HAZARDOUS POLICIES IN NEED OF MITIGATION

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1 PA 553: DISASTER, CRISIS, & EMERGENCY POLICY & MANAGEMENT PROFESSOR BIRKLAND RESPONSE PAPER: MITIGATION 02 SEP 2009 NICK COPARE HAZARDOUS POLICIES IN NEED OF MITIGATION Natural and manmade disasters cause widespread damage to the ecological, economic, and social systems, as well as the infrastructure and other systems in the United States. Disasters may cause loss of life, injuries, and may cost billions of dollars to repair the affected areas where disasters hit. In order to prevent, limit, or reduce the numbers of lives lost and property damage incurred (having a severe impact upon state and local economies), environmental experts, politicians, engineers and other professionals perform processes of natural disaster and hazard mitigation. Mitigation is the reduction or elimination of risk to people and property from hazards and their effects. 1 The mitigation process is an extremely important part of the Disaster Planning Cycle and if there is support for the planning process at all levels, it can be effective. However, because of the commitment required to effectively manage hazards and the cost of certain methods and programs, it can be difficult. There can be many differing ideologies at all levels of government as to the most effective and cost effective method of mitigation. This is true whether the disaster is a flood, a hurricane, a tornado, earthquake, or act of terrorism. Burby and May address the problem of commitment to mitigation as the commitment conundrum where local governments will be hesitant to tackle problems associated with the environment and efforts can be half-hearted. 2 The effectiveness of hazard prevention is determined through planning and the method incorporated attempting to curtail damage. The most common forms of mitigation tools include hazard identification and mapping, design and construction applications, land-use planning, financial incentives, insurance, and structural controls. 3 1 HADDOW, BURBY (1998), HADDOW, 77.

2 According to the experts, land-use planning is the most effective method of mitigation, however, developers continue to build along coastlines, rivers, fault-lines, and mountainsides, with the goal of increasing revenue into local economies. 4 The reason for developers lack of commitment to this type of mitigation is that this method costs local governments money and the private sector money. The economic interests are too great and, because the federal government will almost always significantly aid reconstruction after a disaster and construct structures such as levees beforehand, it is more cost effective to take risk. 5 Levees and structures that protect development from disasters are controversial that they shift the disaster downstream or down the coastline and usually cause an exponentially larger ecological disaster elsewhere. 6 Disaster relief in the United States in on the rise and one hazard that has continuously been a problem has been flooding. Flooding continues to be the greatest threat to the property and safety of human communities among all natural hazards. 7 Development in floodplain regions of the country have increased and the methods of [controlling] floods has been the dominant strategy for land-use. 8 For example, New Orleans has turned into a an ineffective system of 520 miles of levees, 270 floodgates, 92 pumping stations, and hundreds of miles of drainage canals. 9 As Hurricane Katrina has shown, the structural mitigation measures have proven to be costly and inefficient to prevent the risks associated with the disaster. Not only did Katrina cause billions of dollars in damage, the displacement of thousands of individuals, and show the ineffectiveness of the federal government to respond, it has caused water pollution from storm runoff, greater urban flooding from impermeable surfaces, increased damage from historic floods that overtop levees and dams, and demand for even more expensive and ecologically damaging structural mitigation measures as development cost and intensity increase HADDOW, 78; BURBY (1999) ; 5 HADDOW, 80; BEATLEY, 9; BURBY (1999), HADDOW, 81; BIRKLAND, 48; BURBY (1999), BRODY, 1. 8 BIRKLAND, 48 9 BURBY (1999), BIRKLAND, 48.

