Targeting Violence-Prone Offenders: Examination of an Intelligence-Led Policing Strategy

Transcription

1 Targeting Violence-Prone Offenders: Examination of an Intelligence-Led Policing Strategy BY TIMOTHY ALLAN LAVERY B.A., Michigan State University, 1993 M.A., University of Illinois at Chicago, 1998 THESIS Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology, Law and Justice in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Chicago, 2013 Chicago, Illinois Defense Committee: Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Chair and Advisor William McCarty, Criminology, Law and Justice Amie M. Schuck, Criminology, Law and Justice Wesley G. Skogan, Northwestern University Sarah E. Ullman, Criminology, Law and Justice

2 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my dissertation committee William McCarty, Amie M. Schuck, Wesley G. Skogan, and Sarah E. Ullman for their assistance. Academic professionals inherently face a multitude of competing tasks and responsibilities. I am appreciative of the committee s willingness to incorporate my project into their agenda. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my advisor, Dennis P. Rosenbaum. In addition to his thoughtful commentary, this project would not have been possible without his willingness to fold me into an already large group of graduate students under his mentorship. Finally, I thank my wife, Melanie Garrett. Our beautiful daughter, Ada, was born during the completion of this thesis. Melanie s patience and flexibility in the face of our familial responsibilities made this project possible. TAL ii

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION... 1 A. Overview: Intelligence-Led Policing and Pulling Levers Policing... 2 B. The CPD Violence Reduction Initiatives The DOC Process and Offender Targeting a. Offender Target Selection Criteria b. Strategies in the Field Evaluation Results C. Intelligence-Led Policing Defining Intelligence Research Results D. Pulling Levers Policing Deterring Violence-Prone Offenders Elements of the Pulling Levers Approach E. The Two Approaches Areas of Overlap with DOC Offender Targeting F. Analysis Approach G. Expected Results II. METHOD A. Study Period B. Other Inclusion Criteria C. Additional Justifications Study Sample D. Police Records E. Research Design F. Group-Based Trajectory Modeling G. Propensity Score Matching Covariates for Matching H. Outcome Measures I. Estimating Treatment Impact III. RESULTS A. Group-Based Trajectory Models B. Matched Comparison Group C. Poisson Regression Results IV. DISCUSSION CITED LITERATURE APPENDIX VITA iii

4 LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE I. THE VIOLENCE REDUCTION INITIATIVES: A SUMMARY II. RESEARCH STUDIES THAT EXAMINED AN OFFENDER TARGETING APPROACH III. ARRESTED OFFENDERS IN DOC PACKETS, IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TARGET SELECTION V. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PROPENSITY SCORE COVARIATES VI. SUMMARY OF EXPECTED RESULTS VII. COVARIATE BALANCE VIII. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR OUTCOME MEASURES IX. POISSON REGRESSION RESULTS iv

5 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 1. The CPD offender targeting approach Group-based trajectory models by age interval Boxplots absolute standardized differences in means before and after matching v

6 SUMMARY Analyses were conducted examining an offender targeting strategy implemented in the Chicago Police Department as part of a citywide violence reduction effort. Under the strategy, from approximately June 2003 to November 2007, violence-prone offenders were identified for enhanced police contact. Gang-based intelligence was used to identify offenders who posed the greatest immediate risk to commit violent acts. The strategy incorporated elements of two police innovations that have received scholarly attention intelligence-led policing and pulling levers policing. The research goal was to use the analyses as a vehicle to provide greater understanding of these innovations. The analyses examined whether, following identification, police were able to successfully make contact with targeted offenders, and whether such contact could plausibly be attributed to the strategy. A sample of offenders targeted during 2005 or 2006 (N = 885) were compared to a matched sample of non-targeted offenders (N = 3,366) who, (1) conducted their pre-treatment criminal activity in the same geographic area, (2) were at approximately the same temporal place in their criminal career, and (3) had experienced approximately the same amount of pre-treatment police contact for approximately the same types of offenses. Matches were identified based on propensity scores, using nearest neighbor matching. Nineteen covariates, developed based on police records, were used to estimate propensity scores. Outcome analyses examined whether, following identification, targeted offenders experienced more police contact than matched, non-targeted offenders. Poisson regression was used to compare targeted and non-targeted offenders on 45 police contact outcomes measures, purposely designed to vary in terms of the expected impact that the vi

