Learning online: MOOCs, connectivism, and cultural psychology

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1 Learning online: MOOCs, connectivism, and cultural psychology Marc Clarà and Elena Barberà Clarà, M. & Barberà, E. (2013): Learning online: massive open online courses (MOOCs), connectivism, and cultural psychology. Distance Education, 34(1), In this reflection, we discuss the connectivist conception of learning in Web 2.0 environments, which underpins the pedagogy of what are known as cmoocs (connectivist massive open online courses) (Siemens, 2012). We argue that this conception of learning is inadequate and problematic, and we propose that cultural psychology is best suited to address the explanatory challenges that Web 2.0 poses on learning, and therefore, it is also best suited to provide MOOCs with more adequate and less problematic pedagogy. We suggest two initial and general pedagogical principles based on cultural psychology upon which to begin building this new pedagogy for MOOCs. Keywords: Web 2.0; e-learning; distance education Introduction Massive open online courses (MOOCs) are receiving increasing attention and interest from several communities involved in online distance education. Although MOOCs were initiated and guided by very specific pedagogical assumptions, the phenomenon has spread out without necessarily following their initial associated pedagogy. This fact led Siemens (2012) to differentiate between cmoocs and xmoocs. This second type of MOOC is mainly developed by world-leading campus-based universities (such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology or Stanford University) as an evolution of an institutional strategy regarding digital technology and on-campus teaching (Armstrong, 2012). Thus, xmoocs are not pedagogically driven, and the consequence is that they assume pedagogies mainly based on behaviorist psychology (Bates, 2012). cmoocs, on the other hand, were developed with the explicit aim of exploring a pedagogy that takes advantage of Web 2.0 for learning. Pioneers of cmoocs (mainly Siemens and 1

2 Downes) argued that none of behaviorism, cognitivism, or constructivism could adequately explain learning as it happens in Web 2.0. Consequently, they articulated some psychological assumptions that they argued to be a new learning theory, called connectivism. These psychological assumptions led them to propose the pedagogy that in 2008 gave birth to the first MOOC (Mackness, Mak, & Williams, 2010). Disregarding the reasons why some superficial characteristics of cmoocs were assumed by world-leading campus-based universities when they created their xmoocs, and although the pedagogy of xmoocs is not currently based on connectivism (but on behaviorism), connectivism is likely to play an important role in the future evolution of MOOCs, because when xmoocs are forced to modernize their pedagogy and this will occur soon (Daniel, 2012) the first model to look at will be cmoocs. For this reason it is important, at the current stage of this story, to carefully and critically consider the psychological assumptions that connectivism proposes as a way of understanding and explaining learning in Web 2.0. In this reflection, we argue that connectivism is not able to adequately explain how learning occurs (neither in Web 2.0 nor in any other environment) because it does not address many of the central attributes of learning. We then suggest that a promising psychological tradition able to explain learning in Web 2.0, and therefore, able to drive the future pedagogies of MOOCs, is the Vygotskian tradition of cultural psychology. Theoretical assumptions of learning in the Web 2.0 environment When Siemens (2005, 2006) and Downes (2005, 2006, 2012) first proposed the core psychological principles of connectivism, they proceeded from the idea that the existing learning theories were unable to explain some challenging characteristics posed by Web 2.0. These characteristics are mainly the following: (a) the rapid growth of knowledge, which makes knowledge itself a dynamic phenomenon; (b) the new kinds of production 2

3 and externalization of knowledge, which multiply the perspectives embedded in knowledge. Siemens (2005, 2006) and Downes (2005, 2006, 2012) summarized the existing learning theories in three theoretical positions: behaviorism, cognitivism and constructivism. They assumed that these three positions share two key attributes: (a) knowledge resides in the individual; and (b) knowledge is a thing a representation that people create or appropriate. Siemens and Downes argued that these two attributes are not compatible with the characteristics of knowledge in Web 2.0. In their view, the dynamism of knowledge in Web 2.0 contradicts the thingness of knowledge assumed by the existing learning theories, and the multiplicity of perspectives embedded in knowledge in Web 2.0 contradicts the individual location of knowledge assumed by the existing learning theories. As a consequence of this rationale, Siemens (2005, 2006) and Downes (2005, 2006, 2012) proposed a new learning theory, called connectivism, which can be basically summarized by two fundamental ideas that respond to what they identify as explanatory challenges of learning in Web 2.0. First, in reaction to the thingness of knowledge assumed by the existing learning theories, and as explanation of the dynamic nature of knowledge, connectivism states that knowledge is subsymbolic, and that representations are just epiphenomena of knowledge, but not its matter. The following quote by Downes (2006) is illustrative of this idea: It [knowledge] is, rather (and carefully stated), a recognition of a pattern in a set of neural events (if we are introspecting) or behavioural events (if we are observing). We infer to mental contents the same way we watch Donald Duck on TV we think we see something, but that something is not actually there it s just an organization of pixels. 3

