Private military and security companies in European Union policy-making: a case of regulatory capture?

Transcription

1 Sophia Hunger draft Private military and security companies in European Union policy-making: a case of regulatory capture? Sophia Hunger, graduate student hungersophia@gmail.com Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen This is a preliminary draft. Please do not cite or distribute without permission of the author Content 1. Introduction The case: The privatization of security and the role of private security companies Conceptualizing interest group influence Research design Process tracing Regulation of PMSC in the European Union Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry Further analysis

2 1. Introduction The aim of this paper is to investigate the influence of private security companies on the privatisation of security in the European Union (EU). It draws on three broad strands of research that confirm the relevance of my research question. A first field of research deals with the privatisation of security, and the role of military and security companies (PMSC) in it. Scholars like Lemberg-Pedersen (2013) and Leander (2005) amongst others have problematized their influence on policies from a merely qualitative and theoretical view. But apart from a self-reinforcing mechanism and lock-in effects that favour privatisation, there was no attention on the role of the PMSC on the privatisation process itself. Secondly, this paper follows directly upon research that suggests that business groups may be more influential compared to other types of interest groups (Dür, 2008a). Third, the concept of regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971) is used to provide a systematic framework to explain the influence of PMSC on privatisation and regulation. This paper focuses on regulation on European level. Although PMSC in the EU are regulated as a part of the internal market and through regulations on the export of arms and military services, there was no common framework before the Security Industrial Policy was introduced in This Security Industrial Programme represented through the Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry will be the empirical basis for this paper. In a first step, I present research on the role of PMSC that highlights and problematizes their dual role in implementing the policies and influencing them, showing that the question concerning the role of PMSC in the process of privatisation has not been studied yet. Further I focus on interest group influence, its conceptualization and present various findings from previous research. Lastly, the method used in this paper will be presented and the analysis will be carried out. 2. The case: The privatization of security and the role of private security companies Various scholars have shown that there is a privatisation of security (Avant, 2005; Krahmann, 2008; Kruck, 2014; Kümmel, 2005; Singer, 2007; Spearin, 2008) and rising importance of private, commercial actors when it comes to European migration control (Betts, 2013; Gammeltoft-Hansen & Nyberg Sørensen, 2013; Guiraudon & Lahav, 2000; Kruck, 2014; Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013). Some research focused on the consequences of the privatisation in the area of security, e.g. on different modes of regulation of private security and military service suppliers and resulting 2

3 drawbacks and other consequences (Krahmann, 2005; Leander, 2010; Nevers, 2009; Schneiker, 2007) 1. A major part of this field of research is investigating the causes and conditions for the increasing privatisation of security, that Kruck (2014) divides and systematizes into three main lines: functionalist, political instrumentalist and ideationist. The functionalist argumentation explains the increasing privatisation as an effective and cost-efficient way for states to pursue their security goals (Carmola, 2010; Kinsey, 2009; Taylor, 2011). The reduction of political cost is seen as the main driving force leading to privatisation in the political-instrumentalist model (Avant, 2005, p. 60; Avant & Sigelman, 2010; Carmola, 2010, pp , 90 91). The ideationist model explains the privatisation with the diffusion neoliberalist ideas in economic policypromoting market-based solutions (Avant, 2005; Singer, 2007). The role of PSMC on the privatisation has not been subject of intensive research yet. Along these lines various scholars have called for more research on the influence of PSMC on policies and politics. In the field of global governance of migration, Betts (2013, pp ) stresses the influence of private actors on every stage of the policy making-process through strategies such as lobbying, corporate social responsibility, private rule-making and standard setting, their voluntary codes of conduct, public private partnerships and their expert knowledge. Using a constructivist perspectives and methodology Lemberg-Pedersen s (2013) research aims to investigate the influence of PSMCs on the designing of European borderscapes. He argues that the PSMCs use existential threats and market dynamics in order to create their own mode of governance and to wit demand for their own product security. This influences the decision makers [ ]by framing immigration flows as a mounting threat to Europe against which only the defence and security industry can supply the technological solutions, the PMSC are effectively making insecure audiences of governances and EU institutions (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013, p. 161). Leander (2005) argues that there is an increasing influence of private military companies (PMCs). This epistemic power is mostly exercised on the level of agency and lies beyond the decision-making process. She suggests that shapes both the security agenda and the key actors understanding of security, which in turn determines their interests and preferences. She shows that outsourcing creates dependence and that the power implementation give the PMCs a certain leeway (Leander, 2005, pp ). She perceives power as a structural phenomenon and analyses social practices in 1 Krahmann (2008) showed that security is more and more conceptualized as a commodity rather than as a collective good. Another development is that information on private military companies is hard to access which causes a lack of transparency, control and public consent (Avant & Sigelman, 2010). This would also be an explanation why there is not much research and public debate on this issue. 3