7 strategy would have on their levels. The outcome measures based on two dimensions: their association with police discretion and the number of post-treatment days incorporated into the measure (ranging from 7 to 120 days). It was expected that, if: (1) greater differences between targeted and non-targeted offenders would emerge for measures that assessed discretionary police contact (contact for lesser infractions where the police could choose not to respond), and (2) due to decreasing salience of targets over time, treatment effects would diminish, such that greater effects would emerge for measures that assessed shorter post-treatment time periods. Evidence supported the former prediction, but not the latter. Of the 30 outcome analyses that involved a discretionary measure of police contact, 23 yielded significant differences between targeted and non-targeted offenders, whereas of the 14 analyses involving a less discretionary measure, only 4 yielded a significant effect. On the other hand, effects did not diminish over time. Effects were either sustained across all time-based measures, or only yielded significant effects for measures that assessed longer time periods. Overall, these results suggest that, when police seek to unilaterally deliver a deterrence message to an offender, they are able to do so. vii

8 I. INTRODUCTION Tasked with responding to crime, urban police agencies receive a great deal of scrutiny. Elected government officials expect the actions and, more broadly, the strategies of police agencies to yield crime reduction benefits. In the last several decades, police administrators have implemented numerous innovations designed to improve police effectiveness and efficiency. Several of these innovations have received scholarly attention (see Braga & Weisburd, 2006; Telep & Weisburd, 2012). Intelligence-led policing is one such innovation (Ratcliffe, 2008a, 2008b), pulling levers policing another (Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl, 2001; Kennedy, 1997). The research described in this document examined a policing strategy implemented by the Chicago Police Department (CPD) from approximately June 2003 through November The CPD strategy, labeled the violence reduction initiatives, incorporated elements of multiple police innovations most notably hot spots policing (e.g., Braga & Weisburd, 2010), intelligence-led policing, and pulling levers policing. A recent evaluation examined geographically-based aspects of the CPD strategy, associating these aspects with hot spots policing (Alderden et al., 2009). For this study, offender-based aspects of the CPD strategy were examined, and associated with intelligence-led policing and pulling levers policing. The present research is evaluative, examining implementation of the CPD strategy. The research will allow for discussion of the conditions under which intelligence-led policing and pulling levers policing are effective. The next section provides a more detailed overview of the proposed research. 1

9 2 A. Overview: Intelligence-Led Policing and Pulling Levers Policing Those who support the various brands of police innovation strike a common chord: they uniformly encourage changes to traditional police practices. Scholars have long maintained that the standard model of policing (Weisburd & Eck, 2004) is not effective at reducing crime or enhancing citizen perceptions of security. A major critique of the standard model is its emphasis on preventive patrol, whereby police officers remain on the streets, moving across the geographic landscape looking out for criminal behavior or, at minimum, suspicious activity. In principle, this constant movement creates a visible police presence that deters criminal activity. By this logic, a potential offender, not knowing where the police may appear, will refrain from criminal activity. Buoyed by results of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al., 1974), scholars have critiqued the guiding logic of preventive patrol. In particular, two critiques shaped the development of alternate strategies. First, preventive patrol was characterized as overly generic. In practice, preventive patrol addresses all manner of crime problems through basic law enforcement (visible police presence, arrest and subsequent court processing), ignoring nuanced solutions to particular problems. Second, preventive patrol was characterized as overly diffuse. Evidence suggests that crime is highly concentrated. A disproportionate number of criminal events occur at relatively few locations (Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989), and are committed by relatively few offenders (Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972). Critics of preventive patrol acknowledge that police officers are often acutely aware of problem locations and repeat offenders within their geographic realm, and often respond accordingly; preventive patrol is by no means completely random. Nonetheless, critics claim that these informal responses to

10 3 problem locations and chronic offenders maximize neither effectiveness nor efficiency. Because crime is highly concentrated, police agencies should adopt approaches that explicitly, and as a guiding framework, target persons and places. By steering resources to problem locations and repeat offenders, police agencies can achieve greater crime reduction effects with fewer resources. And, by reining in the scope of police efforts, it becomes easier to develop tailored strategies that address particular problems. Recently, two policing models intelligence-led policing and pulling levers policing have gained traction among scholars and practitioners. Conceptually, both models address these two critiques of preventive patrol. Intelligence-led policing, while still evolving as a policing model (Ratcliffe, 2008a, 2008b), involves the use of intelligence to identify, and respond to, targets usually, but not necessarily, repeat offenders. Pulling levers policing relies on focused deterrence : identifying a core group of serious or repeat offenders and, through tailored problem-solving strategies, heightening the risks and consequences associated with further criminality. The purported advantages of the two approaches are similar. Both approaches are characterized as proactive; application requires identification and targeting of the most problematic persons. Both approaches are characterized as effective; if targeted offenders halt their criminal behavior then, because they are the most prolific offenders, crime reduction benefits are maximized. Despite the similarities, pulling levers policing has received considerably more attention in American criminological circles. In part, this attention may be attributed to the American origins of the approach, and to initial successes in Boston. Criminological emphasis on pulling levers policing can also be attributed to the efforts of its architects,

