Washington State Homeland Security Region 9 REGIONAL THREAT/RISK ASSESSMENT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS REPORT

Transcription

1 Washington State Homeland Security Region 9 REGIONAL THREAT/RISK ASSESSMENT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS REPORT January 2011 Prepared for: Washington State Homeland Security Region N. Rebecca Avenue Spokane, WA Prepared by:

2 Disclaimers This document was prepared under a grant from the Office of Grants and Training, United States Department of Homeland Security. Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the Office of Grants and Training or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Per RCW there may be portions of these documents that are exempt from public disclosure based upon their sensitive nature. While regional in scope, these documents contain jurisdiction-specific data and decisions as to whether particular information will be provided to the public shall be made by the jurisdiction to which the request was directed, with a recommended notification of the request to other affected jurisdictions. Questions regarding the applicability of RCW and other disclosure laws and regulations to these documents should be addressed by the jurisdiction s legal counsel.

3 Executive Summary Executive Summary Washington State Homeland Security Region 9 is composed of ten counties in eastern Washington (Adams, Asotin, Columbia, Ferry, Garfield, Lincoln, Pend Oreille, Spokane, Stevens, and Whitman) and two tribes (Spokane and Kalispell). This geographic area extends from the Canadian border south to Oregon and along Idaho s western border. In order to increase emergency planning collaboration among the counties and tribes, Region 9 implemented a program to identify and quantify the risks associated with natural and technological/human-caused disasters and emergencies using a regional approach. Data and information used to develop this analysis came from publicly available sources, county and state planning documents, and through engagement of County and Regional stakeholders though a series of face-to-face interviews and workshops. This report is not a quantitative gap analysis or a critical infrastructure assessment. The intent of this program is to develop an overview of the hazards present, the probability of those hazards occurring, and the associated impacts to life, property, and the economy. This report is structured as a base document that provides a Regional threat, risk, and vulnerability picture and outlines the methodology utilized to conduct the analysis. A series of hazard-specific appendices follow the base document and describe each of the 17 Regional hazards individually. These sections provide Region-specific data around the history and impact of each hazard. This regional document is based upon review of existing local, regional and state plans including, but not limited to, Hazard Mitigation Plans, Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analyses, Community Wildfire Protection Plans and Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans. The 17 hazards included in this document may not include every hazard possible; however, it is intended to standardize and combine as appropriate hazard terminology from existing documents. To assess threats and risks, the analysis identified 17 natural and technological/man-made hazards that have the potential to occur and result in adverse consequences for the Region. Each of these hazards was then reviewed individually to determine the probability of future occurrence and the potential consequences to human health, property and the economy should those hazards occur. This process resulted in an assessment of relative risk among the hazards which can be used to prioritize future preparedness efforts by hazard. The 17 Regional hazards were distributed across four risk categories. The results, from highest to lowest risk, are listed in the table below. i

4 Executive Summary Risk Level Severe Risk Hazard Fire Wildland, Drought, Flood High Risk Transportation; Severe Local Weather; Fire Urban/Structural; Winter Storm; Infectious Disease/Epidemic/Pandemic; Terrorism; Hazardous Materials; Pipeline; Earthquake; Volcano (ash fall); Dam Failure Moderate Risk Low Risk Landslide; Civil Disturbance/Unrest; Columbia Generating Station None To assess the vulnerability of Region 9 to these hazards, each county utilized the Department of Homeland Security Target Capability List to conduct a self-assessment of current emergency management capabilities. The Target Capabilities List is composed of 37 actions that may be required to be conducted for any disaster or emergency in the missions of prevention, protection, response and recovery. In addition, there are five common capabilities that are required for any hazard. Evaluation of the Target Capabilities ensured an all-hazards approach to supplement the hazard-specific threat and risk assessment. It should be noted, that the assessments conducted in all 10 counties were done without extensive prior use of the DHS Capability Assessment (CA) Tool. It is one data point to integrate with local and regional planning processes. It is anticipated that score changes will happen merely as a result of further use and understanding of the tool. Each of the 37 Target Capabilities were reviewed and assigned a score on a scale of one to ten, with ten being completely prepared. In most cases, a value of four was used when a county determined that some capability to execute the task existed but no formal plan or procedure was in place. Individual county results were averaged across the 10 counties to develop a Regional self-assessment score for each capability. Average scores ranged from a low of 3 (Fatality Management) to a high of 7. Those capabilities that were ranked the lowest are considered potential vulnerabilities within Region 9, while those that were ranked highly are the least vulnerable. It is important to note that while some capabilities were ranked relatively high, they are not without vulnerabilities. It will be up to the Region to evaluate all of the capabilities and to determine internal priorities for decreasing vulnerabilities across all-hazards. The most and least vulnerable capabilities are listed in the table below. ii

5 Executive Summary Most Vulnerable Capabilities Fatality Management Animal Disease Emergency Support CBRNE Detection Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Community Preparedness Critical Infrastructure Protection Intelligence Analysis and Production Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment Volunteer Management and Donations Least Vulnerable Capabilities Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation Fire Incident Response Support Mass Care Mass Prophylaxis Medical Supplies Management and Distribution On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation Region 9 can use the results of the hazard risk assessment and the vulnerability analysis to evaluate current programs and to facilitate future strategic planning and decisions by capability and by hazard. Crosswalks contained within this document link the individual hazards to applicable capabilities that may be required during a response, and vice-versa. This gives the Region a detailed assessment for both all-hazards and hazard-specific preparedness initiatives. The result of this unified ten-county effort is the Washington Homeland Security Region 9 Threat/Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis Report. iii

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7 Table of Contents Table of Contents Executive Summary... i Table of Contents... v List of Tables... vii List of Figures... xi 1 Purpose and Scope Purpose Scope Region 9 Characteristics Geography and Climate Population Demographics Economy History of Presidential Disaster Declarations Fundamentals of Hazards, Risk and Vulnerability Methodology Hazard Identification Hazard Probability of Occurrence Hazard Consequences Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities Economic Losses Property Losses Region 9 Hazard Consequences Threat Risk Matrix Vulnerability Assessment Regional Capability Self-Assessment Results Target Capability to Hazard Crosswalk Conclusions v

8 Table of Contents 6.1 Hazards and Threats Consequences Relative Risk Vulnerabilities List of Acronyms References Target Capability Definitions Appendix A: Civil Disturbance/Unrest... A-1 Appendix B: Columbia Generating Station... B-1 Appendix C: Dam Failure... C-1 Appendix D: Drought... D-1 Appendix E: Earthquake...E-1 Appendix F: Fire Urban/Structural...F-1 Appendix G: Fire Wildland... G-1 Appendix H: Flood... H-1 Appendix I: Hazardous Materials...I-1 Appendix J: Infectious Disease Outbreak... J-1 Appendix K: Landslide... K-1 Appendix L: Pipelines...L-1 Appendix M: Severe Weather... M-1 Appendix N: Terrorism... N-1 Appendix O: Transportation... O-1 Appendix P: Winter Storm...P-1 Appendix Q: Volcano (Ash Fall)... Q-1 vi

9 List of Tables List of Tables Table 1: 2009 Population Figures for Region Table 2: Total Industry Earnings (2008) by Economic Sector...6 Table 3: Federally Declared Disasters Affecting Counties within Region 9, Table 4: Natural and Man-Made Hazards for Region Table 6: Economic Consequence Metrics as a Function of Total Industry Earnings...16 Table 7: Property Loss Consequence Metrics as a Function of 2008 Assessed Property Values...17 Table 8: Consequence Severity Estimates for Hazards Present in Region Table 9: Standard Risk Matrix Example...18 Table 10 Risk Severity Groups and Associated Hazards...19 Table 11: Probability and Consequence Summary for 17 Hazards in Region Table 12: Capability Self-Assessment Metrics...23 Table 13: Region 9 Capabilities Assessment Results...25 Table14: Threat, Risk and Vulnerability Crosswalk...28 Table A-1: Civil Disturbance/Unrest Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness... A-3 Table A-2: Civil Disturbance/Unrest Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk... A-4 Table B-1: Minor CGS Incidents in Recent History... B-2 Table B-2: Columbia Generating Station Incident Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness B- 4 Table B-3: Columbia Generating Station Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk... B-5 Table C-1: Dam Hazard Classification and Inspection Cycle... C-2 Table C-2: Region 9 Dam Inventory and Hazard Classification... C-4 Table C-3: Dam Failure Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness... C-6 Table C- 4: Dam Failure Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk... C-7 Table D-1 Serious or Extreme Drought Conditions in HLS Region 9 Counties... D-3 Table D-2 Region Agriculture Statistics... D-4 Table D-3: Drought Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness... D-6 Table D-4: Drought Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk... D-7 vii

10 List of Tables Table E-1: Damaging Benioff Zone Earthquakes in Washington... E-2 Table E-2: Earthquake Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness... E-4 Table E-3: Earthquake Hazard Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk... E-5 Table F-10: Region 9 Fire Statistics, F-2 Table F-2: Fire Urban/Structural Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness...F-4 Table F-3: Fire Urban/Structural Hazard Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk...F-5 Table G-1: Wildland Fire Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness...G-5 Table G- 2: Wildland Fire Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk...G-6 Table H-1: Flood Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness... H-4 Table H-2: Flood Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk... H-5 Table I-1: Hazardous Materials Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness...I-4 Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( )...I-7 Table J-1 Infectious Disease Outbreak Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness.J-3 Table J-2: Infectious Disease Outbreak Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk...J-4 Table K-1: Landslide Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness... K-3 Table K-2: Landslide Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk... K-4 Table L-11: Miles of Pipeline within Region 9 by County...L-1 Table L-12: Significant and Serious Pipeline Incidents within Region 9 between 2000 and L-4 Table L-3: Pipeline Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness...L-6 Table L-4: Pipeline Hazard Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk...L-7 Table M-3: Severe Weather Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness...M-4 Table M-4: Severe Weather Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk...M-6 Table N-1: Terrorism Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness... N-4 Table N-2: Terrorism Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk... N-6 Table O-1: Rail Incident Totals by County...O-2 Table O-2: Road Vehicle Fatalities by County between 2005 and O-3 Table O-3: Transportation Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness...O-5 Table O-4: Transportation Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk...O-7 Table P-5: Winter Storm Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness... P-4 viii

11 List of Tables Table P-6: Winter Storm Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk... P-5 Table Q-1: Volcano (Ash Fall) Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness...Q-3 Table Q- 2: Volcano (Ash Fall) Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk...Q-4 ix

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13 List of Figures List of Figures Figure 1: Washington State Homeland Security Region Figure 2: Federal Disaster Declarations by County and Incident Type...8 Figure 3: Region 9 Threat Risk Matrix...20 Figure B-1: Columbia Generating Station in Relation to Region 9... B-6 Figure C-1: Dams in Region... C-8 Figure D-1: Region 9 Average Precipitation... D-8 Figure E-1: State of Washington Geological Context... E-1 Figure E-2: Region 9 Seismicity... E-6 Figure F-4: Washington State Fire Service Regions...F-2 Figure G-1: Region 9 Wildfires Acreage Burned...G-7 Figure G-2: Region 9 Wildfires Cause of Fire...G-8 Figure H-1: Counties with 2% or More of Land Area in a Floodplain... H-1 Figure H-2: Statewide 100-Year Riverine Flood Areas... H-2 Figure H-3: Region 9 Flood Hazard... H-6 Figure I-1: Region 9 Toxics Release Inventory Sites...I-6 Figure J-1: Region 9 Population Density...J-5 Figure K-1: Region 9 Landslide Incidence and Susceptibility... K-5 Figure L-1: Region 9 Pipelines...L-8 Figure M-1: Fujita "F" Scale for Tornado Intensity...M-2 Figure M-2: Region 9 Severe Weather Hazard...M-7 Figure O-1: Region 9 Transportation Routes and Traffic Data...O-8 Figure P-1: Region 9 Average Temperature... P-6 Figure Q-1: Region 9 Relation to Volcanoes and Prevailing Winds...Q-5 xi

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15 1. Purpose and Scope 1 Purpose and Scope 1.1 Purpose This Threat/Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis (Analysis) has been developed to identify and quantify potential risks due to natural and human hazards that have occurred, or could occur, within Washington State Homeland Security Region 9 (Region 9). In order to better prepare for potential emergencies, Region 9 has identified potential hazards present in the ten-county geographic area and quantified, based on available data, their potential impacts. In some cases (pipelines being an example), objective data was not located to meet the criteria for a Category B Hazard Probability of Occurrence. Experience and input from participating first responders (Fire, EMS, HAZMAT) dictated the placement within the Category B Probability of Occurrence. The jurisdiction has also assessed its response capabilities and identified strengths and vulnerabilities, using an all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness. The risks associated with each hazard were then compared with an assessment of emergency management capabilities. The result is a reference and guidance document that can be used to prioritize future emergency planning, preparedness, and mitigation projects and align them with current and future threats and gaps in capabilities. 1.2 Scope Washington State Homeland Security Region 9 consists of ten counties (Adams, Asotin, Columbia, Ferry, Garfield, Lincoln, Pend Oreille, Spokane, Stevens and Whitman) and the Spokane and Kalispel Tribes. This Analysis is a qualitative assessment of hazards, vulnerabilities, and risks across the ten-county area. This analysis examines 17 hazards that have historically occurred or have the potential to occur in Region 9. It assesses consequences relating to each of these hazards in terms of injuries and fatalities, property damage, and economic impacts. These consequences were estimated by obtaining both subjective (subject and technical matter experts) and objective data (where available), as well as information from local planning documents, interviews, and internet-based research. Details on individual hazards at the Regional level may vary from a county-focused study. Some hazards, such as dam failures and pipelines, are supported by Federal and State agencies and robust databases and may contain more detailed threat and risk information than other hazards. Modeling with geographic information systems (GIS) or other computer-based tools was not conducted. To perform the vulnerability assessment, the individual counties comprising Region 9 conducted internal self-assessments of the 37 capabilities listed in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Target Capabilities List (TCL) in the summer of The results were collected by the Regional Coordinator and provided to the consultants from Ecology and Environment, Inc. to verify and incorporate into this report. It should be noted, that the assessments conducted in all ten counties were done without extensive prior use of the DHS Capability Assessment (CA) Tool. It is one data point to integrate with local and regional planning processes. It is 1

16 1. Purpose and Scope anticipated that score changes will happen merely as a result of further use and understanding of the tool. While it is recognized that there are incidents that can occur elsewhere in the State that might have impact the Region, this report is primarily focused on those hazards that could occur and will directly impact the 10 counties in Region 9. Supporting data found in the State Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis (HIVA) and local risk assessment documents combine with this analysis to provide a comprehensive look at these issues at all levels. 2

17 2. Region 9 Characteristics 2 Region 9 Characteristics 2.1 Geography and Climate The ten counties comprising Region 9 are located in the eastern part of the state. The area stretches from the Canadian border south to Oregon, and the Region shares its eastern border with Idaho (see Figure 1). The ten counties cover an area of approximately 16,455 square miles, or nearly 25% of the state. The northern Rocky Mountains are found in the northeast corner of the region. The Blue Mountains are found in the southeast corner where Washington borders Oregon and Idaho. The Columbia/Central Basin lies in the center. The Region contains parts of the Snake and Columbia Rivers, along with numerous tributaries. Eastern Washington experiences a diverse climate due to its location east of the Cascade Mountain range and between the northern Rockies and the Blue Mountains. Annual precipitation can range from a low of 7 9 inches in the dry central area near the junction of the Snake and Columbia Rivers in the Columbia Basin, to highs of inches of precipitation in the more mountainous areas. April through September is the peak time for thunderstorm activity, with such storms occurring 1 3 days each month. 3

18 2. Region 9 Characteristics Figure 1: Washington State Homeland Security Region 9 4

19 5 2. Region 9 Characteristics 2.2 Population Demographics With just over 629,000 residents, Region 9 makes up approximately 9.4% of the state s population (see Table 1). Notably, Region 9 has a high percentage of young residents (0 19 years of age) and an elderly population (65+ years of age) percentage that is higher than the state total. These age groups could both require special consideration in the event of an emergency, or could have greater susceptibility to a pandemic illness such as influenza. Population density in Region 9 is sparse; densities range from a low of only 3.2 persons per square mile (Garfield County) to a high of (Spokane County). The Region 9 average population density of 37.4 persons per square mile is a third of Washington s overall state average. The rural nature of Region 9 can present challenges to emergency management activities and expose vulnerabilities within the community. Limited resources and long distances between available critical response assets can make it more challenging for the region to respond to a crisis. In addition, low populations can make it difficult for jurisdictions to purchase equipment, supplies, and training due to a relatively low tax base, or when competing against more populous jurisdictions for limited federal, state and local funds. Table 1: 2009 Population Figures for Region 9 County Total Population Density Adams 18,000 6,290 2, Asotin 21,500 5,559 3, Columbia 4, Ferry 7,800 2,126 1, Garfield 2, Lincoln 10,450 2,582 2, Pend Oreille 12,900 3,341 2, Spokane 465, ,286 61, Stevens 44,000 12,584 6, Whitman 43,300 10,901 4, Region Totals 629, ,226 84, % of Regional Total 31.3% 13.4% WA State Total 6,668,200 1,775, , Source: Population data was obtained from the Washington Office of Financial Management s Washington State Data Book Economy Region 9 consists of a diverse economy, with activities in all major sectors. In 2008, total industry earnings (TIE) for the counties within Region 9 were $14,533,238,000. While each county has its own unique blend of industries and employers, Table 2 presents a regional picture of TIE for 2008 by identifying the top 20 industries/employers. TIE is defined as the sum of all payrolls, additional payroll/employment-related benefits, and proprietor incomes. Data for this table was obtained from a website that utilizes Bureau of Economic Adjustment (BEA) data and other sources to provide economic information at the

20 2. Region 9 Characteristics County and State level. This data was used during the evaluation of economic consequences to determine relevant financial impacts to Region 9 should a hazard affect specific sectors of the local economy. Table 2: Total Industry Earnings (2008) by Economic Sector Industry Sector Total Industry Earnings (in $1,000s) State and Local Government $2,472,772 Health Care and Social Assistance $1,969,117 Manufacturing $1,350,977 Retail Trade $1,165,669 Construction $1,000,322 Finance and Insurance $828,092 Professional and Technical Services $780,504 Wholesale Trade $705,954 Other Services (except Public Administration) $607,085 Federal Civilian $541,659 Accommodation and Food Services $446,854 Administrative and Waste Services $389,559 Transportation and Warehousing $386,710 Federal Military $324,630 Farm Earnings $227,813 Management of Companies and Enterprises $216,214 Educational Services $210,039 Information $198,969 Real Estate Rental and Leasing $167,761 Arts, Entertainment, Recreation $85,476 Utilities $62,254 Mining $43,705 Forestry, Fishing, and Related Activities $38,893 Unreported $312,210 Source: History of Presidential Disaster Declarations In the context of this assessment, identification and quantification of threats and associated vulnerabilities requires an examination of past events and an estimation of future possibilities. Within the United States, Presidential Disaster Declarations represent the most significant of these past events. Incidents that exceed (or are projected to exceed) the response capabilities of local jurisdictions may be declared as disasters at the local, state, and Federal levels by following formally established procedures. County officials can request a disaster declaration at the state level and, if deemed necessary, the Governor can then request a major disaster declaration from the 6

21 7 2. Region 9 Characteristics President in accordance with the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C (Stafford Act). A major disaster is defined in the Stafford Act as: any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the U.S. which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. Since 1964, 19 Federal major disasters have been declared in Region 9. The disaster declarations, and the specific counties that were affected, are listed intable 3. Every county within Region 9 has had at least one Presidential Disaster Declaration, and 79% of the Federallydeclared disasters affected more than one county (see Figure 2). These declarations can be classified into five incident types: flood (11 incidents), severe storm (5), snow (1), fire (1), and volcano (1). The history of Presidential disaster declarations reveals that over the past 36 years, flooding and weather-related hazards accounted for almost 90% of the largest emergencies in Region 9 and spanned jurisdictional boundaries. It is important to note that other threats do exist and have occurred in the past, but they were not of such a magnitude as to warrant a Presidential Disaster Declaration. Table 3: Federally Declared Disasters Affecting Counties within Region 9, Disaster Number Declaration Date Incident Type Counties Affected /2/2009 Severe Storm Adams, Asotin, Ferry, Garfield, Lincoln, Pend Oreille, Spokane, Stevens, Whitman /30/2009 Flood Garfield, Lincoln /14/2007 Severe Storm Pend Oreille /17/2006 Severe Storm Pend Oreille /5/1998 Severe Storm Ferry, Stevens /21/1997 Flood Pend Oreille /2/1997 Flood Lincoln, Pend Oreille, Spokane, Stevens /17/1997 Severe Storm Adams, Columbia, Ferry Garfield, Lincoln, Pend Oreille, Spokane, Stevens, Whitman /7/1997 Snow Pend Oreille, Spokane /9/1996 Flood Adams, Asotin, Columbia, Garfield, Lincoln, Spokane, Whitman /13/1991 Fire Ferry, Lincoln, Pend Oreille, Spokane, Stevens, Whitman 822 4/14/1989 Flood Stevens, Whitman 769 7/26/1986 Flood Spokane

