Technical Guideline eid-server. Part 2: Security Framework

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1 Technical Guideline eid-server Part 2: Security Framework BSI TR Version January 15, 2014

2 Federal Office for Information Security Post Box D Bonn Phone: Internet: Federal Office for Information Security 2014

3 Content Content 1 Introduction History Out of scope Functional Architecture Overview of the eid-infrastructure Components of an eid-server IT-Systems Application Communication Provider model Protection requirements Security objectives Security requirements General aspects of IT security Infrastructure IT systems Networks Coverage of the security objectives References Figures Figure 1: Overview of the functional architecture of the eid-infrastructure...5 Figure 2: Architecture of a typical eid-server... 6 Figure 3: Separation of the local network Tables Table 1: History... 4 Table 2: Fundamental values of the eid-server...10 Table 3: Role description Table 4: Role exclusion matrix Table 5: Achievement of security objectives by security requirements...18 Federal Office for Information Security 3

4 Introduction 1 Introduction This part of the technical guideline defines a framework of requirements for eid-servers operated by eid-services and Service Providers under aspects of information security. Procedures and security requirements, which also include the creation of a security concept, are already partially described in the certificate policy [CP CVCA eid] and the technical guideline [EAC PKI npa]. These apply to all participants of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used for the eid-function (i.e. EAC-PKI). Based on this an appropriate security level for the operation of eid-servers is specified. This technical guideline defines security requirements in accordance with [IT-GS] and under consideration of [BDSG] which must also be considered by the participating parties. The Service Provider is the owner of the authorization received from the issuing office for authorization certificates (Vergabestelle für Berechtigungszertifikate - VfB) and is thus responsible for adherence of all specifications and requirements in-house as well as in case of delegation to a third party. The Service Provider must provide a specific security concept for the operation of the eid-server in his context. This security concept must fulfill the security requirements defined in this technical guideline. 1.1 History Changes made to this technical guideline will be summarised in this section to simplify comparing the current version with previous versions for those who have already worked with this technical guideline. Version Date Changes 0.4 Draft August 20, RC December 2, January 15, 2014 Initial External Draft Major improvements based on external feedback (see comment sheet for details) Minor improvements Table 1: History 1.2 Out of scope Out of scope is the technical and security functionality of the eid-server as an application, described in Technical Guideline eid-server Part 1: Functional Specification. Also out of scope are procedures and security requirements described in the certificate policy [CP CVCA eid] and the technical guideline [EAC PKI npa]. 4 Federal Office for Information Security

5 Functional Architecture 2 Functional Architecture This section describes the functional architecture of the eid-server in the eid-infrastructure. The components and communication channels are shown in a logical overview. The components are: eid-server, eservice, EAC-PKI and the User of the eservice. Only the operational security requirements of the eid-server are considered in this technical guideline. All functional security requirements within the eid-server are considered in the Technical Guideline eid-server Part 1: Functional Specification. 2.1 Overview of the eid-infrastructure In addition to the communication with the User by the client-sided ecard-api-framework implementation (eid-client) including all necessary cryptographic protocols, the tasks of the eid-server include the connection to the EAC-PKI. The connection to the EAC-PKI allows the eid-server to verify that the data are received from a valid eid-document and it allows the eid-document to verify the authenticity of the Service Provider. Furthermore the eid-server is responsible for the transmission of the result of the Online-Authentication to the eservice of the Service Provider. In most cases all components of the eid-infrastructure communicate over the Internet. The functional architecture of the eid-infrastructure as described in Technical Guideline eid-server Part 1: Functional Specification, Section 2: Infrastructure is shown in the following Figure 1: Overview of the functional architecture of the eid-infrastructure. Figure 1: Overview of the functional architecture of the eid-infrastructure Federal Office for Information Security 5

6 Functional Architecture Differing from the infrastructure described in Figure 1: Overview of the functional architecture of the eid-infrastructure the eid-server may also communicate directly to the eservice. Nevertheless the eid-server is connected to the Internet for the communication with the eid-client of the User. The following Figure 2: Architecture of a typical eid-server shows the architecture of a typical eid-server as it may be provided by an eid-service or the Service Provider in-house. The components of a typical eid-server are considered in the following chapter. The components include at least one computer on which the eid-application and the Web-Server are running which is called eid-server. Furthermore a Key Store is required for the key storage according to [CP CVCA eid]. 2.2 Components of an eid-server Figure 2: Architecture of a typical eid-server This section describes the various components needed to fulfill the functional requirements for the operation of an eid-server. No operational security requirements are applied at this point of description IT-Systems At least two IT-Systems are required to operate the eid-server: The eid-server-host and the Key Store eid-server-host The eid-server-host is the computer system on which the eid-server (including eid-application, ecard-api-framework and WEB interface) is running. 6 Federal Office for Information Security