4 Therefore, to know means to form a pattern of neuronal associations, which at the experiential level gives the impression of a representation. The patterns of association can be highly changeable, and therefore representations, which are their epiphenomena, are dynamic. Second, these neuronal associative patterns are caused by the learner s recognition of associative patterns between informational entities (named nodes) located outside the learner and organized in a network. In the Web 2.0 environment, the nodes would be people, materials, and tools that the learner connects to. This idea of external network as the starting point of the learning and knowing process is proposed as a reaction to the idea of knowledge as residing in the individual, and as explanation of the multiplicity of perspectives embedded in knowledge. Although connectivism apparently addresses the challenges posed by Web 2.0 for learning, we argue that it does not provide adequate explanation to learning phenomena because it neglects other crucial aspects of learning. We develop this critique much more extensively elsewhere, so in this reflection, we will only point at three important explanatory problems of the connectivist theoretical assumptions. The first problem is that connectivism does not address at all what is known as the learning paradox. This paradox, first posed by Socrates (Plato, 380 B.C./2002), can be applied to connectivism as follows: How do you recognize a pattern if you do not already know that a specific configuration of connections is a pattern? When a pattern is connected for the first time, why are the nodes connected in that specific way, and why is that configuration seen as a pattern? Connectivism leaves this question unaddressed, and therefore unresolved. This theoretical problem causes an important learning problem in cmoocs: Many learners, especially those who do not have high 4

5 self-regulation skills, feel lost and without any direction and support in cmoocs (Kop, 2011; Mackness et al., 2010). The second problem is that connectivism underconceptualizes interaction and dialogue, by understanding it as a learner s connection to a human node in the network. In the connectivist understanding, this connection to a human node is binary (on-off) and static. Besides, the human node is seen as part of the (external) connective pattern constitutive of knowledge (Downes, 2012). These ideas are in clear contradiction with the evidence on interaction that the scientific community has been observing for decades, also in online learning environments. It is well known that the other can be crucial in a learning process without being part of what is learnt, but by being the assistant of this learning. It is also well known that interaction is a process (not a state) which evolves, and that the evolution and dynamics of interaction are related with the learning process think, for example, of the well-documented interactional process of transfer of responsibility (e.g., Coll, Onrubia, & Mauri, 2008; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Van de Pol, Volman, & Beishuizen, 2010). Just because of its dynamic nature, interaction can be hardly characterized as a binomy like interaction-no interaction (onoff). This serious underconceptualization causes another important learning problem in cmoocs: Many learners experience problems in finding proper ways to establish and maintain a fruitful learning dialogue with others (Kop, 2011; Mackness et al., 2010). The third problem is that connectivism is unable to explain concept development. There is no need to mention that there is an extremely large amount of evidence documenting the fact that a concept develops over time in other words, one specific concept is not of the same nature when used by a 4-year-old child as when this child is 12 years old. The important explanatory problem experienced currently by connectivism is the same problem that all associationisms in the history of psychology 5