22 2. Region 9 Characteristics Table 3: Federally Declared Disasters Affecting Counties within Region 9, Disaster Number Declaration Date Incident Type Counties Affected Volcano Adams, Asotin, Columbia, Ferry, Garfield, Pend Oreille, 623 5/21/1980 (Mount St. Helens) Spokane, Stevens, Whitman /10/1977 Flood Garfield, Whitman 414 1/25/1974 Flood Asotin, Columbia, Ferry, Pend Oreille, Stevens, Whitman 322 2/1/1972 Flood Asotin, Whitman 300 2/9/1971 Flood Columbia, Garfield /29/1964 Flood Asotin, Columbia, Garfield, Spokane, Whitman Snow Fire Volcano Severe Storm Flood Adams Asotin Columbia Ferry Garfield Lincoln Pend Oreille Spokane Stevens Whitman Figure 2: Federal Disaster Declarations by County and Incident Type 8

23 3. Fundamentals of Hazards, Risk and Vulnerability 3 Fundamentals of Hazards, Risk and Vulnerability Definitions and terminology related to hazards and risks can vary between disciplines. To ensure a single set of terminology to describe the methodology and results of this analysis, the DHS Risk Lexicon, released in September 2008, was used as the foundation for standardized risk terminology. The following key terms and their definitions from the DHS Risk Lexicon are listed here to provide the reader with a consistent framework and point of reference. Hazard: Natural or man-made source or cause of harm or difficulty. A hazard can be actual or potential. Probability: In the case of this document, this term is used colloquially as a synonym for likelihood, or the estimation of the potential of an incident or event occurrence. Threat: Generally estimated as the likelihood that a specific hazard will occur. Threat is a function of individual hazards and their respective chances of occurring. Consequence: The effect of an event, incident, or occurrence. In this document, consequences can be human, economic, or losses to physical property. Human Consequence: The effect of an incident that results in injury, illness, or loss of life. Economic Consequence: The effect of an incident on the value of property or on the production, trade, distribution, or use of income, wealth, or commodities. (Note: In this document, decreases in property values would fall under economic consequences, while property damage would fall under property losses. ) Property Loss Consequence: The effect of an incident on physical structures resulting in physical damage that can be assigned a repair and/or replacement value. (Note: This definition was created for use in this document. The DHS Risk Lexicon does not create a separate consequence measurement for physical damage.) Risk: Potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences. Vulnerability: Physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity susceptible to a given hazard. (Note: In this document, vulnerability in only assessed in terms of operational attributes of the Region to implement the 37 emergency management Target Capabilities.) 9

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25 4. Methodology 4 Methodology Using the definition listed above, risk is the product of the threat posed by each hazard and the potential consequences to the jurisdiction should the hazard manifest. When the relative risks of individual hazards are assessed against vulnerabilities in target capabilities, emergency management professionals then have tools to make long-term planning and prioritization decisions. This section describes the process by which hazards were identified, their probability of occurrence determined, consequences and risk estimated, and capabilities of determining potential vulnerabilities estimated. The methodology used in this assessment incorporates several specific limitations and assumptions. First, the analysis is based upon a broad review of existing county-based planning documents, as well as internet research and stakeholder interviews. The assessment did not use extensive modeling or GIS tools. Second, estimations of consequences across the region are based on a combination of quantitative data (such as the costs of a historical event) and qualitative estimations (such as simple Low-Medium-High consequence scales with no specific metrics). Since sector-specific quantitative evaluations of impacts have not been performed throughout all ten counties, this document evaluated consequences using the qualitative assessments from Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analyses (HIVA), Hazard Mitigation Plans (HMP), Community Wildfire Protection Plans (CWPP) and Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans (CEMP). Third, this document does not provide details regarding the unique attributes and risks for individual counties or municipalities. It has been designed to examine Region 9 as if it were a single jurisdiction. Therefore, threats and vulnerabilities may appear to be more homogenous throughout the region than they actually are. 4.1 Hazard Identification The first step in this threat and vulnerability assessment process was to determine which hazards were present, or possible, in Region 9. This was determined using multiple sources, including, but not limited to: County-level documents HIVAs HMP CWPP (if used) CEMPs Washington State HIVA 11

26 4. Methodology Internet-based historical research (e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Disaster Declarations) In addition, on-site workshops were held with each of the ten counties to discuss more recent planning efforts and hazard-based concerns. These workshops produced a refined list of hazards that provided the focus for this document. Seventeen hazards were identified, nine of which are natural hazards and eight that are technological or human-caused. Table 4 identifies the hazards and denotes the number of counties in Region 9 that indicated that the hazard was significant enough at a local level to be addressed in this report. The final list contains hazards that were present in at least 50% of the counties or were of such significance to certain counties that they warranted inclusion in the regional report. Table 4: Natural and Man-Made Hazards for Region 9 Natural Hazards # of Counties Indicating Local Hazard Presence Technological/Man-Made Hazards # of Counties Indicating Local Hazard Presence Fire - Wildland 10 Hazardous Materials 10 Flood 10 Civil Disturbance/Unrest 9 Drought 8 Fire Urban/Structural 9 Earthquake 8 Terrorism 9 Severe Weather (thunderstorm, tornado, 7 Dam Failure 8 windstorm) Volcano (Ash Fall) 7 Pipeline 4 Infectious Disease Outbreak 6 Transportation 4 Landslide 5 Columbia Generating Station (Nuclear Power 3 Plant) Winter Storm (snow, ice storm, severe cold) Hazard Probability of Occurrence Once the individual hazards were identified, the next step was to attempt to quantify the likelihood of occurrence for each. In most cases, historical incident occurrences were used as a measurement of future probability. In cases where a historical perspective was limited or not available, this report used either state-based probability estimates from the 2009 Washington State HIVA (or most recent county HIVA) or an average of qualitative probability estimates for county planning documents. In order to maintain consistency with existing local and state HIVAs, the same timeframe scale was used to classify each hazard s probability of occurrence. Probability categories for Region 9 are: Annually (High A) 12

27 4. Methodology Every 1 10 years (Moderate B) Every years (Low C) >50 years per occurrence (Rare D) In general, the more frequently a hazard is likely to occur, the greater its threat will be, relative to other hazards. Table 5 lists the 17 hazards in Region 9, sorted by probability of occurrence, used to develop the risk assessment. Additional history and probability information and background on individual hazards can be found in the respective hazard appendices at the end of this document. Table 5: Probability of Occurrence for Hazards within Region 9 Natural Hazards Probability of Occurrence Technological/Man-Made Hazards Probability of Occurrence Fire Wildland Annually (A) Fire Urban/Structural Annually (A) Flood Annually (A) Hazardous Materials 1 10 yrs (B) Severe Weather (thunderstorm, tornado, Annually (A) Transportation 1 10 yrs (B) windstorm) Winter Storm (snow, ice storm, severe cold) Annually (A) Pipeline 1 10 yrs (B) Drought 1 10 yrs (B) Terrorism yrs (C) Landslide 1 10 yrs (B) Civil Disturbance/Unrest yrs (C) Infectious Disease Outbreak yrs (C) Dam Failure yrs (C) Earthquake yrs (C) Columbia Generating Station (Nuclear Power >50 yrs (D) Plant) Volcano (Ash Fall) yrs (C) 4.3 Hazard Consequences Consequences resulting from potential hazards were assessed semi-quantitatively in three areas: injuries, illnesses, and fatalities; economic losses; and property losses. For each area, data sources included current planning documents, interviews with county and regional staff, and support from the Washington Military Department Emergency Management Division. Consequences were classified into four categories, from Low to Catastrophic, with each of the consequence areas having their own measurement of impacts. It is important to note three things in relation to projected consequences. First, this analysis has attempted to use a worst-case scenario for all hazards. In cases where a single hazard impacted more than one of the consequence measurements, the most significant impact was used to categorize the event. Second, as has been mentioned above, detailed modeling and GIS tools were not used to compute scenario consequences. Third, qualitative estimates from the various county and state planning documents and research resources were often broad and varied among 13

28 4. Methodology jurisdictions and sources. Consequence classifications contained here should be considered estimates Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities Impacts to life and health are significant issues for any jurisdiction to consider. In this Analysis, such impacts were given greater weight than economic and property losses and dictated the individual consequence classification for each hazard. Some hazards, such as dam failures and infectious disease outbreaks, were easier to quantify due to previous work in assessing impacts to health. Other hazards such as terrorism incidents are more difficult to quantify, either due to a lack of historical data or the fact that the location of the incident or the target can vary. Refer to individual hazard appendices for more detail on health impacts. According to 2009 population estimates from the Washington State Data Book, the population within Region 9 is 629,300 or 9.4% of the state total. To maintain consistency with the state HIVA, the state consequence measurements were prorated by 10% to develop categories that better reflected the population size of Region 9. The following categories and associated number of injuries, illnesses, and fatalities were used in this analysis: > 1,000 (Catastrophic - 1) 100 1,000 (Critical - 2) (Moderate -3) < 50 (Low - 4) Economic Losses Economic losses are difficult consequences to estimate. It is possible to estimate the losses of a single business or employer using severity of impacts coupled with the duration of the event and subsequent recovery. However, estimating the economic impacts to ten counties with diverse economic bases is a more difficult undertaking. This assessment approached this task by examining previously completed documents and planning materials, and by incorporating stakeholder inputs from multiple workshops at the county and Regional levels, to develop very broad metrics for measuring potential economic consequences. In addition, the industry sector specific TIE values presented in Table 2, above, were also used when a hazard was deemed to have a potential effect on specific components of the regional economy. Economic losses can be direct and immediate, such as the destruction of an agricultural crop due to an ice storm. These losses can also be indirect and prolonged, such as decreased tourism due to volcanic ash or lost entertainment revenue due to a pandemic. To assist in evaluating economic impacts for individual hazards, this report examined the thresholds presented in Table 6 as both immediate and prolonged effects. Immediate effects could easily be evaluated within the confines of the four categories of severity. For hazards with potentially prolonged effects (e.g., infectious disease outbreaks and droughts), economic loss severity thresholds were divided by 365 days to obtain an average daily loss value that would result in reaching the consequence 14

29 4. Methodology threshold over the course of a year. While neither method predicts what the losses could be, both provide a means to evaluate relative economic consequences. The Washington State HIVA used the state s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the baseline for determining economic impacts. However, the GDP for Region 9 was not readily available. To present economic consequences consistently across Region 9, 2008 TIE was used instead of GDP. TIE is defined as the sum of payrolls, other labor income, and proprietors income. TIE data used in this report was obtained from the Washington Regional Economic Analysis Project ( Earnings are determined using data compiled by the BEA. Industry and employment sources used in calculating TIE include, but are not limited to: Farm earnings Educational services Manufacturing Wholesale trade Retail trade Information Finance and insurance Real estate and rental and leasing Professional and technical services Administrative and waste services Federal civilian/military State/local government Using 2008 TIE for Region 9 as a baseline ($14.5 billion), the following four economic consequence scenarios were developed using a percentage of TIE to delineate a range of impacts. Region 9 totals were rounded up to the nearest million dollars: > 1% TIE, or > $145 million (Catastrophic - 1) 0.5% 1% TIE, or $72 million $145 million (Critical - 2) 0.1% 0.5% TIE, or $15 million $72 million (Moderate - 3) < 0.1%, or <$15 million (Low - 4) Table 6 provides estimated economic impacts for the Region as well as for the individual counties. While this is a Regionally-focused document, identifying economic impacts to the 15

30 16 4. Methodology individual counties sheds additional light on potential economic consequences at a smaller jurisdiction level. It should allow the Region to examine how economic impacts can vary significantly in terms of dollar values from county to county even though the percentage of TIE is constant. Table 6: Economic Consequence Metrics as a Function of Total Industry Earnings Low - 4 Moderate - 3 Critical - 2 Catastrophic - 1 County Total Industry Earnings (2008) < 0.1% 0.1 % - 0.5% 0.5% - 1% >1% Adams $338,820,000 < $340,000 $340,000 $1,690,000 $1,690,000 $3,390,000 > $3,390,000 Asotin $300,366,000 < $300,000 $300,000 $1,500,000 $1,500, > $3,000,000 Columbia $80,701,000 < $81,000 $81,000 $400,000 $400,000 $810,000 > $810,000 Ferry $82,653,000 < $83,000 $83,000 $410,000 $410,000 $830,000 > $830,000 Garfield $41,940,000 < $42,000 $42,000 $210,000 $210,000 $420,000 > $420,000 Lincoln $159,695,000 < $160,000 $160,000 $800,000 $800,000 $1,600,000 > $1,600,000 Pend Oreille $161,776,000 < $162,000 $162,000 $810,000 $810,000 $1,620,000 > $1,620,000 Spokane $11,859,042,000 < $11,860,000 $11,860,000 $59,300,000 $59,000,000 $119,000,000 > $119,000,000 Stevens $531,818,000 < $530,000 $530,000 $2,660,000 $2,660,000 $5,300,000 > $5,300,000 Whitman $976,427,000 < $980,000 $980,000 $4,880,000 $4,880,000 $9,800,000 > $9,800,000 Region 9 Total $14,533,238,000 <$15 million $15 million to $72 million $72 million to $145 million >$145 million Average Daily Economic Loss over 1 Year to Reach Threshold ($ per day) < $40,000 $40,000 - $200,000 $200,000 - $400,000 > $400, Property Losses Hazards can cause physical damage to structures, resulting in temporary or permanent loss of use. Many of the hazards considered in this document pose a threat to residential, commercial, and industrial buildings as well as to regional infrastructure such as bridges. It is highly challenging to not only quantify potential consequences to property, but also to determine a common measurement by which thresholds of severity can be created. Washington State s total assessed property value is approximately $920 billion, and the value of property in Region 9 is approximately $50 billion. This shows that Region 9 s assessed property value is approximately 5% of the State total. The Washington HIVA uses four thresholds,

31 4. Methodology ranging from less than $50 million in property damages to greater than $500 million, to classify property loss consequences. Using the state s thresholds as a guide, each consequence was multiplied by 5% to obtain a regional proportion. Table 7outlines the Region 9 consequence metrics and compares those impacts to the statewide thresholds from the Washington HIVA. The advantage to using assessed property values is that 2008 data for all counties in Washington is readily available in the State Data Book. A limitation of this method, however, is the fact that property not required to pay taxes may not be detected by this measurement. While not a flawless measurement of potential damage to all real property, it does provide a reasonable frame of reference for comparison of hazards within the region. Table 7: Property Loss Consequence Metrics as a Function of 2008 Assessed Property Values Region 9 Potential Assessed Property Losses (5% of State Thresholds) Washington HIVA Property Loss Thresholds Catastrophic - 1 > $25 mil > $500 mil Critical - 2 $5 mil $25 mil $100 mil $500 mil Moderate - 3 $2.5 mil $5 mil $50 mil $100 mil Low - 4 < $2.5 mil < $50 mil Region 9 Total Assessed Value: $50 billion Statewide Assessed Property Value: $920 billion Region 9 Hazard Consequences Utilizing the methodology described above, the 17 regional hazards and their associated consequence impacts are presented intable 8. For hazards with multiple consequences, the most severe consequence was used to determine the severity category. Additional details regarding hazard-specific consequences can be found in the respective Hazard Appendix. Table 8: Consequence Severity Estimates for Hazards Present in Region 9 Consequence Severity Low - 4 Moderate - 3 Critical - 2 Catastrophic - 1 Injuries/Illnesses/Fatalities < ,000 > 1,000 Natural Hazards Flood Fire Wildland Earthquake Severe Weather (Thunderstorm/ Tornado/Windstorm) Economic Losses < $15 mil $15 - $72 mil $72 - $145 mil > $145 mil Property Losses < $2.5 mil $2.5 mil - $5 mil $5 mil - $25 mil > $25 mil X X X X 17

32 4. Methodology Table 8: Consequence Severity Estimates for Hazards Present in Region 9 Volcano (Ash Fall) Drought Landslide Infectious Disease Outbreak Winter Storm (Snow/Ice Storm/Severe Cold) Technological Hazards Civil Disturbance/Unrest Terrorism Hazardous Materials Fire - Urban/Structural Dam Failure Columbia Generating Station Pipeline Transportation Consequence Severity Low - 4 Moderate - 3 Critical - 2 Catastrophic - 1 X X X X X X X X X X X X X 4.4 Threat Risk Matrix Risk, the product of the probability and projected consequences of an event, was identified qualitatively for each of the 17 Regional hazards. In order to assist Region 9 with understanding the relative risk between the hazards, a matrix has been developed to graphically depict the hazards and their associated risks. Using the likelihood of occurrence for each hazard ( threat ) and the consequence ratings described in the previous sections, each hazard was assigned a risk code. The risk code is an alpha-numeric designation of relative risk. Table 9 provides a template of a standard risk matrix that was used in this analysis. In cases where a hazard could result in multiple consequence impacts, such as economic and property losses, the worst-case consequence was used for assigning the risk code. Frequency of Occurrence Table 9: Standard Risk Matrix Example 1 Catastrophic 2 Critical 3 Moderate Relative Consequence Severity 4 Low (D) > 50 yrs 1D 2D 3D 4D (C) years 1C 2C 3C 4C (B) 1 10 years 1B 2B 3B 4B (A) Annually 1A 2A 3A 4A 18

33 4. Methodology Once each hazard was assigned a risk code, all of the hazards were assembled into a matrix outlining relative risk the probability and consequences that illustrate how risk changes from hazard to hazard. Figure 3 is the final Region 9 threat risk matrix, and Table 11 is a single-table summary of all of the probability and consequence metrics identified previously and used in the matrix. The threat risk matrix can assist Region 9 in addressing hazards using a tiered approach. Highprobability/high-consequence hazards are considered the most severe (1A, 2A, 2B). Lowfrequency/low-consequence hazards are considered the least severe (3D, 4C, 4D). This matrix enables the region to group hazards according to relative risk, allowing for another means by which to prioritize future planning and funding efforts. These risk severity groups and their associated hazards are listed in Table 10. Table 10 Risk Severity Groups and Associated Hazards Risk Level Severe Risk Hazard Fire Wildland, Drought, Flood High Risk Transportation; Severe Local Weather; Fire Urban/Structural; Winter Storm; Infectious Disease/Epidemic/Pandemic; Terrorism; Hazardous Materials; Pipeline; Earthquake; Volcano (ash fall); Dam Failure Moderate Risk Low Risk Landslide; Civil Disturbance/Unrest; Columbia Generating Station None In no way does this threat risk matrix assign priorities to the threats. Instead, it is simply a graphical depiction of hazards, relative to each other, that could be used by the Region to prioritize future emergency management activities. Another critical point to note is that the threat risk matrix examines hazards across the entire Region. At the individual county level, a similar risk assessment may have very different results. 19

34 4. Methodology Figure 3: Region 9 Threat Risk Matrix D Columbia Generating Station Increasing Probability C Infectious Disease Outbreak Terrorism Earthquake Volcano (Ash Fall) Dam Failure B Drought Transportation Civil Disturbance/Unrest Hazardous Materials Pipeline Landslide A Fire Wildland Flood Severe Weather Fire Urban/ Structural Winter Storm Increasing Consequence Severity 20

35 4. Methodology Table 11: Probability and Consequence Summary for 17 Hazards in Region 9 Consequence Severity 4 - Low 3 - Moderate 2 - Critical 1 - Catastrophic Injuries/Fatalities < ,000 >1,000 History/Probability Economic Losses < $15 mil $15 $72 mil $72 $145 mil >$145 mil D - Rare C - Low B - Moderate A - High Property Losses < $2.5 mil $2.5 mil $5 mil $5 mil $25 mil > $25 mil >50 yrs yrs 1 10 yrs Annually Natural Hazards X Flood X X Fire - Wildland X X Earthquake X Severe Weather X X (thunderstorm/tornado/windstorm) X Volcano (Ash Fall) X X Drought X X Landslide X X Infectious Disease Outbreak X X Winter Storm (Snow/Ice Storm/Severe Cold) X Technological Hazards X Civil Disturbance/Unrest X X Terrorism X X Hazardous Materials X X Fire Urban/Structural X X Dam Failure X X Columbia Generating Station X X Pipeline X X Transportation X 21

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37 5. Vulnerability Assessment 5 Vulnerability Assessment Capabilities-based planning utilizes the concept of preparing for hazards in the context of what must be accomplished to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from an event. This method follows an all-hazards approach to emergency preparedness. The DHS s TCL is a collection of 37 distinct action items that may need to be accomplished in order to protect life, the environment, and property. They are grouped according to the following missions : Common Capabilities, Prepare, Protect, Respond, and Recover. In 2010, each county within Region 9 conducted a capabilities self-assessment using the TCL to evaluate the current state of preparedness. Utilizing a capability assessment tool provided by the Washington DEM, the counties ranked their individual preparedness for each of the 37 capabilities on a 1 10 scale. The scoring criteria utilized during this self-assessment are listed in Table 12. In most cases, capabilities received a 4 at the county level if they were deemed to have some level of capability, but no plans or procedures in place. Capabilities that received lower ratings are considered to be potential vulnerabilities. Table 12: Capability Self-Assessment Metrics Summary of Level of Preparednes s None Low Medium Low Medium High High Complete Explanation 1: No measures/met rics are satisfied. This may be because it is not critical to the region, or because insurmountabl e barriers exist. The capability cannot be performed successfully. 2: Needs within this capability have been recognized, and initial efforts have been made to satisfy some measures/metric s, but very few if any have been met. The capability is unlikely to be performed successfully. 3: A few measures/metric s are satisfied, but substantial 4: Some measures/met rics are satisfied and substantial effort remains. Significant barriers remain, and plans are being created to address them. The capability may be performed with partial success. 5: Some measures/met rics are satisfied and 6: Many measures/met rics are satisfied. Though much effort remains, a plan is in place to satisfy the rest. Remaining issues are being identified. The capability may be performed successfully if required. 7: Most measures/met rics are satisfied. 8: Most measures/met rics are satisfied. Though moderate effort remains and a few issues are outstanding, a plan is in place and being followed to address them. 9: Almost all measures/met rics are satisfied. 10: All measures/met rics are satisfied. Ideally, activity performance is validated via exercises or experience. 23

