Introduction. Thomas Elkjer Nissen, MA, Royal Danish Defence College 152

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1 6.The Ever Changing Narrative of Conflict How the Role of War Narratives Changes from Mobilizing for the Battle of Perceptions to Influencing History. Thomas Elkjer Nissen 151 Introduction Over the course of the last 20 years, we have seen numerous wars, conflicts and insurgencies around the world, particularly in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. These have ranged from state on state wars, to civil wars and insurgencies, to border disputes - many of which NATO or NATO countries in other constellations or ad hoc coalitions have participated in. In the same period of time, we have also seen a rapid development of media, information and associated technology, along with their use, in the same conflicts. Media and technology are used in order to not only inform, but also to persuade and mobilize audiences, as well as to help write one s own account of the history post-conflict. Both traditional news media and social network media play an increasing role for all parties involved in conflicts in terms of constructing and projecting strategic narratives, internally as well as externally, to foster support for causes and policies and to create perceptions and promote particular behaviours in conflicts. There are many definitions of what a strategic narrative is and what elements it consists of. At the very basic level, it can be argued to contain these three elements, past, present and future, and it can be described as the story about the rationale, intent and aims the why of an organisation that reflects the vision and strategy of the organisation. Like a script or score, this guides its mission conduct the how of its overall activity. A strategic narrative has also been described as a system of stories that share common themes, forms, events, and participants, and create expectations for how those elements can be assembled to satisfy a desire that is rooted on conflict. 152 The latter definition of a narrative indicates that a narrative is not just a single overarching story, but that it is supported by several stories that together make up the strategic narrative, and that all actions taken are storied and become part of the narrative with communicative effect. Conversely, the interaction between these stories can, complex as it is, lead to unintended consequences that potentially end up undermining the strategic narrative. A narrative, however, when formulated, can become very effective when it comes to constructing a shared meaning of international politics amongst multi Thomas Elkjer Nissen, MA, Royal Danish Defence College 152 Jeffry R Halverson, H. L. Goodall and Steven R. Corman: Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.

2 74 ple actors in order to influence perceptions and behaviours of both internal and external audiences. 153 In this context, it is the latter definition of strategic narratives that is interesting, as the process of mobilization and, for that matter, propaganda is based on the creation of perceptions - and behaviour - generated through the interlinked stories that together create the incentive for change. All of that is supported by real-life events and activities, as well as the use of different media outlets. The use of strategic narratives and media is a common denominator in modern conflicts, or the so-called New Wars, 154 for all actors, whether non-state actors fighting for particular political objectives, single state actors or organisations like NATO and its members. In a world where the use of the state s or coalition s instruments of power, especially the military ones, are subject to intense political, media and public scrutiny near to real time, there is an increased need for being able to continuously legitimise and compellingly convey (communicate) the reasons for these actors actions. Furthermore, in a security environment where more and more actions are conducted in ad hoc coalitions, the need for creating and communicating a shared meaning is imperative despite the political / diplomatic and military challenges in order to achieve the desired strategic objectives of these coalitions. On the other hand, more and more non-state actors such as rebels and insurgent groups are fighting for public and political support and legitimacy as much, if not more, than they are fighting on the battlefield. To them, media and information are equally important as they, to a high degree, seek to influence the strategic political level s will and decisionmaking processes rather than going head to head with their opponents militarily. It is, on the one hand, about fostering international media and public support for their cause in order to sway public opinion in their favour to influence political decisionmaking and policies of both state actors and international organisations, and on the other hand, it is about mobilizing internal support and influencing behaviour. The bottom line, though, for both state as well as non-state actors, is that it is done through the use of narratives and supporting stories in words, images and actions through traditional media and/or new media. Particular attention must be paid to the fact that what is relevant to domestic audiences, and therefore politicians, when it comes to Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and International Organisations, is not necessarily directed at audiences in the theatre of operations but will, 153 Based on Alister Miskimmon, Ben O`Loughlin and Laura Roselle: Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations. October Page See Mary Kaldor (2006): New and Old Wars Organized Violence in a Global Era. Polity Press, Cambridge. UK.

3 nevertheless, influence them anyway. The information disseminated in TCN countries will reach crisis areas due to the character of the modern information environment and the near real-time flow of information between the two spheres of interest, thus informing perceptions and behaviour there. To illustrate this dynamic, we can look to the NATO mission in Kosovo, KFOR, where the flow of information and messaging between NATO via international media and audiences in Kosovo is very close. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen spoke in 2009 in one of his monthly press meetings in Brussels about the downsizing of KFOR force numbers and the transition to what was called Deterrent Presences. This was mentioned in international media and quoted in local media. KFOR units on ground in Kosovo were subsequently confronted with the local Serbian population s worries and perceptions of what was going on, based on the local media coverage. A report from a KFOR Liaison and Monitoring Team (LMT) summed up the situation: People in ZUBIN POTOK [red. Local city in the Serbian enclaves in the northern part of Kosovo] are very worried about the security in the area, when KFOR is downsizing. They do not know what is going on and that creates rumours that are not true. Even though KFOR keeps the municipality informed, the information does not reach the people. The rumours are making people unsecure and afraid for the future. 155 This example shows how information flows in an interconnected world, how information has influence both top-down and bottom-up, how audiences cannot be separated and how audiences always interpret information they receive in the context of their own context, or in other words based on existing narratives. On the other hand, actions, messages and existing narratives in crisis areas can also be of importance to the ability of state actors and international organisations to foster support for their policies in their home countries, especially when directly or indirectly supporting different groups in conflict areas. There is a tendency to tip-toe around the question of the choice of operational partners and their role and behaviour in the conflict. They may not always live up to the ambitions and the values that are put forward in the international actor s - own value biased - strategic narrative about why these groups should be supported. The result of this is the creation of strategic narratives for internal consumption in order to legitimise the choice of operational partners (i.e., rebel groups). In other words, the strategic narratives become a justification that fits neatly into the actor s own world view because it cannot tell the truth without being politically incorrect and hampering the possibilities for achieving political compromises domestically within government or within an alliance or coalition. When the realities of the messaging and LMT report form the Danish LMT in KFOR [NATO Unclassified]

