Mobile Platform Security Architectures A perspective on their evolution

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Mobile Platform Security Architectures A perspective on their evolution"

Transcription

1 Mobile Platform Security Architectures A perspective on their evolution N. Asokan Kari Kostiainen 1 NA, KKo, JEE, Nokia Resarch Center

2 Introduction Recent interest in smartphone security 2 NA, KKo, JEE, Nokia Resarch Center Jan 2011?

3 Introduction Recent interest in smartphone security 3 Oct 2012

4 Securing smartphone application platforms: challenges Introduction Smartphones Open software platforms Third party software Internet connectivity Packet data, WiFi Personal data Location, contacts, communication log Risk of monetary loss Premium calls Feature phones Java ME PCs? Is smartphone platform security different? 4

5 Outline Outline A bit of background on requirements for securing mobile phones Basics on hardware security enablers Comparison of modern mobile (software) platform security architectures Discussion: open issues and summary 5

6 6 Background

7 Platform security requirements for mobile phones Mobile network operators; 1. Subsidy locks immutable ID 2. Copy protection device authentication, app. separation 3. Regulators; 1. RF type approval secure storage 2. Theft deterrence immutable ID 3. Background End users; 1. Reliability app. separation 2. Theft deterrence immutable ID 3. Privacy app. separation 4. Closed Open Different Expectations compared to the PC world 7

8 Early adoption of hardware and software security GSM 02.09, 1993 Background 3GPP TS , 2001 Different starting points: widespread use of hardware and software platform security ~2001 ~2002 ~2005 ~2008 8

9 9 Hardware security enablers

10 Hardware support for platform security Hardware security Public key hash Trust root Base identity E.g., serial number Crypto Library Boot sequence (ROM) TCB for platform software Start of boot code Basic elements in immutable storage 10

11 Secure bootstrapping Hardware security Code certificate Boot code hash Trust root Base identity Validate and execute Crypto Library Secure boot Boot sequence (ROM) TCB for platform software Ensure only authorized boot image can be loaded Launch platform boot code 11

12 Identity binding Hardware security Identity certificate Base identity Code certificate Boot code hash Assigned identity E.g., IMEI, link-layer addresses, Trust root Base identity Secure boot Crypto Library Boot sequence (ROM) TCB for platform software Validate and accept assigned ID Securely assign different identities to the device Launch platform boot code 12

13 Trusted execution environment (TEE) Hardware security Identity certificate Base identity Assigned identity Code certificate Boot code hash Code certificate Validate and execute TEE code hash Why? How? Isolated execution Trust root Base identity TEE Crypto Library Device key Basis for secure external storage Secure boot Boot sequence (ROM) TEE code TCB for platform software Launch platform boot code TEE API 13 Authorized execution of arbitrary code, isolated from the OS; access to device key

14 Secure state Hardware security Identity certificate Base identity Assigned identity Code certificate Boot code hash Code certificate TEE code hash Authenticated boot Trust root Crypto Library Base identity Configuration register(s) Device key TEE Secure boot Boot sequence (ROM) TEE code TCB for platform software Launch platform boot code TEE API 14

15 Secure boot vs Authenticated boot Hardware security OS Kernel checker pass/fail OS Kernel measurer Boot block checker pass/fail Boot block measurer Boot seq. checker pass/fail Boot seq. measurer state Trust root TCB TCB Root of Trust for measurement 15

16 Secure state Hardware security Identity certificate Base identity Assigned identity Code certificate Boot code hash Code certificate TEE code hash Authenticated boot, Securing TEE sessions Trust root Base identity Configuration register(s) TEE Why? How? Secure boot Crypto Library Boot sequence (ROM) Device key TEE code Non-vol. memory or counter TCB for platform software Launch platform boot code TEE API Rollback protection for persistent secure storage 16 Integrity-protected state within the TEE

17 Device authentication Identity certificate Code certificate Base identity Assigned identity Boot code hash Code certificate TEE code hash External trust root Device certificate Identity Public device key Hardware security Trust root Secure boot Crypto Library Base identity Boot sequence (ROM) TCB for platform software Configuration register(s) Device key TEE code TEE Device authentication, secure provisioning, attestation Non-vol. memory or counter 17 Launch platform boot code TEE API Prove device identity or properties to external verifier

18 Hardware platform security features: summary Hardware security Secure boot: Ensure only authorized boot image can be loaded Authenticated boot: Measure and remember what boot image was loaded Identity binding: Securely assign different identities to the device Secure storage: protect confidentiality/integrity of persistent data Isolated execution: Run authorized code isolated from the device OS Device authentication: Prove device identity to external verifier Remote attestation: Prove device configuration/properties to external verifier 18

19 Hardware security Architectural options for realizing TEEs External Memories External Memories External Memories RAM Crypto Accelerators On-SoC RAM Crypto Accelerators On-SoC RAM Crypto Accelerators On-SoC Processor core(s) Processor core(s) Processor core(s) ROM Peripherals ROM Peripherals ROM Peripherals OTP Fields OTP Fields On-chip Security Subsystem OTP Fields External Security Co-processor External Secure Element Embedded Secure Element Processor Secure Environment TEE component 19 Figures taken from GlobalPlatform Device Technology, TEE System Architecture, Version 1.0, December 2011

20 Hardware security architectures (mobile) ARM TrustZone and TI M-Shield Augments central processing unit: Secure processor mode Isolated execution with on-chip RAM: Very limited (<20kB) Secure storage: Typically with write-once E-fuses Usually no counters or non-volatile memory: Cost issue Hardware security Processor Secure Environment 20

21 Hardware security architectures (TCG) Hardware security Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Standalone processor on PCs Isolated execution for pre-defined algorithms Arbitrary isolated execution with DRTM ( late launch ) Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) Monotonic counters External Secure Element Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) Mobile variant of TPM Defines interface Implementation alternatives: TrustZone, M-Shield, software 21

22 Uses of hardware security Hardware security Recap from features Secure/authenticated boot Identity binding/device authentication Secure storage Remote attestation Uses of hardware security (device manufacturer) Device initialization DRM Subsidy lock How can developers make use of hardware security? an example in the second part of this seminar 22