38 5. Vulnerability Assessment Table 12: Capability Self-Assessment Metrics Summary of Level of Preparednes s None Low Medium Low Medium High High Complete barriers remain, and it is not yet clear how they will be overcome. This activity is unlikely to be performed successfully. considerable effort remains. Barriers that could undermine achievement exist, but plans are in place to resolve them. The capability may be performed with partial success. Though effort remains, a plan is in place to satisfy the rest. Remaining issues have been identified and are being addressed. The capability may be performed successfully. Progress is being made toward satisfying the others with no issues outstanding. It is likely, though not assured, that the capability could be performed adequately. 5.1 Regional Capability Self-Assessment Results The results of the individual county-based TCL self-assessments were averaged across the ten counties to develop a Region-wide rating for each capability. The list of 37 target capabilities was then sorted based upon their regional average score to assist in identified real or perceived weaknesses and vulnerabilities in preparedness, response, and recovery activities. It is important to note that the individual counties focused on local capabilities and, therefore, did not address state-based resources. For example, while Animal Disease Emergency Support was perceived to be a weaker capability across the Region, it is the state that oversees the lead agency and a majority of the resources that could be required to respond to an animal disease incident. Among the 37 target capabilities, the regional average score for all capabilities was 5.3 out of 10. Scores ranged from a low of 3 (Fatality Management) to a high of 7. The 37 target capabilities were grouped into four categories that reflected relative preparedness levels based upon their individual ratings. These four categories were designated as follows: Critical Capabilities in this category received the lowest assessment scores, indicating a significantly impaired ability to execute the associated capabilities. Regional average capability scores rated as critical ranged from 3 to 4. High This category is composed of the tier of capabilities that scored higher than critical but at or below the average. These capabilities still require additional 24

39 5. Vulnerability Assessment resources to address significant gaps in preparedness, response, and recover capabilities. 5 was the average score for capabilities categorized as high. Moderate These capabilities received average scores of 6 and were assessed above the regional self-assessment average, but capability gaps still exist. The average score was 6 for moderate vulnerabilities. Low These capabilities were assessed by the counties to be in the best position for execution. However, it is important to note that even these low capabilities may have significant gaps in emergency management effectiveness. For this category, the past successes and stronger capabilities may be serve as a foundation upon which some of the more vulnerable capabilities may be further developed. Table 13presents the 37 regional target capability regional assessment. This table has been sorted from more to less vulnerable to aid in comparison. Using this table, Region 9 can identify vulnerabilities in capability execution for all hazards. Table 13: Region 9 Capabilities Assessment Results Target Capability Regional Self-Assessment Score Fatality Management 3 Animal Disease Emergency Support 4 CBRNE Detection 4 Citizen Evacuation & Shelter-in-Place 4 Community Preparedness 4 Critical Infrastructure Protection 4 Intelligence Analysis & Production 4 Restoration of Lifelines 4 Structural Damage Assessment 4 Volunteer Management & Donations 4 Communication 5 Critical Resource Logistics & Distribution 5 Economic & Community Recovery 5 Emergency Operations Center Management 5 Environmental Health 5 Explosive Device Response Operations 5 Food & Agriculture Safety & Defense 5 Information Gathering & Recognition of Indicators & Warnings 5 Isolation and Quarantine 5 Laboratory Testing 5 Relative Vulnerability Critical High 25

40 5. Vulnerability Assessment Table 13: Region 9 Capabilities Assessment Results Target Capability Regional Self-Assessment Score Planning 5 WMD & Hazardous Materials Response & Decontamination 5 Counter-terror Investigation & Law Enforcement 6 Emergency Public Information & Warning 6 Emergency Public Safety & Security Response 6 Intelligence & Information Sharing and Dissemination 6 Medical Surge 6 Risk Management 6 Search and Rescue (Land-Based) 6 Emergency Triage & Pre-Hospital Treatment 7 Epidemiological Surveillance & Investigation 7 Fire Incident Response Support 7 Mass Care 7 Mass Prophylaxis 7 Medical Supplies Management & Distribution 7 On-Site Incident Management 7 Responder Safety & Health 7 Relative Vulnerability Moderate Low 5.2 Target Capability to Hazard Crosswalk While all-hazards or capabilities-based planning is the preferred method for increasing emergency management and response proficiency, it is also valuable to consider how weaker capabilities could affect activities related to individual hazards. Some capabilities only apply to a small set of threats, and if capabilities or hazards are only viewed separately, it becomes difficult to ascertain where planning priorities and limited funding should be dedicated for maximum effectiveness. To provide Region 9 with a practical connection between the threat risk matrix and the capabilities assessment, Table 14 provides a crosswalk by which hazards can be connected to the applicable capabilities and vice-versa. Hazards are listed across the top from greater to less risk according to the threat risk matrix. This table also groups the target capabilities by mission and provides the self-assessment score average for that mission. These missions are: Common: Target capabilities under this mission are relevant to all hazards and are almost always a priority for emergency management. While they apply to all hazards, they are often some of the most challenging to accomplish (e.g., communications). Prevent: This mission primarily supports the deterrence or detection of terrorist activity. However, some of the capabilities such as chemical, biological, radiological, 26

41 5. Vulnerability Assessment nuclear, and explosive material detection, and intelligence analysis and production, can have implications for hazardous materials incidents or civil unrest, respectively. Protect: Capabilities under this broad mission support protection and maintenance critical infrastructure, food supplies, and public health detection. Respond: This is the largest mission area. Twenty-one capabilities under the Respond mission are applicable to the majority of threats within Region 9. These activities are implemented once the event has occurred. Recover: This is the smallest mission area in terms of the number of capabilities, but it represents some of the most significant capabilities that need to be implemented by a community to return to a state of normalcy after a threatened event has occurred. Viewing vulnerabilities in the context of major missions can aid Region 9 in decreasing its vulnerabilities not only in terms of individual capabilities and individual hazards, but also in the context of the overarching missions of prevention, protection, response and recovery as well.. 27

42 5. Vulnerability Assessment Table14: Threat, Risk and Vulnerability Crosswalk Mission COMMON PREVENT Fire Wildland Flood Drought Transportation Terrorism Infectious Disease Outbreak Severe Weather Winter Storm Fire - Urban/Structural Hazardous Materials Pipeline Dam Failure Earthquake Volcano (Ash Fall) Landslide Civil Disturbance/Unrest Columbia Generating Station Regional Self- Assessme nt Score Number of Hazards Influenced by Each Capability (Max of 17) Target Capability Community Preparedness and X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 4 17 Participation Communications X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 5 17 Planning X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 5 17 Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management CBRNE Detection Intelligence Analysis and Production X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6 17 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6 17 Common Capabilities Mission Average 5.2 X X X X 4 4 X X

43 5. Vulnerability Assessment Table14: Threat, Risk and Vulnerability Crosswalk Mission PROTECT Target Capability Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings Counter- Terrorism Investigation and Law Enforcement Fire Wildland Flood Drought Transportation Terrorism Infectious Disease Outbreak Severe Weather Winter Storm Fire - Urban/Structural Hazardous Materials Pipeline Dam Failure Earthquake Volcano (Ash Fall) Landslide Civil Disturbance/Unrest Columbia Generating Station Regional Self- Assessme nt Score Number of Hazards Influenced by Each Capability (Max of 17) X X 5 2 X X 6 2 Prevent Mission Average 4.8 Critical Infrastructure X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 4 17 Protection Food and Agriculture Safety and X X X X 5 4 Defense Lab Testing X X X 5 3 Epidemiological X X 7 2 Surveillance 29

44 5. Vulnerability Assessment Table14: Threat, Risk and Vulnerability Crosswalk Mission RESPOND Target Capability and Investigation Fatality Management Animal Disease Emergency Support Citizen Evacuation and Shelter- In-Place Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Fire Wildland Flood Drought Transportation Terrorism Infectious Disease Outbreak Severe Weather Winter Storm Fire - Urban/Structural Hazardous Materials Pipeline Dam Failure Earthquake Volcano (Ash Fall) Landslide Civil Disturbance/Unrest Columbia Generating Station Regional Self- Assessme nt Score Protect Mission Average 5.3 Number of Hazards Influenced by Each Capability (Max of 17) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 3 15 X X 4 2 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 4 15 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 4 16 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

45 5. Vulnerability Assessment Table14: Threat, Risk and Vulnerability Crosswalk Mission Target Capability Environmenta l Health EOC Management Explosive Device Response Operations Isolation and Quarantine WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety Fire Wildland Flood Drought Transportation Terrorism Infectious Disease Outbreak Severe Weather Winter Storm 31 Fire - Urban/Structural Hazardous Materials Pipeline Dam Failure Earthquake Volcano (Ash Fall) Landslide Civil Disturbance/Unrest Columbia Generating Station Regional Self- Assessme nt Score Number of Hazards Influenced by Each Capability (Max of 17) X X X X X X X X X X X X 5 12 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 5 17 X 5 1 X X 5 2 X X X X X X 5 6 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6 17 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6 17

46 5. Vulnerability Assessment Table14: Threat, Risk and Vulnerability Crosswalk Mission Fire Wildland Flood Drought Transportation Terrorism Infectious Disease Outbreak Severe Weather Winter Storm Fire - Urban/Structural Hazardous Materials Pipeline Dam Failure Earthquake Volcano (Ash Fall) Landslide Civil Disturbance/Unrest Columbia Generating Station Regional Self- Assessme nt Score Number of Hazards Influenced by Each Capability (Max of 17) Target Capability and Security Response Medical Surge X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 6 16 Search and Rescue (Land- X X X X X X X X 6 8 Based) Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 7 16 Treatment Fire Incident Response X X X X X X X 7 7 Support Mass Care X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 7 17 Mass Prophylaxis X X X 7 3 Medical Supplies Management and Distribution X X X X X X X X 7 8 On-Site X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

47 5. Vulnerability Assessment Table14: Threat, Risk and Vulnerability Crosswalk Mission RECOVER Target Capability Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment Economic and Community Recovery Number of Capabilities Influenced by Each Hazard (Max of 37) Fire Wildland Flood Drought Transportation Terrorism Infectious Disease Outbreak Severe Weather Winter Storm Fire - Urban/Structural Hazardous Materials Pipeline Dam Failure Earthquake Volcano (Ash Fall) Landslide Civil Disturbance/Unrest Columbia Generating Station Regional Self- Assessme nt Score Number of Hazards Influenced by Each Capability (Max of 17) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 7 17 Respond Mission Average 5.6 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 4 16 X X X X X X X X X X X X 4 12 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 5 17 Recover Mission Average

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49 6. Conclusions 6 Conclusions The Region 9 Regional Threat and Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis was completed to develop an overview of the risks and vulnerabilities that exist in the counties comprising the region. 6.1 Hazards and Threats The 17 hazards that were selected for this analysis are those that have occurred in the past or have the highest potential to occur in the future. With a few exceptions, these hazards are expected to be present for at least half of the counties in the Region. Many of these hazards, such as drought, have the potential to affect multiple counties simultaneously. The approach used in this assessment facilitated a regional analysis, but future efforts at the county level may require greater local focus. Several of the hazards, such as winter storm and severe weather, are actually composed of a set of separate hazards that were grouped together in this analysis. Since each county may have a unique history or concerns about these sub-groups (e.g., snow storm, ice storm, and severe cold), future efforts may benefit from separating these sub-hazards depending on county-based hazard assessments. Assessing potential threats, defined as the function of hazards and their associated likelihood of occurrence, allows Region 9 to examine preparedness programs in terms of relative probability. The hazards determined to be most likely to occur were wildland and urban/structural fires, winter storms, severe weather, and floods. The hazard determined to be the least likely to occur was a failure at the Columbia Generating Station nuclear power plant. It is important to note that likelihood of occurrence is only part of the assessment. The potential consequences of each hazard must also be assessed to obtain an accurate picture of the risk that each hazard possesses relative to the others. 6.2 Consequences Impacts of individual hazards upon human health, the local economy, and physical property were estimated based upon research, interviews, and local documents. The consequence assessment was largely qualitative. When a hazard had the potential for multiple consequences, the most severe consequence was used to classify that hazard. Details and historical context specific to each hazard are provided in the Hazard Appendices. In addition, since one hazard can result in secondary hazards ( second order effects ), this analysis also linked hazards together so that Region 9 could examine how one hazard could result in one or more other hazards. For example, this analysis assumed that dam failure would be an unintentional event; however, since a dam could also be a terrorist target, readers are referred to the terrorism hazard appendix for additional threat information. The hazards posing the greatest consequences were infectious disease/epidemic/pandemic, and terrorism (due to human health impacts), and drought (due to economic impacts). The least severe consequences were determined to be landslide and civil disturbance/unrest hazards. 35

50 6. Conclusions Region 9 now has the ability to examine each hazard and prioritize future preparedness efforts by consequence severity. 6.3 Relative Risk The final Threat Risk Matrix provides Region 9 with a depiction of the relative risk of the 17 hazards. Wildfires, flooding, and drought are the hazards posing the greatest relative risk due to frequency of occurrence and potential consequences. Columbia Generating Station, civil disturbance/unrest, and landslides pose the lowest relative risk. Again, as with probability of occurrence, consequences only provide one facet of risk. A high consequence event with a low probability of occurrence may not be deemed as urgent as a hazard with a higher likelihood but slightly lower consequence potential. Region 9 should examine this matrix, in association with the vulnerabilities assessment of this report, to prioritize future planning efforts. 6.4 Vulnerabilities DHS Target Capabilities that received low scores after averaging the county self-assessment results were determined to be potential vulnerabilities within Region 9. Individual counties may or may not share the same level of capability, but this regional average provides a situational picture of overall capabilities throughout the ten-county area. The 37 DHS Target Capabilities are organized into five major missions representing the emergency management cycle: Common, Prevent, Protect, Respond and Recover. The Common Target Capabilities are those that apply to all hazards and will always be a priority. Communications, information sharing, planning, community preparedness, and risk management are all capabilities that require ongoing assessment, evaluation, and improvement. Among the Common capabilities, community preparedness and participation was ranked the lowest, revealing a possible vulnerability. Preparedness begins with the individual, but it requires support from emergency management experts to engage the public and to provide them with the tools they need to prepare for disasters and to actively participate in the process. Response mission capabilities related to law enforcement, fire suppression, public health, healthcare, and emergency management are some of the least vulnerable. This is to be expected, as these agencies engage in training, exercising, and responding to events throughout the year. In addition, they have access to funding sources that target them as key response entities. The Region should examine how best practices associated with these stronger capabilities could be used to bolster those that are perceived to be more vulnerable. The Recovery mission is the most vulnerable, based upon the self-assessment results. The Region s ability to move forward after a hazard has occurred is critical for both the short- and long-term viability of the community and economic recovery. One only has to look at disasters such has Hurricane Katrina or the recent earthquake in Haiti to see that ineffective plans and procedures to restore lifelines and return to some state of normalcy can erode the public s confidence in its leadership and unnecessarily prolong the duration and costs of the incident. The following target capabilities were ranked among the lowest for the region, and they represent areas of potentially significant vulnerability. They are listed according to mission. It is 36

51 6. Conclusions important to note that each of these potential vulnerabilities can be hazard-dependent. For example, CBRNE Detection and Intelligence Analysis and Production are terrorism-focused. If a natural hazard is under consideration, these vulnerabilities may not apply. Common Mission Community Preparedness and Participation Prevent Mission CBRNE Detection Intelligence Analysis and Production Protect Mission Critical Infrastructure Protection Respond Mission Fatality Management Animal Disease Emergency Support Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Recover Mission Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment One vulnerability E & E recommends Region 9 should particularly consider focusing on is critical infrastructure protection. All 17 regional hazards could have some level of adverse impact on critical infrastructure. During the development of this Analysis, obtaining information on critical infrastructure was found to be a challenge because individual counties may have different perspectives regarding what is considered critical infrastructure, which could then differ from regional or state definitions. Future planning efforts that utilize this document to assist in prioritizing activities must weigh relative risks and vulnerabilities. Not all hazards are equal in terms of risk, and therefore all real and perceived vulnerabilities may not apply. The region could choose to address vulnerabilities based upon the desire to mitigate hazards with the highest risks (hazard-based). Conversely, the region could choose to address vulnerabilities that are impacted by a majority of the hazards to get the broadest benefit for the amount of resources that may be spent (capabilities-based). It should be recognized that there are some capabilities that will be continuously identified for assessment and improvement. While the Region may have not identified these capabilities as a vulnerability, they are nonetheless critical components of almost every response and should be regularly tested. These capabilities are aptly called out as common by the TCL. As noted above, only Community Preparedness and Participation was called out as a vulnerability in the regional capability assessment, however the remaining common capabilities should be incorporated into annual planning and training efforts. These capabilities include: 37

52 Planning 6. Conclusions Communications Risk Management Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination Additionally, it was repeatedly heard from regional stakeholders that resource management arises as an area for improvement both in incidents and training and exercises. Development of resource management capabilities should be a focus of the Region and it is recommended that consideration be given to the resource management recommendations that are provided in the Region 9 Strategic Plan. The Region 9 Threat and Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis is intended to be a broad strategic planning tool that provides linkages among hazards, threats, risks, and vulnerabilities so that both hazard- and capabilities-based planning can be coordinated and prioritized along multiple lines of comparison. The threat picture for the region is dynamic and will change over time. Improvements in capabilities will necessitate periodic reviews of this document to update risk and vulnerability assumptions. Ultimately, it is professional judgment, funding constraints, and the dynamic nature of threat and risk assessments that will drive long-range preparedness efforts for Region 9. 38

53 7. List of Acronyms 7 List of Acronyms ALF BEA BLM CBRNE CEMP CWPP DHS DNR ELF GDP GIS HIVA HMP LEPC NFIRS PHMSA Animal Liberation Front Bureau of Economic Adjustment Bureau of Land Management Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan Community Wildfire Protection Plan Department of Homeland Security Department of Natural Resources Earth Liberation Front Gross Domestic Product Geographic information systems Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis Hazard Mitigation Plan Local Emergency Planning Committee National Fire Incident Reporting System U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Region 9 Washington State Homeland Security Region 9 TCL TIE WMD WSU Target Capabilities List Total Industry Earnings Weapon of Mass Destruction Washington State University 39

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55 8. References 8 References In addition to general reference to Region 9 HMPs, HIVAs, CWPPs and CEMPs, the following references were utilized in the development of this report. Resources, documents and websites listed in the Threat/Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis reference section were also utilized in the individual Hazard Appendices but were not duplicated as references under those headings. Threat/Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis Region 9 County Documents Adams County Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis, Adams County, WA, June Asotin County Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis, Asotin County, WA, May Columbia County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Columbia County, WA, November Columbia County Comprehensive Flood Hazard Management Plan, Columbia County, WA, January 28, Ferry County All-Hazards Mitigation Plan, Ferry County, WA, Garfield County Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis, Garfield County, WA, February Lincoln County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Lincoln County, WA, December Pend Oreille County Multi-jurisdiction All-Hazards Mitigation Plan, Pend Oreille County, WA, July 30, Southeast Washington Multi-Hazards Mitigation Plan (Public Review Draft), Asotin, Columbia and Garfield Counties, WA, July Spokane County Multi-jurisdiction All-Hazards Mitigation Plan, Spokane County, WA, April Stevens County Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis, Stevens County, WA, August Stevens County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan, Stevens County, WA, November

56 8. References Other References and Resources Used in the Base Document 2009 Data Book (WA), Washington State Office of Financial Management, Forecasting Division, January Washington Statewide All-Hazards Emergency Preparedness Strategic Plan, March 20, 2009, (November 2010). Asset Value, Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Chapter 1, FEMA Publication 428, FEMA, December Climate of Washington, Western Regional Climate Center, (November 2010). Department of Homeland Security s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 2, DHS Risk Lexicon, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, September Efforts to Identify Critical Infrastructure and Systems, Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of Homeland Security, June Federally Declared Disasters by Year or State, FEMA, (October 2010). FEMA Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years , FEMA, January Hazardous Analysis Methodology, Oregon Emergency Management, May Integrating Man-made Hazards into Mitigation Planning, FEMA, September National Climatic Data Center, NOAA, (October 2010). National Infrastructure Protection Plan, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, April National Response Framework, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, January Target Capabilities List, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, September