6 have also faced before, and it is one of the key reasons that led to abandonment of associationism in the 20th century (Vygotsky, 1986). The problem, in connectivist terms, can be posed as follows: If a concept consists of a specific pattern of associations, how can it be explained that the concept develops but the pattern of associations remains the same? From our point of view, this problem inevitably leads to abandonment of the connectivist idea of knowledge as associative patterns, which actually means abandoning the whole theoretical assumption of connectivism. The consequence of all of this is that, although at first glance the connectivist proposals may seem appealing, connectivism does not provide an adequate explanation of learning phenomena in Web 2.0, and therefore it is not able to provide an adequate pedagogy for MOOCs. In the next section, we propose that cultural psychology is a promising starting point to provide a conceptual explanation of learning in Web 2.0, which is able to underlie and support an adequate pedagogy for MOOCs. The Vygotskian tradition of cultural psychology The genealogy of the Vygotskian psychological tradition is quite complex to trace. In this reflection, we consider that this tradition is articulated around the axis formed by the works of Vygotsky-Leontiev-Ga lperin-davydov-cole-engeström. This tradition is commonly known as cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) or cultural psychology (Blunden, 2010; Cole, 1996; Engeström, 2001). Summarizing the theoretical universe developed by this tradition is, of course, beyond the scope of this reflection. Instead, we will briefly focus on three ideas that together can adequately address the two challenges of learning in Web 2.0 identified by connectivists. The first idea is that representations (knowledge) are tools (psychological tools i ) that mediate between the subject and the object. Representations are not originally located within the subject; their origin is external. Moreover, representations (as tools) 6

7 only exist in use, as mediating between subject and object. Therefore, a representation is not something that the subject has but something that the subject uses in relation to an object. The second idea is that representations are distributed (present and available) in communities and systems of activity. A community (Wenger, 1998) can be understood as a group of people who have a mutual engagement (or in other words, a common object) and a shared repertoire (or in other words, a shared set of tools to relate to the object). A system of activity can be understood as a tradition within which a community can be located in the long-term history (Engeström, 2001). The tools distributed in a community and in a system of activity are transformed and redistributed by different mechanisms (Engeström, 1987). The most powerful mechanism is the interaction of two or more systems of activity as a consequence of a partially shared object. The third idea is that learning consists of the learner s internalization of the use of a representation in relation to an object. This internalization is possible only if the learner has the opportunity of using the representation jointly with others within a zone of proximal development. As a consequence of their participation in this joint activity there is internalization by the learners, who can finally use the representation on their own (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986). Internalization always implies certain transformations in the use of the representation: When using the representation autonomously, the learner always uses it in slightly different ways than the people who were involved in the joint activity that made internalization possible. These transformations in use can be at the same time externalized by the learner and therefore distributed in the community and the system of activity; in this way these new uses can be internalized by other users who will also transform and externalize them (Engeström, 1999). 7

8 In our view, these ideas adequately meet the two explanatory challenges that, according to Siemens (2005, 2006) and Downes (2005, 2006, 2012), Web 2.0 poses for learning, namely the dynamism of knowledge and the multiplication of perspectives embedded in knowledge. From the viewpoint of cultural psychology, representations are things; however, they are not fixed objects but mediational means. Thus, the object can remain the same, but the representations used to relate to this object may be highly changeable. This dynamism and changeability of representations is a consequence of the two main mechanisms of transformation and re-distribution that we mentioned earlier: the interaction between systems of activity and the process of internalizationexternalization. Both mechanisms necessarily require a dialectic interaction among a multiplicity of perspectives (Engeström, 1999, 2001). Web 2.0 amplifies and accelerates these two mechanisms (Engeström & Sannino, 2010). The consequence is that the dynamism and the multiplicity of perspectives inherent in any representation are currently much more evident and larger than in earlier decades. However, from the viewpoint of cultural psychology, this phenomenon is not new, and it is fully explainable: it just responds to a (technologically accelerated) transformation and re-distribution of representations in order to relate to an object. From this conceptualization, we suggest two initial and general pedagogical principles regarding MOOCs. The first principle is to enable, both didactically and technologically, the visualization of the objects that learners choose to relate to, in order to make possible and evident the use of representations as mediating tools between the learner and the object. Too often, pedagogies have confused the representations with the object, so that it has been assumed that the object of the learner s activity is the representation itself; in the Web 2.0 era, with the acceleration of transformation and re- 8