11 4 David Kennedy and Anthony Braga. Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl (2001) describe how conceptual components of the pulling levers approach evolved from an interagency researcher/practitioner working group that adopted a flexible brainstorming approach. Absent efforts by Kennedy, Braga, and colleagues to articulate a coherent framework, the approach would likely have remained unstated. In contrast, intelligence-led policing was introduced in the United Kingdom. British scholars trace the origins of intelligence-led policing to two practitioner-focused government reports: Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively (Audit Commission, 1993), and Policing With Intelligence (Her Majesty s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1997). Both reports include claims that police agencies can improve crimefighting efficiency by placing increased emphasis on repeat offenders. Both reports describe how, through the use of intelligence, repeat offenders can be targeted more effectively. Later, a third government report, the National Intelligence Model (National Criminal Intelligence Service, 2000), commissioned by the United Kingdom s Association of Chief Police Officers, included strategies for adopting an intelligence-led approach as a managerial framework. In this document, I describe a series of analyses examining a violent crime reduction strategy in Chicago that, in design, adopted elements of intelligence-led policing and, with its focus on deterrence, adopted elements of pulling levers policing. The violence reduction initiatives were a bundle of loosely connected police strategies and tactics nominally designed to address gang-related violent crime. As a cornerstone of the initiatives, CPD administrators created the Deployment Operations Center (DOC), a centralized intelligence hub tasked with the role of identifying geographic and offender

12 5 targets. Once identified, targets were the focus of proactive suppression and enforcementoriented police activity, the effectiveness of which was predicated largely on deterrence concepts. Shortly after the violence reduction initiatives were implemented, various violent crime indicators in Chicago decreased considerably. This temporal concurrence sparked interest in CPD activity. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded an evaluation of the initiatives. I was involved in this project, in dual capacity as a graduate student and civilian employee with the Chicago Police Department. The final evaluation report has been completed (Alderden et al., 2009). The NIJ-funded evaluation did not emphasize offender targeting. Instead, we chose to emphasize geographic targeting, connecting analyses and results to the hot spots policing literature (e.g., Braga & Weisburd, 2010). By focusing on geographic targets, we were examining the process that, in public discourse, was most commonly attributed to the initiatives. CPD administrators publicly characterized the initiatives as an aggressive, geographically-focused approach: proactive saturation patrol in select geographic areas. Results indicated that the DOC process did not appear to be a significant contributor to the sizable violent crime declines in Chicago. However, the NIJ-funded evaluation did not examine all aspects of the DOC process. The CPD effort not only targeted hot spot areas, but also targeted repeat offenders. Yet, because of our theoretical framing, crime reduction effects attributable to offender targeting were not examined for the NIJ report. Thus, the present research appends the NIJ report, providing a richer set of analyses. Specifically, I examine whether, following targeting, selected offenders experienced enhanced police presence, relative to a comparison sample of similarly

13 6 situated chronic offenders. As will be explained in more detail below, this analysis was, from a scientific perspective, an important first step towards the goal of affirming a causal link between the onset of DOC offender targeting and subsequent geographic crime reduction effects. Ultimately, the success of the DOC offender targeting process was predicated on crime reduction effects. If the strategy was effective, then key crime indicators should decrease in geographic areas where the offenders engaged in criminal behavior. Yet, the success of the approach was predicated on deterrence. In turn, deterrence was predicated on enhanced police contact; targeted offenders needed to know that they were being surveilled by the police. The analyses presented in this document examine whether, based on police data, it could plausibly be inferred that targeted offenders perceived enhanced police scrutiny. The remainder of the introduction is organized into six sections. The next section describes the CPD violence reduction initiatives in more detail, with an emphasis on the DOC offender targeting process. Here, I include a sub-section that summarizes the NIJfunded evaluation report. Then, in two sections, I summarize relevant literature on intelligence-led policing and pulling levers policing, respectively. In the fourth section, I describe areas of overlap and disconnect between DOC offender targeting and the two theoretical policing models. Bear in mind that the DOC offender targeting process was practitioner led. There was no explicit attempt by CPD administrators to apply a by the books version of intelligence-led policing or pulling levers policing. As I have suggested, the DOC offender targeting process did (organically, or otherwise) adopt elements of these approaches. Yet, the areas of overlap were bounded. Thus, the fourth