57 8. References Washington State Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan, WA State Military Department Emergency Management Division, October Washington State Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis, WA State Military Department Emergency Management Division, September Washington State Total Economic Earnings Data, Washington Regional Economic Analysis Project, (November 2010). Appendix A: Civil Disturbance/Unrest Civil Disturbance Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Appendix B: Columbia Generating Station Adams County Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis, Adams County, WA, June CGS Boiling Water Reactor, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (November 2010). Columbia Generating Station, Washington State Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis, WA State Military Department Emergency Management Division, September Radiological Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Appendix C: Dam Failure Dam Failure Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Inventory of Dams in the State of Washington, Washington Department of Ecology, Dam Safety Section, June Water Resources Program Policy 5404, Frequency of Periodic Dam Inspections, Washington Department of Ecology, Dam Safety Office, July 1,

58 8. References Appendix D: Drought 2007 Census of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Agriculture, (Accessed November 2007). Drought Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Revised Code of Washington RCW:43.83B.400, Drought Conditions Defined, Washington State Legislature, April U.S. Seasonal Drought Outlook, NOAA National Weather Service Climate Prediction Center, (November 2010). Washington State Hazard Mitigation Plan, Washington State Military Department Emergency Management Division, January 28, Appendix E: Earthquake Deep Quakes in Washington and Oregon, The Pacific Northwest Seismic Network, (November 2009). Documentation for the 2008 Update of the United States National Seismic Hazard Maps, U.S. Geologic Survey, Earthquake, Washington State Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis, WA State Military Department Emergency Management Division, September Earthquake Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Earthquakes in Washington, Washington Department of Natural Resources, thquakes.aspx (November 2009). Washington Seismic Hazard Map, U.S. Geologic Survey Earthquake Hazards Program, (November 2010). 44

59 8. References Appendix F: Fire Urban/Structural 2009 Fire in Washington (Annual Report), Washington State Fire Marshal s Office, April 1, Fire in the United States: , U.S. Fire Administration, National Fire Data Center, August Urban Fire Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Appendix G: Fire - Wildfire Washington State Fire Mobilization History of Activations: , Washington State Patrol, Office of the Fire Marshal, (October 2010). Wildfire Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Wildfire Hazards A National Threat, U.S. Geological Survey, Fact Sheet , February 2006, (November 2010). Wildland Fire, Washington State Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis, WA State Military Department Emergency Management Division, September Appendix H: Flood FEMA Q3 Flood Maps by Water Resource Inventory Areas, Washington State Department of Ecology, (November 2010). Flood Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Jim E. O Conner and John E. Costa, Large Floods in the United States: Where They Happen and Why, U.S. Geological Survey, Circular 1245, National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA, (November 2010). The National Flood Insurance Program Community Status Book, Federal Emergency Management Agency, June 14,

60 8. References Appendix I: Hazardous Materials Hazardous Materials Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Hazardous Materials Incident Reports Database, U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, (November 2009). Appendix J: Infectious Disease Outbreak The Great Pandemic The United States in : Washington State, 1918 Pandemic Flu, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, n.d., (November 2010). Pandemic Influenza, Global Security, n.d., (November 2009). Appendix K: Landslide Landslide Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Landslide Types and Processes, U.S. Geological Survey, Fact Sheet , July 2004, (November 2010). Landslides 101, U.S. Geological Survey, (November 2010). Appendix L: Pipelines Pipeline Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Appendix M: Severe Weather The Enhanced Fujita Scale, NOAA Storm Prediction Center, (November 2010). Severe Weather Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). 46

61 8. References Appendix N: Terrorism Terrorism: , Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division. Terrorism Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Weapons of Mass Destruction, Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d., (November 2010). Appendix O: Transportation Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Analysis Accident Database, (November 2010). Traffic Safety Facts for Washington , National Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), (November 2010). Transportation Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Appendix P: Winter Storm Extreme Events Economics of Snow and Ice, NOAA, (November 2010). Severe Weather Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Appendix Q: Volcano (Ash Fall) Volcano Hazard Summary, Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, (November 2010). Steve R. Brantley and Bobbie Myers, Mount St. Helens From the 1980 Eruption to 2000, U.S. Geological Survey, March 2000, (November 2010). Dan Dzurisin, Peter H. Stauffer, and James W. Hendley II, Living with volcanic Risk in the Cascades, U.S. Geological Survey, Fact Sheet , March 2008, (November 2010). 47

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63 9. Target Capability Definitions 9 Target Capability Definitions Descriptions of each of the DHS Target Capabilities are provided below for quick reference. Complete descriptions, including critical tasks contained within each capability, can be found in the Target Capabilities List published in September It can be downloaded at: Mission Capability Description COMMON Planning Communications Risk Management Community Preparedness and Participation Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration The mechanism through which Federal, State, local and tribal governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector develop, validate, and maintain plans, policies, and procedures describing how they will prioritize, coordinate, manage, and support personnel, information, procedures describing how they will prioritize, coordinate, manage, and support personnel, information, equipment, and resources to prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to, and recover from Catastrophic events. The fundamental capability within disciplines and jurisdictions that practitioners need to perform the most routine and basic elements of their job functions. Agencies must be operable, meaning they must have sufficient wireless communications to meet their everyday internal and emergency communication requirements before they place value on being interoperable, i.e., able to work with other agencies. A continuous process of managing through a series of mitigating actions that permeate an entity s activities the likelihood of an adverse event and its negative impact. Risk Management is founded in the capacity for all levels of government to identify and measure risk prior to an event, based on credible threats/hazards, vulnerabilities, and consequences, and to manage the exposure to that risk through the prioritization and implementation of risk-reduction strategies. Provides that everyone in America is fully aware, trained, and practiced on how to prevent, protect/mitigate, prepare for, and respond to all threats and hazards. This requires a role for citizens in personal preparedness, exercises, ongoing volunteer programs, and surge capacity response. The Intelligence and Information Sharing and Dissemination capability provides necessary tools to enable efficient prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities. It is the multi-jurisdictional, multidisciplinary exchange and dissemination of information and intelligence among the Federal, State, local, and tribal layers of government, the private sector, and citizens. The goal of sharing and dissemination is to facilitate the distribution of relevant, actionable, timely, and preferably declassified or unclassified information and/or intelligence that is updated frequently to the consumers who need it. 49

64 9. Target Capability Definitions Mission Capability Description PREVENT PROTECT Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings Intelligence Analysis and Production Counter- Terrorism Investigation and Law Enforcement CBRNE Detection Critical Infrastructure Protection Entails the gathering, consolidation, and retention of raw data and information from sources to include human sources, observation, technical sources and open (unclassified) materials. Unlike intelligence collection, information gathering is the continual gathering of only pure, unexamined data, not the targeted collection traditionally conducted by the intelligence community or targeted investigations. Recognition of indicators and warnings is the ability to see in this gathered data the potential trends, indications, and/or warnings of criminal and/or terrorist activities against U.S. citizens, government entities, critical infrastructure, and allies. The merging of data and information for the purpose of analyzing, linking, and disseminating timely and actionable intelligence with an emphasis on the larger public safety and homeland security threat picture. This process focuses on the consolidation of analytical products among the intelligence analysis units at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels for tactical, operational, and strategic use. This capability also includes the examination of raw data to identify threat pictures, recognize potentially harmful patterns, or connect suspicious links to discern potential indications or warnings. The capability that includes the broad range of activities undertaken by law enforcement and related entities to detect, examine, probe, investigate, and conduct operations related to potential terrorist activities. Current and emerging investigative techniques are used with an emphasis on training, legal frameworks, recognition of indications and warnings, source development, interdiction, and related issues specific to antiterrorism activities. The ability to detect CBRNE materials at points of manufacture, transportation, and use. It is important to note that the activities and tasks described in this capability will be carried out individually for each specific agent, rather than for all agents at the same time. Therefore, when considering critical tasks and preparedness measures, each task and measure should be applied separately to each CBRNE agent. For example, in considering whether technical support (or reachback ) is available, rad/nuc reachback is considerably different from chemical, biological, or explosive reachback. Preparedness in one or more of the CBRNE areas does not equate to preparedness across the entire CBRNE detection spectrum. The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) capability enables public and private entities to identify, assess, prioritize, and protect critical infrastructure and key resources so they can detect, prevent, deter, devalue, and mitigate deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit the Nation s critical infrastructure and key resources. The risk to, vulnerability of, and consequence of an attack on critical infrastructure are reduced through the identification of critical infrastructure; conduct, documentation, and standardization of risk assessments; prioritization of assets; decisions regarding protective and preventative programs; and implementation of protective and preventative plans. 50

65 9. Target Capability Definitions Mission Capability Description RESPOND Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation Lab Testing On-Site Incident Management EOC Management Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Volunteer Management and Donations The capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from chemical, biological and radiological contaminants, and other hazards that affect the safety of food and agricultural products. This includes the timely eradication of outbreaks of crop diseases/pests, assessments of the integrity of the food producing industry, the removal and disposal of potentially compromised materials from the U.S. food supply, and decontamination of affected food manufacturing facilities or retail points of purchase or service. This also includes appropriate laboratory surveillance to detect human foodborne illness or food product contamination. The capacity to rapidly conduct epidemiological investigations. It includes exposure and disease (both deliberate release and naturally occurring) detection, rapid implementation of active surveillance, maintenance of ongoing surveillance activities, epidemiological investigation, analysis, and communication with the public and providers about case definitions, disease risk and mitigation, and recommendation for the implementation of control measures. The ongoing surveillance, rapid detection, confirmatory testing, data reporting, investigative support, and laboratory networking to address potential exposure, or exposure, to all-hazards which include chemical, radiological, and biological agents in all matrices including clinical specimens, food and environmental samples, (e.g., water, air, soil). Such all-hazard threats include those deliberately released with criminal intent, as well as those that may be present as a result of unintentional or natural occurrences. The capability to effectively direct and control incident activities by using the Incident Command System (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The event is managed safely, effectively and efficiently through the common framework of the Incident Command System. The capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs; coordination public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities. The capability to identify, inventory, dispatch, mobilize, transport, recover, and demobilize and to accurately track and record available human and material critical resources throughout all incident management phases. Critical resources are those necessary to preserve life, property, safety, and security. Volunteer Management and Donations is the capability to effectively coordinate the use of volunteers and donations in support of domestic incident management. 51

66 9. Target Capability Definitions Mission Capability Description Responder Safety and Health Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Animal Disease Emergency Support Environmental Health Explosive Device Response Operations The capability that ensures adequate trained and equipped personnel and resources are available at the time of an incident to protect the safety and health of on scene first responders, hospital/medical facility personnel (first receivers), and skilled support personnel through the creation and maintenance of an effective safety and health program. The program also needs to be integrated into the Incident Command System (ICS) and include training, exposure monitoring, personal protective equipment, health and safety planning, risk management practices, medical care, decontamination procedures, infection control, vaccinations for preventable diseases, adequate work-schedule relief, psychological support, and follow-up assessments. This capability identifies the critical personnel, equipment, training, and other resources needed to ensure that all workers are protected from all hazards, including fire (heat and products of combustion), CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive) materials, electrical hazards, collapsed structures, debris, acts of violence, and others. The capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS). The capability to protect, prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from threats and incidents that would result in the disruption of industries related to U.S. livestock, other domestic animals (including companion animals) and wildlife and/or endanger the food supply, public health, and domestic and international trade. It includes the ability to respond to large-scale national and regional emergencies as well as to smaller-scale incidents through rapid determination of the nature of the event, initiation of the appropriate response, containment of the disrupting effects, and facilitation of recovery. The capability to protect the public from environmental hazards and manage the health effects of an environmental health emergency on the public. The capability minimizes human exposures to environmental public health hazards (e.g., contaminated food, air, water, solid waste/debris, hazardous waste, vegetation, sediments, and vectors). The capability provides the expertise to run fate and transport models; design, implement, and interpret the results of environmental field surveys and laboratory sample analyses; develop protective guidance where none exists; and use available data and judgment to recommend appropriate actions for protecting the public and environment. Environmental Health identifies environmental hazards in the affected area through rapid needs assessments and comprehensive environmental health and risk assessments. The capability to coordinate, direct, and conduct improvised explosive device (IED) response after initial alert and notification. Coordinate intelligence fusion and analysis, information collection, and threat recognition, assess the situation and conduct appropriate Render Safe Procedures (RSP). Conduct searches for additional devices and coordinate overall efforts to mitigate chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threat to the incident site. 52

67 9. Target Capability Definitions Mission Capability Description RESPOND Fire Incident Response Support WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Isolation and Quarantine Search and Rescue (Land- Based) Emergency Public Information and Warning This capability provides coordination and implementation of fire suppression operations, which include the following tasks: assessing the scene, assigning resources, establishing an incident command system (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), communicating the status of the situation, requesting additional resources, establishing a safe perimeter, evacuating persons in danger, rescuing trapped victims, conducting fire suppression, determining the cause of the fire(s), and ensuring the area is left in a safe condition. This capability further includes support necessary to prepare the community and reduce vulnerabilities in the event of a major event. The capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures. The capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population (and companion animals), and/or the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe reentry of the population where feasible. The capability to protect the health of the population through the use of isolation and/or quarantine measures in order to contain the spread of disease. Isolation of ill individuals may occur in homes, hospitals, designated health care facilities, or alternate facilities. Quarantine refers to the separation and restriction of movement of persons who, while not yet ill, have been exposed to an infectious agent and may become infectious. The capability to coordinate and conduct SAR response efforts for all hazards, including searching affected areas for victims (human and, to the extent no humans remain endangered, animal) and locating, accessing, medically stabilizing, and extricating victims from the damaged area. Includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions. Public information refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official and includes both general information and crisis and emergency risk communication. 53

68 9. Target Capability Definitions Mission Capability Description RESPOND Emergency Triage and Pre- Hospital Treatment Medical Surge Medical Supplies Management and Distribution Mass Prophylaxis Mass Care Fatality Management The capability to appropriately dispatch emergency medical services (EMS) resources; to provide feasible, suitable, and medically acceptable pre-hospital triage and treatment of patients; to provide transport as well as medical care enroute to an appropriate receiving facility; and to track patients to a treatment facility. The capability to rapidly expand the capacity of the existing healthcare system (long-term care facilities, community health agencies, acute care facilities, alternate care facilities and public health departments) in order to provide triage and subsequent medical care. The capability to procure and maintain pharmaceuticals and medical materials prior to an incident and to transport, distribute, and track these materials during an incident. The capability to protect the health of the population through the administration of critical interventions in response to a public health emergency in order to prevent the development of disease among those who are exposed or are potentially exposed to public health threats. This capability includes the provision of appropriate follow-up and monitoring of adverse events, as well as risk communication messages to address the concerns of the public. The capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a largescale incident. Mass Care is usually provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the American Red Cross, or by local government. The capability also provides for companion animal care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related organizations. The capability to effectively perform scene documentation; the complete collection and recovery of the dead, victim s personal effects, and items of evidence; decontamination of remains and personal effects (if required); transportation, storage, documentation, and recovery of forensic and physical evidence; determination of the nature and extent of injury; identification of the fatalities using scientific means; certification of the cause and manner of death; processing and returning of human remains and personal effects of the victims to the legally authorized person(s) (if possible); and interaction with and provision of legal, customary, compassionate, and culturally competent required services to the families of deceased within the context of the family assistance center. Fatality management activities also need to be incorporated in the surveillance and intelligence sharing networks, to identify sentinel cases of bioterrorism and other public health threats. 54

69 9. Target Capability Definitions Mission Capability Description RECOVER Structural Damage Assessment Restoration of Lifelines Economic and Community Recovery The capability to conduct damage and safety assessments of civil, commercial, and residential infrastructure and to perform structural inspections, and mitigation activities. The capability includes being able to provide contractor management, construction management, cost estimating, technical assistance, and other engineering services to support and manage response and recovery operations. The capability to initiate and sustain restoration activities. This includes facilitating the repair/replacement of infrastructure for oil, gas, electric, telecommunications, drinking water, wastewater, and transportation services. The capability to implement short- and long-term recovery and mitigation processes after an incident. This will include identifying the extent of damage caused by an incident, conducting thorough post-event assessments and determining and providing the support needed for recovery and restoration activities to minimize future loss from a similar event. 55

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71 Appendix A. Civil Disturbance/Unrest Appendix A: Civil Disturbance/Unrest General Hazard Description In this analysis, civil disturbances and unrest incidents are defined as actions taken by a number of members of the public to which law enforcement must respond to maintain the peace. This includes riots, strikes, and demonstrations. It may include certain criminal activities such as large-scale vandalism that might accompany demonstrations or riots. Civil disturbances can occur anywhere. However, locations with populations of college students and professional or collegiate athletic events can be especially susceptible to this type of incident. In Washington, there have been civil unrest incidents related to race riots, anti-war protests, and demonstrations against abortion clinics. In 1999, while Seattle hosted a World Trade Organization conference, violent civil unrest incidents resulted in emergency declarations by the City of Seattle and the Governor s Office. Civil disturbances and public unrest can result in damage to public and private property. Such incidents can cause injuries to participants, as well as innocent bystanders and members of the law enforcement community. Responses by law enforcement to stop a civil disturbance can also result in injuries. Use of pepper spray and tear gas or other riot control agents can cause respiratory problems and eye/skin irritation, which could result in an increase in the number of individuals seeking medical attention. Local commerce may be disrupted, either directly through the civil unrest, or indirectly through curfews or other measures that limit the public s ability to conduct day-to-day activities. Regional Hazard Description It is reasonable to expect that incidents of civil unrest are more likely to occur in the more populous counties and urban centers. Cities with a college or university presence may exhibit greater risk, while rural areas can expect a lower risk. On May 3, 1998, at Washington State University (WSU) in Pullman (Whitman County), when student year-end celebrations got out of hand, law enforcement officials at the local and state level were required to quell the disturbance and restore order. Large crowds of students filled the streets, and some were committing acts of vandalism, starting fires, and throwing bottles, and rocks. The State EOC was activated and the Washington National Guard was placed on standby. Region 9 is host to many colleges and universities. Some of the larger institutions are WSU, Gonzaga, and Eastern Washington University, all of which have robust athletic programs that attract many visitors to collegiate sporting events. There are also several community colleges in the region. A-1

72 Appendix A. Civil Disturbance/Unrest Other possible sites or events that could serve as the location of civil disturbance incidents include, but are not limited to: Military facilities (Fairchild Air Force Base, Spokane); Animal science facilities and veterinary schools (e.g., WSU Animal Science Department, Pullman); and Prisons and Jails (e.g., Airway Heights Correctional Center, which is a medium to long-term correctional facility in Spokane County with over 2,200 inmates). Civil Disturbance/Unrest Threat and Consequence Scoring Overall risk to Region 9 from a significant civil disturbance/unrest incident is moderate. Using public sources of information and interviews with members of the law enforcement community in Region 9, the projected threat and associated consequences for civil disturbance/unrest incidents are as follows: Probability of Occurrence: years; Low (C) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: ; Moderate (3) Property Losses: <$2.5 million; Low (4) Economic Losses: < $15 million; Low (4) Civil Disturbance/Unrest Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond to, or recover from an incident of civil disturbance/unrest. At least 18 of 37 Target Capabilities would be required at some level. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects noted in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to these second-order threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. Table A-1 identifies those capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities Assessment. Additional capabilities could be required, depending on the details of the civil disturbance incident. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects noted in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to A-2

73 Appendix A. Civil Disturbance/Unrest these second-order threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. Table A-1: Civil Disturbance/Unrest Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness Common Prevent EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management Intelligence Analysis and Production Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings Counter-Terrorism Investigation and Law Enforcement Protect Critical Infrastructure Protection Respond Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Emergency Operations Center Management Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Medical Surge Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Recover Economic and Community Recovery A-3

74 Appendix A. Civil Disturbance/Unrest Second-Order Threats and Consequences Incidents of civil disturbance and unrest can be triggered by any of the other hazards reviewed in this analysis. Panic, despair, and frustration are just a few of the emotions that can result from a disaster or emergency. As these emotions take hold among congregations of individuals with similar feelings, civil unrest can occur. There are a limited number of hazards that could be deemed as secondary effects. Urban or structural fires set by protesters, for example, could exacerbate an already dangerous situation. Table A-2 identifies the interconnection between civil disturbance and unrest and the other hazards described within this document. Readers can review those related hazards for additional information on threats and consequences. Table A-2: Civil Disturbance/Unrest Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS Any hazard could result in a civil disturbance/unrest incident. RELATED EFFECTS Fire Urban/Structural A-4

