By Szymon Ananicz, Florian Hartleb, Agata Hinc, Nicolai von Ondarza

Transcription

1 Center for Central and Eastern Europe of the Robert Bosch Stiftung Editors: Anna Quirin Gereon Schuch Position paper German-Polish Impulses for Europe By Szymon Ananicz, Florian Hartleb, Agata Hinc, Nicolai von Ondarza In the second half of 2011, Poland held the EU-Council presidency, which the country took over for the first time, and had prepared for this task with a comprehensive agenda. However, the European financial and debt crisis as well as the Arab Spring in the North African countries represented a time and strength-consuming burden for all European governments and thus encumbered the implementation of the Polish priorities during the EU-Council presidency. Undoubtedly, the European Union has to react to such developments in financial and foreign politics. Nonetheless, it poses a risk when politics are dominated permanently by crisis-driven reactions. The European governments have to assert their role as active players. This is true especially for Germany and Poland, as both countries are connected through numerous common interests in European foreign, security and energy policy. In this context that two states should develop joint political concepts and lobby for majorities among the EU member states necessary for their implementation. It is just as important to strive jointly to solve also such issues in which the two countries hold differing, often radically contrary positions. Compromises arrived in such cases may be regarded as especially credible and may expect greater support by the other EU member states. Within the framework of the project German-Polish Impulses for Europe, 14 young experts from Germany and Poland addressed positions of their countries on pressing issues from the areas of a.) Common Foreign and Security Policy b.) European Neighbourhood Policy c.) Energy Policy They discussed the subjects in a European context and mapped out joint recommendations for an orientation as to how Germany and Poland should design policies actively.

2 a.) Common Foreign and Security Policy Poland and Germany share an interest in the European Union being regarded in international politics as a reliable foreign policy player, speaking with one voice. Yet, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have meanwhile moved into a period of perceived standstill, following a dynamic development in the 2000s. The reforms of the Lisbon Treaty, including the upgrading of the High Representative of the EU and the establishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS), have not provided the desired new impulses for strengthening the coherence and increasing the EUs capacity to act externally. Rather in 2011, the EU reacted to the transformations in the Arab region according to the wellknown patterns. As regards major issues, for instance, the position vis-à-vis the rulers in Tunisia and Egypt, it was at first individual large member states that reacted, followed by Brussels. On the issue of military operations to implement Resolution No 1973 of the UN Security Council in Libya, the member states put forward contrary positions publicly. The EU was only able to agree on economic sanctions as well as on economic and humanitarian aid. The following conclusions were prepared: Make better use of EU institutions: Warsaw and Berlin should work together for the better use of existing institutions. Following an inter-institutional power struggle during the first two years in office, the High Representative Ashton has been able to turn the European External Action Service into an institutional foundation of EU foreign policy. As became evident after the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, institutional reforms alone can neither solve nor cover up the political problems of EU foreign policy if the member states are not prepared to support these reforms. If, as was the case in Egypt, the demand for Mubarak to step down was negotiated and put forward first by the five largest member states multilaterally, subsequent political declarations from Brussels will only have a very limited effect and attract little attention. Especially the large member states should thus first look to the High Representative for foreign policy declarations, in order to strengthen her office externally as well as internally. At the same time, the High Representative should make more distinctive use of her limited scope of action. This is how the EEAS may be geared towards conflict recognition and preventative diplomacy, involving the member states and working for their support for a common European position. Avail of European soft powers: In developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy further, Germany and Poland are able to contribute their own positive experience with the German-Polish reconciliation as well a the

3 transformation following The EU is confronted with numerous conflicts in its neighbourhood in the Republic of Moldova, in the Caucasus or the Middle East that endanger the political and economic stability of the regions. The German-Polish past proves apart from the necessity of political conflict mediation the outstanding significance of direct contacts between citizens and civil societies for reconciliation and, ultimately, a long-term solution to security-policy conflicts. In this process, purposeful visa liberalisation for selected countries may be very helpful. Connecting CFSP and economic policy, for instance in the form of conditional free-trade agreements, the EU could act both as a stabilising force of international order and at the same time use its soft powers as a mediator. A new EU security strategy: Generally, the European foreign and security policy requires a new strategic orientation urgently. Since the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, the international, security political and economic environment of the Union has undergone drastic change. These changes become especially clear in the European neighbourhood following the Arab transformation and at an international level through the rise of Asia and the strategic re-orientation of the USA towards the Pacific. Germany and Poland should thus win over their partners jointly to strive for a revision and enlargement of the ESS. Clear red lines should be defined within the framework of this strategic debate upon whose breaching the EU is willing to employ the entire range of CSDP instruments, including military means, if necessary. Above all, the EU should define foreign and security policy priorities within the framework of the ESS, which the community is going to target its political energy at in the future. The cooperation with France within the Weimar Triangle, in which important initiatives for the Common Security and Defence Policy were developed already in 2011, could play a key role. b.) European Neighbourhood Policy The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) pursued by the European Union vis-à-vis the countries of transformation in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and the Southern Mediterranean region has proved to be more or less unsuccessful to date. There are no stable, pluralist or well functioning democratic states that have emerged to the East or the South of the EU. On the contrary, autocratic tendencies have rather increased apart from a few exceptions. The main reason for the failure of the ENP is to be seen in the fact that it does not represent an attractive option or perspective for the EU neighbouring countries. The ENP was developed in order to promote longterm change. However, the neighbours expect immediate help from the EU. The funds made available by the EU for the ENP target countries are far too