7 Functional Architecture Key Store The key store is the central component for signature-creation and storage of the private key(s) of the terminal authorization certificate(s). The key store is directly attached to the eid-server-host. The key storage MUST be implemented according to [CP CVCA eid] Application The following section shows the minimal configuration of applications required for running the eid-server-host eid-application The eid-application reads the identity data from the eid-document (e.g. npa) using the ecard-api-framework and provides these data to the business logic of the eservice WEB The eid-server provides a simple web service (WEB) to the eservice, which encapsulates the complexity of the protocols and components involved in the eid-function ecard-api-framework The communication between the eid-server and the eid-client (e.g. AusweisApp) is managed by an implementation of the ecard-api-framework Communication The eid-server uses the protocols listed in Section : Protocols to communicate with other components of the eid-infrastructure via networks Networks To offer the web service of the eid-server to the eservice or at least connect to the eid-client of the User, Internet access is required. Generally the Internet access will be provided by a local network (e.g. LAN). A connection to a local network may also be necessary for administrative purposes Interfaces A network interface (copper or fiber, respectively Ethernet or FDDI) connects the eid-server-host with the local network Protocols The general message flow between the eid-server, eservice and the eid-client of the User is based on SOAP with the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS). Federal Office for Information Security 7

8 Functional Architecture The eid-server must have access to the Public Key Directory (PKD), a Certification Authority (CA) and to Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) of the EAC-PKI. Protocols used for this purpose are Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) and Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). This requirements only refer to the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used for Extended Access Control (EAC). Certificates from other PKIs may have different protocols and organizational requirements. 8 Federal Office for Information Security

9 Provider model 3 Provider model Apart from the Service Provider operating the eid-server in-house this technical guideline distinguishes two eid-service provider models: An eid-service offers its service to its customers and operates the eid-server itself. An eid-service offers its service to its customers but the eid-server is hosted by a third party. In this scenario the eid-service used by the Service Provider's eservice acts as a reseller. In this case the Requirement R.2 : Outsourcing must be fulfilled. Note: The provider models described above are both referring to an outsourced eid-service used by the Service Provider for his eservice. Federal Office for Information Security 9

10 Protection requirements 4 Protection requirements It is necessary to determine the protection requirements of the identified components before analyzing the realization of the security objectives. For the German eid-infrastructure the security concept of the new personal identification card (neuer Personalausweis - npa) was used as a basis for this determination. During security assessment in accordance with [IT-GS] the fundamental values of information security confidentiality (non-disclosure of data), integrity (verification that data aren't being manipulated and transactions and information exchanges can be trusted, i.e. authenticity) as well as availability (ability of an IT service to perform its agreed function when required, which also includes the availability of data) were considered in the manner below. The eid-data, i.e. the personal data of the User stored in an eid-document (e.g. npa) and the result of operations performed on the User's eid-document, are the assets to be primarily protected. All other data deserving protection in the context of eid-infrastructure are assigned to protect these eid-data (e.g. private keys) therefore all other data owns at least the same protection requirement as the eid-data. Value Description Level Confidentiality Integrity Availability The eid-data is confidential and must not be registered or forwarded without authorization. This applies particularly to authorized reading of personal data and the communication between the chip of the eid-document and the receiver of the data. Since the operations performed by the eid-server are always processed on behalf of the Service Provider owning the authorization certificate the limitations of [BDSG] apply and the data read out must not be stored in the eid-server longer than needed for a specific authentication procedure. The correctness of the data read from the eid-document and the processes, applications and systems associated with it, in this case the eid-server, must be ensured. The authenticity of the eid-data must be verifiable. At the same time the authenticity of persons and technical components that want to access the eid-data or are at least involved in the process must be guaranteed. The eid-server is available to perform Online-Authentication on request of authorised eservices. The level of availability depends on the requirements of the eservice. It usually must be considered as "high" and may only be lowered to "normal" if the Service Provider's specific requirements allow to do so. If there is more than one eservice entity using the eid-service the maximum principle must be applied. The highest availability requirement determines the availability of the whole eid-server. Table 2: Fundamental values of the eid-server high high high (to normal) 10 Federal Office for Information Security