9 distribution of representations, this erroneous assimilation of representation-object may lead both learners and teachers to a crisis about what is worthy to know and learn. Pedagogy in Web 2.0 environments needs to make more evident than ever this differentiation between representation-object, and needs to provide learners with visualized objects that give direction to their learning, since objects remain relatively stable even when the representations and (other) tools used to relate with them change and transform rapidly. The second principle is to enable, both didactically and technologically, opportunities for joint activity; that is, opportunities for people to use together a representation in order to relate to a common object. Only if these opportunities are provided will the uses of representations be internalized (i.e., learned) by participants. This requires the possibility of dialogicity in interaction (Wells & Mejía Arauz, 2006) and dialogue sustained over time, in order to make possible processes of transfer or responsibility. Conclusion Since its formulation in 2005, connectivism has received strong critiques from several authors from different points of view. Kop and Hill (2008), for example, have argued that connectivism cannot be considered a learning theory (yet) because its postulates do not meet the criteria to be so considered. Lange (2012) has been more severe, and has argued that connectivism is not a learning theory, not only because it does not meet the criteria, but because it does not offer anything new, just a mixture of ideas already present in other well-established learning theories. In the same vein, Verhagen (2006) has suggested that connectivism is a pedagogical view, but not a learning theory; however, even as a pedagogical view, both Verhagen and Lange have argued that connectivism does not offer any relevant contribution. Bell (2011) has argued that 9

10 connectivism must be seen as just a phenomenon, and not as a learning theory or as a pedagogical view. From this view, Bell has suggested that connectivism can be understood and practiced from different conceptualizations and pedagogies. As can be seen, these critiques mainly address the ontological and epistemological status of connectivism (what kind of thing connectivism is learning theory, pedagogy, phenomenon and in which sense connectivism is better than other similar things of the same status better than other learning theories, or better than other pedagogies). In this reflection, we aimed to examine connectivism from an additional point of view: we tried to avoid discussing the status of connectivism in order to focus the discussion on the psychological contents of its postulates. The conclusion of this discussion is that, taken from a psychological point of view, connectivism, as currently formulated, should be abandoned as a learning theory and as a theoretical guide for pedagogy in MOOCs and in Web 2.0 environments in general. As such, we have reached the same conclusion as those who have discussed the ontological and epistemological status of connectivism. However, the need to abandon connectivism does not mean the abandonment of MOOCs, which seem to be expanding rapidly among universities all over the world (Bates, 2012). Therefore, if connectivism is not a valid learning theory, and considering that xmoocs are adopting old behavioral pedagogies, there is the urgent need to build an adequate pedagogy for MOOCs, based on a valid learning theory. We have argued that this learning theory could be the Vygotskian cultural psychology, and we have proposed two initial and general principles for a future pedagogy of MOOCs: the visualization of objects and the enabling of dialogic and sustained joint activity. Other authors, such as Ravenscroft (2011) or Kop, Fournier, and Mak (2011), have also seen in the Vygotskian tradition an inspiration for trying new pedagogies in Web 2.0. The 10

11 main concern of these authors has been enabling dialogue, which is related to the second pedagogical principle outlined in this reflection. As a final thought, it is perhaps worthwhile to note that the psychological discussion conducted in this reflection against connectivism recalls some arguments especially the discussion on concept development from old discussions against associationism in the early and mid-20th century (e.g., Vygotsky, 1986, 1997; Fodor, 1983). It seems that in its periodic reappearance in the psychological arena, associationism is attempting to come back in the Web 2.0 era. Although connectivism deserves to be fully considered and discussed, we think that it is also important in this discussion not to forget why associationism was discarded in the past as a central explanation in psychology. Some of those reasons may still be important nowadays. Notes on contributors Dr. Marc Clarà (PhD in psychology) is associate professor at the University of Barcelona and research assistant at the elearn Center of the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya. His research interests include the relationship between knowledge and action, the nature of educational joint activity, and the mediation of digital media in learning processes. Dr. Elena Barberà (PhD in psychology) is the research director of the elearn center at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya and adjunct teacher at the South-eastern University of Florida. Her research interests include e-assessment, learning strategies and teaching and learning processes in online innovative contexts. References Armstrong, L. (2012, August 6). Coursera and MITx: Sustaining or disruptive? [Web log message]. Retrieved from 11