4 order to expose the Foucaultian knowledge-nexus in order to show to what extent PMCs are (dis)empowered by the evolving logic ( ) of the field of legitimate security expertise and to what extent their actions refashion this logic (intentionally or not) (Leander, 2005, p. 811). The study also provides extensive examples for the entanglement of PMCs in the shaping of security policies and the linkage of individual actors in both fields. For instance former Vice- President Dick Cheney, former Secretary of Defence Frank Carlucci, Republican politicians as James Baker and George W.H. Bush (Leander, 2005, p. 816). One of Leanders conclusions reads: With privatisation a new caste of private security experts emerged; and the expert is of course privileged in the production of legitimate knowledge (Leander, 2005, p. 820). This leads to a central point that is shared by most of the authors cited above: privatisation may be a self-reinforcing dynamic because of some of them call lock-in effects and others identify as pathdependency. Lock-in effects occur when PSMCs accumulate more and more knowledge through providing security in a long-term perspective, while government agencies loose this expertise. Therefore the criticism on the suppliers practices, problem definition and policy formulation are compounded for the decision-makers. This empowers the PMSC and may provide them with capacities in influencing policies (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2013, pp ; Menz, 2013, pp ). As the influence of PSMCs is uncontested in the literature, their involvement in the privatisation process has not been studied intensively so far. Besides the lock-in effects, the PMSC s power through implementation and the self-reinforcing dynamic. Drawing on the ideationist model, as arguing that PSMC profit from those market-based approach on security, they also actively take part in framing and establishing the privatised provision of security as a normal and proper mode of governance (2014, p. 119). Therefore this paper seeks to examine their influence on the privatisation itself with regard to the concept of regulatory capture. The concept can be understood as the subversion of regulatory agencies by the firms they regulate (Posner, 2013, p. 52). It has received attention from both political scientists as well as economists. While the former such as Marver Bernstein (1955) mainly focused on the organisational dimension of the life cycle of regulatory commissions, which inevitably results in a lack of vitality and easing the interest of the industry, economists saw regulation as shaped by the laws of supply and demand (Posner, 2013, p. 52). In his influential article from 1971 Stigler introduced its understanding of regulatory capture as regulation [that] is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits (1971, p. 3). The demand for regulation depends on the size of the group of beneficiaries as well as on how large their stakes are. This special interest pressure wins over the electoral pressure and the interest of consumers who will 4

5 not organise themselves as the benefits will not outweigh the costs for it. Furthermore industry groups either seek direct subsidies from the state or protectionism in order to prevent new rivals from entering the market. It is to show what the preferences of the PMSC are, how the try to formulate them and how they are involved in the regulation process in order to draw conclusion on the question if the PMSC have captured the European Commission when it comes to the privatisation of security. 3. Conceptualizing interest group influence This paper aims to investigate an empirical case which has an undeniable and tangible relevance in a public policy research framework on interest groups. In order to make this endeavour work and to get substantive findings, the hypothesis will be put in relation to previous research on interest group influence and lobbying. This includes not only relevant empirical findings, but also a theoretical discussion on the conceptualization of interest group influence. The hypothesis is derived from the literature and previous research on PSMCs is also in line with public policy research that deals with interest group influence on a higher abstraction level without focusing on so much on specific, substantial characteristics of the interest groups. Dür describes four strands of theory that tend to explain why interest groups might be successful: the interest groups resources, their strategies, the characteristics of the policy issues and the institutional context (2008a, pp ). Especially the policy issue itself and the groups resources seem to support the hypothesis deduced in the previous chapter. For a start, resources,including organizational capacity, financial resources, expertise and knowledge -, may influence the success of interest groups (Crombez, 2002; Hall & Deardorff, 2006). Research has shown that business interest groups have a comparative advantage regarding those resources. The fact that private business groups therefore have more influence than those of non-governmental and public interest nature which have been labelled as elite pluralism (Coen, 1997, 1998, 2007, p. 335; Mazey & Richardson, 2006). Business groups may especially stand out when it comes to information on market conditions, probable policy results, problems of implementation, and the support a specific policy will receive, which politicians need to assess the political feasibility of a policy proposal (Dür, 2008a, p. 1214). From a rational-choice point of view, the more information an interest group is provide in exchange for able to trade for influence, the more powerful it will be and thus maximise their utility (Kohler-Koch, 1994, p. 170). Providing information to politicians that 5