75 Appendix B. Columbia Generating Station Appendix B: Columbia Generating Station General Hazard Description A radiological hazard is the uncontrolled release of radioactive material that can harm people or damage the environment. In Washington State, one facility capable of large-scale radiological release is Energy Northwest s Columbia Generating Station (CGS) nuclear power plant, located 14 miles north northwest of Richland, the United States Department of Energy-Richland Operations (USDOE)-Richland) Hanford Site, military bases, medical and research facilities, private industry, and trucks, trains, aircraft, and other vessels traversing the state carrying radiological materials. The primary concern at the CGS is a potential release of radiological material. To minimize the likelihood of such an event, emergency plans are in place and annual exercises are conducted. In addition, safety inspections are performed at the plant to ensure that proper operation and safety procedures are followed. Regional Hazard Description Although the CGS is not located in Homeland Security Region 9, an incident at the facility could potentially impact a portion of the region, particularly Adams County. The CGS is a commercial nuclear power plant within the boundaries of the Hanford site. The CGS is a 1,150-megawatt boiling water reactor owned and operated by Energy Northwest. It is the only commercially operated nuclear power plant in the Northwest. Uranium, a naturally occurring element, is its primary fuel source. Energy Northwest built the CGS on land leased from the USDOE. Unlike the USDOE facilities at Hanford, the CGS must meet strict safety requirements mandated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. USDOE-Richland is responsible for on-site response to an emergency at its facilities on the Hanford site. Effects of an emergency at the plant could range from no radioactive release to a radioactive release that would initiate the evacuation of the general population within an approximate radius of 10 miles of the facility. Sirens, tone alert radios, and local media stations would alert the community. Radioactive materials from a release may enter the human food chain via crops or dairy products within an approximate radius of 50 miles from the facility. This area is called the Ingestion Zone. Meteorological conditions can influence the size of the contaminated area. In Region 9, only Adams County falls with in this 50-mile zone. A radiological event at the CGS could critically impact agriculture in Region 9, stemming not only from actual contamination of the food supply, but the perception of contaminated foodstuffs leading to consumers refusing to buy from regional producers. B-1

76 Appendix B. Columbia Generating Station Energy Northwest is responsible for on-site response to an emergency at the CGS. The states of Washington and Oregon, and their affected counties, must handle off-site response. Table B-1: Minor CGS Incidents in Recent History Date Incident Description Notification Level 14 May 1997 Explosion at the Plutonium Alert Reclamation Facility (200 West Area) 28 January 1998 Picric Acid crystals found in 327 Alert building (300 Area) 28 June COMMAND Range Fire (started Alert in Benton County and came onsite. Threatened multiple facilities throughout the Hanford Site) 24 August 2005 Solid Waste Storage and Disposal Alert Facility incident(200 West Area) 25 June 2004 Radiography vehicle stolen, vehicle Alert later recovered 30 July 2004 Failure of two control rods to Alert properly insert into the reactor 6 November 2005 Fast Flux Test Facility incident (400 Alert Area) 28 March 2006 Range brush fire threatened the protected area near the CGS Alert Columbia Generating Station Threat and Consequence Scoring Overall risk to Region 9 from an incident at the CGS is low. Using hazard assessment information from the Washington HIVA, the projected threat and associated consequences for a reactor accident at the CGS is as follows: Probability of Occurrence: > 50 years; Rare (D) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: ; Moderate (3) Property Losses: $2.5 mil $5 mil; Moderate (3) Economic Losses: $72 mil-$145mil; Critical (2) Besides the loss of agricultural products due to radiation contamination, economic impacts could spread beyond Adams County to the entire region because of negative perceptions of eastern Washington agricultural products due to the spread of misinformation. B-2

77 Appendix B. Columbia Generating Station Columbia Generating Station Incident Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond to, or recover from a nuclear reactor incident. At least 27 of 37 Target Capabilities would be required at some level. Table B- identifies those capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission, based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities Assessment. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects noted in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to these second-order threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. B-3

78 Appendix B. Columbia Generating Station Table B-2: Columbia Generating Station Incident Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness Common EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION Prevent CBRNE Detection KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management Protect Critical Infrastructure Protection Respond Recover Fatality Management Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Environmental Health Emergency Operations Center Management WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Medical Surge Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Fire Incident Response Support Mass Care Mass Prophylaxis Medical Supplies Management and Distribution On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment Economic and Community Recovery B-4

79 Second-Order Threats and Consequences Appendix B. Columbia Generating Station Beyond operator error or mechanical failure, an incident at the CGS could be the result of another natural or human-caused hazard and could potentially cause secondary hazards to occur. Table B- identifies both causes and effects that would connect an incident at the CGS to other hazards discussed in this document s other hazard appendices. Readers can review those related hazard appendices for additional information on threats and consequences. Table B-3: Columbia Generating Station Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS Earthquake Terrorism RELATED EFFECTS Hazardous Materials B-5

80 Appendix B. Columbia Generating Station Figure B-1: Columbia Generating Station in Relation to Region 9 B-6

81 Appendix C. Dam Failure Appendix C: Dam Failure General Hazard Description Dams are man-made barriers that are designed to impede the flow of water for irrigation, drinking water, recreation, flood control, hydroelectric power, and other uses. If a dam fails, it could cause an uncontrolled release of waters, resulting in flooding, landslides, and rapid erosion. If a dam has a commercial purpose, such as electricity production or canal/loch-based transportation, those functions could be lost as well. Dam failures can arise under a variety of conditions such as overtopping, defects in foundation construction, piping and seepage losses, and loss of integrity of conduits and valves. These failures can result in flooding of downstream areas, economic losses, damage to property and agricultural lands, loss of critical infrastructure and essential services, and potential injuries and fatalities to individuals caught in the ensuing breach. As of June 2010, Washington State has a total inventory of 1,159 dams, 188 (6.2%) of which are located within the ten counties of Region 91. The Washington Department of Ecology s Dam Safety Office is the state entity that is primarily responsible for statewide dam safety issues and regulates approximately 870 dams. A collection of other agencies is responsible for regulating dams, including the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Approximately 35% of these dams are located in the vicinity of population centers. Water Resources Program Policy 5404 outlines an inspection prioritization scheme based upon the downstream hazard classification of individual dams. The Washington Dam Hazard Classification scheme and the associated inspection cycles are outlined in Table C-1. As the table illustrates, even the most hazardous categories of dams are only inspected every six years. 1 Inventory of Dams in the State of Washington, WA Department of Ecology: June C-1

82 Appendix C. Dam Failure Table C-1: Dam Hazard Classification and Inspection Cycle Downstream Hazard Potential Low Significant High High Downstream Hazard Class 3 2 1C 1B Population at Risk Economic Loss Description Environmental Damage Inspection Cycle Every 10 years (>15 high), or no inspection requirement (<15 high) 0 Minimal. No inhabited structures. Limited agricultural development. No deleterious material in reservoir contents. Limited water quality degradation from reservoir contents and only shortterm consequences. Every 8 10 years 1-6 Appreciable. 1 2 inhabited structures. Notable agriculture or work sites. Secondary highway and/or rail lines. Severe water quality degradation potential from reservoir contents and long-term effects on aquatic and human life. Every 6 years 7-30 Major inhabited structures. Medium density suburban or urban area with associated industry, property, and transportation features. Severe water quality degradation potential from reservoir contents and long-term effects on aquatic and human life. Every 6 years Extreme inhabited structures. Medium density suburban or urban area with associated industry, property and transportation features. C-2

83 Appendix C. Dam Failure Table C-1: Dam Hazard Classification and Inspection Cycle Downstream Hazard Potential High Downstream Hazard Class 1A Population at Risk Economic Loss Description Environmental Damage >300 Extreme. >100 inhabited structures. Highly developed, densely populated suburban or urban area with associated industry, property, transportation and community lifeline features. Severe water quality degradation potential from reservoir contents and long-term effects on aquatic and human life. Inspection Cycle Every 6 years Regional Hazard Description The Washington State HIVA states that dam failures occur statewide once every two years. The State s Dam Safety Office identifies 14 notable dam failures between 1914 and 1993, or an average of a single notable dam failure approximately every five years. Two of these notable historical dam failures that have affected Region 9 are: In May 1974, the Horseshoe Lake Dam (Hazard Class 2) failure occurred in Chewelah, Washington (Stevens County). The outlet tunnel that was constructed through a 50-foot-high natural ridge collapsed, causing the ridge to fail, and drained a 20-foot-deep lake. While there were no fatalities, extensive flood damage resulted, and debris was deposited on croplands in the lower valley. Spokane County s Upriver Station Control Works Dam (Hazard Class 2) failed due to overtopping in May A lightning strike disabled the facility turbines, resulting in water levels rising upstream. Backup power failed, and the spillway could not be opened in time. While there were no fatalities, the emergency resulted in $11 million in damage to the facility. Table C-2 provides a count of the dams by county and hazard class. Of the 188 dams in the Region, 24 are classified by the Dam Safety Office as having the highest potential for downstream damage and impacts (Hazard Class 1A/B/C). Eight of the ten counties have at least one dam classified in the highest hazard classes, with Pend Oreille containing over 40% of the Class 1 dams. Structural failures of dams can potentially be contributed to age. Table C-2 also provides the average age of the High Hazard Class dams, as well as the year of construction of the single oldest dam for each of the High Hazard Classes in the Region. For these dams that pose the C-3

84 Appendix C. Dam Failure greatest threat, the average ages are over 40 years old. Class 1A dams pose the greatest threat and also happen to have the oldest average age, which should be a concern for the Region. Finally, the oldest dams for Class 1A, B and C were also identified. The oldest Class 1C dam, built in 1912, is the Marshall Lake Dam in Pend Oreille County. The Nine Mile Dam in Spokane County is the oldest Class 1B dam, at 102 years old. The oldest dam in the most severe hazard class is the Long Lake Dam in Lincoln County. Built in 1914, it is approaching a century of operations. Extra consideration should be given to those dams that are in the highest hazard categories and have been in operation for decades. Table C-2: Region 9 Dam Inventory and Hazard Classification Total Number of Dams County 1 Number of Dams per Downstream Hazard Class 3 2 1C 1B 1A Adams Asotin Columbia Ferry Garfield Lincoln Pend Oreille Spokane Stevens years 57 years 62 years Whitman Region 9 Totals 4 Average Age of High Hazard Dams 1912 Year of Construction for Oldest High Hazard Dam (Pend Oreille County Marshall Lake Dam) 1908 (Spokane County Nine Mile Dam) 1914 (Lincoln County Long Lake Dam) Source: Inventory of Dams in the State of Washington. Washington Dept. of Ecology: June State HIVA indicates 27 dams in Adams County, however the Dam Inventory only lists State HIVA indicates 42 dams in Pend Oreille County, however the Dam Inventory only lists State HIVA indicates 32 dams in Spokane County, however the Dam Inventory only lists State HIVA indicates 10 dams in Whitman County, however the Dam Inventory only lists 8. C-4

85 Appendix C. Dam Failure Dam Failure Threat and Consequence Scoring Overall risk to Region 9 from a dam failure incident is high. Using hazard assessment information from the Dam Safety Office, the Washington State Emergency Management Division website, and county/state planning documents, the projected threat and associated consequences for a dam failure is as follows: Probability of Occurrence: years; Low (C) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: 100 1,000; Critical (2) Property Losses: $5 million $25 million; Critical (2) Economic Losses: $15 million $72 million; Moderate (3) While these statistics show the statewide incidence of notable dam failure events as occurring once every 5 6 years, the historical frequency of incidence within Region 9 is characterized as low (every years). However, as the age of these dams increases, it is possible that the probability of occurrence within Region 9 could increase in the future. Consequences of dam failure were estimated based upon the dam hazard classification table. Assuming a worst-case scenario of a failure of one of the Class 1 dams, injuries and fatalities could exceed 300 individuals. Economic losses could result from a decrease in the property tax base due to the destruction of homes and commercial buildings, loss of agricultural products, and the damage and/or disruption of day-to-day business operations in the vicinity of the dam failure. It is expected that property damage would be highest in the area closest to the dam and would decrease with distance from the incident site as the flood waters and debris spread out over the flooded area. An additional concern related to dam failures is environmental impacts associated with such an event. Some dams can act as storage reservoirs for hazardous materials contained within the soil and mud trapped behind the dam. Dam Failure Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond to, or recover from a dam failure incident. At least 23 of 37 Target Capabilities would be required at some level. Table C-3 identifies those capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission, based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities Assessment. It is important to note that capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects noted in the following section, additional capabilities may or C-5

86 Appendix C. Dam Failure may not be required. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to these second-order threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. Table C-3: Dam Failure Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION Common KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management Prevent None Protect Critical Infrastructure Protection Fatality Management Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Environmental Health Emergency Operations Center Management Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Medical Surge Search and Rescue (land-based) Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Fire Incident Response Support Mass Care On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment Economic and Community Recovery Respond Recover C-6

87 Appendix C. Dam Failure Second-Order Threats and Consequences Dam failures can lead to other hazard incidents discussed within this document. They can also be a secondary result of another natural or technological/human-caused hazard. To assist Region 9 in recognizing the interaction between dam failures and other causes and effects, Table C- 4 identifies these interconnections. Readers can review those related hazards for additional information on threats and consequences. Table C- 4: Dam Failure Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS Earthquake Flood Landslide Severe Weather Terrorism C-7 RELATED EFFECTS Flood Hazardous Materials Landslide Transportation

88 Appendix C. Dam Failure Figure C-1: Dams in Region C-8

89 Appendix D. Drought Appendix D: Drought General Hazard Description Drought is a prolonged period of dryness severe enough to reduce soil moisture, water, and snow levels below the minimum necessary for sustaining plant, animal, and economic systems. Droughts are a natural part of the climate cycle. In the past century, Washington State has experienced a number of drought episodes, including several that lasted for more than a single season: 1928 to 1932, 1992 to 1994, and 1996 to Unlike most states, Washington has a statutory definition of drought (Revised Code of Washington Chapter 43.83B.400). According to state law, an area is considered to be in a drought condition when: The water supply for the area is below 75 percent of normal, and Water uses and users in the area will likely incur undue hardships because of the water shortage. Drought can have a widespread impact on the environment and the economy, depending upon its severity, although it typically does not result in loss of life or damage to property, as do other natural disasters. The National Drought Mitigation Center at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln uses three categories to describe likely drought impacts: Agricultural Drought threatens crops that rely on natural precipitation. Water supply Drought threatens supplies of water for irrigated crops and for communities. Fire hazard Drought increases the threat of wildfires from dry conditions in forest and rangelands. In Washington State, drought also threatens the supply of electricity. Hydroelectric power plants generated nearly three-quarters of the electricity produced in Washington State in When supplies of locally generated hydropower shrink because of drought, utilities seek other sources of electricity and energy for power generation, which can drive up prices as well as reduce supply. Unlike most disasters, droughts normally occur slowly but last a long time. Drought conditions occur every few years in Washington. The droughts of 1977 and 2001, the worst and second D-1

90 Appendix D. Drought worst in state history, resulted from low precipitation and snowpack and resulted in impacts that were felt around the entire state, including Region 9. On average, the nationwide annual impacts of drought are greater than the impacts of any other natural hazard. They are estimated to be between $6 billion and $8 billion annually in the United States and occur primarily in the agriculture, transportation, recreation and tourism, forestry, and energy sectors. The social and environmental impacts are also significant, although it is difficult to put a precise cost on these impacts. Although drought generally affects groundwater sources less than surface water supplies; it takes longer for groundwater supplies to recover. Reduced precipitation during a drought means that groundwater supplies are not replenished at a normal rate. This can lead to a reduction in groundwater levels and problems such as reduced pumping capacity or wells going dry. Shallow wells are more susceptible than deep wells. About 16,000 drinking water systems in Washington get water from the ground; these systems serve about 5.2 million people. Figure D-1 illustrates the national drought outlook for the end of 2010 to early Reduced replenishment of groundwater affects streams. Much of the flow in streams comes from groundwater, especially during the summer, when there is less precipitation, and after snowmelt ends. Reduced groundwater levels mean that even less water will enter streams when steam flows are lowest. A drought directly or indirectly affects all people and all areas of the state. A drought can result in farmers not being able to plant crops or the failure of the planted crops. This results in loss of work for farm workers and those in related food processing jobs. Other water- or electricitydependent industries are commonly forced to shut down all or a portion of their facilities, resulting in further layoffs. A drought can spell disaster for recreational companies that use water (e.g., swimming pools, water parks, and river rafting companies) and for landscape and nursery businesses because people will not invest in new plants if water is not available to sustain them. Also, people could pay more for water if utilities increase their rates. With much of Washington s energy coming from hydroelectric plants, a drought would reduce the amount of inexpensive electricity coming from dams, likely resulting in higher electric bills. The severity of drought is measured by the Palmer Index in a range of 4 (extremely wet) to -4 (extremely dry). The Palmer Index incorporates temperature, precipitation, evaporation and transpiration, runoff, and soil moisture when designating the degree of drought. Regional Hazard Description The counties of Homeland Security Region 9 are susceptible to drought based on all of the risk categories (agricultural, water supply, fire danger) outlined above. Agriculture is a major industry in all of the counties of Region 9, and extended periods of drought have the potential to cause a significant economic impact. Table D-1 identifies time spent in drought conditions by county from 1895 to D-2

91 Appendix D. Drought Table D-1 Serious or Extreme Drought Conditions in HLS Region 9 Counties County % Time in Drought % Time in Drought % Time in Drought Adams County 10 15% 20 30% 30 40% Asotin County 10 15% 20 30% 30 40% Columbia County 10 15% 20 30% 30 40% Ferry County 10 15% 5 10% >50% Garfield County 10 15% 20 30% 30 40% Lincoln County 10 15% 20 30% 30 40% Pend Oreille County 10 15% 5 10% >50% Spokane County 10 15% 20 30% 30 40% Stevens County 10 15% 5 10% >50% Whitman County 10 15% 20 30% 30 40% The major causes of droughts in Region 9 are either low snow accumulations from low precipitation or warm winter temperatures or warm weather in the late winter/early spring that causes early melt of the snowpack. Most of the state s annual precipitation occurs during the winter. Precipitation in the Blue Mountains or Selkirk Mountains is normally stored as snow that slowly melts during the spring and summer, maintaining stream and river flows. This is the primary source of water for irrigation and municipal use. Agriculture is the industry most heavily affected by drought in Region 9. Drought can affect crop viability as well as flow of agricultural commodities. Table D-2 provides agricultural information for Region 9 by county for For example, low water flow in the Snake River can present problems for wheat growers in southeastern Washington since more than 80% of their crop is transported by barge. Lack of dredging combined with low river levels reduces the capacity for barge transportation downriver from Lewiston, forcing southeast Washington growers to use higher cost transportation alternatives such as trucking and rail. Additionally, drought threatens the supply of electricity in Washington. Hydroelectric power plants generate approximately three quarters of the electricity produced in Washington State. When supplies of locally generated hydropower shrink because of drought, utilities seek other sources of electricity, which can drive up prices as well as reduce supply. D-3

92 Appendix D. Drought Table D-2 Region Agriculture Statistics # of Farms Land in Farms (acres) Market Value of Products Sold Government Payments Adams 782 1,098,487 $344,130,000 $14,454,000 Asotin ,860 $13,376,000 $2,339,000 Columbia ,307 $39,819,000 $5,257,000 Ferry ,452 $2,913,000 $73,000 Garfield ,212 $26,440,000 $5,086, ,090,178 $126,216,000 $15,371, ,109 $2,818,000 $3,366,000 Spokane 2, ,329 $117,065,000 $5,929,000 Stevens 1, ,082 $24,530,000 $846,000 Whitman 1,247 1,271,141 $254,031,000 $25,305,000 County Lincoln Pend Oreille Source: 2007 Census of Agriculture, Drought Threat and Consequence Scoring Overall risk to Region 9 from a prolonged drought is severe the highest risk category in this analysis. This ranking is primarily due to the economic impacts a drought would cause to the extensive agricultural communities in the ten-county area. The projected threat and associated consequences for drought are as follows: Probability of Occurrence: 1 10 years; Moderate (B) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: < 50; Low (4) Property Losses: < $2.5 million; Low (4) Economic Losses: > $145 million; Catastrophic (1) D-4

93 Appendix D. Drought Drought Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond or recover from a prolonged drought. At least 17 of 37 Target Capabilities would be required at some level. Table D-3 identifies those capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission, based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities Assessment. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to these second-order threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. D-5

94 Appendix D. Drought Table D-3: Drought Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION Common Prevent KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management None Protect Respond Recover D-6 Critical Infrastructure Protection Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Emergency Operations Center Management Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Mass Care On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Economic and Community Recovery

95 Appendix D. Drought Second-Order Threats and Consequences Although drought conditions do not originate from any of the other natural or technological hazards examined in this analysis, a drought can definitely trigger several of these hazards as secondary effects. As an example, dry lands can result in greater fire potential, and decreases in the water supplies could affect fire fighting capabilities. Table D-4 outlines the interconnection between droughts and the other hazards described in this Regional threat and vulnerability assessment. Table D-4: Drought Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS None D-7 RELATED EFFECTS Civil Disturbance/Unrest Fire Wildland Fire Urban/Structural