3 Even though the mitigation stage may be the most effective method in the prevention of property damage, loss of life, and ecological damage resulting from natural/hazard prevention, it is evident that there is a disconnect between the federal, state, and local governments in planning, a lack of commitment, and an ill-guided focus. Because disasters such as floods can affect an entire region of the United States over time, it is essential that local governments plan effectively and create policies that limit land-use in hazard areas. Additionally, although private property needs to be respected, it is essential that the federal government and state governments plan and set guidelines for local governments with the appreciation for the affect that a natural disaster could have on a community. One look at New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina should remind all citizens of the problems associated with disasters and the consequences of dealing with a natural, hazardous threat without proper mitigation. WORKS CITED:

4 Haddow and Bullock Chapter 3 Birkland, Thomas A., Raymond J. Burby, David Conrad, Hanna Cortner, and William K. Michener River Ecology and Flood Hazard Mitigation. Natural Hazards Review 4 (1): [PDF] Beatley, Timothy "Towards a Moral Philosophy of Natural Disaster Mitigation." International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 7 (1):5-32. Samuel D. Brody, Sammy Zahran, Wesley E. Highfield, Himanshu Grover, and Arnold Vedlitz Identifying the impact of the built environment on flood damage in Texas, The Authors Journal Compilation, Overseas Development Institute, at Burby, Raymond J., Timothy Beatley, Philip R. Berke, Robert E. Deyle, Steven P. French, David Godschalk, Edward J. Kaiser, Jack D. Kartez, Peter J. May, Robert Olshansky, Robert G. Paterson, and Rutherford H. Platt "Unleashing the power of planning to create disaster-resistant communities." Journal of the American Planning Association 65: [PDF] Burby, Raymond J., and Peter J. May Intergovernmental environmental planning: addressing the commitment conundrum. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 41 (1): [PDF]

5 Rebecca D Angelo PA 553 Response Paper 2 Mitigation: Who s Lane Is It? Two of the readings present different perspectives to the question where is the breakdown in effective mitigation planning? Is it state/local governments or the federal government? The Burby/May article argues that local governments sometimes ignore or fail to commit to higher government level environmental issues or programs. The commitment conundrum is a product of indifferent local governments or poor plans issued from higher government levels. But the article subtly implies that local governments are snubbing higher governments planning attempts, not out of malicious intent, but lack of public interest. The solution, according to Burby and May, is to gain commitment from local governments through the use of prepared, high quality plans and through the establishment of public support for the programs. But the second Burby et al article blames federal programs for making planning more difficult for state and local governments. The article first states that federal policies facilitate the development of areas exposed to natural hazards, such as coastal urban areas and severe sloping areas. Secondly, federal policies undermine local and state hazard mitigation planning by stepping in to save local and state areas when disasters do strike. This does not just undermine planning, it prevents planning from ever reaching the discussion table. So who is to blame, if there is blame to assign in the breakdown of mitigation planning: the federal government for poor planning or state/local governments for not committing to federal planning? There is no decisive answer to that question. In both articles Burby and his co-authors agree that the best strategy to combat planning shortfalls at all levels of government is citizen involvement through a knowledgeable constituency that supports hazard mitigation programs. This will motivate local and state governments to either commit to supporting federal programs, or lead them to question their own land use plans in order to take appropriate mitigation measures. This is also alluded to in the conclusion of the Birkland/Burby et al article, which agrees that policy implementation will rely on local governments, although the concept focuses more on the ecological impacts of land use planning. The next set of articles present arguments on the moral obligations of government in disaster mitigation. The question between the two articles is how much moral obligation is too much? The Beatley article is careful not to take a particular opinion on moral philosophy and government involvement, but rather to explain utilitarian and market failure theoretical bases for moral dimensions of mitigation policy. Disaster relief is seen as a public good like national defense, and the government is therefore responsible for protecting its citizens from disaster related harm as if it 1