6 lack resources to gain information is a major part of lobbying (Chalmers, 2011; Crombez, 2002; Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). Secondly, this research also draws on the theory that issuescharacteristics, e.g. the type of policy, the degree of technicality and the degree of public interest in the issue (Dür, 2008a, p. 1218). Smith (2000), Greenwood (2003) and Beyers (2008) suggest that technical policy issues will be easier to influence for interest groups. Mahoney (2007) shows that issues which are in the centre of public interest may be harder to influence for public interest groups. In regards to PSMCs these findings match perfectly with Avant and Siglman s (2010) research that shows that information on PSMCs activities is hard to access for decisions-makers and the public. The conceptualization of influence is of high importance as it needs to be clear what is being measured. Influence is heavily intertwined with the concept of power, and defining the latter is an ongoing issue (Pedersen, 2013, p. 29). A common approach is to distinguish between power as control over outcomes, control over resources and control over actors. In research on interest group influence the former is the most common (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007, p. 3). This paper draws on the definition by Nagel: Influence is generally understood as an actor s ability to shape a decision in line with her preferences, or, in other words `a causal relation between the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself (Nagl, 1975, p. 29). But is not only the question of what kind of influence is measured exactly, but which pathways may be used to exercise this influence. Dür and De Bièvre distinguish between direct influence on decisions-makers, the opportunity to influence the selection of decision-makers, the strategy to shape public opinion and employing structural coercion power (2007, p. 3). 4. Research design In order to investigate the Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry and its origination process, a set of considerations regarding the measurement of regulatory capture is used. Carpenter (2013) develops claims which must be fulfilled to identify capture. Each claim needs to be identified in a specific case and all of them claims together are sufficient. He distinguishes between two kind of capture, the case of statutory capture and the agency capture. The first one implies that the capture happens before the administrator even acts, while the latter assumes that a public interest is embodied in the statute that delegates authority and resources (Carpenter, 2013, pp ). This paper draws on these categorisation which defines claims as: 6

7 1. Identifiable general interest or public interest, this public interest seeks to pursues people s welfare 2. Identifiable interest or goal of the industry 3. Identifiable special interest outside the industry interest, e.g. labour unions, environmental groups, NGOs; value certain goods more highly than the people do. 4. Conflict of industry/special interest and public interest 5. Existence of a capture mechanism by that the industry tries to make the regulator to choose the industry s interest over the people s welfare 6. In a pattern where the regulator should choose the welfare over the other interests, because of its statue and the case evidence, the agency chooses the industry s or the special interest. Without the capture and under the same conditions, the regulator would choose the people s welfare repeatedly over the industry s or the special interest. 7. Agency s choice for the industry s or the special interest comes with higher probability with the capture than without. (Carpenter 2013: 60) Carpenter stresses that for a full diagnoses of capture an analysis needs to show: (a) to posit a defensible model of public interest, (b) action and intent by the regulated industry, and (c) that the ultimate policy is shifted away from the public interest and toward industry interest. (Carpenter, 2013, p. 63). Hence a regulatory capture is a case of regulation where a set of interests have been served that differs from the public interest.carpenter underlines the importance of a public interest as a counterfactual in empirical studies on public interest (2013, p. 58). Despite the vivid academic debate on how to investigate group interest influence, there seems to be astonishing consensus among researchers on the fact that measuring this influence is a serious methodological dead-end (Chalmers, 2011, p. 471). This is not only due to the difficulties to conceptualize and measure influence, but also to the existence of different channels of influence, the occurrence of counteractive lobbying and the fact that influence can be wielded at different stages of the policy process (Friedrich, 2010, p. 37). Dür s influential work from 2008 suggests three main techniques in order to study the influence of interest groups in the EU: Process tracing, the attributed influence method and assessing the degree of preference attainment (Dür, 2008b, pp ). As all of them provide several advantages and drawbacks, Dür suggests a mixed-method approach, e.g. process-tracing which tends to underestimate the influence and preference attainment usually overestimating it (Dür, 2008a, pp , 2008b, p. 569). Carpenter also stresses the that inferential strategies should involve both quantitative and qualitative data in order to make qualified claims (Carpenter, 2013, p. 57). 7