23 23 Software platform security

24 Open mobile platforms Software Platform security Java ME ~2001 For feature phones 3 billion devices! Not supported by most smartphone platforms Symbian ~2004 First smartphone OS App development in C++ (Qt) Android ~2007 Linux-based OS App development in Java MeeGo ~2010 Linux-based OS App development in C++ (Qt) MSSF (Intel Tizen) Windows Phone ~2010 App development in.net 24

25 Mobile platform security model Software Platform security Common techniques Application signing Permission-based access control architecture Application isolation Common operations 1. Permission request 2. Application signing 3. Application installation 4. Application loading 5. Run-time access control enforcement 25

26 Step 1: Developer publishes an application Software Platform security Developer submits the application to a centralized marketplace In some platforms the application can be directly pushed to the mobile device Centralized marketplace Developer Auxiliary marketplaces Developer requests permissions for his application Some platforms support auxiliary marketplaces Mobile device TCB 26

27 Step 2: Marketplace signs the application Software Platform security Developer In some platforms the developer signs the application Marketplace provider checks the application (and requested permissions) and signs it Centralized marketplace Auxiliary marketplaces Mobile device TCB 27

28 Step 3: Application installation Developer Software Platform security Installer may request the user to accept some of the requested permissions Mobile device receives an application installation package from a marketplace (or developer) Centralized marketplace Auxiliary marketplaces User Mobile device TCB Installer consults local policy database about requested permissions After these checks, the installer assigns these permissions to the application Application permission database Policy database Application Installer Installer stores application permissions Secure storage integrity Platform integrity Installer checks application signature and requested permissions 28 Permission and policy databases need integrity protection Application installer component needs integrity protection

29 Step 4: Application loading Software Platform security Developer Centralized marketplace Auxiliary marketplaces User Mobile device Application Loader attaches permissions to the started process TCB Application permission database Policy database Application loader Application Installer Secure storage integrity Platform integrity Loader reads permissions from the permission database 29 Also loader component needs integrity protection

30 Step 5: Application execution Software Platform security Developer Centralized marketplace Auxiliary marketplaces User OS/HW isolate applications from one another at runtime Mobile device Application Application Application TCB Reference monitor Application permission database Policy database Some applications need secrecy for their persistent storage Application loader Application Installer Some applications need device identification (e.g., DRM) Reference monitor controls access to system resources with permissions 30 Platform integrity Secure storage secrecy integrity Secure state Some applications need secure state (e.g., DRM) Device identification Random Some applications may also need source of randomness

31 Step 6: System updates Software Platform security Developer Platform provider Centralized marketplace Auxiliary marketplaces User Platform providers issues (signed) system updates Mobile device Application Application Application TCB System updater verifies received update using policy Reference database monitor Application permission database Policy database Application loader Application Installer System updater System updater rewrites parts of system software Platform integrity Secure storage secrecy integrity Secure state Device identification Random System updates may need device identification 31 System updates need secure state to prevent rollbacks to previous system version

32 Recap main techniques Software Platform security Developer 1. Permission request Platform provider Centralized marketplace Auxiliary marketplaces User 2. Application signing Mobile device 5. Application isolation Application Application Application OS 6. API to system functionality (e.g. secure storage) Reference monitor 4. Permission-based access control Application permission database Policy database Application loader Application Installer System updater 3. Permission assignment Platform integrity Secure storage secrecy integrity Secure state Device identification Random 32

33 Software Platform security Software platform security design choices Device boot How is platform integrity verified? Application development and installation How finely are access control policies defined? What is the basis for granting permissions? Application installation What is shown to the user? Application runtime How is the integrity of installed applications protected? How can applications protect the confidentiality and integrity of their data? Application updates How is a new version of an existing application verified? 33

34 OS bootstrapping Software Platform security Is hardware security used to secure OS bootstrapping? Symbian Java ME Android MSSF Windows Phone Secure boot Not applicable Typically no Authenticated boot: Normal mode vs Developer mode Secure boot 39

35 Permission granularity Software Platform security How finely is access control defined? Symbian Java ME Android MSSF Windows Phone Fixed set of capabilities (21) Fine-grained permissions (many) Fine-grained permissions (112) Linux access control Fine-grained resource-tokens Linux access control Fixed set of capabilities (16) Android and MSSF: Each application is installed under a separate Linux UID 40

36 Permission assignment (basis) Software Platform security What is the basis for granting permissions? Symbian Java ME Android MSSF Windows Phone 4 categories Trusted signature (also user prompts) Trusted signatures for protection domains 4 permission modes 4 protection levels Trusted signatures Local policy file Trusted signatures (user prompt for location) User System, Restricted, Manufacturer Blanket, Session, One-shot, No Normal (automatic) Dangerous (user-granted) Signature (developer-controlled) SystemOrSignature (Google-controlled) 41

37 Permission assignment (user prompting) Symbian Java ME Android Windows Phone Capability description 21 capabilities Function group description 15 groups Permission group description 11 groups Software Platform security User prompted only for location capability E.g.,Read user data, Use network, Access positioning, E.g., NetAccess PhoneCall Location, E.g., LOCATION, NETWORK, ACCOUNTS, 42 What is shown to the user? Skip to Application Updates Only LOCATION

38 Permission assignment (timing) Software Platform security When are permissions assigned to a principal? Symbian Java ME Android MSSF Windows Phone Install-time assignment Run-time prompts Install-time assignment Install-time assignment Run-time privilege shedding possible Install-time assignment Symbian and MSSF: Permissions of app loading a DLL is a subset of permissions of DLL 43

39 Access control policy Software Platform security How does a resource declare the policy for accessing it? How is it enforced? Symbian Java ME Android MSSF Windows Phone Declare in code Enforced by IPC framework or code [System resources] Enforced by VM Declare in manifest Enforced by VM Declare in manifest Enforced by Smack or via libcreds [System resources] Enforced by VM 44

40 Application identification Software Platform security How are applications identified at install and runtime? Symbian Java ME Android MSSF Windows Phone Install and runtime: Protected range SID and VID (managed) UID (unmanaged) Install: Signing key Midlet attributes Install: Signing key Runtime: Unix UID Package name (locally unique) Install: Software source (signing key) Package name Runtime: Software source Package name Application ID Install and runtime: Unique ID (assigned by marketplace) 45