4 modest to create an incentive for difficult structural reforms there. Furthermore, the means are often used ineffectively. So far, the local civil societies have experienced too little support as compared to the centres of power. When the Arab Spring broke out at the beginning of 2011, it proved the powerlessness of the ENP, not least due to an ineffective preparation for such a case: The EU was not able to offer the transformation countries any other help than financial aid, which had been granted to the previous regimes already in Originally, the ENP was linked to conditions: the more comprehensive the reforms, also with a view to the rule of law, the more money for the countries and the stronger their link with the EU. This principle was not implemented consistently enough, which undermined the credibility of the EU as a supporter of reforms in the eyes of the neighbouring states. The European Union needs to ensure in its Neighbourhood Policy that the promotion of democracy and good governance is not overshadowed by economic interests. The EU should pursue both aspects at the same time, however, not one at the cost of the other. Due to the geographic proximity, Poland and Germany have a special interest in stability, democracy and prosperity in the Eastern neighbourhood. Thus, both countries should strengthen the commitment of the EU in this region together. At the same time, the Southern Neighbourhood Policy of the EU must not be neglected, which also embodies important challenges and opportunities for the EU. The following conclusions were prepared: Promote civil societies: The support of the civil societies is the best and most sustained investment of the EU in promoting the development of their neighbourhood. This commitment should be expanded further especially for the young generation and at a local level. The Civil Society Facility (CSF) and the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) both represent steps in the right direction in this area. It is especially instruments such as the CSF and the EED that enable civil societies to exert direct influence on their environment. In the area of education, the programmes Tempus and Erasmus Mundus, however, offer too few opportunities. The cooperation between the universities within the EU and their neighbouring countries should be improved. The number of students from EU neighbouring countries should be increased considerably. Set up Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA): DCFTAs with the neighbours in the East can represent a decisive step towards linking this region with the EU. As the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas may not only reduce tariffs but may

5 at the same time import EU standards to the Eastern neighbouring countries. Setting up such Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas would thus not only drive economic development in the respective countries but at the same time promote political and institutional reforms there, and, ultimately, the maturity of democracy and the rule of law. Strengthen people-to-people contacts: The support of direct people-to-people contacts is an important instrument for promoting the process of transformation. That is why the EU should abolish the visa requirement for citizens of East European states as soon as the conditions called for in the Visa Action Plans (VAPs) have been fulfilled. Once the liberalisation of the visa requirement is more clearly linked to the adherence to the VAPs, (as in the case of the Visa Road Maps for countries of the Western Balkans), this would probably represent a strong incentive for the neighbouring countries to introduce the necessary reforms. Such conditional offers on behalf of the EU would motivate the people of Eastern Europe to demand reform from their governments. Reinforce the principle of conditionality: The principle of more for more and less for less should be pursued more firmly. In cases of a deviation from democratic standards, the EU should reduce the financial help for such governments and at the same time step up the support for the civil society. When employing a negative conditionality, the EU needs to be consistent and unambiguous so that the governments of the neighbouring countries become aware of the fact that the violation of human rights and democracy will lead to higher costs. In the opposite case, the EU should also be able to offer tangible support in steps of reform. Involve the people in the processes of reform: Die EU has so far failed to make attractive offers to the people of the neighbouring countries with the help of which the EU would win them over in the demand for reform. As long as the governments of the neighbouring states do not feel any public pressure in their own countries, they will postpone difficult reforms. That is the reason why the EU should make offers to such societies and link these clearly with the agenda of transformation. It would be one possibility to hold out the clear perspective of opening the European labour market to the neighbours in the East if in turn, the free trade areas (DCFTAs) were implemented effectively. Such prospects would turn the local population into strong allies of the EU in the Europeanization of the