14 7 section lays out these boundaries. In so doing, it not only becomes easier to explain successes or failures of DOC offender targeting, but also lays the groundwork for further discourse on intelligence-led policing and pulling levers policing. The fifth section elaborates on the scientific rationale for my methodological approach. Finally, in the sixth section, I describe research questions that can be answered through the methodological approach. B. The CPD Violence Reduction Initiatives The violence reduction initiatives were implemented during a single police administration. As the administrative reign ended, and new leadership took over, the moniker was dropped, even as many of the same strategies were maintained (albeit with varying levels of modification). In truth, the violence reduction initiatives were part political ploy; a label that could be attached to any policing strategy that could be billed as successful. As a result, CPD administrators linked a variety of activities to the initiatives that, while they occurred during the same administrative reign, had disparate conceptual underpinnings. Rosenbaum and Stephens (2005) authored a report devoted exclusively to description of the initiatives. This report reveals the expansive breadth of the violence initiatives. Disparate police strategies, tactics, and conceptual frameworks were included as part of the initiatives: including community partnerships, CompStat-like accountability meetings, information technology development, and saturation patrol. Because the Rosenbaum and Stephens (2005) report was based on qualitative data collected from high-ranking CPD administrators, this characterization presumably accords with how CPD sought to present the initiatives to the public. Consistent with this, the conceptual

15 8 breadth of the initiatives may have served sociopolitical goals, helping CPD administrators to sell the initiatives in Chicago s difficult political environment. Yet, despite the breadth, the initiatives were grounded in an overarching set of assumptions. Rosenbaum and Stephens (2005) characterize the initiatives as a group of strategies and tactics connected, sometimes tightly and sometimes loosely, by an organizational mission and administrative approach (see Table I). The organizational mission was to address gangs, guns, and drugs. This mission was based on a series of causal assumptions, as follows: (1) the murder total in Chicago is largely the byproduct of public violence - violent crime that occurs on the public way, (2) public violence in Chicago stems largely from gang activity, and is committed with a firearm, (3) to cripple gangs, it is important to cut off their money supply, and (4) the illegal drug trade provides a large percentage of gang subsidies. Rosenbaum and Stephens (2005) list components of an administrative approach designed to achieve this mission (p. 10). To paraphrase their descriptions of these components, the approach was to: (1) increase information exchange between CPD units, (2) increase information exchange between CPD and other criminal justice agencies, (3) intelligently use CPD resources, (4) deploy resources to targeted, violence prone areas, (5) rely on multiple strategies to curb violence in these targeted areas, (6) closely monitor violence prone individuals, and (7) enhance accountability mechanisms, to ensure that CPD members are responding to the organizational mission. Because these components are abstract, strategies that formed the core of the initiatives addressed multiple components. The primary focus of my research is component 6: monitoring violence prone individuals. This component is centrally linked

16 9 to component 4 and component 5. These three components were acted out in tandem, through an organizational process spearheaded by the Deployment Operations Center (DOC). The DOC was created in 2003, and housed at CPD headquarters. Initially, the DOC Commander, or top-ranking administrator, answered directly to the CPD Superintendent of Police. Subsequently, the DOC was placed in a new operational bureau - the Bureau of Strategic Deployment. This specialized bureau, formed after the onset of the initiatives, included eight units, including several units that, like the DOC, were responsible for key enforcement components associated with the initiatives. Rosenbaum and Stephens (2005) mention the DOC process but, because their report is designed as an overview, they do not provide much detail. Nonetheless, I am able to provide a general description of the DOC process, based on personal, post-hoc observations of DOC meetings that I attended, and second-hand description of qualitative data collected for the NIJ report. Analysis was central to the DOC process. DOC analysts identified places and persons: geographic areas where gang-related violence was likely to occur, and gang members who were likely to commit violent acts. These places and persons were characterized as recommended targets. Once identified, information on the targets was disseminated throughout the Department but, in particular, to CPD field command staff, who were encouraged, but not explicitly required, to make operational decisions based on the information. Every week, outcomes were reviewed at a formal meeting attended by CPD command staff. At the meeting, new targets were announced for the upcoming week. Overall, this constituted a basic, iterative process: target selection, then

17 10 dissemination of information, then field activity, then analysis of results which fed back into the selection of new targets. TABLE I THE VIOLENCE REDUCTION INITIATIVES: A SUMMARY The Organizational Mission: Address gangs, guns, and drugs Causal Origins of the Mission: Political ramifications of an increase in the Chicago murder total Administrative Approach: Increase information exchange between CPD units Increase information exchange between CPD and other criminal justice agencies Intelligently use CPD resources Deploy resources to targeted, violence prone areas Rely on multiple strategies to curb violence in these targeted areas Closely monitor violence prone individuals Enhance accountability mechanisms, to ensure that CPD members are responding to the organizational mission A Key Strategy: A process spearheaded by the Deployment Operations Center (DOC), a small, centralized, administrative unit devoted to analysis and dissemination of intelligence Activities and Efforts Associated With the DOC Process: Strategic organization based on administrative boundaries that encompass multiple police districts Use of citywide police units the Targeted Response Unit and Special Operations Section were deployed to target locations