41 Application integrity Software Platform security How is the integrity of installed applications protected? Symbian Java ME Android MSSF Windows Phone Dedicated directory Java sandboxing Java sandboxing Linux access control IMA, Smack Offline protection with EVM and TEE.NET sandboxing Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) store hash of file (in extended attribute security.ima) and verify on launch Extended Validation Module (EVM) store MAC of all extended attributes (in security.evm) and verify on access 46

42 Application update Software Platform security How is a new version of an existing application verified? Symbian Java ME Android MSSF Windows Phone Protected SID/VID: trusted signature Rest: no controls Signed midlets: same-origin policy Unsigned midlets: user prompt Same origin policy Same or higher origin policy Trusted signature 47

43 Application data protection Software Platform security How can applications protect the confidentiality and integrity of their data? Symbian Java ME Android MSSF Windows Phone Runtime: private directory Runtime: private record stores Runtime: dedicated UID file system Runtime: fine-grained data caging Runtime: private directory Off-line: private secure storage Off-line: private secure storage 48

44 49 Discussion

45 Recurring themes (hardware enablers) Discussion Hardware-support for platform security Cambridge CAP etc. (~1970 s) Extended to Processor Secure Environments Hardware-assisted secure storage Secure and authenticated boot Academic research projects (mid 1990 s) TCPA and TCG (late 1990 s) Extended (private secure storage for applications) Adapted (normal vs. developer mode in MSSF) 50

46 Recurring themes (software platforms) Discussion Permission-based platform security architectures VAX /VMS privileges for user (~1970 s) Adapted for applications Code signing (mid 1990 s) Used for application installation Application/process isolation 51

47 Open issues Discussion Permission granularity Coarse-grained permissions vs. principle of least privilege Fine-grained permissions vs. user/developer confusion [Felt et al, CCS 12] Permission assignment Is it sensible to let end users make policy assignment decisions? [Chia et al, WWW 12] [Felt et al, SOUPS 12] Centralized vetting for appropriateness Can central authority decide what is offensive? Can there be crowd-sourced alternatives? [Chia et al, Nordsec 10, Amini et al, CMU 12] Colluding applications How to detect/prevent applications from pooling their privileges? [Marforio et al, ETHZ 11] [Schlegel et al, NDSS 11] [Bugiel et al, NDSS 12] 52

48 Summary Discussion Mobile phone security Requirements: operators, regulators, user expectations Closed open Early adaptation of hardware security mechanisms Platform security architecture 1. Application signing 2. Permission based access control 3. Application isolation Many features borrowed or adapted Open issues remain This tutorial is based on an earlier survey paper [Kostiainen et al, CODASPY 2011]; expanded version in preparation. 53

A Perspective on the Evolution of Mobile Platform Security Architectures

A Perspective on the Evolution of Mobile Platform Security Architectures A Perspective on the Evolution of Mobile Platform Security Architectures N. Asokan Nokia Research Center Joint work with Kari Kostiainen, Jan-Erik Ekberg, Elena Reshetova (Intel) Padova, July 2012 1 Introduction

More information

A Perspective on the Evolution of Mobile Platform Security Architectures

A Perspective on the Evolution of Mobile Platform Security Architectures A Perspective on the Evolution of Mobile Platform Security Architectures Kari Kostiainen Nokia Research Center, Helsinki TIW, June 2011 Joint work with N. Asokan, Jan-Erik Ekberg and Elena Reshetova 1

More information

Patterns for Secure Boot and Secure Storage in Computer Systems

Patterns for Secure Boot and Secure Storage in Computer Systems Patterns for Secure Boot and Secure Storage in Computer Systems Hans Löhr, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Marcel Winandy Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany {hans.loehr,ahmad.sadeghi,marcel.winandy}@trust.rub.de

More information

A Virtualized Linux Integrity Subsystem for Trusted Cloud Computing

A Virtualized Linux Integrity Subsystem for Trusted Cloud Computing A Virtualized Linux Integrity Subsystem for Trusted Cloud Computing Stefan Berger Joint work with: Kenneth Goldman, Dimitrios Pendarakis, David Safford, Mimi Zohar IBM T.J. Watson Research Center 09/21/2011

More information

Lecture 17: Mobile Computing Platforms: Android. Mythili Vutukuru CS 653 Spring 2014 March 24, Monday

Lecture 17: Mobile Computing Platforms: Android. Mythili Vutukuru CS 653 Spring 2014 March 24, Monday Lecture 17: Mobile Computing Platforms: Android Mythili Vutukuru CS 653 Spring 2014 March 24, Monday Mobile applications vs. traditional applications Traditional model of computing: an OS (Linux / Windows),

More information

Lecture Embedded System Security A. R. Sadeghi, @TU Darmstadt, 2011 2012 Introduction Mobile Security

Lecture Embedded System Security A. R. Sadeghi, @TU Darmstadt, 2011 2012 Introduction Mobile Security Smartphones and their applications have become an integral part of information society Security and privacy protection technology is an enabler for innovative business models Recent research on mobile

More information

Example of Standard API

Example of Standard API 16 Example of Standard API System Call Implementation Typically, a number associated with each system call System call interface maintains a table indexed according to these numbers The system call interface

More information

Building Blocks Towards a Trustworthy NFV Infrastructure

Building Blocks Towards a Trustworthy NFV Infrastructure Building Blocks Towards a Trustworthy NFV Infrastructure IRTF NFVRG Adrian L. Shaw Hewlett-Packard Laboratories / July 22 nd, 2015 1 Why security and trust? Big requirement for critical

More information

M-Shield mobile security technology

M-Shield mobile security technology Technology for Innovators TM M-Shield mobile security technology making wireless secure Overview As 3G networks are successfully deployed worldwide, opportunities are arising to deliver to end-users a

More information

Analysis of advanced issues in mobile security in android operating system

Analysis of advanced issues in mobile security in android operating system Available online atwww.scholarsresearchlibrary.com Archives of Applied Science Research, 2015, 7 (2):34-38 (http://scholarsresearchlibrary.com/archive.html) ISSN 0975-508X CODEN (USA) AASRC9 Analysis of