11 Security objectives 5 Security objectives Because the eid-data are the assets to be primarily protected the following security objectives only regard these data. All other data deserving protection in the context of the eid-infrastructure (e.g. private keys) are assigned to protect these eid-data. Therefore all other data own at least the same protection requirements as the eid-data. The security objectives of the eid-server are: SO1: SO2: SO3: The confidentiality of the eid-data on the eid-server must be guaranteed. The integrity of the eid-data must be guaranteed. The availability of the eid-server must be guaranteed according to the requirements of the eservice. Federal Office for Information Security 11

12 Security requirements 6 Security requirements This chapter defines the security requirements for operating an eid-server. 6.1 General aspects of IT security R.1 Technical Guideline eid-server Part 1: Functional Specification The security measures referenced in Section 4.5 and 5.8 of the Technical Guideline eid-server Part 1: Functional Specification must be implemented by the participating entities. R.2 Outsourcing If the eid-server is hosted by a third party (see Section 3: Provider model), contractual arrangements with the outsourcing service provider must include a commitment of the outsourcing service provider to fulfill the security requirements of this technical guideline. R.3 Information security management IS Management requires an appropriate IS Management Team. The IS Management Team shall perform the following management tasks: Determine the information security strategy Develope the information security policy Supervise the implementation of the information security policy Initiate, control and monitor the security process Thus an employee of the eid-service Provider shall be assigned to the role of the IT Security Officer. The IT Security Officer is an employee with adequate knowledge of information security. The IT Security Officer is responsible for all tasks concerning information security like assisting the security process and coordination of rescue management and realisation of the requirements defined in this security concept. The IS Management Team comprises of the eid-service Provider's IT Security Officer and the eid-service Provider's person in charge. R.4 Role concept A role concept must be developed and documented that adopts the following principles: Segregation of duties and Need-to-know principle Role exclusions are derived from the following principle limitations: Persons in charge should not perform operative or administrative tasks Persons with controlling tasks should not perform operative or administrative tasks Administrative rights should be limited to a restricted number of persons The following table shows the minimal role set. 12 Federal Office for Information Security

13 Security requirements Role eid-service's Person in Charge (PiC) eid-service's IT Security Officer (ITSO) Data Protection Officer (DPO) Administrator(s) User Table 3: Role description Description The Person in charge (PiC) holds the general responsibility for the eid-service's organisational unit. He is part of the IS Management Team. The IT Security Officer (ITSO) is part of the IS Management Team and helps to fullfil the four-eyes principle on the HSM with the Administrator. Together with the Administrator he is responsible for the administration of the applications, cryptographic key and certificate management, administration of networks and firewalls and facility access control. The Data Protection Officer (DPO) for data according to [BDSG]. The DPO may support the IS Management Team.. The (ideally a group of) Administrator(s) has the authoritative rights on all IT systems of the eid-service. He is responsible for backup, malware protection and periodical update of protective measures (e.g. malware signature files). Together with the ITSO he is responsible for the administration of the applications, cryptographic key and certificate management, administration of networks and firewalls and facility access control. The User of the eid-service. This includes the User of the eservice and the eservice himself as both use the eid-server for mutual authentication. A person in the role of the User must not gain administrative rights while acting as User. The following table shows the role exclusion matrix. An E means exclusion, those roles must not be assigned to a single person. A C means that the corresponding roles may be assigned to a single person. Role PiC ITSO Role PiC ITSO DPO Administrator User E DPO E C Administrator E E E User C C C C Table 4: Role exclusion matrix R.5 Facility access concept An facility access concept for the eid-server location (building, room) must be developed and documented. The number of persons with access to the facility shall be limited to a minimum. The following entrance rules are mandatory: Only an Administrator is allowed to enter the security area where the IT systems are administered and hosted. All other roles and external persons (e.g. visitors) must be escorted by an Administrator. R.6 Admission concept Admission means to have a useraccount on the IT system in order to use the functionality of the IT system. It is necessary to develop an admission concept that ensures that only authorised persons have admission. Minimal requirements are: Federal Office for Information Security 13