18 11 Targets were identified based on intelligence. The CPD report entitled Making Chicago the Safest Big City in America (2008) makes clear the Department s emphasis on intelligence. This public report characterizes the violence reduction initiatives in a favorable light. The report includes a one paragraph description of the DOC. In this paragraph, the word intelligence is used three times at different points: the DOC is described as an intelligence hub, as a cornerstone of intelligence-led policing, and as a unit that produces actionable intelligence. Intelligence took different forms, but was commonly linked to potential gang violence. In some instances, intelligence included information that linked prior violent incidents to gang conflicts and, hence, potential retaliation. Or, intelligence included information indicating that a new conflict may arise. DOC analysts obtained intelligence from various sources. For the NIJ report, we interviewed DOC analysts, and asked them about intelligence sources. DOC analysts reported that intelligence might be obtained from their personal experience, based on past assignments. It might be obtained from officers assigned to gang units. Or, from detectives who investigate violent crimes. In the NIJ report, we conclude that these intelligence sources were combined, and used to identify violence prone areas and gang members. CPD administrators characterized the DOC process as proactive or predictive. This characterization was a direct extension of the emphasis placed on intelligence. For the most part, DOC analysts did not focus on crimes that had already occurred. Instead, they sought to identify persons who would commit violent crimes in the future, and the locations where violent crimes would be committed.

19 12 Once targets were identified, DOC analysts collated relevant intelligence pertaining to the targets. Through various strategies, the intelligence was disseminated throughout the Department. The most noteworthy dissemination strategy was a weekly meeting attended by CPD command staff the DOC meeting. The meetings had a formal, ritualistic tone and structure. They were held in a large multi-purpose room. High-ranking Department members had assigned seats at long tables in the front of the room. Microphones and name placards were placed on the tables, in front of each assigned seat. The remaining participants sat in rows of chairs facing the high-ranking members. A large screen was used to project maps, pictures of targeted offenders, and statistics. DOC meetings were facilitated by the DOC Commander. The meetings had approximately the same agenda every week. First, targets from the previous week were reviewed. Maps were displayed on the projection screen, with symbol markers showing violent incidents that occurred within or surrounding targeted areas. Pictures of targeted persons were shown, along with information on their arrest status. During the display of information, relevant command staff were asked questions that focused on the previous week - what had been done to address crime in the targeted area, or respond to targeted offenders. Next, new targets were presented on the screen. New targets remained in effect until the next meeting. The DOC Commander supplemented the announcement of new targets with a presentation that described relevant intelligence. Meeting participants were provided a handout that included much of this intelligence the DOC packet.

20 13 Although some parts of Chicago have higher crime totals than others, targets were spread throughout the city. For operational purposes, CPD splits Chicago into distinct police areas. When the DOC process was operational, CPD used five police areas (labeled numerically), with a sixth geographic designation for the Chicago downtown area. For the DOC process, one targeted area was selected from within each of these six geographic areas. Likewise, targeted offenders were linked to the police area where they operate, ensuring a spread of offenders from throughout the city. The layout and content of DOC packets remained relatively consistent over time. One or two pages were devoted to each of the six geographic designations. Appendix A shows the layout of a typical DOC packet, for a single police area, with names, pictures, and other identifying information removed. At the top of the first page, the targeted area, or recommended deployment area, was noted. Below this, pages included information on gang-related violent incidents and ongoing gang conflicts within the target area. They also included pictures of targeted offenders, and relevant information pertaining to these offenders. Typically, targeted offenders were linked to targeted areas. In such instances, police intelligence suggested that targeted offenders commit their criminal acts within the targeted area. CPD field command staff were encouraged, but not required, to have those under their command act on intelligence provided at DOC meetings. DOC staff characterized their targets as recommendations. Nonetheless, the formality of the DOC meetings belied the impression that attentiveness to the DOC process was discretionary. Interview data collected for the NIJ report suggests that, throughout the Department, emphasis was placed on DOC targets particularly targeted areas.

21 14 Responsibility for responding to targets was spread across multiple Department units. Roving, citywide units the Targeted Response Unit and Special Operations Section were deployed to targeted areas. These units were to provide a visible presence, engaging in saturation patrol and various proactive police-initiated tactics. In theory, these units provided flexibility, as they could be moved wherever deemed necessary. Citywide units notwithstanding, much of the responsibility still rested on districtlevel staff patrol officers, gang team officers, and tactical team officers. However, district activity was coordinated at the police area-level. Area-level command staff coordinated DOC-related operational and deployment decisions for districts in their realm of command. 1. The DOC Process and Offender Targeting Offender targeting was one element of the DOC process; a single strategy embedded in a larger process. In published accounts of the violence reduction initiatives, offender targeting is not emphasized. For example, although Rosenbaum and Stephens (2005) cite close monitoring of violence prone individuals as part of the administrative approach that guided the initiatives, none of the activities and efforts that they associate with the initiatives are specific to offender targeting within the DOC process. Thus, it might seem that offender targeting was a trivial component of the violence reduction initiatives. However, there was disconnection between public and internal emphases. Within the Chicago Police Department, offender targeting played a larger role than is evident in public descriptions. In general, there is a covert aspect to offender targeting by the police, even when it is not connected to surreptitious police activities. This covert aspect is, in part, political. In an era when urban police agencies are