More information

User. Role. Privilege. Environment. Checkpoint. System

User. Role. Privilege. Environment. Checkpoint. System 8. Security Features Motivation Viruses, spam, trojan horses have become increasingly common in PC environment In mobile environment, new kinds of opportunities offered for malicious software Potentially

More information

Trustworthy Computing

Trustworthy Computing Stefan Thom Senior Software Development Engineer and Security Architect for IEB, Microsoft Rob Spiger, Senior Security Strategist Trustworthy Computing Agenda Windows 8 TPM Scenarios Hardware Choices with

More information

Mobile Operating Systems. Week I

Mobile Operating Systems. Week I Mobile Operating Systems Week I Overview Introduction Mobile Operating System Structure Mobile Operating System Platforms Java ME Platform Palm OS Symbian OS Linux OS Windows Mobile OS BlackBerry OS iphone

More information

Secure Wireless Application Platform

Secure Wireless Application Platform Texas Instruments SW@P Secure Wireless Application Platform New Challenges for Wireless Handsets Open Environment Multi-application, Interoperability Multiple Access Data Paths GSM/GPRS, EDGE, 802.11,

More information

CycurHSM An Automotive-qualified Software Stack for Hardware Security Modules

CycurHSM An Automotive-qualified Software Stack for Hardware Security Modules CycurHSM An Automotive-qualified Software Stack for Hardware Security Modules Dr. Frederic Stumpf, ESCRYPT GmbH Embedded Security, Stuttgart, Germany 1 Introduction Electronic Control Units (ECU) are embedded

More information

Mobile Simplified Security Framework

Mobile Simplified Security Framework Mobile Simplified Security Framework Dmitry Kasatkin Nokia Corporation dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com Abstract Linux kernel has already several security frameworks such SELinux, AppArmor, Tomoyo and Smack.

More information

Security Technology for Smartphones

Security Technology for Smartphones Security Technology for Smartphones Yasuhiko Abe Hitoshi Ikeda Masafumi Emura Service functions are implemented on smartphones by storing on them personal information, network-operator information, corporate

More information

Chapter 14 Virtual Machines

Chapter 14 Virtual Machines Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles Chapter 14 Virtual Machines Eighth Edition By William Stallings Virtual Machines (VM) Virtualization technology enables a single PC or server to simultaneously

More information

Embedded Trusted Computing on ARM-based systems

Embedded Trusted Computing on ARM-based systems 1 / 26 Embedded Trusted Computing on ARM-based systems Martin Schramm, M.Eng. 10.04.2014 Agenda 2 of 26 martin.schramm@th-deg.de Embedded computing platforms have become omnipresent intend to alleviate

More information

Acronym Term Description

Acronym Term Description This glossary contains definitions of terms created by TCG, or terms that have a particular meaning in trusted computing, or terms that cause particular confusion in trusted computing. Acronym Term Description

More information

Software Execution Protection in the Cloud

Software Execution Protection in the Cloud Software Execution Protection in the Cloud Miguel Correia 1st European Workshop on Dependable Cloud Computing Sibiu, Romania, May 8 th 2012 Motivation clouds fail 2 1 Motivation accidental arbitrary faults

More information

ios Security Decoded Dave Test Classroom and Lab Computing Penn State ITS Feedback - http://j.mp/psumac33

ios Security Decoded Dave Test Classroom and Lab Computing Penn State ITS Feedback - http://j.mp/psumac33 ios Security Decoded Dave Test Classroom and Lab Computing Penn State ITS Feedback - http://j.mp/psumac33 Why care about ios Security? 800M 800 million ios devices activated 130 million in last year 98%

More information

Android Architecture For Beginners

Android Architecture For Beginners Leon Romanovsky leon@leon.nu www.leon.nu April 22, 2013 Introduction Linux-based operating system with market share - 69.70% in smartphones, 42% in tablets, available on smart TVs and mini PC. History

More information

Can you trust me now? The Current State of Mobile Security

Can you trust me now? The Current State of Mobile Security Can you trust me now? The Current State of Mobile Security Black Hat USA August 2016 Atredis Partners Overview Bene Diagnoscitur, Bene Curatur That which is well diagnosed is well cured. Research Driven

More information

BUSINESS PROTECTION. PERSONAL PRIVACY. ONE DEVICE.

BUSINESS PROTECTION. PERSONAL PRIVACY. ONE DEVICE. BUSINESS PROTECTION. PERSONAL PRIVACY. ONE DEVICE. Enhanced Security for Your Network and Business Intelligence. Work Hard. Rest Easy. Today, employees are always on, which for you means always vulnerable.

More information

Oracle Solaris Security: Mitigate Risk by Isolating Users, Applications, and Data

Oracle Solaris Security: Mitigate Risk by Isolating Users, Applications, and Data Oracle Solaris Security: Mitigate Risk by Isolating Users, Applications, and Data Will Fiveash presenter, Darren Moffat author Staff Engineer Solaris Kerberos Development Safe Harbor Statement The following

More information

BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10. Secure Work Space for ios and Android Version: 10.1.1. Security Note

BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10. Secure Work Space for ios and Android Version: 10.1.1. Security Note BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10 Secure Work Space for ios and Android Version: 10.1.1 Security Note Published: 2013-06-21 SWD-20130621110651069 Contents 1 About this guide...4 2 What is BlackBerry Enterprise

More information

CSE543 - Introduction to Computer and Network Security. Module: Reference Monitor

CSE543 - Introduction to Computer and Network Security. Module: Reference Monitor CSE543 - Introduction to Computer and Network Security Module: Reference Monitor Professor Trent Jaeger 1 Living with Vulnerabilities So, software is potentially vulnerable In a variety of ways So, how

More information

Lecture 2 PLATFORM SECURITY IN ANDROID OS

Lecture 2 PLATFORM SECURITY IN ANDROID OS Lecture 2 PLATFORM SECURITY IN ANDROID OS You will be learning: Android as a software platform Internals and surrounding ecosystem Security techniques in Android: Application signing Application isolation

More information

Lecture Embedded System Security Dynamic Root of Trust and Trusted Execution

Lecture Embedded System Security Dynamic Root of Trust and Trusted Execution 1 Lecture Embedded System Security Dynamic Root of Trust and Execution Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi System Security Lab Technische Universität Darmstadt (CASED) Germany Summer Term 2014 Dynamic Root