6 neighbouring countries in the East. The demographic development of Europe suggests the necessity already today of opening up the labour markets to the workers from the Eastern neighbouring countries. Synchronise elements of foreign policy: The EU should better coordinate the individual instruments of their foreign policy vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbouring countries. The activities of the EU in this region have not been coherent to the present day. One example is the position of the EU on the Ukraine: whereas political pressure was exerted on Kiev to force the discharge from prison of the former Premier Timoshenko, the European Investment Bank, at the same time, granted Ukraine loans without any strings attached. On this issue, it would have been a step in the right direction if the ENP instruments had been combined with the instruments of the Common Security and Defence Policy. c.) Energy Policy By publishing the strategy paper Energy Road Map 2050 at the end of 2011, the EU Commission put the discussion about the future energy supply of Europe back on the agenda. The publication of this document had been delayed quite rightly at the end due to the most recent developments. These included, for instance, the German decision on the phase-out of nuclear energy or the decision taken by Poland to step up the exploration of shale gas. The two decisions, which are of strategic importance from the German and the Polish view respectively, have a considerable impact both on the structure of energy generation in the whole of Europe as well as on the need for external energy deliveries. In view of the worldwide advancing digitisation and electrification of society, energy policy is no longer an autonomous parameter with little influence on the other political areas of individual states and alliances of states. Today, energy policy is part of major fields of politics, such as the economy, industry, innovation or climate policies. New energy technologies take on an evergrowing role both as regards the performance of the economy as well as the security of the country. The institutions of the European Union have registered this trend well in time. At the EU level, mechanisms have been put in place for promoting innovative technologies in the energy sector that are to help the European Union in building new markets and thus in gaining a competitive edge in the international framework. This has become especially important in the context of the economic crisis. The energy policy interests of the individual member states of the European Union are very different in part. This is also true for the Weimar Triangle, for instance, among which major discrepancies have emerged in recent time: Germany is phasing out nuclear energy, France insists on its nuclear policy and Poland wants to start building nuclear power plants. France has prohibited the use of hydraulic technologies for producing shale gas on its territory and has

7 consequently banned the exploration of this raw material, whereas Poland has been driving on the exploration work with unmitigated speed for a year now. The following conclusions have been prepared: Common framework for European energy policy: The energy policy of the European Union should not intervene in the structure of energy generation in the individual member states, as long as they live up to the objectives that have been agreed at the level of state and government leaders. The energy policy of the EU should create a solid and stable framework for the participants in the energy market to arrive at rational decisions on investments that enable an increase in the security of energy supply and environmental protection. Clear political guidelines are required in order to minimise the legal and political insecurities. Prepare a clear vision for the future energy policy: First, all the roadmaps up to the year 2050, published by the EU Commission, need to be studied closely. There is the so-called Low Carbon Economy Road Map, and then there is the Roadmap leading to a sustained transport policy and the Roadmap to an economy using the resources efficiently as well as the Energy Roadmap. All these are aspects that touch upon energy policy. The fact that there are four such Roadmaps does not make the task of preparing a clear vision for the future energy policy any easier. Thus, it is necessary to prepare an EU Strategy 2050, which acts like an umbrella spanning these four documents. It would need to unify them and represent a target and point of reference for the member states within the framework of a common energy policy. Create an infrastructure of energy transmission among all parties involved: Is European solidarity possible in view of the differing interests of the respective member states in the area of energy policy? Of course. There is one common denominator connecting the interests of all states, regardless of their decisions on the national structure of energy generation. This is the reaction in emergency situations, in case energy supplies to one member state are interrupted. However, for the EU countries to be able to react, it is necessary to create connecting lines and infrastructures for energy transmission among all the parties involved and to develop mechanisms for a reaction in crisis situations. Both from the view of Poland as well as from Germany, the issue of an energy infrastructure is of top priority. In Poland, the transmission grids are outdated they require a fundamental modernisation or renewal.

8 Furthermore, Poland needs to build a gigantic infrastructure network for the transmission of gas if the country wants to avail of the shale gas potential. Germany, on the other hand, faces the challenge of distributing the power generated in the north with wind power plants across the entire country, reaching right down to the south, a large proportion of industry is located. Creating a so-called European Super Grid (network for the transport of large amounts of energy across long distances) will not only make it possible to increase the security of the energy supply but also to reduce the greenhouse emissions. This creates the possibility of connecting those countries that are planning to generate the greatest part of their energy from renewable sources with those countries that will stay with fossil fuels and transition technologies for the foreseeable future.

9 German-Polish Impulses for Europe is a joint initiative of the Center for Central and Eastern Europe of the Robert Bosch Stiftung of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), the Polish Institute in Berlin und the Foundation for German-Polish Cooperation (SdpZ). It brought together fourteen young German and Polish experts for a two-day conference in Berlin in October They joined in a discussion of European subjects relevant to the future and worked on them in three sections (Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, European Neighbourhood Policy and Energy Policy). The results of the deliberations were recorded in this document by Nicolai von Ondarza (Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU), Szymon Ananicz and Florian Hartleb (European Neighbourhood Policy) as well as by Agata Hinc (Energy Policy). Participants: Szymon Ananicz, Anna Maria Dyner, Irene Hahn, Florian Hartleb, Agata Hinc, Iwona Jakuszko-Dudka, Małgorzata Kopka, Tomasz Krawczyk, Thomas Mehlhausen, Nicolai von Ondarza, Patrycja Sokołowska, Małgorzata Śmieszek, Jędrzej Trojanowski, Anne Velder Project partners: Project coordination: Anna Quirin (DGAP) and Karoline Gil (SdpZ)