12 Bates, T. (2012, August 5). What s right and what s wrong about Coursera-style MOOCs? [Web log message]. Retrieved from Bell, F. (2011). Connectivism: Its place in theory-informed research and innovation in technology-enabled learning. International Review of Research in Open and Distance Learning, 12(3), Retrieved from Blunden, A. (2010). An interdisciplinary theory of activity. Leiden: Brill. Cole, M. (1996). Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Coll, C., Onrubia, J., & Mauri, T. (2008). Ayudar a aprender en contextos educativos: El ejercicio de la influencia educativa y el análisis de la enseñanza [Supporting learning in educational contexts: The exercise of educational influence and the analysis of teaching]. Revista de Educación, 346, Retrieved from Daniel, J. (2012). Making sense of MOOCs: Musings in a maze of myth, paradox and possibility. Seoul: Korean National Open University. Retrieved from Downes, S. (2005). An Introduction to Connective Knowledge. Stephen s Web (22 December). Retrieved from Downes, S. (2006, October 16). Learning networks and connective knowledge. Paper presented at the Instructional Technology Forum. Retrieved from 12

13 Downes, S. (2012). Connectivism and connective knowledge: Essays on meaning and learning networks. Retrieved from Engeström, Y. (1987). Learning by expanding. Helsinki: Orienta-Konsulfit Oy. Engeström, Y. (1999). Activity theory and individual and social transformation. In Y. Engeström, R. Miettinen, & R. Punamäki (Eds.), Perspectives on activity theory (pp ). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Engeström, Y. (2001). Expansive learning at work: Toward an activity theoretical reconceptualization. Journal of Education and Work, 14, Retrieved from Engeström, Y., & Sannino, A. (2010). Studies of expansive learning: Foundations, findings and future challenges. Educational Research Review, 5, doi: /j.edurev Fodor, J. A. (1983). The modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kop, R. (2011). The challenges to connectivist learning on open online networks: Learning experiences during a massive open online course. International Review of Research in Open and Distance Learning, 12(3), Retrieved from Kop, R., Fournier, H., & Mak, J. S. F. (2011). A pedagogy of abundance or a pedagogy to support human beings? Participant support on massive open online courses. International Review of Research in Open and Distance Learning, 12(7), Retrieved from 13

14 Kop, R., & Hill, A. (2008). Connectivism: Learning theory of the future or vestige of the past? International Review of Research in Open and Distance Learning, 9(3), Retrieved from Lange, M. (2012). Talk:Connectivism. Retrieved from Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Mackness, J., Mak, S. F. J., & Williams, R. (2010). The ideals and reality of participating in a MOOC. In L. Dirckinck-Holmfeld, V. Hodgson, C. Jones, M. de Laat, D. McConnell, & T. Ryberg (Eds.), Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Networked Learning 2010 (pp ). Lancaster: Lancaster University. Retrieved from ml Plato. (2002). Meno. (J. Holbo & B. Waring, Trans.). Retrieved from (Original work published 380 B.C.) Ravenscroft, A. (2011). Dialogue and connectivism: A new approach to understanding and promoting dialogue-rich networked learning. International Review of Research in Open and Distance Learning, 12(3), Retrieved from Siemens, G. (2005). Connectivism: a learning theory for the digital age. International Journal of Instructional Technology and Distance Learning 2(1), January. Retrieved from 14

15 Siemens, G. (2006, November 12). Connectivism: Learning theory or pastime for the self-amused? [Web log message]. Retrieved from Siemens, G. (2012, July 25). MOOCs are really a platform. [Web log message]. Retrieved from Van de Pol, J., Volman, M., & Beishuizen, J. (2010). Scaffolding in teacher-student interaction: A decade of research. Educational Psychology Review, 22(3), doi: /s Verhagen, P. (2006). Connectivism: A new learning theory? Retrieved from Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Interaction between learning and development. In M. Cole, V. J. Steiner, S. Scribner, & E. Souberman (Eds.), Mind in society (pp ). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1986). Thought and language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). The historical meaning of the crisis in psychology: A methodological investigation. In R. Rieber & J. Wollock (Eds.), The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky: Vol. 3. Problems of the theory and history of psychology (pp ). New York, NY: Plenum Press. Wartofsky, M. W. (1979). Models: Representation and the scientific understanding. Dordrecht: Reidel. Wells, G., & Mejía Arauz, R. (2006). Dialogue in the classroom. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 15, Retrieved from 15

16 Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. i The Vygotskian tradition makes a distinction between technical tools (or primary artifacts) and psychological tools (or secondary artifacts) (e.g.,vygotsky, 1986, or Wartofsky, 1979). The details of this distinction are outside the scope of this reflection; the important idea here is that both are instrumental, both are conceptualized as (external) tools which mediate the relationship subject-object. 16