More information

OMAP platform security features

OMAP platform security features SWPT008 - July 2003 White Paper OMAP platform security features By Harini Sundaresan Applications Engineer, OMAP Security Texas Instruments, Wireless Terminal Business Unit This white paper introduces

More information

Research and Design of Universal and Open Software Development Platform for Digital Home

Research and Design of Universal and Open Software Development Platform for Digital Home Research and Design of Universal and Open Software Development Platform for Digital Home CaiFeng Cao School of Computer Wuyi University, Jiangmen 529020, China cfcao@126.com Abstract. With the development

More information

Adobe Flash Player and Adobe AIR security

Adobe Flash Player and Adobe AIR security Adobe Flash Player and Adobe AIR security Both Adobe Flash Platform runtimes Flash Player and AIR include built-in security and privacy features to provide strong protection for your data and privacy,

More information

CARTES 2012 Demo presentation. Secure Trusted Execution Environment

CARTES 2012 Demo presentation. Secure Trusted Execution Environment CARTES 2012 Demo presentation Secure Trusted Execution Environment MobiCore offers a preventive security solution, protecting most of currently known cyber attacks, complementary to other security solutions

More information

Network Licensing. White Paper 0-15Apr014ks(WP02_Network) Network Licensing with the CRYPTO-BOX. White Paper

Network Licensing. White Paper 0-15Apr014ks(WP02_Network) Network Licensing with the CRYPTO-BOX. White Paper WP2 Subject: with the CRYPTO-BOX Version: Smarx OS PPK 5.90 and higher 0-15Apr014ks(WP02_Network).odt Last Update: 28 April 2014 Target Operating Systems: Windows 8/7/Vista (32 & 64 bit), XP, Linux, OS

More information

SECURE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF CONTENT PROTECTION (DRM) SCHEMES ON CONSUMER ELECTRONIC DEVICES

SECURE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF CONTENT PROTECTION (DRM) SCHEMES ON CONSUMER ELECTRONIC DEVICES SECURE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF CONTENT PROTECTION (DRM) SCHEMES ON CONSUMER ELECTRONIC DEVICES Contents Introduction... 3 DRM Threat Model... 3 DRM Flow... 4 DRM Assets... 5 Threat Model... 5 Protection of

More information

Security challenges for internet technologies on mobile devices

Security challenges for internet technologies on mobile devices Security challenges for internet technologies on mobile devices - Geir Olsen [geiro@microsoft.com], Senior Program Manager for Security Windows Mobile, Microsoft Corp. - Anil Dhawan [anild@microsoft.com],

More information

QUIRE: : Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems

QUIRE: : Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems QUIRE: : Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems Dan S. Wallach Rice University Joint work with Mike Dietz, Yuliy Pisetsky, Shashi Shekhar, and Anhei Shu Android's security is awesome

More information

Index. BIOS rootkit, 119 Broad network access, 107

Index. BIOS rootkit, 119 Broad network access, 107 Index A Administrative components, 81, 83 Anti-malware, 125 ANY policy, 47 Asset tag, 114 Asymmetric encryption, 24 Attestation commercial market, 85 facts, 79 Intel TXT conceptual architecture, 85 models,

More information

End User Devices Security Guidance: Apple OS X 10.10

End User Devices Security Guidance: Apple OS X 10.10 GOV.UK Guidance End User Devices Security Guidance: Apple OS X 10.10 Published Contents 1. Changes since previous guidance 2. Usage scenario 3. Summary of platform security 4. How the platform can best

More information

Kernel Types System Calls. Operating Systems. Autumn 2013 CS4023

Kernel Types System Calls. Operating Systems. Autumn 2013 CS4023 Operating Systems Autumn 2013 Outline 1 2 Types of 2.4, SGG The OS Kernel The kernel is the central component of an OS It has complete control over everything that occurs in the system Kernel overview

More information

Hardware Security Modules for Protecting Embedded Systems

Hardware Security Modules for Protecting Embedded Systems Hardware Security Modules for Protecting Embedded Systems Marko Wolf, ESCRYPT GmbH Embedded Security, Munich, Germany André Weimerskirch, ESCRYPT Inc. Embedded Security, Ann Arbor, USA 1 Introduction &

More information

Security Technical. Overview. BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10. BlackBerry Device Service Solution Version: 10.2

Security Technical. Overview. BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10. BlackBerry Device Service Solution Version: 10.2 BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10 BlackBerry Device Service Solution Version: 10.2 Security Technical Overview Published: 2014-09-10 SWD-20140908123239883 Contents 1 About BlackBerry Device Service solution

More information

Lecture Overview. INF3510 Information Security Spring 2015. Lecture 4 Computer Security. Meaningless transport defences when endpoints are insecure

Lecture Overview. INF3510 Information Security Spring 2015. Lecture 4 Computer Security. Meaningless transport defences when endpoints are insecure Lecture Overview INF3510 Information Security Spring 2015 Fundamental computer security concepts CPU and OS kernel security mechanisms Virtualization Memory Protection Trusted computing and TPM Lecture

More information

Secure Containers. Jan 2015 www.imgtec.com. Imagination Technologies HGI Dec, 2014 p1

Secure Containers. Jan 2015 www.imgtec.com. Imagination Technologies HGI Dec, 2014 p1 Secure Containers Jan 2015 www.imgtec.com Imagination Technologies HGI Dec, 2014 p1 What are we protecting? Sensitive assets belonging to the user and the service provider Network Monitor unauthorized

More information

Using the TPM to Solve Today s Most Urgent Cybersecurity Problems

Using the TPM to Solve Today s Most Urgent Cybersecurity Problems Using the to Solve Today s Most Urgent Cybersecurity Problems May 20, 2014 10:00AM PDT 2 Stacy Cannady, Technical Marketing Trustworthy Computing, Cisco Stacy Cannady, CISSP, is technical marketing - Trustworthy

More information

Desktop Virtualization. The back-end

Desktop Virtualization. The back-end Desktop Virtualization The back-end Will desktop virtualization really fit every user? Cost? Scalability? User Experience? Beyond VDI with FlexCast Mobile users Guest workers Office workers Remote workers