22 15 routinely criticized for profiling and harassment, offender targeting must be tactfully presented to the public, if it is mentioned at all. Despite the covert nature of offender targeting, one characteristic of the CPD offender targeting approach can be safely stated: geographic targeting was sometimes linked to offender targeting. In some instances, targeted areas were extrapolations of person-based information to geographic space. The targeted areas were hunches as to where targeted offenders, or their gang associates, might commit violent crime, based on intelligence regarding areas where targeted offenders engaged in criminal activity. In other instances, geographic targeting came first, perhaps based on a pending gang conflict, and offender targets were selected from the conflicting gangs. In yet other instances, there may have been coincidental overlap between targeted areas and targeted offenders areas of operation. Temporal issues aside, it is clear that, in some instances, there was overlap between geographic and offender-based aspects of the DOC process. Beyond this overlap, because the offender targeting process has not been chronicled, less is certain. However, qualitative data collected for the NIJ report provides insights. DOC analysts and DOC command staff were interviewed. Researchers observed DOC roundtable meetings, at which DOC staff considered possible offender targets for the upcoming week. Command staff who oversaw citywide units were also interviewed, providing insights on field strategies associated with offender targeting. And, researchers participated in ride-alongs with officers assigned to citywide units, as well as officers assigned to three police districts (selected in order to capture socio-demographic variation in Chicago). Collectively, through these qualitative methods, the offender target selection process has been documented.

23 16 I asked the lead qualitative researcher to review her data, then answer a series of questions on the CPD offender targeting approach. Admittedly, this is an imperfect method, yet one that provides second hand insights on how the process was understood by persons involved. The next section is devoted to description of DOC offender target selection criteria. Then, the following section is devoted to description of field strategies associated with the offender targeting process. In whole, I highlight six selection criteria and four strategies (I note these in the two sections with bold, italicized font). A list of this size could lead to conceptual complexity. That is, the precise combination of selection criteria and strategies could suggest different underlying crime reduction mechanisms. However, there is overlap between the elements in these lists. In practice, although leaving aside some nuance, every combination leads to the same operational mechanisms: deterrence and incapacitation. a. Offender Target Selection Criteria According to the lead qualitative researcher, DOC staff described multiple criteria that, in isolation or in concert, might lead an offender to be targeted. One criterion is immediately apparent upon basic examination of DOC packets. Offenders were presented in demarcated sections of the DOC packets. These sections had titles that suggest selection criteria: person of interest, gang intelligence, criminal warrant, warrant and investigative alert, to name a few examples. By these titles alone, it is clear that some offender targets were wanted offenders. These persons were wanted for felony offenses, typically violent gang-related offenses, and warrants had been issued for their arrest. Here, the DOC packets were simply a mechanism to facilitate their apprehension.

24 17 Besides issuance of an arrest warrant, there were at least five additional reasons why a person might be targeted. The five reasons are not mutually exclusive. Yet, they are distinct enough to be classified separately. As a general theme, offenders were targeted because, based on available intelligence, they might commit a violent act in the upcoming week. Persons targeted based on this rationale can be partitioned further. Most targeted offenders had a violent history, rendering them potential perpetrators in the upcoming week. Here, the selection was based on chronicity; a consistent pattern of past behavior. The violent history category is a catch-all. All offender targets had an arrest record with the Chicago Police Department. All offender targets were deemed violence prone by Department members. In truth, the remaining offender target categories could be prefaced with the expression violent history plus... That is, in addition to violence-proneness, there was some other factor (or combination of factors) contributing to the selection. Violence proneness was a necessary criterion, and all other criterion were sufficient, but not necessary. For the violent history category, targets possess the necessary condition, but none of the additional, sufficient conditions. Some persons were selected because they were members of a particular gang, and intelligence suggested there was a pending gang conflict. So, targets were selected partly based on group membership. Yet, personalized data and intelligence was considered as well. In some instances, intelligence suggested that the target had particular cause to resent the opposing gang. Or, intra-gang roles were considered; intelligence may have identified the target as a designated shooter in the violence-prone gang. Or, the targeted offender may simply have had a criminal history that suggested a propensity for violence. Regardless of the personalized rationale, the offender target was deemed a particularly