14 Security requirements The admission concept must define that every IT system is protected against unauthorised admission by adequate admission mechanisms. Within the admission concept it must be defined how a single role must be authenticated by the IT system. A minimal requirement is the authentication via username and password. Therefore an adequate password directive must be developed. Only strong passwords shall be allowed. That means the password must have at least 8 characters and contains ¾ of the following items: upper case letters, lower case letters, symbols and numbers. It must be changed at least every 90 days. Preferably a hardware token and a password should be used for authentication. Remote administration requires appropriate consideration within the admission concept. The communication channel for the administration must be protected by using strong authentication mechanisms and strong encryption. Adequate cryptographic parameters and algorithms may be found in [BSI TR-02102]. Only an Administrator has admission to all IT components of the eid-server. Users must not have admission to other IT components of the eid-server than the webservice. The admission authorization for the eid-server must be assigned according to the requirements of the role concept and its exclusions. R.7 Access concept It is necessary to develop an access concept. Within the access concept the access rights to the data with protection requirements must be defined according to the role concept. The access authorization must be assigned according to the requirements of the role concept and its exclusions. The four-eyes principle must be ensured for the access to and the use of the data stored in the HSM (e.g. privates keys). Use of the HSM may imply an extension of the four-eyes principle to the whole eid-server. R.8 Malware protection All IT systems of the eid-server except the HSM must be equipped with active malware scanners. Only checked malware-free data media are allowed to be used. The malware signature files must be up to date. R.9 Technical qualification of employees Employees must be sufficiently trained before starting their work. The training includes an introduction to their tasks and an awareness training, which covers the security relevance of their tasks considering [BDSG] and the security concept. The technical qualification of employees must be checked regularly by the Person in Charge to determine if a retraining is required. The Person in Charge shall ensure that a qualified deputy is available, if a person fulfiling one of the roles defined in Requirement R.4 : Role concept (except User) is not able to fulfil his role. R.10 Change management A change management must be established. This includes life cycle regulations for the operational usage of hard- and software. The change management also includes the release procedures for new hardware and software and regulations for the update policy. On all IT systems of the eid-server stable released hard- and software shall be used. The release procedure must be implemented by the IS Management according to Requirement R.3 : Information security management. The roll-out procedure requires well defined criteria including test procedures of the new hard- and software. Further criteria for removing hardware and uninstalling of software must be established. Especially the handling of data media is important. It must be ensured that residual data are irretrievably deleted (e.g. destruction of hard disk). 14 Federal Office for Information Security

15 Security requirements R.11 Availability concept The architecture and the infrastructure of the eid-service must be designed in a way that the requirements for availability can be fulfilled. Therefore an adequate availability concept must be developed, regarding: choice of adequate and reliable hardware building security, fire protection, water protection and humidity protection, energy supply, climatisation and hazard alert system redundant IT components (redundancy of private keys according to Section 6.2: Sicherung des privaten Schlüssels und Anforderungen an kryptographische Module of [CP CVCA eid]) monitoring and alerting qualified deputies must be available for all roles defined in Requirement R.4 : Role concept (except User) R.12 Crypto concept In order to fulfill the cryptographic requirements of the Technical Guideline eid-server Part 1: Functional Specification (Section 4.5 and 5.8) a crypto concept must be developed regarding key management and certificate management of the eid-service. This crypto concept must consider key lengths and algorithms according to [BSI TR-02102] and the requirements resulting from the certificate policy [CP CVCA eid]. The Administrator is responsible for key management and certificate management and for requesting certificates as well as secure storage of private keys. 6.2 Infrastructure R.13 Security areas The required IT components and technical equipment for eid-server operation must be hosted within buildings. These buildings must provide security areas where the IT components and technical equipment are hosted. Data media must be stored in a security area that represents a separate fire area. Every security area must provide an entrance control service that uses entrance control technique. R.14 Entrance control service Security areas must be protected against unauthorised entrance. This must be realised by adequate constructional measures. The constructional infrastructure must provide a high resistance. It must be ensured that an unauthorised entrance attempt will be defended as long as officials arrive. At least one state-of-the-art hazard alert system must be established. It must be ensured that the alerts are sent to the officials promptly. R.15 Entrance control technique The entrance to and the presence in security areas must be checked, monitored and documented. An entrance control technique should be established according to [BSI 7550]. 6.3 IT systems R.16 Updating software The newest stable software patches must be installed on every IT system of the eid-service. All rules defined in change management must be considered before updating software. Federal Office for Information Security 15