96 Appendix D. Drought Figure D-1: Region 9 Average Precipitation D-8

97 Appendix E. Earthquake Appendix E: Earthquake General Hazard Description An earthquake is the sudden release of stored energy in the earth; most earthquakes occur along a fracture within the earth, called a fault. The shaking caused by this sudden shift is often very small, but occasionally large earthquakes produce very strong ground shaking. It is this strong shaking and its consequences ground failure, landslides, liquefaction that damages buildings and structures and upsets regional economies. Washington is situated at a convergent margin, the collisional boundary between two tectonic plates. The Cascadia subduction zone, which is the convergent boundary between the North American plate and the Juan de Fuca plate, lies offshore from northernmost California to southernmost British Columbia. The two plates are converging at a rate of about 3 4 centimeters per year (about 2 inches per year); in addition, the northward-moving Pacific plate is pushing the Juan de Fuca plate north, causing complex seismic strain to accumulate. Earthquakes are caused by the abrupt release of this slowly accumulated strain. Figure E-1 shows the relative positions of the Juan de Fuca and North American Plates. Figure E-1: State of Washington Geological Context Source: More than 1,000 earthquakes occur in the state annually. Washington has a record of at least 20 damaging earthquakes during the past 125 years. Large earthquakes in 1946, 1949, and 1965 killed 15 people and caused more than $200 million (1984 dollars) in property damage. E-1

98 Appendix E. Earthquake Most of these earthquakes occurred in western Washington, but several, including the largest historic earthquake recorded in Washington (1872), occurred east of the Cascade crest. Earthquake histories spanning thousands of years from Japan, China, Turkey, and Iran show that large earthquakes recur there on the order of hundreds or thousands of years. Washington s short historical record (starting about 1833) is inadequate to sample its earthquake record. Using a branch of geology called paleoseismology to extend the historical record, geologists have found evidence of large, prehistoric earthquakes in areas where there have been no large historic events, suggesting that most of the state is at risk. Although several types of damaging earthquakes occur in Washington, deep earthquakes beneath Puget Sound, at depths from 30 to 70 kilometers (19 to 43 miles), have historically caused the most damage. Although other types of earthquakes can be much larger, damaging deep earthquakes are more frequent, occurring every 30 years or so. Deep earthquakes, also called "Benioff Zone earthquakes," reach magnitudes as high as 7.5 on the Richter Scale (see Table E-1). For example, a magnitude 7.5 Benioff Zone quake beneath Oaxaca, Mexico, occurred on September 30, Benioff Zone earthquakes usually have dipslip, or normal faulting, and no large aftershocks. These earthquakes are caused by mineral changes as the plate goes to deeper depths and is exposed to increased temperature and pressure. The mineral changes cause the plate to shrink and become denser while stresses build up that pull the plate apart. Table E-1: Damaging Benioff Zone Earthquakes in Washington Year Magnitude Depth 53 km 63 km 41 km 52 km 40 km Location Olympia Sea-Tac Satsop Olympia(Nisqually) Matlock Source: Regional Hazard Description The state s two largest crustal earthquakes felt by European settlers occurred in Eastern Washington: the 1872 quake near Lake Chelan and the 1936 earthquake near Walla Walla. Residents of Spokane felt a swarm of earthquakes in 2001, the largest of which had a magnitude of 4.0. The recent Spokane earthquakes were very shallow, with most events located within a few miles of the surface. The events occurred near a suspected fault informally called the Latah Fault; however, the relation between the fault and the swarm is uncertain. Geologists have mapped the Spokane area, but none have confirmed the presence of major faults that might be capable of producing earthquakes. State geologists continue to investigate the geology and earthquake risk in Spokane and surrounding areas. E-2

99 Appendix E. Earthquake Elsewhere in Eastern Washington, geologists have uncovered evidence of a number of surface faults; however, they have not yet determined if the faults are active or the extent of the risk they pose to the public. One fault, Toppenish Ridge, appears to have been the source of two earthquakes with magnitudes of 6.5 to 7.3 in the past 10,000 years. Earthquake Threat and Consequence Scoring The risk to Region 9 from an earthquake is high. While the probability of a significant quake is relatively low, a sizeable quake near higher population centers could exceed critical-level thresholds for human health, property or economic losses. Probability of Occurrence: years; Low (C) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: 100-1,000; Critical (2) Property Losses: $5 million to $25 million; Critical (2) Economic Losses: $72 million to $145 million; Critical (2) Earthquake Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond to, or recover from an earthquake. At least 25 of 37 Target Capabilities would be required at some level. Table E-2 identifies those capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission, based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities Assessment. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects noted in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to these second-order threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. E-3

100 Appendix E. Earthquake Table E-2: Earthquake Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION Common Prevent KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management None Protect Respond Recover E-4 Critical Infrastructure Protection Fatality Management Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Environmental Health Emergency Operations Center Management Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Medical Surge Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Fire Incident Response Support Mass Care Medical Supplies Management and Distribution On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment Economic and Community Recovery

101 Appendix E. Earthquake Second-Order Threats and Consequences Earthquakes can lead to other hazard incidents discussed within this document. Table E-3 identifies the interconnection between earthquake hazards and other hazards discussed in the hazard appendices of this document. Readers can review those related hazards for additional information on threats and consequences associated with them. Table E-3: Earthquake Hazard Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS None E-5 RELATED EFFECTS Dam Failure Fire Urban/Structural Hazardous Materials Landslide Transportation

102 Appendix E. Earthquake Figure E-2: Region 9 Seismicity E-6

103 Appendix F. Fire Urban/Structural Appendix F: Fire Urban/Structural General Hazard Description Urban and structural fires are conflagration incidents that affect man-made structures. These structures can be public or private property, residences, or businesses. While this report discusses urban/structural fires separately from wildland fires, the two fire-related appendices should be reviewed together because one type of fire can develop into the other. Fire services are some of the most active responders. The National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) is the means by which fire service agencies can document and report on fire incidents. Data in this section was obtained from the 2009 Fire in Washington Report, which was developed from NFIRS data. This report provides some key statewide statistics for urban/structural fires in Washington, including the following: A structural fire is reported every 1.1 hours. Over 25,000 fire incidents resulted in 59 fatalities and an estimated $239 million in damages in Structural fires accounted for 30% of the reports, 87% of the dollar losses, and 73% of the statewide fatalities. Regional Hazard Description Washington State is divided into nine geographic regions for fire services under the Office of the State Fire Marshal. These regional boundaries are not aligned with the Washington State Homeland Security regional boundaries. Region 9, which is a Homeland Security based category, is composed of five counties from Fire Region 8 (Adams, Asotin, Columbia Garfield and Whitman) and all five counties in Fire Region 9 (Ferry, Lincoln, Pend Oreille, Spokane, and Stevens). Figure F-1 illustrates the State Fire Regions. This disparity between the regions makes it difficult to provide Homeland Security Region 9 fire data, as the information includes several counties (Benton, Franklin and Walla Walla) that fall within another Homeland Security Region. F-1

104 Appendix F. Fire Urban/Structural Figure F-4: Washington State Fire Service Regions Note: Shaded counties have populations greater than 100,000. Table F-1 provides fire information for Region 9 between 2005 and The 2009 Fire in Washington Report was the source of the data. All statistics include all fire types and sources (to include both urban/structural and wildfire). The inability to separate the two fire hazard types was a limitation on the analysis of the urban fires as well as wildfire, but it does provide some valuable insight into both hazards. The data does show that fires are an annual occurrence and that on the average, property losses per fire are relatively low (approximately $8,000 per fire). Table F-10: Region 9 Fire Statistics, Fire Service Regions County # of Fire Incidents Total Property and 1 Content Loss Adams Asotin Columbia Garfield Whitman Ferry Lincoln Fire Service Pend Oreille Region 9 Spokane Stevens Homeland Security Region 9 Totals Fire Service 2 Region 8 Fatalities ( ) 3 8,995 $43,309,438 11,006 $118,212,085 20,001 $161,212,085 F

105 Appendix F. Fire Urban/Structural Table F-10: Region 9 Fire Statistics, Fire Service County Regions Annualized Averages 1 # of Fire Incidents 4,000 fires per year Total Property and 1 Content Loss $32,242,417 in losses per year $8,060 Average Property Loss per fire Fatalities ( ) 5 fatalities per year Property and content loss values are estimates by the servicing Fire Department. It does not reflect insurance based estimates or all potential losses. 2 Number of incidents and property losses do include reports from Benton, Franklin and Walla Walla Counties. Fire Urban/Structural Threat and Consequence Scoring The risk from urban/structural fires in Region 9 is high. This assessment examined the results of a single severe fire and not a cumulative assessment of all fires that may occur in a given time period. While the number of injuries and fatalities and the economic consequences are estimated to be low, potential property losses raise the risk. Table F-1, above, presents the average cost per fire at $8,060 between 2005 and Data sources did not provide examples of the highestcost structural fires. However, it is not unlikely that a structural fire at an office building or hotel could result in losses of between $2.5 million and $5 million, far greater than the average loss of $8,060. Using historical information and public sources of information, in particular the 2009 Fire in Washington report, the projected threat and associated consequences for urban/structural fires are as follows: Probability of Occurrence: Annually, High (A) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: <50; Low (4) Property Losses: <$2.5 $5 million; Moderate (3) Economic Losses: < $15 million; Low (4) Urban and Structural Fire Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond to, or recover from an urban structural fire. At least 24 of 37 Target Capabilities would be required at some level. Table F-2 identifies those capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission, based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities Assessment. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects noted in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to these second-order threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. F-3

106 Appendix F. Fire Urban/Structural Table F-2: Fire Urban/Structural Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION Common Prevent Protect Respond Recover KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management None Critical Infrastructure Protection Fatality Management Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Environmental Health Emergency Operations Center Management Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Medical Surge Search and Rescue (Land-Based) Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Fire Incident Response Support Mass Care On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment Economic and Community Recovery F-4

107 Appendix F. Fire Urban/Structural Second-Order Threats and Consequences Urban/structural fires can lead to other hazard incidents contained within this document. As noted above, a structural fire could spread to the wildland/urban interface and cause a wildland fire, and vice versa. A structural fire could also lead to a hazardous materials incident. In addition, causal factors for structural fires can vary. Various natural and technological hazards can cause fires as a secondary hazard, such as severe weather (lightning) and terrorism or civil unrest incidents. Table F-3 identifies the interconnection between urban or structural fires and the other hazards (as causes and effects of these fires) contained within this document in the other hazard appendices. Readers can review those related hazards for additional information on threats and consequences. Table F-3: Fire Urban/Structural Hazard Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS Civil Disturbance/Unrest Earthquake Fire Wildland Hazardous Materials Severe Weather Terrorism Transportation F-5 RELATED EFFECTS Fire Wildland Hazardous Materials

108 Appendix F. Fire Urban/Structural THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY F-6

109 Appendix G. Fire - Wildland Appendix G: Fire Wildland General Hazard Description Wildland fire is an integral part of most forest and rangeland ecosystems throughout the United States. Prior to the adoption of aggressive fire protection policies by federal agencies following the large fires of 1910 across Washington, Idaho, and Montana, records show that fires burned regularly in these fire-prone ecosystems, most of which were low intensity and caused by lightning. These relatively small, low-intensity fires had the effect of cleaning up the fuels, which helped prevent larger intensity fires from taking hold. As a result of destruction caused by the 1910 wildfires, federal agencies adopted aggressive fire protection policies that remained in effect until the 1970 s. These policies, along with modern day forest and rangeland management practices, have altered the vegetation and increased fuels in many areas. This has contributed to an increase in high-intensity wildland fires today that are more damaging and difficult to control. In addition, the expansion of human developments into many of the forest and rangeland areas, known as the wildland urban interface, has made it more difficult and costly to suppress fires that do occur. Consequently, many of these large, complex fires result in high suppression costs, significant loss of forest and rangeland resources, and major damage to watersheds, recreation, and scenic values. Wildland urban interface fires often cause significant loss of homes and other structures and significantly impact the economy of the areas affected. Impacts to communities from wildfires include: Major losses to forests Major damage to homes and other structures Major losses to rangelands Major impacts to recreation and scenic values Major impacts to watershed resources Impacts to air quality Impacts to local economy Major disruptions to area residents ways of life Statistics published by the National Interagency Fire Center for show that nationally, 83 percent of the wildland fires are human-caused, while 17 percent are caused by lightning. G-1

110 Appendix G. Fire - Wildland These human-caused fires burn 49 percent of the acres, and lightning fires burn 51 percent of the acres. Regional Hazard Description Security Region 9 is made up of diverse ecosystems with differing fuels, terrain, and weather, which all have a direct bearing on wildland fire occurrence and fire behavior characteristics. Much of the region has experienced the same kind of heavy fuel buildup and altered vegetation due to aggressive fire suppression policies and management practices. Generally, the region can be grouped into three categories based on these factors. The southern group consists largely of sparsely populated private lands dominated by a mix of cultivated farmland, grassland, and shrub, with scattered timberlands. The terrain is characterized by rolling hills and deep valleys that are sometimes steep and rugged. Even though fire occurrence in these areas is generally low, under extreme burning conditions, fires spread rapidly in the extremely flashy grasslands and shrub areas found throughout the area. According to statistics compiled by the Office of the Washington State Fire Marshall, during the period of , there have been eight wildland fire incidents in this area that required activation of Washington State Mobilization Plan. The Washington State Mobilization Plan may be activated by the Chief of the Washington State Patrol to assist with resources in managing fires that jeopardize the ability to provide protection of life and property after all local and mutual aid resources have been expended. Another category includes areas in the central portion of the region, which transitions from the lands dominated by a mix of cultivated farmland, grassland, and scattered timberlands into areas becoming more dominated by coniferous timberland. Terrain is variable, with timbered mountainous areas up to 5,878 feet to the north and scablands to the west. The Spokane Indian Reservation is located in this grouping. There are also vast areas of cultivated farmland and grass to the west of the timbered area. Wildland urban interface areas are common throughout much of the timbered areas of this central portion. Fires that start in this area are often an immediate threat to many homes and other structures. During the period, there were 13 Washington State Mobilization Plan activations in response to wildland fire incidents in this central group. The third category includes areas in the northern portion of the region. These areas are dominated by commercial coniferous forests, even on many of the private lands. The terrain is mountainous, with narrow valleys and steep drainages. Homes and other structures are found throughout much of the area on private land. The Colville National Forest and Kalispel Indian Reservation are located in this area. There have been 13 Washington State Mobilization Plan activations in response to wildland fire incidents in this group during the period Seven of the ten counties and one tribe in Region 9 have a completed Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP): Columbia, Ferry, Garfield, Lincoln, Pend Oreille, Spokane, Stevens Counties and the Spokane Tribe. Asotin County has a partial CWPP. Two other counties have not initiated a CWPP. The CWPP addresses issues such as wildfire response, wildland fire hazard mitigation, community wildland fire preparedness, and structure protection related to G-2

111 Appendix G. Fire - Wildland wildland fire in an effort to make county residents, communities, state agencies, local governments, and businesses less vulnerable to the negative effects of wildland fires. These plans contain detailed description of the fire hazards faced by each county. Wildland fire protection in the region is provided by a combination of fire services entities, depending on ownership of the lands. Fire Protection Districts and the Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR) cover most private lands, while DNR protects state lands. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) protects BLM lands, and the U.S. Forest Service protects National Forests. DNR also provides wildland fire protection on the Spokane and Kalispel Reservations on a cost reimbursable basis. Several areas in the southern part of the region are not covered by a Fire District or DNR. This presents major problems when fires occur in those areas since these fires threaten lives, communities, and property and often burn onto lands protected by Fire Districts, DNR, or the federal agencies. Fire Protection Districts may be limited in their response capabilities due to lack of staffing and equipment, and this may expose Fire District personnel to safety hazards when fast moving fires quickly exceed their capabilities. Since Fire Districts are responsible for emergency medical services as well as fire, they often face competition for their services, and this further limits their capabilities and increases their exposure to wildland fire hazards due to reduced numbers. Wildland fire statistics for the region compiled by DNR for a ten-year period of show: Lightning causes 29 percent of the fires and 54 percent of the acres burned. Human causes start 71 percent of the fires and burn 46 percent of the acres. Major human causes include debris burning, recreation, and children playing with fire. Fire Wildland Threat and Consequence Scoring The risk from wildland fires in Region 9 is severe. This assessment examined the results of a single severe fire and is not a cumulative assessment of all fires that may occur in a given time period. While the number of injuries and fatalities is estimated to be low, property losses and economic consequences (depending on the location of the fire), raises the risk. The annual probability of occurrence is the driving factor for why this hazard is scored at the highest risk level. Using this historical information and public sources of information, the projected threat and associated consequences for urban/structural fires are as follows: Probability of Occurrence: Annually; High (A) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: <50; Low (4) Property Losses: $5 million - $25 million; Critical (2) G-3

112 Appendix G. Fire - Wildland Economic Losses: $15 mil - $72 mil; Moderate (3) Urban/Structural Fire Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond to, or recover from an urban/structural fire. At least 25 of 37 Target Capabilities would be required at some level. Table G-1 identifies those capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission, based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities Assessment. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements will be incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be required more than others, or potentially not required at all. In addition, when considering second-order causes and effects in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. Refer to those sections within this document for capability and vulnerability information in regards to those hazards. G-4

113 Appendix G. Fire - Wildland Table G-1: Wildland Fire Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION Common KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management Prevent None Protect Critical Infrastructure Protection Fatality Management Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Environmental Health EOC Management Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Medical Surge Search and Rescue (Land-Based) Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Fire Incident Response Support Mass Care Medical Supplies Management and Distribution On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment Economic and Community Recovery Respond Recover G-5

114 Appendix G. Fire - Wildland Second-Order Threats and Consequences Wildland fires can lead to other hazard incidents addressed within this document. In addition, causes of these types of fires can vary. Various natural and technological hazards can cause fires as a secondary hazard, and conversely, fires can lead to other hazards addressed in this assessment. Table G- 2 identifies the interconnection between wildland fires and the other hazards (as causes and effects of wildfires) discussed within this document s other hazard appendices. Readers can review those related hazards for additional information on threats and consequences. Table G- 2: Wildland Fire Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS Earthquake Fire Urban/Structural Hazardous Materials Severe Weather Transportation G-6 RELATED EFFECTS Fire Urban/Structural Hazardous Materials

115 Appendix G. Fire - Wildland Figure G-1: Region 9 Wildfires Acreage Burned G-7

116 Appendix G. Fire - Wildland Figure G-2: Region 9 Wildfires Cause of Fire G-8

117 Appendix G. Fire - Wildland Figure G-3: Region 9 Wildfires Simulated Historical % of Mixed Severity Fires G-9

118 Appendix G. Fire - Wildland THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY G-10

119 Appendix H. Flood Appendix H: Flood General Hazard Description Flooding can occur due to a number of reasons. Excessive rainfall or rapid thaws can result in flash flooding as a natural hazard. Dam failures (see Appendix C) can also result in flooding due to this technological hazard. Flooding has the potential to directly cause significant losses to property, and it can also trigger other hazards such as landslides and pipeline failures. In Washington, flooding to some degree, is an annual occurrence. According to the Washington HIVA (2009), only 7.5% of the state lies in a floodplain (see Figure H-1and Figure H-2). Compared to other states, this is a relatively low percentage. In addition to being a frequent hazard, flooding is often one of the most costly. The National Flood Insurance Program has been established to help mitigate the cost of damage by providing a pool from which property owners can purchase flood insurance, which is typically not covered by commercial insurance vendors. Figure H-1: Counties with 2% or More of Land Area in a Floodplain H-1

120 Appendix H. Flood Figure H-2: Statewide 100-Year Riverine Flood Areas Regional Hazard Description Region 9 has a lower incidence of flooding than other parts of the state. However, threats related to this type of hazard do exist, and some amount of flooding is expected annually. County participants at numerous workshops used in developing this analysis perceived a relatively low risk from flooding. Of the 19 Federally declared disasters in Region 9 from 1964 to 2009, 11 were due to flooding, and every county was affected by flooding at least once. Since Presidential Disaster Declarations represent the most significant emergencies, the risk to Region 9 has the potential to be greater than initially perceived. The following provides historical information on several of the Presidentially declared flooding disasters that have impacted several of the counties in Region 9. In March 1989, Stevens and Whitman Counties were affected by flooding under Federal Disaster #822. Heavy rainfall resulted in flooding, which damaged roads and utilities. Total damage to public facilities among the four counties affected was approximately $2 million. In February 1996, heavy rains, coupled with higher than normal temperatures resulting in the melting of snow, caused flooding in Adams, Asotin, Columbia, Garfield, Lincoln, Spokane, and Whitman Counties (as well as 17 other counties outside of Region 9). Federal Disaster #1100 resulted in $113 million in total disaster assistance under the Stafford Act and over $60 million in Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster loans. H-2

121 Appendix H. Flood Between December 1996 and January 1997, over $110 million in Stafford Act disaster assistance and SBA loans were provided under Federal Disaster #1159. Snow melts and rain resulted in widespread flooding that impacted 38 counties statewide, including all ten counties of Region 9. In May 1998, heavy rainfall resulted in flooding and the issuance of Federal Disaster #1252. This disaster was only declared for Ferry and Stevens Counties, both of which are part of Region 9. $3.6 million in Stafford Act assistance was provided. Hazards from flooding are not only associated with floodplains. Thunderstorms can deliver heavy rains that lead to isolated flash flooding in both rural and urban settings. Urban flooding can result from rapid inundation of sewer and drainage systems, although these incidents are expected to be of short duration. This could also lead to localized flooding of basements and ground floors, resulting in property damage losses. Flood Threat and Consequence Scoring The risk from flooding in Region 9 is severe. This assessment examined flooding is an annual event, even though in most years it does not pose significant consequences to the community. Essentially, the risk rating is based upon a worst-case scenario that is in line with Presidentially declared disasters. While the number of injuries and fatalities is estimated to be low, property losses raise the risk. The annual probability of occurrence is the driving factor as to why this hazard is scored at the highest risk level. Using this historical information and public sources of information, the projected threat and associated consequences for flooding are as follows: Probability of Occurrence: Annually; High (A) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: <50; Low (4) Property Losses: $5 million to $25 million; Critical (2) Economic Losses: $15 million - $72 million; Moderate (3) Flood Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond to, or recover from a significant flooding incident. At least 24 of 37 Target Capabilities would be required at some level. Table H-1 identifies the capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission, based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities Assessment. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects noted in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to H-3

