Shame Faced and ORNGE All Over. How Government Can Flub their Accountabili<es for the Agencies They Create

Transcription

1 Shame Faced and ORNGE All Over How Government Can Flub their Accountabili<es for the Agencies They Create

2 Agencies in the Ontario Context Ontario has created a number of agencies to carry out specific roles General history of success with them Called transfer payment agencies in which governments transfer public funds to carry out a func<on money remains part of government financial repor<ng Plenty of policy and direc<ves to guide it About 250 in Ontario those agencies regulated through appointment and appropria<ons Focus here is on those that deliver a specialized service or operate an enterprise for government

3 Deliver Specialized Service Operate Commercially Expert Advice Separate Opera1onal Func1ons from Policy and Oversight Quasi- judicial Uses of Agencies outside Conven1onal Government Structures Partnership Enterprises

4 Agencies in the Ontario Context Examples: Infrastructure Ontario LCBO Hydro One Cancer Care Ontario Metrolinx

5 The Crea<on of a New Agency Intended to end confusion, overlap and lack of clarity in air ambulance services in Ontario To improve speed and safety in distance ambulance Consolida<on dispatch Upgrade fleet move out of patchwork contracts

6 How it was structured Legisla<ve agency Board of directors CEO appointed Dr. Mazza Loosely wriven performance contract with Ministry of Health Given $150 from appropria<ons Created as a corpora<on under Corpora<ons Act

7 CEO Dr. Chris Mazza

8 What went wrong Basic shiz in orienta<on away from consolida<on of services to selling them interna<onally Created a number of not- for- profit and for- profit companies to sell exper<se interna<onally Moved execu<ves into for- profit companies, outside government sunshine law Growth of cult of personality of CEO Salary pumped up to $1.4 Given $450,000 loan to buy a house to help with work stress Contracts for advisory services that he never provided $10 M insurance policy paid for Hiring of ques<onable people as execu<ves, including his former water ski instructor Major fleet purchase made badly designed with too much equipment no opera<onal input

9 Bought two vanity choppers for public rela<ons - $500,000

10 The Curious Case of the Dog in the Night Who was watching at the Ministry? Ministry of Finance audit sounded alarms Minister asked Auditor General to go in Could not access some accounts as they were in for- profits and AG did not have jurisdic<on Reports of problems feeding into Ministry for more than a year - nothing done Where was the bureaucracy? Who would take on Dr. Mazza?

11 Agencies will have different CEOs or different boards of directors. That may change from <me to <me, but there is one constant: The government remains the primary source of oversight. - Mr. Jagmeet Singh MPP

12 Inevitable Fallout CEO fired Board fired Interim rescue team Collapsed all the for- profits Call in the forensics and police nothing yet

13 Swirl of accusa<ons Fundamental absence within parts of the public sector of the required skill set and competence in commercial and legal mavers to properly understand and manage public- private partnerships. Alfred Apps, lawyer for Ornge, Legisla<ve hearings. It came as a surprise given that it was very clear from the get- go this was to be a public sector, not- for- profit organiza<on and to provide a much bever integrated delivery system that was recommended in a series of reports. That had always been the intent going in Where this got to was quite a departure from where this started. Hugh MacLeod, former ADM, Health I believe Ornge can best be described as a rogue agency. The Ornge management quietly avempted to restructure the not- for- profit Ornge into a for- profit corporate en<ty that would serve their interests and obscure the lines of accountability and the flow of money. David Kaplin, former Minister of Health and Long Term Care

14 What are some of the key public policy ques<ons that are involved in the oversight of agencies? In or out of the financial en<ty Do freedom of informa<on and privacy rules apply? Nature of contractual rela<onship. Repor<ng requirements. Ombudsman and auditor general oversight Limits of use of agency powers (to go into for profit) Oversight and capacity to oversee

15 What has happened since? Legisla<ve hearings Government made legisla<ve changes the sound of the barn door closing

16 What does this tell us about the governance of agencies Nothing inherently wrong with the use of agencies Government does not diminish any accountability in that process Oversight is not a casual affair Inherent tensions between the flexibility inherent in use of agencies and control for accountability and due regard for public purse, purpose and outcomes Charisma<c leadership is all well and good as long as it is also honest and focused on results

17 The auditor said we failed to provide the necessary oversight over ORNGE. I accept that. We have learned our lesson there. Dalton McGuinty, Premier of the day