6 were another enemy of the state. Beatley states in his conclusion that it is not clear that individuals or public agencies must adopt only one moral philosophy, but that disaster management professionals must put forth more moral arguments in order to elevate disaster mitigation on political agendas. But the Birkland/Burby et al article argues that government moral obligation to compensate and financially protect its citizens can lead to moral hazard where risky behavior, in the form of exposure to disaster, is encouraged and even subsidized. An example to support this is the North Carolina hurricane/flood insurance program discussed in class that provides stipulations for increased cost in homeowners insurance to individuals who do not even live on the coast. North Carolina homeowners as far away as Asheville are, in essence, subsidizing the beach houses in Wilmington. Why do the individuals who choose not to live where a hurricane can level their house have the obligation to subsidize those who do live where disaster is more likely to strike? Any more importantly, why is the government allowing this? Does this not equate to subversive socialism? A probable solution could be found in the same solution proposed in the previous discussion on planning: an informed group of citizens, who are knowledgeable about disaster planning, could be very effective in defining the limits and reaches of government moral obligation by influencing lower level governments and their federal representatives in developing clear mitigation plans and defining roles for each level of government in the mitigation planning process. Finally, there is the issue of financing disaster mitigation plans and the idea of local government collaboration on disaster planning. The Haddow/Bullock/Coppola book provides a general overview of FEMA, federal flood insurance plans and earthquake hazard reduction programs funded by the federal government. But in his article on financing disaster mitigation, Allen K. Settle discusses mutual aid agreements between local governments as a means of planning and aid-costs to area-specific disaster mitigation, such as a possible chemical spill at a large plant that would affect several surrounding local municipalities. Settle also introduces the concept of Joint Powers Agreements (JPAs) and Joint Powers Insurance Agreements (JPIAs), which provide a cash pool between local governments to help spread the costs of emergencies between several local governments, and the reserves can be paid back over time. These two concepts are an example of local government collaboration on disaster planning and collaborative financing, which does not take place in all areas, but could serve as a valuable and viable policy that would provide the greatest benefits to the most citizens. In closing, local governments failure or inability to plan mitigation strategy is a recurring theme of most of this weeks articles. This may be due to excessive federal intervention when what is needed most is local government planning and involvement. Informed citizens have the greatest influence on local and state planning efforts and could also influence major federal policy decisions if a large enough interest is generated. What is not effective is government finger-pointing and shifting blame between all levels of government for failures to plan, act and respond before disaster strikes. 2

7 Additional Article Settle, A. K. (1985) Financing Disaster Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and Recovery Public Administration Review, 45,

8 Bess Tyner PA 553 Mitigation Response Paper 3 Sept 10, 2009 MITIGATION WHAT EXACTLY IS IT? The theme for the readings this week is the portion of the disaster cycle that has the most opportunity to relieve future suffering and loss mitigation. Yet, it is this portion of the cycle that is possibly the most flawed and mismanaged by all levels of government. The readings provide a basis of what mitigation involves, and a discussion of the pitfalls facing mitigation efforts. Mitigation is defined as the sustained action to reduce or eliminate risk from hazards (Haddow, Bullock and Coppola p. 75). Costs from disasters have grown significantly from the last decade. While mitigation normally occurs as part of a disaster recovery effort, recent public policy has been to encourage pre disaster planning (Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola p. 76). The results of these efforts however leave much to be desired. Major public policy initiatives to impact mitigation have been the changes in building codes, structural projects and a myriad of federal programs for dams, fire protection, flood insurance, and earthquake resistance. Some see the structural projects as pork, but this broad brush should not entirely tar the whole list as such. Many politicians have come to view mitigation projects however as tangible signs to their constituents that they are being effective in bringing mitigation dollars home to their districts, so this trend of money for structural projects is likely to continue. WHY SHOULD WE DO MITIGATON? There are many tools available to governments for use in mitigation planning. These include hazard identification modeling, new design and construction codes, land use knowledge bases, financial incentives and grants, insurance, and finally structural controls (Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola, p. 77). However, this does not address the question of why is it the responsibility of any governmental body to provide mitigation services, especially to those who knowingly build or live in hazardous areas. Beatley addresses the morality of mitigation with his question why and to what extent governments have a moral obligation to protect people and property from disaster (Beatley, 1989, p. 5). He goes further to ask whether there is an inherent right to natural disaster mitigation (Beatley, 1989, p. 12). He discusses several views on this such as the utilitarian view of two basic principles of justice. These two principles are that all individuals should be ensured the same basic liberties, and that social and economic inequalities should be tolerated only when they lead to maximal benefit of the least disadvantaged (Beatley, 1989, p 14). It is this second principle, he argues, that provides the primary justification for government to respond to disaster recovery and continue on with mitigation. He continues the argument for a better means of decision making by using the culpability standard, which would place the burden of mitigation primarily on those creating the need for mitigation (Beatley, 1989, p 16). Tyner Response Paper 3 - Mitigation Page 1