122 Appendix H. Flood these second-order threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. Table H-1: Flood Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION Common KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management Prevent None Protect Critical Infrastructure Protection Fatality Management Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Environmental Health Emergency Operations Center Management Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Medical Surge Search and Rescue (Land-Based) Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Fire Incident Response Support Mass Care On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment Economic and Community Recovery Respond Recover H-4

123 Appendix H. Flood Second-Order Threats and Consequences Flooding can both cause and be caused by hazard incidents discussed in this document. As noted above, flooding can be caused by both natural and technological/man-made hazards. In addition, flooding can cause other events, e.g., it could weaken a railroad trestle, which could, in turn, result in a transportation-related hazard. Table H-2 identifies the interconnection between flooding and the other hazards discussed in the other hazard appendices in this document. Readers can review related hazards for additional information on threats and consequences. Table H-2: Flood Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS Dam Failure Earthquake Severe Weather Winter Storm H-5 RELATED EFFECTS Dam Failure Landslide Hazardous Materials Pipeline Transportation

124 Appendix H. Flood Figure H-3: Region 9 Flood Hazard H-6

125 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Appendix I: Hazardous Materials General Hazard Description Hazardous materials are materials that, because of their chemical, physical, or biological nature, pose a potential risk to life, health, or property when released. Hazardous material incidents are intentional or unintentional releases of a material that, because of its chemical, physical, or biological nature, poses a potential risk to life, health, environment, or property. A release may occur by spilling, leaking, emitting toxic vapors, or any other process that enables the material to escape its container, enter the environment, and create a potential hazard. The hazard can be explosive, flammable, combustible, corrosive, reactive, poisonous, biological, and/or radioactive. Each incident s impact and resulting response depends on a multitude of interrelated variables, ranging from the quantity and specific characteristic of the material to the conditions of the release and area/population centers involved. Releases may be small and easily handled with local response resources, or they may rise to catastrophic levels with long-term consequences that require representatives of federal, state, and local governments to be present at the scene. The Washington State Hazardous Materials Program consists of several agencies, each responsible for specific elements of the program. A number of strategies have evolved to limit risk, response to, and recovery from hazardous materials releases, intentional discharges, illegal disposals, or system failures. A comprehensive system of laws, regulations, and resources are in place to provide for technical assistance, environmental compliance, and emergency management. Natural disasters like floods, landslides, and earthquakes can also result in spills. Illegal activities, such as illegal dumping and disposal of waster and drug labs used for manufacturing methamphetamines and other narcotics present yet another hazardous materials concern. Recent history shows a nationwide increase in the threat from terrorist use of hazardous materials as well. The combination of possible sources of hazardous material exposure to Region 9 s sizable population and workforce presents complex problems to responders. Regional Hazard Description All communities located near the region s major transportation corridors (land, rail, and air) are subject to the probability of a significant hazardous material release. Hazardous materials are transported over or near numerous wetlands and environmentally sensitive areas, and through densely populated centers. Of particular concern in Region 9 is transportation and storage of chemicals used in agriculture. I-1

126 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Because hazardous materials are so widely used, stored, and transported in the region, often in very large quantities a hazardous material event could take place almost anywhere, with potentially widespread and powerful impacts. Regulations and safety practices make such largescale events unlikely, but smaller-scale incidents may have severe impacts as well, including: Human deaths, injuries, and permanent disabilities Livestock/animal deaths Destruction of vegetation and crops Property damage and destruction Pollution of groundwater, drinking water supplies, and the environment Contamination of foodstuffs, property, land, and structures Temporary or long-term closure of transportation routes and/or facilities Loss of business and industrial productivity Utility outages Clean-up and restoration costs Losses and inconvenience due to evacuation Loss of valuable chemical product The most vulnerable areas in the region are those associated with the storage of hazardous materials and those adjacent to the region s major transportation corridors. These corridors are often located near densely populated commercial and residential centers. Numerous critical facilities are vulnerable to hazardous spills. Individual counties maintain lists of both fixed facilities and sensitive facilities in their respective jurisdictions. Many counties in Region 9 have established Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). An LEPC conducts hazard identification, vulnerability analysis, and risk analysis activities for its jurisdiction. Federal and state statutes require LEPCs to develop and maintain emergency response plans based on the volumes and types of substances found in, or transported through, their districts. Attachment 1, appended to this hazard, contains a history of hazardous materials releases and incidents within Region 9. A federal law called the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) gives you the right to know about toxic chemicals being released into the environment. The law requires facilities in certain industries, which manufacture, process, or use significant amounts of toxic chemicals, to report annually on their releases of these chemicals. The annual Toxic Release Inventory Report (TRI) contains information about the types and amounts of toxic I-2

127 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials chemicals that are released each year to the air, water, and land as well as information on the quantities of toxic chemicals sent to other facilities for further waste management. TRI sites in Region 9 are shown on Figure I-1. Hazardous Materials Threat and Consequence Scoring The risk from unintentional hazardous material releases in Region 9 is high. This classification is due to an anticipated 1 10 year event occurrence, coupled with a moderate consequence to human health through illness, injury, and potentially fatalities. It is expected that property and economic losses will both be relatively low. Using this historical information and public sources of information, the projected threat and associated consequences for hazardous materials incidents are determined to be as follows: Probability of Occurrence: 1 10 years; Moderate (B) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: ; Moderate (3) Property Losses: < $2.5 million; Low (4) Economic Losses: < $15 million; Low (4) Hazardous Material Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond to, or recover from an unintentional hazardous materials release. At least 26 of 37 Target Capabilities could be required at some level. Table I-1 identifies those capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission, based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities Assessment. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects noted in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to these second-order threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. I-3

128 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-1: Hazardous Materials Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION Common Prevent CBRNE Detection Protect Critical Infrastructure Protection Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Lab Testing Fatality Management Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Environmental Health Emergency Operations Center Management WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Medical Surge Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Fire Incident Response Support Mass Care On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Economic and Community Recovery Respond Recover I-4

129 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Second-Order Threats and Consequences Many of the natural and technological hazards applicable to Region 9 can result in a hazardous materials release. In addition, hazardous materials incidents can contribute to the development of other hazards as secondary effects. Table I-2 identifies the interconnection between hazardous materials incidents and the other hazards contained within this document in the other hazard appendices. Readers can review those related hazards for additional information on threats and consequences. Table I-2: Hazardous Materials Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS Dam Failure Earthquake Fire Urban/Structural Flood Landslide Severe Weather Terrorism Transportation Winter Storm I-5 RELATED EFFECTS Fire Urban/Structural Fire Wildland

130 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Figure I-1: Region 9 Toxics Release Inventory Sites I-6

131 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Attachment 1 History of Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 1/6/1998 ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ LIQ UN3082 1/8/1998 HYDROGEN PEROXIDE 40-60% UN2014 1/13/1998 ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ LIQ UN3082 1/13/1998 1/19/1998 Air DICHLOROMETHANE HYPOCHLORITE SOLUTN 5-16% UN1593 UN1791 1/21/1998 Loading ISOPROPANOL UN1219 1/25/1998 Loading CORROS LIQ ACIDIC INORGAN UN3264 1/27/1998 NAPHTHA PETROLEUM UN1255 1/27/1998 Loading METHANOL UN1230 2/2/1998 ALCOHOLS N.O.S. UN1987 2/5/1998 XYLENES UN1307 2/5/1998 OTHER REGULATED SUB LIQ NA3082 2/11/1998 POISONOUS S N.O.S. UN2810 2/11/1998 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 2/25/1998 METHYL METHACRYLATE INHIB UN1247 I-7 Hazard Class MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL OXIDIZER MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL POISONOUS MATERIALS MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL POISONOUS MATERIALS

132 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 2/26/1998 METHYL METHACRYLATE INHIB 3/1/1998 Air CONSUMER COMMODITY 3/11/1998 METHYL METHACRYLATE INHIB UN1247 3/19/1998 In Transit SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION UN1824 3/23/1998 ETHANOL UN1170 3/27/1998 Rail FLAMMABLE CORROSIV UN2924 3/30/1998 ISOPROPANOL UN1219 4/1/1998 PHOSPHORIC ACID UN1805 4/24/1998 Air PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 5/5/1998 FLUOROBORIC ACID UN1775 6/14/1998 Air PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 6/29/1998 Air INFECTIOUS SUBSTANC HUMAN UN2814 8/4/1998 ISOPROPANOL UN1219 9/14/1998 ETHYL ACETATE UN1173 9/25/1998 Loading SMOKELESS POWDR SMALL ARM NA /9/1998 ADHESIVES UN1133 I-8 UN1247 Hazard Class OTHER REGULATED MATERIAL CLASS D INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCE (ETIOLOGIC) FLAMMABLE SOLID

133 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) 1/26/1999 Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase Rail ALUMINUM CHLORIDE SOLUTN 3/5/1999 ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ SOLID UN3077 3/25/1999 8/27/1999 8/31/1999 STEVENS Loading HYDROGEN PEROX-PEROXYACET ETHANOLAMINE SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION UN3149 UN2491 UN /2/1999 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 3/14/2000 ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ LIQ UN3082 3/17/2000 Air Loading PAINT RELATED MATERIAL UN1263 3/24/2000 Air In Transit Storage BATTERY WET ACID UN2794 5/8/2000 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 5/17/2000 Loading PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 6/6/2000 Air In Transit PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 6/29/2000 7/20/2000 COMPOUND CLEANING LIQ PHO POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE SOLTN NA1760 UN1814 8/1/2000 In Transit ALUMINUM MOLTEN NA9260 8/3/2000 CORROSIVE S N.O.S. UN1760 8/10/2000 STEVENS ASPHALT NA1999 8/30/2000 8/30/2000 HYDROCHLORIC ACID SOLUTN METHYL METHACRYLATE INHIB UN1789 UN1247 Date of Incident Incident County Loading I-9 ID # Hazard Class UN2581 MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL OXIDIZER MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL

134 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 8/30/2000 Loading COMPOUND CLEANING NA1993 9/6/2000 SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION UN1824 9/18/2000 GASOLINE UN1203 9/18/2000 ETHANOL UN1170 9/29/ /19/ /27/2000 POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE SOLTN COMPOUND CLEANING PHOSPHORIC ACID UN1814 NA1760 UN /27/2000 WHITMAN In Transit AMMONIA ANHYDROUS UN /30/2000 In Transit PRINTING INK FLAMMABLE UN /22/2000 Loading DIETHYL ETHER UN /27/2000 In Transit SULFURIC ACID UN /5/2000 ISOPROPANOL UN /7/2000 ISOPROPANOL UN /13/2000 ISOPROPANOL UN1219 1/16/2001 In Transit SULFURIC ACID UN1830 1/29/2001 Loading FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 2/1/2001 In Transit TRICHLOROETHYLENE UN1710 I-10 Hazard Class NONFLAMMABLE COMPRESSED GAS POISONOUS MATERIALS

135 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) 2/19/2001 Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase TOXIC INORGANIC 2/22/2001 3/7/2001 3/15/2001 Loading CORROSIVE S N.O.S. FLAMMABLE SOLIDS N.O.S. UN1760 UN1325 3/19/2001 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 3/19/2001 4/2/2001 CORROSIVE S N.O.S. CORROS LIQ ACIDIC INORGAN UN1760 UN3264 4/12/2001 In Transit Storage FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 5/1/2001 Loading PRINTING INK FLAMMABLE UN1210 5/7/2001 In Transit Storage ISOPROPANOL UN1219 5/10/2001 PHOSPHORIC ACID UN1805 5/15/2001 ISOPROPANOL UN1219 5/17/2001 Loading DISINFECTANT CORROS LIQ UN1903 5/23/2001 In Transit Storage XYLENES UN1307 5/24/2001 POWDER SMOKELESS UN0161 5/26/2001 Air CONSUMER COMMODITY 6/13/2001 7/26/2001 8/10/2001 8/30/2001 PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION CORROS LIQ BASIC INORGANI ACETONE Date of Incident Incident County I-11 ID # Hazard Class UN3287 ETHYL METHACRYLATE UN2277 POISONOUS MATERIALS FLAMMABLE SOLID EXPLOSIVE FIRE HAZARD OTHER REGULATED MATERIAL CLASS D FLAMMABLE GAS UN1075 UN1824 UN3266 UN1090

136 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 9/14/2001 9/19/2001 Rail Loading COMPOUND CLEANING LIQ PHO SULFURIC ACID NA1760 UN1830 9/20/2001 Air Loading PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 9/28/2001 Loading ISOPROPANOL UN /2/ /17/2001 Loading SULFURIC ACID SULFURIC ACID UN1830 UN /23/2001 Rail In Transit GAS OIL UN /8/2001 Loading FIRE EXTINGUISHERS UN /22/2001 ORGANIC PEROXIDE E UN /12/2001 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN /18/ /20/2001 DISINFECTANT CORROS LIQ HYDROCHLORIC ACID SOLUTN UN1903 UN1789 1/24/2002 Rail Loading ETHYL ACETATE UN1173 1/25/2002 HYDROGEN PEROXIDE 20-40% UN2014 2/1/2002 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 3/6/2002 In Transit Storage ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ SOLID UN3077 3/12/2002 TETRAHYDROFURAN UN2056 3/13/2002 Air Loading DANGEROUS GOODS APPARATUS UN3363 I-12 Hazard Class NONFLAMMABLE COMPRESSED GAS ORGANIC PEROXIDE OXIDIZER MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL MISCELLANEOUS

137 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 3/18/2002 3/26/2002 4/11/2002 4/16/2002 Rail Rail Loading CORROS LIQ BASIC INORGANI CORROSIVE S N.O.S. TRICHLOROETHYLENE TOXIC INORGANIC UN3266 UN1760 UN1710 UN3287 5/1/2002 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 7/20/2002 7/30/2002 8/16/2002 9/12/2002 9/13/2002 9/27/ /16/2002 3/8/2003 Rail Rail In Transit In Transit CORROS LIQ ACIDIC INORGAN CORROS SOLID ACID INORGAN TOXIC LIQ INORGANIC INH A DICHLOROMETHANE CORROSIVE S N.O.S. CORROS LIQ BASIC INORGANI CORROSIVE S TOXIC SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION UN3264 UN3260 UN3287 UN1593 UN1760 UN3266 UN2922 UN1824 5/5/2003 Loading ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ SOLID UN3077 5/13/2003 STEVENS In Transit ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ LIQ UN3082 5/22/2003 5/28/2003 6/5/2003 6/11/2003 WHITMAN SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION CORROSIVE S N.O.S. CAUSTIC ALKALI NOS COMPOUND CLEANING LIQ PHO UN1824 UN1760 UN1719 NA /20/2003 Rail In Transit FUEL OIL NO NA /20/2003 Air RESIN SOLUTION UN1866 I-13 Hazard Class HAZARDOUS MATERIAL POISONOUS MATERIALS POISONOUS MATERIALS POISONOUS MATERIALS POISONOUS MATERIALS MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL

138 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) 12/4/2003 Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase Air PAINT or PAINT RELATED 2/4/2004 ADHESIVES UN1133 3/2/2004 CORROS LIQ BASIC ORGANIC UN3267 5/4/2004 COMPOUND CLEANING NA1993 5/17/2004 ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ LIQ UN3082 5/20/2004 CORROSIVE S N.O.S. UN1760 5/27/2004 Air ARTICLES PRESSURIZED UN3164 6/8/2004 ADHESIVES UN1133 6/18/2004 Rail In Transit ELEVATED TEMP MATERIAL LI UN3257 6/22/2004 7/7/2004 7/12/2004 7/12/2004 CAUSTIC ALKALI NOS CORROSIVE S N.O.S. LIQUEFIED GAS FLAM N.O.S. TOXIC SOLID INORGANIC NOS UN1719 UN1760 UN3161 UN3288 9/9/2004 PRINTING INK FLAMMABLE UN /29/2004 Rail In Transit FUEL OIL NO NA /18/2004 In Transit Storage ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ SOLID UN3077 1/10/2005 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 1/24/2005 Rail In Transit FUEL OIL (NO ) NA1993 Date of Incident Incident County I-14 ID # Hazard Class UN3066 MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL NONFLAMMABLE COMPRESSED GAS MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL FLAMMABLE GAS POISONOUS MATERIALS MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL

139 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 1/24/2005 Rail In Transit FUEL OIL (NO ) NA1993 1/27/2005 ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ SOLID UN3077 3/7/2005 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 4/6/2005 In Transit CORROS LIQ ACIDIC INORGAN UN3264 4/6/2005 TOLUENE UN1294 4/21/2005 Air In Transit Storage GASOLINE UN1203 5/3/2005 5/20/2005 5/24/2005 LINCOLN Rail In Transit In Transit PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED CHLOROFORM LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS UN1075 UN1888 UN1075 6/7/2005 Rail ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ SOLID UN3077 6/27/2005 Loading PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 7/24/2005 Rail In Transit DIESEL FUEL NA1993 7/25/2005 Rail In Transit FUEL OIL NO NA1993 8/10/2005 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 8/10/2005 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 9/12/2005 ETHYL ACETATE UN1173 I-15 Hazard Class MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL FLAMMABLE GAS POISONOUS MATERIALS FLAMMABLE GAS MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL

140 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 10/10/2005 COMPOUND CLEANING NA /20/2005 Air EXTRACTS FLAVORING UN /2/ /9/ /9/2005 CORROSIVE S N.O.S. POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE SOLTN CORROSIVE S N.O.S. UN1760 UN1814 UN /14/2005 ADHESIVES UN /16/2005 In Transit PETROLEUM DISTILLATES NOS UN /17/2005 ISOPROPANOL UN1219 1/20/2006 2/2/2006 In Transit FLUOROSILICIC ACID CORROSIVE S N.O.S. UN1778 UN1760 2/2/2006 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 2/2/2006 PAINT UN1263 3/6/2006 3/7/2006 3/9/2006 3/27/2006 4/7/2006 GARFIELD In Transit CORROS LIQ BASIC INORGANI HYDROCHLORIC ACID INHIBIT N N-DIMETHYLANILINE PETROLEUM GASES LIQUEFIED ETHYL CHLORIDE UN3266 UN1789 UN2253 UN1075 UN1037 4/14/2006 ISOPROPANOL UN1219 4/17/2006 Rail In Transit FUEL OIL (NO ) NA1993 I-16 Hazard Class POISONOUS MATERIALS FLAMMABLE GAS FLAMMABLE GAS

141 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 4/17/2006 Rail In Transit GAS OIL UN1202 5/1/2006 Loading ISOPROPANOL UN1219 5/5/2006 5/16/2006 Loading ALUMINUM CHLORIDE SOLUTN CORROSIVE LIQ FLAM N.O.S. UN2581 UN2920 6/1/2006 In Transit Storage PAINT RELATED MATERIAL NA1263 6/15/2006 CAUSTIC ALKALI NOS UN1719 6/20/2006 PAINT RELATED MATERIAL UN1263 6/22/2006 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 6/23/2006 SMOKELESS POWDR SMALL ARM NA3178 6/26/2006 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 6/28/2006 7/11/2006 LINCOLN In Transit Storage SULFURIC ACID AQUA AMMONIA UN1830 UN2672 7/12/2006 Loading ISOPROPANOL UN1219 7/12/2006 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 7/13/2006 Air PRINTING INK FLAMMABLE UN1210 7/14/2006 Loading HYDROGEN PEROX-PEROXYACET UN3149 7/19/2006 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 7/24/2006 PAINT RELATED MATERIAL UN1263 I-17 Hazard Class FLAMMABLE SOLID OXIDIZER

142 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 7/28/2006 8/4/2006 In Transit Loading CORROS LIQ BASIC ORGANIC POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE SOLTN UN3267 UN1814 8/16/2006 PAINT RELATED MATERIAL UN1263 8/17/2006 In Transit PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 8/18/2006 8/31/2006 HYDROCHLORIC ACID MIXTURE HYDROCHLORIC ACID SOLUTN NA1789 UN1789 9/11/2006 FIRE EXTINGUISHERS UN1044 9/19/2006 9/19/2006 In Transit SULFURIC ACID NITRIC ACID >70% UN1830 UN2031 9/21/2006 HEXANES UN1208 9/23/2006 Rail In Transit DIESEL FUEL NA /4/ /10/2006 Air Loading RAM TYPE A NONSPECIAL FRM CORROSIVE S TOXIC UN2915 UN /11/2006 PAINT RELATED MATERIAL UN /26/2006 Loading PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN /28/2006 Air In Transit PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN /13/2006 ETHANOL UN /15/2006 METHANOL UN1230 I-18 Hazard Class NONFLAMMABLE COMPRESSED GAS RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