25 18 violence-prone person in an already violence-prone group. And, violence was deemed pending, or even imminent. In some instances, offender targets were selected because they were a criminal suspect, but additional evidence was needed before issuing an arrest warrant. These persons did not meet the threshold of a wanted person, but were deemed worth monitoring. In addition, persons recently released from prison or jail were targeted. In such instances, DOC analysts suspected that these persons may re-establish relationships with criminal associates, or that they may attempt to retake former areas of control, with violent results. Finally, some offender targets were associates of other, more desirable targets. Here, the true goal was to deter or incapacitate the more desirable target. The selected target was a means to a grander end. The true targets were sometimes criminal suspects for whom additional evidence was needed before issuing an arrest warrant. In such cases, associates were potential evidentiary sources. Or, true targets may simply have been less publicly assessable. In such cases, the associate, in a form of vicarious deterrence, was selected so as to send a message to the true target. Regardless of the details, gang association is another target offender selection category. b. Strategies in the Field The lead qualitative researcher identified four strategies that might be used to deter or incapacitate targeted offenders. She also identified an assumption associated with these strategies: because the selection of offender targets was sometimes linked to selection of geographic targets, CPD administrators surmised that, in these instances, the

26 19 geographic impacts of saturation patrol and proactive policing might extend to offender targets. Because they were focusing heavily on their areas of operation, expanded police activity in targeted areas should inhibit targeted offenders. Figure 1 shows the four strategies. Each of the strategies could potentially be implemented anywhere in the city by any department member. There were no strict policies or guidelines for responding to offender targets. Nor were department members required to document whether activities were related to offender targeting. And, aside from the fact that they were associated with a centralized offender targeting approach, the four strategies were not entirely distinguishable from typical police activity. First, Department members could have informal, undocumented contact with targeted offenders. This might take the form of a patrol drive-by. Or, there might be verbal exchange between a department member and the targeted offender, designed to send an informal deterrence message. Department members were also encouraged to document street contacts. CPD policy allows department members to complete a field contact card, a short form that includes the name, demographic information, and gang affiliation of persons who are stopped and questioned. Nominally, the cards are to be used as an investigative and intelligence tool. The formality of documentation distinguishes this strategy from undocumented contacts. Department members could also arrest targeted offenders. Arrests can be distinguished based on offense severity. As severity increases, officer discretion decreases. For serious offenses, incapacitation is the primary, if not exclusive, goal. For less serious offenses, officers have more latitude. They can ignore the infraction, issue a

27 20 warning, or make an arrest. When department members arrested targeted offenders for minor offenses they were, in a strict sense, enforcing the law in question. But, they were also sending a deterrence message to the offender. The offender was inconvenienced, but there was little pretence that the arrest would result in long-term incapacitation. In short, arrests for serious offenses and arrests for less serious offenses are distinguishable as separate field strategies. There was an element of circularity to the DOC offender target selection process; an element that also contributes to an imprecise relationship between field activity and DOC efforts. Targets were selected based on intelligence, much of which was gleaned from the field. By implication, department members who provided this intelligence to DOC analysts were also invested in making contact with the targeted offender. They were already aware of the potential for violence. They may have responded to this potential even had the offender not appeared in the DOC packet. In this respect, an assumption underlying the CPD offender targeting approach was that, by increasing awareness beyond a core group of department members, the likelihood of deterrence or incapacitation was enhanced. In addition to showing the four strategies, Figure 1 also summarizes relationships between field strategies, causal mechanisms (deterrence and incapacitation), and the end goal of DOC offender targeting: to reduce violent crime levels in geographic areas where target offenders engage in criminal behavior.

28 21 Figure 1 The CPD offender targeting approach Wanted Offenders All Other Targeted Offenders Arrest Arrest Serious Offense Undocumented Contact Contact Card Arrest Less Serious Offense Incapacitation Incapacitation Deterrence Violent Crime Reduction Incapacitation and deterrence may occur in conjunction with geographic targeting. Or, it may occur independent from geographic targeting.

29 22 2. Evaluation Results The NIJ-funded evaluation of the DOC process included both process and outcome analyses. The process evaluation suggested that the DOC process was meaningfully implemented. Qualitative data suggested that central CPD administrators had successfully communicated their organizational mission to address gangs, guns, and drugs throughout the department, and emphasized the DOC s role in this mission. DOC staff implemented the process as described intelligence was analyzed, targets were selected, information on targets was disseminated, and field officers were aware of the DOC recommendations. There were no notable breakdowns in practice. Consistent with this, quantitative results suggested that there was enhanced police activity in targeted geographic areas. For police beats, there were significant positive correlations between the extent to which target areas were subsumed within beat boundaries, and several police activity measures (including the number of arrests for various types of offenses, and the number of completed field contact cards). Despite evidence that the DOC process was implemented as designed, outcome analyses did not reveal crime reduction benefits. For the outcome analyses, police beats were selected as the geographic unit of analysis. For each of the 281 Chicago police beats in existence at the time of the research, five measures were developed, based on the extent to which target areas were subsumed within beat boundaries. The five measures took into account the percentage of the beat s geographic area that overlapped with target area boundaries, and the number of days that a target area was subsumed within the beat. The measures were designed to capture the extent to which each beat was selected as a target area.