9 PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTING MITGATION Why doesn t mitigation seem to work well? The readings focus heavily on the stumbling blocks to effective mitigation. These are flawed land use policy, financial incentives that are ineffective, building codes that are not updated or enforced properly, local politics that seek to shift financial burdens of mitigation onto those not affected. In addition to these, we also have denial of risk by those affected, the politics of land use, financial incentives that are misguided, and immanent domain laws (which are changing). Sometimes mitigation also provides a false sense of security (like those building behind levees as discussed in the supplemental reading presented) and when done improperly can actually increase risk or just move it somewhere else, in addition to damaging ecology. It is only after a severe disaster that interest in serious mitigation typically becomes of interest to the public. MITIGATION REFORM The historical record indicates floods are the most common hazard, and these have been dealt with mostly by structural mitigation. When these fail, insurance programs exist for rebuilding. Current environmental damage however has occurred due to some of these policies. While dams, reserviors etc can be used for societal good, they can also damage natural ecology by interferring with natural cycles in waterways that depend on cyclical floods or droughts. Structures occasionally enhance environment but many more times damage it than enhance (Birkland, 2003, p. 48). Recommended flood mitigation strategies are revamping the National Flood Insurance Program to shift the cost of the improvements more towards those affected. This would prvoide an economic incentive to not buid in the risky areas. Land use must also be considered, but this is a volitile issue which involves property rights, economic impact of taxes on local governments, land scarcity, and fragmented local policy. To this end, they recommend that the federal government must take a more active role in mitigation policy (Birkland, 2003, p. 53). In addition, Burby, et. Al argues that land use planning should be the tool of choice, despite the governmental reluctance to use it. (Burby, et. al, 1999, p. 248). Local planning is still the primary vehicle for land use determination and it needs the most change. This will probably not occur without external forces or incentives. Also, with the Federal history of bail outs of disasters creates a built in disincentive for reform. Why bother to mitigate? In addition to the reform of national policies and programs,we must encourage better local planning in high risk areas, help local governments change the way they manage use of hazardous areas, continue to build and share knowledge for sustainable living amidst natural hazards, and limit subsidies of using hazardous areas (Burby, et. al, 1999 p. 256). Tyner Response Paper 3 - Mitigation Page 2

10 Works Cited Beatley, Timothy Towards a Moral Philosophy of Natural Disaster Mitigation. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 7 (1) Birkland, Thomas A., Raymond J. Burby, David Conrad, Hanna Cortner, and William K. Michener River Ecology and Flood Hazard Mitigation. Natural Hazards Review 4 (1) Burby, Raymond J., Timothy Beatley, Philip R. Berke, Robert E. Deyle, Steven P. French, David Godschalk, Edward J. Kaiser, Jack D. Kartez, Peter J. May, Robert Olshansky, Robert G. Paterson, and Rutherford H. Platt "Unleashing the power of planning to create disaster-resistant communities." Journal of the American Planning Association 65 Burby, Raymond J., and Peter J. May Intergovernmental environmental planning: addressing the commitment conundrum. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 41 (1) Haddow, Gearge D., Jane A. Bullock and Damon P. Coppola. Introduction to Emergency Management. Ed. Pamela Chester. 3. Burlington, Ma.: Elsevier, Irons, Larry Hurricane Katrina as a Predictable Surprise Homeland Security Affairs 1 ( 2): Article 7 (Internet link Tyner Response Paper 3 - Mitigation Page 3