More information

A M D DA S 1. 0 For the Manageability, Virtualization and Security of Embedded Solutions

A M D DA S 1. 0 For the Manageability, Virtualization and Security of Embedded Solutions A M D DA S 1. 0 For the Manageability, Virtualization and Security of Embedded Solutions AMD DAS (DASH, AMD Virtualization (AMD-V ) Technology, and Security) 1.0 is a term used to describe the various

More information

A framework for on-device privilege escalation exploit execution on Android

A framework for on-device privilege escalation exploit execution on Android 1 A framework for on-device privilege escalation exploit execution on Android IWSSI/SPMU 2011 at Pervasive 2011 12. June 2011, San Francisco, CA, US Sebastian Höbarth, Rene Mayrhofer Fachhochschule Hagenberg,

More information

Protecting Data with Short- Lived Encryption Keys and Hardware Root of Trust. Dan Griffin DefCon 2013

Protecting Data with Short- Lived Encryption Keys and Hardware Root of Trust. Dan Griffin DefCon 2013 Protecting Data with Short- Lived Encryption Keys and Hardware Root of Trust Dan Griffin DefCon 2013 Time-Bound Keys Announcements New tool: TimedKey.exe New whitepaper: Trusted Tamperproof Time on Mobile

More information

Special FEATURE. By Heinrich Munz

Special FEATURE. By Heinrich Munz Special FEATURE By Heinrich Munz Heinrich Munz of KUKA Roboter discusses in this article how to bring Microsoft Windows CE and WindowsXP together on the same PC. He discusses system and application requirements,

More information

(Advanced Topics in) Operating Systems Winter Term 2009 / 2010. Jun.-Prof. Dr.-Ing. André Brinkmann brinkman@upb.de Universität Paderborn PC

(Advanced Topics in) Operating Systems Winter Term 2009 / 2010. Jun.-Prof. Dr.-Ing. André Brinkmann brinkman@upb.de Universität Paderborn PC (Advanced Topics in) Operating Systems Winter Term 2009 / 2010 Jun.-Prof. Dr.-Ing. André Brinkmann brinkman@upb.de Universität Paderborn PC 1 Overview Overview of chapter 3: Case Studies 3.1 Windows Architecture.....3

More information

Introducing etoken. What is etoken?

Introducing etoken. What is etoken? Introducing etoken Nirit Bear September 2002 What is etoken? Small & portable reader-less Smartcard Standard USB connectivity Logical and physical protection Tamper evident (vs. tamper proof) Water resistant

More information

Symbian phone Security

Symbian phone Security ITSX Overview Symbian OS. Risks and Features. Taking it apart. Conclusions. Symbian History Psion owner of EPOC OS, originally from 1989, released EPOC32 in 1996 EPOC32 was designed with OO in C++ 1998:

More information

Security Enhanced Linux on Embedded Systems: a Hardware-accelerated Implementation

Security Enhanced Linux on Embedded Systems: a Hardware-accelerated Implementation Security Enhanced Linux on Embedded Systems: a Hardware-accelerated Implementation Leandro Fiorin, Alberto Ferrante Konstantinos Padarnitsas, Francesco Regazzoni University of Lugano Lugano, Switzerland

More information

What s New in Juniper s SSL VPN Version 6.0

What s New in Juniper s SSL VPN Version 6.0 What s New in Juniper s SSL VPN Version 6.0 This application note describes the new features available in Version 6.0 of the Secure Access SSL VPN products. This document assumes familiarity with the Juniper

More information

Android Security. Device Management and Security. by Stephan Linzner & Benjamin Reimold

Android Security. Device Management and Security. by Stephan Linzner & Benjamin Reimold Android Security Device Management and Security by Stephan Linzner & Benjamin Reimold Introducing Stephan Linzner Benjamin Reimold Consultant, Software Engineer Mobile Developer Founder of Stuttgart GTUG

More information

Guidance End User Devices Security Guidance: Apple OS X 10.9

Guidance End User Devices Security Guidance: Apple OS X 10.9 GOV.UK Guidance End User Devices Security Guidance: Apple OS X 10.9 Published 23 January 2014 Contents 1. Changes since previous guidance 2. Usage Scenario 3. Summary of Platform Security 4. How the Platform

More information

Android Fundamentals 1

Android Fundamentals 1 Android Fundamentals 1 What is Android? Android is a lightweight OS aimed at mobile devices. It is essentially a software stack built on top of the Linux kernel. Libraries have been provided to make tasks

More information

SA Series SSL VPN Virtual Appliances

SA Series SSL VPN Virtual Appliances SA Series SSL VPN Virtual Appliances Data Sheet Published Date July 2015 Product Overview The world s mobile worker population passed the 1 billion mark in 2010 and will grow to more than 1.3 billion by

More information

M-Shield Mobile Security Technology: making wireless secure

M-Shield Mobile Security Technology: making wireless secure WHITE PAPER Jerome Azema Distinquished Member of Technical Staff WTBU Chief Technology Office - Security Texas Instruments Gilles Fayad Worldwide Strategic Marketing Manager, Mobile Platform Security and

More information

Business Protection. Personal Privacy. One Device. Enhanced Security for Your Network and Business Intelligence.

Business Protection. Personal Privacy. One Device. Enhanced Security for Your Network and Business Intelligence. Business Protection. Personal Privacy. One Device. Enhanced Security for Your Network and Business Intelligence. Work Hard. Rest Easy. Today, employees are always on, which for you means always vulnerable.