143 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 11/28/2006 Loading PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN /28/2006 Loading PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN /14/ /18/2006 Loading AMINES LIQ CORROS FLAM CORROSIVE S N.O.S. UN2734 UN /19/2006 Loading RUBBER SOLUTION UN /20/2006 In Transit HYDROGEN PEROX-PEROXYACET UN3149 1/5/2007 STEVENS ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ SOLID UN3077 1/13/2007 Air In Transit ORGANOTIN COMPOUNDS LIQ UN2788 1/16/2007 STEVENS ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ SOLID UN3077 2/6/2007 CORROS SOLID BASIC ORGANI UN3263 2/12/2007 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 2/13/2007 ETHYL ACETATE UN1173 2/13/2007 Air Loading CONSUMER COMMODITY 3/15/2007 ISOPROPANOL UN1219 3/21/2007 PAINT UN1263 3/30/2007 Loading FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 I-19 Hazard Class OXIDIZER MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL POISONOUS MATERIALS MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL OTHER REGULATED MATERIAL CLASS D

144 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) 4/2/2007 Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase CORROS LIQ ACIDIC INORGAN 4/3/2007 In Transit Storage FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 4/6/2007 Loading PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 4/10/2007 In Transit RESIN SOLUTION UN1866 4/19/2007 4/25/2007 SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION SODIUM HYDRATE SOLUTION UN1824 UN1824 5/2/2007 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 5/11/2007 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 5/16/2007 ISOPROPANOL UN1219 5/17/2007 In Transit PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 5/25/2007 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 6/3/2007 Rail In Transit DIESEL FUEL NA1993 6/17/2007 6/19/2007 WHITMAN Rail Rail In Transit In Transit VANADIUM PENTOXIDE PHOSPHORIC ACID UN2862 UN1805 6/22/2007 Loading FIRE EXTINGUISHERS UN1044 7/11/2007 LINCOLN In Transit Storage AMMONIA ANHYDROUS UN1005 7/25/2007 GAS OIL UN1202 Date of Incident Incident County I-20 ID # Hazard Class UN3264 POISONOUS MATERIALS NONFLAMMABLE COMPRESSED GAS NONFLAMMABLE COMPRESSED GAS

145 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 7/26/2007 ETHANOL UN1170 9/17/2007 In Transit FIRE EXTINGUISHERS UN /11/2007 In Transit PAINT UN /22/2007 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN /22/2007 EXTRACTS FLAVORING UN /22/2007 ACETIC ACID GLACIAL UN /22/2007 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN /30/2007 Rail In Transit DIESEL FUEL NA /2/ /8/2007 Loading POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE SOLTN CORROS LIQ BASIC ORGANIC UN1814 UN /14/2007 Rail In Transit FUEL OIL (NO ) NA /14/2007 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN /19/ /20/2007 1/3/2008 SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLID AMINES CORROS NOS UN1824 UN1823 UN2735 1/17/2008 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 1/18/2008 FIRE EXTINGUISHERS UN1044 I-21 Hazard Class NONFLAMMABLE COMPRESSED GAS NONFLAMMABLE

146 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 1/28/2008 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 2/1/2008 ETHANOL UN1170 2/25/2008 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 3/25/2008 PHOSPHORIC ACID UN1805 4/9/2008 ISOPROPANOL UN1219 4/10/2008 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 4/24/2008 PAINT UN1263 5/2/2008 SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION UN1824 5/8/2008 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 5/12/2008 COATING SOLUTION UN1139 5/16/2008 5/16/2008 In Transit Storage CORROSIVE S N.O.S. SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION UN1760 UN1824 5/23/2008 EXTRACTS FLAVORING UN1197 6/12/2008 In Transit CORROS LIQ BASIC INORGANI UN3266 6/18/2008 In Transit FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 6/20/2008 6/23/2008 ORGANIC PEROXIDE F POTASSIUM CHLORATE UN3109 UN1485 I-22 Hazard Class COMPRESSED GAS ORGANIC PEROXIDE OXIDIZER

147 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) 6/25/2008 Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase Loading HYDROCHLORIC ACID SOLUTN 6/26/2008 Loading FLAMMABLE CORROSIV UN2924 6/27/2008 Loading AEROSOLS CORROSIVE N.O.S. UN1950 7/1/2008 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 7/2/2008 EXTRACTS FLAVORING UN1197 7/12/2008 BATTERY WET ACID UN2794 7/23/2008 Loading ETHYL METHACRYLATE UN2277 7/23/2008 Loading ETHYL METHACRYLATE UN2277 8/12/2008 COMBUSTIBLE N.O.S. NA1993 8/15/2008 In Transit CORROSIVE LIQ FLAM N.O.S. UN2920 8/20/2008 ALCOHOLS N.O.S. UN1987 8/26/2008 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 8/26/2008 8/26/2008 PAINT or PAINT RELATED CORROS LIQ BASIC INORGANI UN3066 UN3266 9/2/2008 Rail In Transit FUEL OIL DIESEL NA1993 9/8/2008 PAINT RELATED MATERIAL UN1263 9/11/2008 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 Date of Incident Incident County I-23 ID # Hazard Class UN1789 FLAMMABLE GAS

148 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 9/16/2008 FIRE EXTINGUISHERS UN /3/2008 SULFURIC ACID <51% ACID UN /17/2008 Rail In Transit ALCOHOLS N.O.S. UN /6/2008 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN /19/2008 ISOPROPANOL UN /26/2008 LITHIUM BATTERY UN /26/2008 FIRE EXTINGUISHERS UN /2/2008 Loading PAINT UN1263 2/12/2009 2/17/2009 CORROS LIQ BASIC INORGANI SMOKELESS POWDR SMALL ARM UN3266 NA3178 2/24/2009 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 3/23/2009 In Transit GASOLINE UN1203 4/20/2009 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 4/24/2009 CAUSTIC ALKALI NOS UN1719 5/1/2009 PAINT RELATED MATERIAL UN1263 5/4/2009 ACETONE UN1090 I-24 Hazard Class NONFLAMMABLE COMPRESSED GAS MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL NONFLAMMABLE COMPRESSED GAS FLAMMABLE SOLID

149 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) 5/20/2009 ASOTIN Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase Loading CORROSIVE S N.O.S. 6/11/2009 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 6/28/2009 Loading FIREWORKS UN0333 7/1/2009 7/21/2009 Rail Rail In Transit CORROS LIQ ACIDIC INORGAN SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION UN3264 UN1824 7/24/2009 PAINT RELATED MATERIAL UN1263 8/4/2009 8/11/2009 COLUMBIA Rail In Transit CORROS LIQ BASIC INORGANI SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION UN3266 UN1824 8/30/2009 Rail In Transit ALCOHOLS N.O.S. UN /2/2009 SMOKELESS POWDR SMALL ARM NA /2/2009 Air CONSUMER COMMODITY 10/15/2009 HYDROGEN PEROXIDE 20-40% UN /11/2009 Loading FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN /18/2009 HYDROCHLORIC ACID SOLUTN UN /30/2009 PAINT UN1263 1/8/2010 HYPOCHLORITE SOLUTIONS UN1791 1/12/2010 Loading FIRE EXTINGUISHERS UN1044 2/3/2010 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 3/2/2010 Loading ETHYL CHLORIDE UN1037 Date of Incident Incident County I-25 ID # Hazard Class UN1760 EXPLOSIVE MASS EXPLOSION HAZARD FLAMMABLE SOLID OTHER REGULATED MATERIAL CLASS D OXIDIZER NONFLAMMABLE COMPRESSED GAS FLAMMABLE GAS

150 Appendix I. Hazardous Materials Table I-3 Hazardous Materials Incidents in Region 9 ( ) Date of Incident Incident County Source: Mode of Transportation Commodity Short Name Transportation Phase ID # 3/3/2010 ACETONE UN1090 3/22/2010 PAINT RELATED MATERIAL UN1263 4/12/2010 PAINT or PAINT RELATED UN3066 4/12/2010 FLAMMABLE S N.O.S. UN1993 4/21/2010 Rail In Transit GAS OIL UN1202 4/30/2010 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 5/11/2010 HYDROCHLORIC ACID SOLUTN UN1789 5/18/2010 Air In Transit PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 6/22/2010 ENVIRONMENTALLY HAZ LIQ UN3082 7/8/2010 SODIUM HYDROXIDE SOLUTION UN1824 7/8/2010 Air CARTRIDGES SMALL ARMS 7/14/2010 PAINT OR PAINT RELATED UN1263 7/26/2010 9/1/2010 SMOKELESS POWDR SMALL ARM AMINES CORROS NOS NA3178 UN2735 I-26 Hazard Class MISCELLANEOUS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL OTHER REGULATED MATERIAL CLASS D FLAMMABLE SOLID

151 Appendix J. Infectious Disease Outbreak Appendix J: Infectious Disease Outbreak General Hazard Description Infectious disease outbreak, particularly pandemic influenza, is one of the 15 national planning scenarios developed by a federal interagency committee to be used in homeland protection planning and preparedness activities. This is because the consequences of such an event can be catastrophic, have a long duration, and impact any jurisdiction. Not all infectious disease outbreaks affecting humans are influenza pandemics. However, this analysis uses pandemic influenza as the worst-case event that has the furthest-reaching impacts and consequences. A pandemic occurs when a novel strain of the influenza virus manifests, to which humans have minimal or no immunity. In the case of influenza pandemics, history indicates that they have occurred every years. The most significant pandemic during the last century was the Spanish Flu of In , a new strain of avian influenza resulted in the Asian Flu. The third major pandemic during the 20th century was the Hong Kong Flu of The most recent pandemic was the 2009 flu pandemic was caused by a novel variation of the H1N1 flu virus. Just prior to the 2009 pandemic, there was widespread concern regarding a potential attack of a highly virulent H5N1 strain, but that never materialized beyond relatively local epidemics. Since pandemic influenza outbreaks, by definition, result from a new viral strain, no vaccines will be immediately available to combat them. Countries will need to manage the disease through public awareness and disease control measures until an effective vaccine has been created. Even then, until the pharmaceutical industry can increase production of the new vaccine, critical shortages of the limited quantities will need to be prioritized for administration. Anti-viral drugs may be available, but the rush for these drugs may result in geographically based shortages, and these medications may not be as effective as many people expect. Regional Hazard Description Without knowing the characteristics of a specific strain of influenza involved in a pandemic, it is difficult to estimate the impacts of such an infection on Region 9. A strain may affect the elderly the most, or it may be healthy young adults that are the most susceptible. The system used to quantify the potential number of individuals who become ill with the pandemic strain is referred to as the attack rate. This attack rate is the percentage of individuals that will become clinically ill. Using the 2008 population for Region 9 (629,300 residents), and an attack rate range of 15% 35% (representing a moderate and a severe outbreak), between 94,000 and 220,000 individuals could become clinically ill in a pandemic influenza outbreak. If the disease affects a specific age group with more intensity, these figures could change. However, these values provide a J-1

152 Appendix J. Infectious Disease Outbreak reasonable estimate for a worst-case scenario pandemic influenza incident for use in this analysis. For non-influenza infectious disease outbreaks, it is expected that the numbers of illnesses (and fatalities) would be much less. However, even non-pandemic outbreaks could still significantly affect the population and create emergency management challenges for Region 9. One major challenge of a pandemic is that since it can strike many jurisdictions at the same time, mutual support of healthcare personnel and resources from adjacent states and counties may not be available, as adjacent as these areas may need all of their resources to fight the disease within their own borders. Infectious Disease Outbreak Threat and Consequence Scoring The risk from an infectious disease outbreak in Region 9 is high. Using pandemic influenza as a worst-case scenario, the projected probability of occurrence is low. However, consequences to human health are expected to be catastrophic with significant numbers of illnesses and potential fatalities. In addition, economic impacts could range from critical to catastrophic due to loss of incomes from businesses and associated wages for employees. There would be no property losses. Using this historical information and public sources of information, the projected threat and associated consequences for an infectious disease outbreak in Region 9 are as follows: Probability of Occurrence: years; Low (C) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: > 1,000; Catastrophic (1) Property Losses: < $2.5 mil; Low (4) Economic Losses: $72 million - $145 million; Critical (2) Infectious Disease Outbreak Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond to, or recover from an infectious disease outbreak. At least 30 of 37 Target Capabilities could be required at some level. This hazard has the second highest number of required capabilities necessary to cope with the event (terrorism was the highest). As Region 9 reviews its capabilities, it should note that a pandemic or significant infectious disease outbreak may expose significant vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities could detract from an efficient and effective response. Table J-1 identifies those capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission, based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities Assessment. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects noted in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to these second-order threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. J-2

153 Appendix J. Infectious Disease Outbreak Table J-1 Infectious Disease Outbreak Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management Prevent CBRNE Detection Protect Critical Infrastructure Protection Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Lab Testing Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation Fatality Management Animal Disease Emergency Support Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Environmental Health Emergency Operations Center Management Isolation and Quarantine WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Medical Surge Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Mass Care Mass Prophylaxis Medical Supplies Management and Distribution On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Economic and Community Recovery Common Respond Recover J-3

154 Appendix J. Infectious Disease Outbreak Second-Order Threats and Consequences Causes and effects, in relation to the 17 hazards examined in this assessment, are limited in terms of an infectious disease outbreak. In addition to natural causes, such an outbreak could result from a terrorist attack. Effects of a prolonged infectious disease outbreak could include incidents of civil unrest due to critical shortages of vaccinations, medication, and medical care, as well as widespread shortages of all supplies due to large-scale absenteeism. Table J-2 identifies the interconnection between infectious disease outbreaks and a limited number of causes and effects related to hazards discussed in other appendices in this document. Readers can review those related hazards for additional information on threats and consequences. Table J-2: Infectious Disease Outbreak Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS Terrorism J-4 RELATED EFFECTS Civil Disturbance/Unrest

155 Appendix J. Infectious Disease Outbreak Figure J-1: Region 9 Population Density J-5

156 Appendix J. Infectious Disease Outbreak THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY J-6

157 Appendix K. Landslide Appendix K: Landslide General Hazard Description Mass wasting is the movement of rock, soil, and debris down a hillside or slope. Landslides (a common term for a mass wasting event) can take lives; destroy homes, businesses, and public buildings; interrupt transportation, undermine bridges, derail train cars, cover marine habitats, and damage utilities. Mass wasting includes a wide range of ground movement, such as rock fall, deep failure of slopes, mudslides, and shallow debris flows. While movement under the influence of gravity is the primary reason for a landslide, there can be other contributing factors, including: Saturation, by snowmelt or heavy rains, that weakens rock or soils on slopes. Erosion by rivers, glaciers, or ocean waves that creates overly steep slopes. Slope topography its shape, size, degree of slope and drainage. Earthquakes of magnitude 4.0 and greater. Volcanic eruptions that produce pyroclastic flows, loose ash deposits, and debris flows. Excess weight, from accumulation of rain or snow, from stockpiling of rock or ore, from waste piles, or from man-made structures. Human action, such as construction, logging, or road building that disturbs soil and slopes. Landslides occur under certain combinations of geologic conditions. For example, groundwater can accumulate and zones of weakness can develop when layers of sand and gravel lie above less permeable silt and clay layers. In the Puget Sound region, for example, this combination is common and widespread; glacial outwash, often Esperance sand or gravel, overlies the finegrained Lawton clay or Whidbey formation. Landslides commonly occur on slopes that have experienced movement in the past, as well as in areas where they have not been previously documented. Areas in Washington State historically subject to landslides include the Columbia River Gorge, the banks of Lake Roosevelt, the Interstate 5 corridor, the U.S. 101 corridor along the Pacific Coast and from the coast to Olympia, the Cascade and Olympic mountain ranges, and Puget Sound coastal bluffs. K-1

158 Appendix K. Landslide Determining the probability of future landslide events is difficult because so many factors can contribute to a landslide or ground failure, as noted above. Scientists from the United States Geological Survey are testing a pilot system that warns of increased risk of landslides in Seattle during certain heavy rainfall events. Regional Hazard Description While the majority of Region 9 does not face a high risk for landslide, it does contain areas of potential concern, particularly the Blue Mountains in the south and along the banks of Lake Roosevelt in the north. It is also of note that, while there may be large areas with the potential for landslides in the region, an incident in these areas would not have an impact due to their remote locations and lack of human and economic consequences that would result from such an event. Landslide Threat and Consequence Scoring The risk to life, property, and the economy of Region 9 due to a landslide is moderate. While the consequences associated with a landslide in this area are expected to be low relative to other hazards, the probability of occurrence is frequent enough to result in a moderate relative risk classification. Using historical and public sources of information, as well as input from regional stakeholders, the projected threat and associated consequences for landslides are as follows: Probability of Occurrence: 1 10 years; Moderate (B) Consequence Assessment: Injuries/Fatalities: < 50; Low (4) Property Losses: < $2.5 million; Low (4) Economic Losses: < $15 million; Low (4) It is important to bear in mind that this analysis examines only individual hazards. However, a landslide is a type of hazard that is typically caused by another triggering event such as flooding, severe weather, or an earthquake, all of which have higher risks than the landslide itself. Please refer to those hazard appendices for further information regarding their likelihood of occurrence and consequence severity. Landslide Vulnerabilities The DHS TCL was reviewed to identify which capabilities could be required to prevent, protect, respond or recover to a landslide. At least 22 of 37 Target Capabilities could be required at some level. It is important to note that the capabilities requirements are incident-dependent. Some capabilities may be needed more than others, and some may not be required at all. In addition, for the second-order causes and effects noted in the following section, additional capabilities may or may not be required. Table K-1 identifies those capabilities and lists them in order of most to least vulnerable within each mission, based upon the 2010 Regional Capabilities K-2

159 Appendix K. Landslide Assessment. For more information about capability and vulnerability related to these secondorder threats and consequences, refer to the hazard-specific appendices in this document. Table K-1: Landslide Hazard Vulnerabilities as a Function of Target Capability Preparedness EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MISSION Common KEY TARGET CAPABILITIES (ranked within each mission from most vulnerable to least vulnerable/most prepared) Community Preparedness and Participation Communications Planning Intelligence and Information Sharing and Collaboration Risk Management Prevent None Protect Critical Infrastructure Protection Fatality Management Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place Volunteer Management and Donations Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Emergency Operations Center Management WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Emergency Public Information and Warning Emergency Public Safety and Security Response Medical Surge Search and Rescue (Land-Based) Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Mass Care On-Site Incident Management Responder Safety and Health Restoration of Lifelines Structural Damage Assessment Economic and Community Recovery Respond Recover K-3

160 Appendix K. Landslide Second-Order Threats and Consequences As mentioned previously, many of the natural hazards applicable to Region 9 can result in a landslide. In addition, landslide incidents can contribute to the development of other hazards as secondary effects. Table K-2 identifies the interconnection between landslides and the other hazards discussed in the hazard appendices in this document. Readers can review related hazards for additional information on threats and consequences. Table K-2: Landslide Second-Order Hazard Crosswalk RELATED CAUSAL HAZARDS Dam Failure Earthquake Flood Severe Weather K-4 RELATED EFFECTS Transportation

161 Appendix K. Landslide Figure K-1: Region 9 Landslide Incidence and Susceptibility K-5

162 Appendix K. Landslide THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY K-6

163 Appendix L. Pipelines Appendix L: Pipelines General Hazard Description Pipelines are transportation arteries carrying liquid and gaseous fuels. Pipelines may be buried or above ground and are vulnerable to breaks and punctures caused by earth movement, material failure, operator error, construction defects, and tampering. Fuel leaks cause hazardous materials spills, fires and explosions. Federal oversight of pipeline safety is controlled by the PHMSA. Pipelines regulated by the PHMSA may transport natural gas, petroleum and other hazardous materials. Serious incidents are classified by the PHMSA as incidents involving a fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization. Significant incidents are serious incidents with additional consequences beyond injury and fatality. These consequences are defined as: $50,000 or more in total costs (measured in 1984 dollars); Release of highly volatile liquids of 5 barrels or more, or other liquid releases of 50 barrels or more; or Liquid releases resulting in unintentional fire or explosion. Regional Hazard Description Within Region 9, there are over 760 miles of gas and liquid pipelines (see Table L-1). The county-based maps in Figure L-1 were developed using the public side of the National Pipeline Mapping System. Due to security concerns, the public side of this site only provides a limited view of pipelines in the area. These limited figures do illustrate that both gas and hazardous liquid pipelines traverse urban and rural areas. Government representatives can request access to the private side of this site and generate detailed maps as needed. Table L-11: Miles of Pipeline within Region 9 by County County Gas Miles Liquid Miles Total Miles by County Adams Asotin Columbia Ferry Garfield L-1

164 Appendix L. Pipelines Table L-11: Miles of Pipeline within Region 9 by County County Gas Miles Liquid Miles Total Miles by County Lincoln Pend Oreille Spokane Stevens Whitman Region 9 Totals Source: L-2

165 Appendix L. Pipelines Adams County Lincoln County Spokane County Stevens County Whitman County Figure L-1: Maps of Pipelines within Region 9 L-3