16 Security requirements R.17 Secure installation and secure operation of the IT systems The IT systems must be installed and operated in a secure way. That means that all instructions of the user guidance concerning installation and operation must be considered. Every IT system must be installed and operated based on a minimized/hardened operating system. This means that only services needed for the eid-service may be activated. Software that is not required for the eid-service must not be installed. The assignment of permissions must be done in a way that all roles get only the minimal required permissions. The assignment of permissions must be documented. Adequate measures (e.g. BIOS settings) must enforce that a system boot is only possible from the designated hard disk drive (HDD). The operating system or the application must be configured in a way that the identification and authorization mechanisms according to Requirement R.6 : Admission concept and R.7 : Access concept are enforced. R.18 Integrity protection for IT systems The integrity of every IT system of the eid-service must be checked at least once a week by using adequate measures. The result of the check must be documented. If the integrity check fails the affected IT system of the eid-service must be shut down. According to the availability concept redundant components must be started. R.19 Logging Every IT system of the eid-service must have logging capability. At least the following events must be logged: System log-in (successful and unsuccessful) Access attempts Every administrative access Every access via Web-Service In case of more than 3 unsuccessful system log-in attempts, an alert must be generated. This alert must be caught by the Administrator. In this case the Administrator must involve the ITSO to decide the further proceedure (e.g. shut down the eid-server and reset the accounts). 6.4 Networks R.20 Network security zones The local network of the eid-server must be separated into three security zones: internet zone, external zone (i.e. DMZ) and internal zone. The separation of these zones must be achieved by a firewall system. The eid-server must be split into two separate physical components, an eid web server host (i.e. web front end) and eid application server host (i.e. application server). The eid web server host must be placed in the external zone and the eid application server host must be placed in the internal zone. The eid-service is connected to the internet via the internet zone. 16 Federal Office for Information Security

17 Security requirements The following Figure 3: Separation of the local network shows the separation of the local network. Figure 3: Separation of the local network R.21 Firewall system (security gateway) As Figure 3: Separation of the local network shows, security zones must be separated by a firewall system (FW). The firewall system must be state-of-the-art. It must be designed as a combination of a packet filter (PAP), Application Level Gateway (ALG) and another packet filter (PAP). The firewall system must be configured in a way that unauthorised access attempts via internet zone are restricted. Every communication with external entities must pass the firewall system. Furthermore the firewall system must log all connections. The log files must be checked regularly, at least every day. Detected attacks and attempts of attacks must be evaluated and an adequate reaction must be performed. In case of failure of the logging functionality an alert must be sent to the Administrator. If the logging functionality cannot be restarted by the Administrator the firewall system must block all communication. R.22 Intrusion Detection System In order to detect attacks on the eid-service a state-of-the-art Intrusion Detection System (IDS) must be established. Organisational and technical measures must ensure that in case of security relevant attacks a reliable and prompt alert is sent to the Administrator. The IDS must support the following modes of analysis: Signature based detection (Detection by comparison with known standard attack signatures) Protocol based detection (Detection of protocol irregularities) Anomaly based detection (Detection of unusual network traffic) Federal Office for Information Security 17

18 Coverage of the security objectives 7 Coverage of the security objectives The following table shows the coverage of the security objectives by security requirements. An 'X' means that a requirement is part of the realisation of the security objective. Conclusion: The security requirements meet all security objectives. SO1 SO2 SO3 R.1 X X R.2 X X X R.3 X X X R.4 X X R.5 X X R.6 X X R.7 X X R.8 X X X R.9 X X X R.10 X X X R.11 X R.12 X X R.13 X X R.14 X X X R.15 X X X R.16 X X X R.17 X X X R.18 X R.19 X X X R.20 X X R.21 X X X R.22 X X X Table 5: Achievement of security objectives by security requirements 18 Federal Office for Information Security

19 References References BDSG BfDI: Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz - as of 1 September 2009) BSI 7550 BSI: Anforderungen an Zutrittskontrollanlagen, Oktober 2005 BSI TR BSI: Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen; Version CP CVCA eid BSI: Certificate Policy für die eid-anwendung des epa, Version 1.29 EAC PKI npa BSI: TR-03128, EAC-PKI'n für den elektronischen Personalausweis, Version 1.1 IT-GS BSI: Grundschutz Catalogue Federal Office for Information Security 19

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