Michael Lacewing The ontological argument St Anselm and Descartes both famously presented an ontological argument for the existence of God. (The word ontological comes from ontology, the study of (-ology)
Draft prepared for the NYU conference on the Hart-Fuller exchange 1/30/2008 For Private Circulation Only: This is a very preliminary draft and is not to be quoted; it is barely adequate to be read. But
MILD DILEMMAS Gregory Mellema Department of Philosophy Calvin College Grand Rapids, MI email@example.com Abstract. This paper argues that, while the existence of strong moral dilemmas is notoriously controversial,
PHL 202 Introduction to Ethics Spring 2004 Course Goals: This course is designed to enhance your understanding of the moral dimensions of human experience and to provide you with the theoretical understanding
LEGAL POSITIVISM vs. NATURAL LAW THEORY There are two natural law theories about two different things: i) a natural law theory of morality, or what s right and wrong, and ii) a natural law theory of positive
COPYRIGHT NOTICE: Richard Raatzsch: The Apologetics of Evil is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, 2009, by Princeton University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA Mock Trial Script The Case of a Stolen Car This mock trial is appropriate for middle and high school students. The script includes a role for a narrator,
But until a person can say deeply and honestly, "I am what I am today because of the choices I made yesterday," that person cannot say, "I choose otherwise. Seek first to understand, then to be understood.
Graduate School Into the groove, Rebecca Watts, Graduate School Research Images Competition 2012 The Graduate School guide to Surviving the viva You have submitted your thesis and now all you have to do
A. The Three Main Branches of the Philosophical Study of Ethics 1. Meta-ethics 2. Normative Ethics 3. Applied Ethics 1 B. Meta-ethics consists in the attempt to answer the fundamental philosophical questions
Vivisection: Feeling Our Way Ahead? R. G. Frey Bowling Green State University In his paper "Lab Animals and The Art of Empathy", David Thomas presents his case against animal experimentation. That case
Descartes Fourth Meditation On human error Descartes begins the fourth Meditation with a review of what he has learned so far. He began his search for certainty by questioning the veracity of his own senses.
Teaching Public Relations Published by the Public Relations Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication. Edited by Professor Todd Hunt, Rutgers University No. 33, November
Balancing Risk In Retirement Giving You Insight Into The Advisor s Character & Expertise Nine Questions To Ask Your Next Advisor Before You Hire Them Brought to you by Philip A. Guske, CFP Nine Questions
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On-Line AA Skype Meetings Format [This is our suggested format for the on-line Skype meetings. We are fortunate to have this option and many of us find talking on-line is the next best thing to in-person
The Common Denominator of Success by Albert E.N. Gray The common denominator of success --- the secret of success of every man who has ever been successful --- lies in the fact that he formed the habit
ON GIVING PRIORITY TO POSSIBLE FUTURE PEOPLE Nils Holtug Philosophy Section Department of Media, Cognition and Communication firstname.lastname@example.org ABSTRACT: According to prioritarianism, roughly, it is better
Is there a problem about nonconceptual content? Jeff Speaks (forthcoming in the Philosophical Review) 1 Two understandings of nonconceptual content.................. 1 2 The case for nonconceptual content..........................
Introduction to the PMA Self- help technique How do you do an effective PMA session on yourself? What do you have to do and what do you have to avoid? Progressive Mental Alignment (PMA) makes use of the
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[This essay originally appeared in the Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd edition, ed. Lawrence Becker and Charlotte Becker (New York: Routledge, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 947-50.] Killing And Letting Die Is it worse
Consumer Awareness Guide Using Recruitment Agencies Prepared By Ian M Campbell Avenue Scotland Introduction At Avenue Scotland, we take great pride in the honest, professional service we provide. We have
QUESTION 60 An Angel's Love or Affection We next have to consider the act of the will, which is love, i.e., affection (amor sive dilectio). For every act of an appetitive power stems from love, i.e., affection.
Convention: An interdisciplinary study Luca Tummolini Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies Via San Martino della Battaglia 44 00185 Roma Italy email@example.com In our lives we are
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CROSS EXAMINATION OF AN EXPERT WITNESS IN A CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE Mark Montgomery Post Office Box 161 Durham, NC 27702 (919) 680-6249 firstname.lastname@example.org Opinion Testimony by a Pediatrician/Nurse/Counselor/Social
Frege s theory of sense Jeff Speaks August 25, 2011 1. Three arguments that there must be more to meaning than reference... 1 1.1. Frege s puzzle about identity sentences 1.2. Understanding and knowledge
1/9 Locke and Hume on Personal Identity Locke and Hume both discuss the idea of personal identity in connection with certain general claims about the very idea of identity in a more general sense and I