More information

Sierraware Overview. Simply Secure

Sierraware Overview. Simply Secure Sierraware Overview Simply Secure Sierraware Software Suite SierraTEE/Micro Kernel TrustZone/GlobalPlatform TEE SierraVisor: Bare Metal Hypervisor Hypervisor for ARM Para-virtualization, TrustZone Virtualization,

More information

Verfahren zur Absicherung von Apps. Dr. Ullrich Martini IHK, 4-12-2014

Verfahren zur Absicherung von Apps. Dr. Ullrich Martini IHK, 4-12-2014 Verfahren zur Absicherung von Apps Dr. Ullrich Martini IHK, 4-12-2014 Agenda Introducing G&D Problem Statement Available Security Technologies Smartcard Embedded Secure Element Virtualization Trusted Execution

More information

Property Based TPM Virtualization

Property Based TPM Virtualization Property Based Virtualization Marcel Winandy Joint work with: Ahmad Reza Sadeghi, Christian Stüble Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security Chair for System Security Ruhr University Bochum, Germany Sirrix

More information

Trusted Platforms for Homeland Security

Trusted Platforms for Homeland Security Trusted Platforms for Homeland Security By Kevin Schutz, Product Manager Secure Products Summary Ongoing threats from hackers, viruses, and worms continue to make security a top priority for IT and business

More information

In-Depth Look at Capabilities: Samsung KNOX and Android for Work

In-Depth Look at Capabilities: Samsung KNOX and Android for Work In-Depth Look at Capabilities: Samsung KNOX and Android for Work Silent Install Using the Samsung KNOX Workspace Mobile Device Management (MDM) APIs, IT admins can install and enable applications automatically.

More information

Technologies to Improve. Ernie Brickell

Technologies to Improve. Ernie Brickell Technologies to Improve Platform Security Ernie Brickell Intel Corporation 9/29/2011 1 Security is Intel s Third Value Pillar Intel is positioning itself to lead in three areas: energy-efficient efficient

More information

vtpm: Virtualizing the Trusted Platform Module

vtpm: Virtualizing the Trusted Platform Module vtpm: Virtualizing the Trusted Platform Module Stefan Berger Ramón Cáceres Kenneth A. Goldman Ronald Perez Reiner Sailer Leendert van Doorn {stefanb, caceres, kgoldman, ronpz, sailer, leendert}@us.ibm.com

More information

Security Guide. BlackBerry Enterprise Service 12. for ios, Android, and Windows Phone. Version 12.0

Security Guide. BlackBerry Enterprise Service 12. for ios, Android, and Windows Phone. Version 12.0 Security Guide BlackBerry Enterprise Service 12 for ios, Android, and Windows Phone Version 12.0 Published: 2015-02-06 SWD-20150206130210406 Contents About this guide... 6 What is BES12?... 7 Key features

More information

Software-based TPM Emulator for Linux

Software-based TPM Emulator for Linux Software-based TPM Emulator for Linux Semester Thesis Mario Strasser Department of Computer Science Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich Summer Semester 2004 Mario Strasser: Software-based TPM

More information

Chapter 2: Operating-System Structures

Chapter 2: Operating-System Structures Chapter 2: Operating-System Structures Chapter 2: Operating-System Structures Operating System Services User Operating System Interface System Calls Types of System Calls System Programs Operating System

More information

Secure Data Management in Trusted Computing

Secure Data Management in Trusted Computing 1 Secure Data Management in Trusted Computing Ulrich Kühn Deutsche Telekom Laboratories, TU Berlin Klaus Kursawe (KU Leuven) Stefan Lucks (U Mannheim) Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (RU Bochum) Christian Stüble (RU

More information

Cloud Terminal: Secure Access to Sensitive Applications from Untrusted Systems

Cloud Terminal: Secure Access to Sensitive Applications from Untrusted Systems Cloud Terminal: Secure Access to Sensitive Applications from Untrusted Systems Lorenzo Martignoni, Pongsin Poosankam, y Matei Zaharia, Jun Han, y Stephen McCamant, Dawn Song, Vern Paxson, Adrian Perrig,

More information

Uni-directional Trusted Path: Transaction Confirmation on Just One Device

Uni-directional Trusted Path: Transaction Confirmation on Just One Device Uni-directional Trusted Path: Transaction Confirmation on Just One Device Atanas Filyanov 1, Jonathan M. McCune 2, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi 3, Marcel Winandy 1 1 Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany 2 Carnegie Mellon

More information

Reminders. Lab opens from today. Many students want to use the extra I/O pins on

Reminders. Lab opens from today. Many students want to use the extra I/O pins on Reminders Lab opens from today Wednesday 4:00-5:30pm, Friday 1:00-2:30pm Location: MK228 Each student checks out one sensor mote for your Lab 1 The TA will be there to help your lab work Many students

More information

System Structures. Services Interface Structure

System Structures. Services Interface Structure System Structures Services Interface Structure Operating system services (1) Operating system services (2) Functions that are helpful to the user User interface Command line interpreter Batch interface

More information

Trustworthy Execution on Mobile Devices: What security properties can my mobile platform give me?

Trustworthy Execution on Mobile Devices: What security properties can my mobile platform give me? Trustworthy Execution on Mobile Devices: What security properties can my mobile platform give me? Amit Vasudevan, Emmanuel Owusu, Zongwei Zhou, James Newsome, and Jonathan M. McCune CyLab/Carnegie Mellon

More information

Secure web transactions system

Secure web transactions system Secure web transactions system TRUSTED WEB SECURITY MODEL Recently, as the generally accepted model in Internet application development, three-tier or multi-tier applications are used. Moreover, new trends

More information

Chapter 2 System Structures

Chapter 2 System Structures Chapter 2 System Structures Operating-System Structures Goals: Provide a way to understand an operating systems Services Interface System Components The type of system desired is the basis for choices

More information

Protecting the Filesystem Integrity of a Fedora 15 Virtual Machine from Offline Attacks using IMA/EVM Linux Security Summit 8 September 2011

Protecting the Filesystem Integrity of a Fedora 15 Virtual Machine from Offline Attacks using IMA/EVM Linux Security Summit 8 September 2011 Protecting the Filesystem Integrity of a Fedora 15 Virtual Machine from Offline Attacks using IMA/EVM Linux Security Summit 8 September 2011 Peter Kruus Peter.Kruus@jhuapl.edu Agenda Need for integrity

More information

Objectives. Chapter 2: Operating-System Structures. Operating System Services (Cont.) Operating System Services. Operating System Services (Cont.