8 Taking this advice into account the influence of PMSC will be investigated tracing the origination process of the Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry and by carrying out a quantitative analysis that allows to attain preferences. Therefore the analysis starts with taking a closer look at the context of EU regulation of PMSC, the origination process, the background and structural context of this process and the studies and conferences that were held and included. I further aim to identify the public interest and the industry s interest in order to see whether they diverge from each other, which is crucial for identifying a regulatory capture. This method tries to uncover the steps by which causes affect outcomes and provides a good knowledge of nearly all influencing factors (Dür, 2008b, p. 563). Carpenter argues that the interest that is hardest to define is that of welfare (W). He suggests four ways to identify the public interest; one of them is to rely on accepted theory. Drawing on this, I will argue that the public interest is to oppose the privatisation of security based on moral reasons. This is especially necessary, because there were no other stakeholders than PMSC and their lobby groups included in the public consultation on the Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry. There are three arguments that support the hypothesis that public interest is opposed to the privatisation of security. Firstly, privatised security may challenge the unity of states and therefore lead to disloyalty and bad behaviour (Percy, 2007a, p. 69). Besides that, there is also a strong resistance to private security from institutions such as the UN and in international law, stressing the moral obligations that come along with PSMC (Percy, 2007b, pp ). Caparini identifies the provision of security as a public interest and therefore emphasizes the government s obligation of regulation, especially when various actors are involved in the provision of security. It is of crucial importance that this provision supports democratic principles (2006, p. 272). The identification of the industry s interest is carried out by a careful investigation of the positions expressed in the origination process of the Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry, especially in the public consultation. Eventually, the special interests are to be identifies. The final part of my analysis includes a comparison of the different interests and the outcome of the Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry. This is related to the assessment of the degree of preference attainment, a method used in group influence research. Assessing the degree of preference attainment means comparing the interest groups positions with the actual policy outputs (Dür, 2008b, p. 566). The underlying idea of this method is that the distance between the outcome and the actor s influence depicts the actor s influence. It is suitable to reveal influence, 8

9 even when noting visible happens, i.e. when hidden processes or structural power determine the decision making process (Dür 2008: 567). 5. Process tracing 5. 1 Regulation of PMSC in the European Union The case for more regulation on PMSC is often traced back through their involvement in human right violating incidents and the ineffective existing regulation by regional and international actors such as the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries by African Union or the United Nations International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Furthermore, Krahmann stresses the importance of regulation through the EU, since it employs PMSC on a regularly basis (2006, pp ). Others draw attention on the fact that PMSC can evade the existing national regulations by shifting through site relocation (Born, Caparini, & Cole, 2007, p. 4). The term PMSC subsumes various actors and so are the policies they are regulated such as the internal market or the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Notable examples are the EU s Code of Conduct on Arms Export (1998), the Council Common Position on Armaments Brokering (2003/468/CFSP), the Council Joint Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2002/589/CFSP), and EU Embargoes on Technical Services. On national level regulation applies to technical assistance to weapons of mass destruction and embargoed countries, brokering, technical services related to controlled goods, military training and domestic security services (Krahmann, 2006, pp ). As a matter of course, PMSC are also impacted by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Convention on the Control of the Acquisition and Possession of Firearms by Individuals as well as by the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. Depending on the activity field, some PMSC are higher regulated as others, e.g. those providing airport security (Born et al., 2007, pp. 7 10). Although the European Court of Justice has stressed that PMSC belong to the economic sector and are therefore part of the first pillar of the internal market, 2 the sector has been excluded from Directive2006/123/EC on services in the internal market. On the 13 June of 2002 the Council 2 See Court of Justice of the EU, Case Law, Rulings C-114/97 (vs. Spain), C-355/98 (vs. Belgium), C-283/99 (vs. Italy), and C-189/03 (vs. Netherlands). 9