30 23 Outcome analyses focused on explaining crime drops from July 1, 2003 through June 30, Chicago crime trends showed that, although violent crime levels were notably lower during the entire time period when the violence reduction initiatives were in effect, much of the citywide decline occurred during this first year of implementation. After this reduction, for the remainder of the time period, violent crime levels were stable. Thus, analysis focused on explaining the most substantial violent crime drop in Chicago. Crime rates for the full year July 1, 2003 through June 30, were compared to rates for the year immediately preceding implementation. Six violent crime outcome measures were examined: (1) homicide rate, (2) gun-related homicide rate, (3) gang-related homicide rate, (4) drive-by shooting rate, (5) aggravated battery rate, and (6) violent index crime rate. In a series of analyses that, in the collective, took into account all five target area saturation measures and all six outcome measures, effects did not suggest that beat-level crime was reduced as a function of the DOC geographic targeting process. In perhaps the most definitive analyses, growth curve modeling yielded null effects for five of the six outcome measures and, unexpectedly, a significant positive relationship for the final outcome measure (aggravated battery rate), indicating that beat-level aggravated battery rates were actually higher in beats that received more target area coverage. We attributed these results to eight factors. First, the target areas were shifted frequently (often weekly), perhaps inhibiting long term, tangible results. Second, target areas were fairly large, perhaps making it difficult to saturate and proactively target the entire area. The average target area was 1.39 square miles, which is larger than the

31 24 average police beat. Third, DOC analysts may have made decisions based on false assumptions; the areas selected may not have been as violence-prone as believed. Fourth, the decision to select a target area from each police area ignored the fact that violent crime is not evenly distributed across police areas, meaning that some target areas had a lesser need for enhanced police activity than some unselected areas. Fifth, the field strategy (primarily proactive saturation patrol) may have been too simplistic, and ignored nuanced issues in particular communities. Sixth, if the field strategy did successfully disrupt gang drug markets, it may have resulted in violence stemming from market destabilization that offset any gains from other deterrence strategies. Seventh, accountability mechanisms associated with the violence reduction initiatives may have led some department members to feel pressure to produce documented evidence of activity, even if the activity did not meaningfully address violent crime. Eighth, the field strategy may have undermined police-community relations, thus inhibiting community cooperation with police efforts. The evaluation results provide evidence that, at least when examined at the beatlevel, geographic aspects of the DOC process did not contribute to meaningful violent crime reduction. However, the evaluation report omits offender targeting aspects of the process. Perhaps the DOC process was effective at addressing crime in areas where targeted offenders engage in criminal activity geographic target areas or otherwise. C. Intelligence-Led Policing As mentioned, scholars consistently trace the origins of intelligence-led policing (ILP) in the United Kingdom to a series of government reports targeted towards police practitioners (e.g., Brown, 2007; Hale, Heaton, & Uglow, 2004; James, 2003; Kleiven &

32 25 Maren, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2008a, 2008b), most notably Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively (Audit Commission, 1993), Policing With Intelligence (Her Majesty s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1997), and National Intelligence Model (National Criminal Intelligence Service, 2000). The reports call for expanded use of intelligence to aid police practices, nominally to improve managerial efficiency. Following their publication, the reports influenced initial attempts in the United Kingdom to implement an ILP model, with the Kent Constabulary taking the public lead (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007; Peterson, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2008b). Several scholars have contrasted the development of ILP in the UK to the path followed in the United States, concluding that, while United Kingdom efforts generally came first, ILP gained momentum in the United States, following the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2008a). British criminologist Jerry Ratcliffe, now a professor at Temple University, points out that the government reports fail to explicitly define intelligence-led policing (Ratcliffe, 2008a, p. 64). Despite extensive government and academic discourse, Ratcliffe (2008a) contends that, years after intelligence-led policing was introduced in the United Kingdom, it remained in a definitional fog. Partly as a result, research on intelligence-led policing remains in incipient stages. Recently, Ratcliffe (2008a) wrote extensively on intelligence-led policing, wading through ambiguity to provide definitional boundaries. To Ratcliffe (2008a, 2008b), intelligence-led policing is a business model; a managerial framework that guides agency policy and activity. In this regard, ILP is comparable to other major policing models that have also been framed as holistic, organization-wide philosophies: community policing,