Objectives. Chapter 2: Operating-System Structures. Operating System Services (Cont.) Operating System Services. Operating System Services (Cont. Objectives To describe the services an operating system provides to users, processes, and other systems To discuss the various ways of structuring an operating system Chapter 2: Operating-System Structures

More information

Digital Rights Management Demonstrator

Digital Rights Management Demonstrator Digital Rights Management Demonstrator Requirements, Analysis, and Design Authors: Andre Osterhues, Marko Wolf Institute: Ruhr-University Bochum Date: March 2, 2007 Abstract: This document describes a

More information

CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security

CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security CIS 551 / TCOM 401 Computer and Network Security Spring 2007 Lecture 3 1/18/07 CIS/TCOM 551 1 Announcements Email project groups to Jeff (vaughan2 AT seas.upenn.edu) by Jan. 25 Start your projects early!

More information

Technical Brief Distributed Trusted Computing

Technical Brief Distributed Trusted Computing Technical Brief Distributed Trusted Computing Josh Wood Look inside to learn about Distributed Trusted Computing in Tectonic Enterprise, an industry-first set of technologies that cryptographically verify,

More information

Mobile Protection. Driving Productivity Without Compromising Protection. Brian Duckering. Mobile Trend Marketing

Mobile Protection. Driving Productivity Without Compromising Protection. Brian Duckering. Mobile Trend Marketing Driving Productivity Without Compromising Protection Brian Duckering Mobile Trend Marketing Mobile Device Explosion Paves Way for BYOD 39% 69% 340% 2,170% 2010 177M corp PCs 2015 246M corp PCs 2010 173

More information

Tutorial on Smartphone Security

Tutorial on Smartphone Security Tutorial on Smartphone Security Wenliang (Kevin) Du Professor wedu@syr.edu Smartphone Usage Smartphone Applications Overview» Built-in Protections (ios and Android)» Jailbreaking and Rooting» Security

More information

CSE343/443 Lehigh University Fall Mobile Security. Presenter: Yinzhi Cao Lehigh University

CSE343/443 Lehigh University Fall Mobile Security. Presenter: Yinzhi Cao Lehigh University CSE343/443 Lehigh University Fall 2015 Mobile Security Presenter: Yinzhi Cao Lehigh University Some contents are borrowed from the following sources. http://siis.cse.psu.edu/slides/android-sec-tutorial.pdf

More information

Windows Phone 7 Internals and Exploitability

Windows Phone 7 Internals and Exploitability Windows Phone 7 Internals and Exploitability (abridged white paper) Tsukasa Oi Research Engineer 目 次 1. Abstract... 3 2. Introduction: Windows Phone 7 and Analysis... 3 3. Security Analysis Windows Phone

More information

Republic Polytechnic School of Information and Communications Technology C226 Operating System Concepts. Module Curriculum

Republic Polytechnic School of Information and Communications Technology C226 Operating System Concepts. Module Curriculum Republic Polytechnic School of Information and Communications Technology C6 Operating System Concepts Module Curriculum Module Description: This module examines the fundamental components of single computer

More information

How to Secure Infrastructure Clouds with Trusted Computing Technologies

How to Secure Infrastructure Clouds with Trusted Computing Technologies How to Secure Infrastructure Clouds with Trusted Computing Technologies Nicolae Paladi Swedish Institute of Computer Science 2 Contents 1. Infrastructure-as-a-Service 2. Security challenges of IaaS 3.

More information

Android Operating System

Android Operating System Prajakta S.Adsule Student-M.B.A.[I.T.] BharatiVidyapeeth Deemed University,Pune(india) praju_hiramani@yahoo.co.in Mob. No. 9850685985 Android Operating System Abstract- Android operating system is one

More information

Comprehensive Security for Internet-of-Things Devices With ARM TrustZone

Comprehensive Security for Internet-of-Things Devices With ARM TrustZone Comprehensive Security for Internet-of-Things Devices With ARM TrustZone Howard Williams mentor.com/embedded Internet-of-Things Trends The world is more connected IoT devices are smarter and more complex

More information

SierraVMI Sizing Guide

SierraVMI Sizing Guide SierraVMI Sizing Guide July 2015 SierraVMI Sizing Guide This document provides guidelines for choosing the optimal server hardware to host the SierraVMI gateway and the Android application server. The

More information

Computer System Structure

Computer System Structure Computer System Structure Reading: Silberschatz chapter 3 Additional Reading: Stallings chapter 2 EEL 602 1 Outline OS Services User Interfaces System Call OS Design OS Implementation System Structure

More information

Chapter 3 Operating-System Structures

Chapter 3 Operating-System Structures Contents 1. Introduction 2. Computer-System Structures 3. Operating-System Structures 4. Processes 5. Threads 6. CPU Scheduling 7. Process Synchronization 8. Deadlocks 9. Memory Management 10. Virtual

More information

Data Sheet. NCP Secure Enterprise Management. Next Generation Network Access Technology

Data Sheet. NCP Secure Enterprise Management. Next Generation Network Access Technology Centrally Managed VPN Fully Automatic Operation of a Remote Access VPN via a Single Console Enables easy rollout and operation of secure remote access infrastructures Central creation of client configuration

More information

Secure Boot on i.mx25, i.mx35, and i.mx51 using HABv3

Secure Boot on i.mx25, i.mx35, and i.mx51 using HABv3 Freescale Semiconductor Application Note Document Number: AN4547 Rev. 0, 10/2012 Secure Boot on i.mx25, i.mx35, and i.mx51 using HABv3 by Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. This application note explains how

More information

CEN 559 Selected Topics in Computer Engineering. Dr. Mostafa H. Dahshan KSU CCIS mdahshan@ccis.ksu.edu.sa

CEN 559 Selected Topics in Computer Engineering. Dr. Mostafa H. Dahshan KSU CCIS mdahshan@ccis.ksu.edu.sa CEN 559 Selected Topics in Computer Engineering Dr. Mostafa H. Dahshan KSU CCIS mdahshan@ccis.ksu.edu.sa Access Control Access Control Which principals have access to which resources files they can read

More information

CSE597a - Cell Phone OS Security. Cellphone Hardware. William Enck Prof. Patrick McDaniel

CSE597a - Cell Phone OS Security. Cellphone Hardware. William Enck Prof. Patrick McDaniel CSE597a - Cell Phone OS Security Cellphone Hardware William Enck Prof. Patrick McDaniel CSE597a - Cellular Phone Operating Systems Security - Spring 2009 - Instructors McDaniel and Enck 1 2 Embedded Systems

More information