10 recommended the cooperation between the competent national authorities of Member States responsible for the private security sector 3. Both the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) and the European Organisation for Security (EOS) emphasized the need for regulation and harmonization of PMSC. The CoESS in collaboration with the trade union federation Uni-Europa signed a Code of Conduct for the sector on the 18 July 2003 aiming for raising standards and guaranteeing a high level of professional ethics in private security companies. 4 In a joint declaration from 15 October 2005 CoESS and Uni-Europa stated that they appreciate the decision to exclude the private security sector from the recent directive, as the nature of private security services ( ) that requires the establishment of strict conditions specific to the sector especially for entering the market, the screening of private security officers, training, the definition of activities, and the right and the obligation for national authorities to exercise a permanent control over private security companies. 5 They call for harmonisation in order to enhance the overall level of our industry which is necessary because of the sketchiness of national regulation. Some years later, another lobby organisation, the European Organisation for Security (EOS) called for more regulation. In a press release 6 of the organisation officials from major companies as Thales and the Airbus parent EADS call for common standards in order to have a synchronised and well organised industry. The statements were made at the official launch of the European Organisation for Security (EOS). In the following years private security companies have been the focus of European policy-making, which will be elaborated further. Carpenter sees intent as crucial for a valid capture diagnoses: There must, somewhere, be an attempt to lobby, an attempt to offer an implicit bribe or implicit contract, an attempt to stack the deck of an institutional process, or (as in cultural capture) an attempt to influence frames, assumptions, and worldviews of regulators or professionals involved in regulation (2013, p. 62). In this case I argue that the joint efforts of CoESS and the EOS as well as the launch of EOS can be seen as a clear attempt to influence EU regulation for their own benefits. 3 Council recommendation 2002/C 153/01, [available online, last visited ] Joint declaration by CoESS and UNI: Europa Towards a European Model of Private Security, p. 3 [available online, last visited ] 6 Press release Fragmented security industry wants EU standards [available online, last visited ]. 10

11 5. 2 Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry In the last ten years various initiatives were taken regarding the regulation of the security industrial policy in the EU. In 2007 the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) was founded at the 2nd European Conference on Security Research 7 as an initiative of the European Commission and the 27 EU Members with the goal of developing a European Research and Innovation Agenda (ESRIA) for the next 20 years presenting different context scenarios within this time period. It consisted of 65 members from 32 countries including representatives from the security industry, research institutions and universities, private and public users of security technology, non-governmental organizations and EU bodies. Over 600 experts contributed to ERIF s work. In the introduction of the report it is emphasized that ESRIF role is not to define security policy: it strives to inform decision making at industrial, national and European levels (ESRIF, 2009, pp ). The forum itself is embedded in the broader context of European Security Research which started in 2004 with the Preparatory Action for Security Research (PASR). Based on this research project, the EU s 7th Framework Programme for Research (FP7) was established for the period of ERSRIF is an succession organization of European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) which Lemberg-Pedersen labels just as the ESRIF as blurred private/public (ESRIF, 2009, p. 45; Lemberg- Pedersen, 2013, p. 153). Following this final report, a Communication of the Commission s initial reaction to ESRIF's key findings and recommendations was published calling for an ambitious industrial policy for the security sector, in order to harvest innovation and growth tomorrow. 8 According to the Commission Staff Working Paper on Security Industrial Policy (hereafter referred to as SIP working paper) this was the first time the need for a security industrial policy was emphasised (European Commission, 2012, p. 8). It can be seen as the initial spark for the development of a European Security Industrial Policy which also makes the security industry an indispensable part of the 2020 initiative "An Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage" that is labelled as a flagship. 7 Press release [available online, last visited ] 8 Communication from the Commission: "A European Security Research and Innovation Agenda - Commission's initial position on ESRIF's key findings and recommendations" [available online, last visited ] 11

12 The Commission Services Staff Working Document, and the Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry (hereafter referred to as SIP Action Plan) were both published on the 26 July The former resulted of the Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry s analysis on possible areas and measures where the EU could launch policy initiatives in support of the EU security industry (European Commission, 2012, p. 5). This analysis included three studies that were carried out by external contractors: 1. A study on the Competitiveness of the EU Security Industry. Within the Framework Contract for Sectoral Competitiveness Studies (ENTR/06/054) 9 by Ecorys (Netherlands), DECISION Études et Conseil (France) and TNO Management Consultants (Netherlands); 2. A study on the Regulatory Framework and Certification/Conformity Assessment Procedures in the Security Sector 10 by Ecorys (Netherlands); 3. A study on the Pre-commercial Procurement in the field of Security 11 by Ecorys (Netherlands) in collaboration with Manchester Institute of Innovation Research (UK) and the Corvers Procurement Service (UK). Further included studies consist of: 4. A study on the Civil-Military Synergies in the Field of Security 12 by Ecorys (Netherlands); 5. A study on the Industrial implications in Europe of the blurring of the dividing lines between Security and Defence 13 " by the Instituto Affari Internazionali (Italy) with partners from the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research (UK) and the Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (France); 6. work of the research project EUSECON (A New Agenda for European Security Economics) 14, that was financed by the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community and was carried out in cooperation with various partners: German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), Economics Institute, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (CERGE-EI) Charles University, Prague; Athens University of Economics and Business; University of Oxford (Center for Criminology and Queen Elizabeth House); Ingenieria de Sistemas para la Defensa de España, S.A. (Isdefe); University of the Basque Country, RAND Corporation; 9 ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/study_on_the_competitiveness_of_the_eu_security_industry_ en.pdf) 10 ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/doc/secerca_final_report_volume 1_main_report_en.pdf

13 Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Thessaly; Johannes Kepler University, Linz; International Peace Research Institute, Oslo; Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. The stakeholders were included in the origination process through various initiatives. Firstly, an online public consultation was held from 14th of March until the 15th of May The 59 answers came from enterprises (50,9 %), business associations (22%), national or regional administrations (8,5%), academic institutions or think tanks (5,1%), NGOs (6,8%) and other types of actors (6,8%) coming from 13 countries (European Commission, n.d., p. 2). There were also held several targeted consultations: 1. two High Level Public-Private Security Roundtable" organised by the EOS together with the Commission, held on 9 February 2011 and 21 March 2012; the "High Level Conference Defence and Security Industries and Markets" held on 23 May 2011, organised by VP Tajani and Commissioner Barnier; 16 speakers were amongst several politicians the CEO of Airbus Military Domingo Ureña Raso, chairman of Finmeccanica Pier Francesco Guarguaglini, Antoine Bouvier, CEO of missile developer and manufacturer MBDA, as well as Victor Chavez, Chief Executive of Thales UK. 3. a workshop on standardisation in the security held on 29 September 2011 and organised with European Committee for Standardization (CEN), European Committee for Electro technical Standardization (CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), participating were around 80 stakeholders from industry, national and European standardisation organisations, as well as a number of national ministries ; 4. a conference on "Competitiveness through Standardisation, held on 14 October 2011, industry representatives are mentioned as participant; 5. a workshop on Security Industrial Policy held on 18 October 2011, participating were around 100 stakeholders, named in the summary are EU Member States (Ministries of research, defence, interior and economics), Business associations (European Organisation for Security, German European Security Association, AeroSpace and Defence Industries of Europe), industry representatives as well as EU institutions (The EU counter terrorism coordinator, various DG's of the Commission) EOS website on this event format: 16 Summary of the discussions available online: f, last accessed Summaries of the latter three consultations included in annex 1 of the SIP working paper (European Commission, 2012, pp ). 13

14 As this tracing of the origination the SIP Action Plan has shown where PMSC and their business groups deeply involved in every step of the process. They first called for action and when they eventually were successful and the work on an industrial security policy started, they were included the consultation process in a special way, as they were not only contributing through the public consultation, but also by organizing and attending meetings. Although there were four NGOs contributing to the public consultation, they are not mentioned as participants of any of the meetings. 5. Further analysis The second part of my analysis focuses on the different actors ability to attain their preferences. Therefore I will analyse the documents relevant for the Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry, i.e. the background paper and the contributions of the public consultation, the summaries of the various conference and the Action Plan itself. Using an approach by Bunea & Ibenskas (2015) and Bunea (2013), my content analysis seeks to identify policy issues and the actors preferences regarding these issues. Based on the issues and preferences found, an ordinal scale will be constructed for every policy issue, with [e]ach preference receiv[ing] a value indicating that it is substantially different from the others while expressing the rank of each preference relative to each other in terms of the underlying policy dimension characterizing each issue (Bunea, 2013, p. 560). Likewise the preferences, the policy outcomes are coded on basis of the Action Plan (Bunea & Ibenskas, 2015, p. 10). After the coding interest groups preference attainment is estimated by coding a dummy variable stating whether or not a group has reached its goal for each policy issue. This is aggregated to the share of positions achieved in relation to all position expressed in order to have a continuous measure. Finally a Specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis (SMCA) is carried out (Bunea & Ibenskas, 2015, pp. 11, 15). This part of the analysis has not been conducted yet, as there is still empirical material missing due to the lengthy process of requesting for access to EU documents. 14

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