4 76 behaviour on the ground of some of these operational partners become media stories, the actor s strategic narrative becomes seriously challenged. 156 This was illustrated in NATO s Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011, when NATO was very concerned about influencing the rebel group s behaviour in a way that would not undermine NATOs strategic narrative for being involved in the operation. NATO s operations are taking place in support of the UNSCRs 1970 and 1973 as part of the broad international effort. All NATO allies are committed to meet their responsibilities under the UN Security Council Resolution to stop the violence against the Libyan people and in support of their legitimate aspirations. 157 Especially, NATO was worried that the rebel groups would behave in a way that undermined the rebels claim to legitimate aspirations by, for example, breaching International Laws of Armed Conflict, thereby threatening NATO s ability to legitimately support them and, as a consequence, perhaps even force NATO to take action against the rebels for being a threat to the civilian population. The mobilizing role of narratives In conflict situations, especially when talking about civil wars and insurgencies, the information and narratives used to mobilize tend to more emotional than factual, even though comprising both elements, and take the form of what can be labelled as propaganda. Propaganda can be described as a process of persuasion which utilises any available means (media) to persuade people (target audiences) to think and/or behave in a manner desired by the source in order to benefit the interests of that source, either directly or indirectly. 158 According to the media researcher Philip Knightly, you can set up four simple rules for mobilizing populations or specific groups in conflict situations, thereby achieving that same effect. They include presenting the audience with an imminent threat, substantiated with reports of attacks or abuse, painting a picture of the opponent as inhuman and impossible to negotiate with, leaving only armed resistance as a viable option. 159 When a narrative is constructed using Knightley s four elements for mobilizing popular support, it can become very effective. Threat: You must be able to present or demonstrate a direct threat to the audience. If no threat exists, one can be fabricated - potentially by putting the threat in a future context, or by making reference to historical events involving the 156 Thomas Elkjer Nissen (2013): Constructing Strategic Narratives as an Integral Part of Strategy Formulation. In Preparing for the Imperfect World: Strategy in NATO. To be published by Palgrave MacMillan, London, expectedly September (Ed. Liselotte Odgaard) (forthcoming) 157 NATO StratCom Framework for Operation Unified Protector Philip M. Taylor (1990): The Munitions of the Mind A history of Propaganda from the ancient world to present day. Manchester University Press. United Kingdom. 159 Philip Knightly: Quoted in Toni Liversage (1997): Den Youguslaviske Tragidie Om krig, nationalism og fred. Gyldendal, København. Page 181.

5 same actor with the claim that it is likely that the history will repeat itself, or by making reference to ongoing events in other areas or countries close to the audience highlighting the threat of spill-over to their area. Reports: Reports of attacks and abuse have a very strong impact on human will to fight. Reports of attacks can be used to substantiate the threats presented. In some cases, these can be staged in order for the media, either a group s own social media or traditional news media, to report on them. Preferably, these reports are supported by images and witness accounts and expert commentary from people who enjoy a high degree of credibility with the intended audience. Dehumanisation: The opponent is portrayed as less human through his actions or through historical references to his previous behaviour in similar situations in order to induce a them versus us feeling based on religious, ethnic, national or otherwise divisions. Negotiation: The situation must be framed as having passed a point of no return where negotiation is no longer possible and conflict resolution only happens through the use of armed force or violence. The audience must be convinced that all possibilities to negotiate a political settlement are exhausted and that any settlement allowing the opponent to retain any formal political power only will lead to continued attacks. This formula, so to speak, can be a very powerful tool when creating a conflict / war narrative to mobilize a population or specific group to either support or personally take up arms against others in a conflict. In the now nearly two years of conflict in Syria, it is possible to recognize the formula in the ongoing battle of perceptions and messaging between the different rebel groups and the Syrian regime and again between these and international audiences - especially in social network media. Based on the overarching narrative of their respective legitimate right to either uphold law and order against foreign-supported criminal groups or the rebels right to defend themselves against an oppressive regime, they both produce and project stories and events that support these stories containing the elements of the continued threat backed up with messaging and images (video and still photos) of the inhumane behaviour of the other party. Much of the imagery used and the accounts of atrocities are constructed to convey the strategic narrative of a legitimate struggle for survival in order to influence international decision-making and mobilize local and international support. That the formula is originally based on internal mobilization of armed resistance in civil wars does not, however, mean that it cannot help explain the rhetoric of external actors and justification of actions and policies as well. When looking at how state actors might justify interventions in conflicts, sometimes 77

6 78 based on humanitarian arguments, some of the elements Knightly put forward still apply. In this case, it is simply put in a context and language of some sort of necessity humanitarian or self-defence and on behalf of a group of people who cannot help themselves or are in danger of being defeated by whatever state structure they are rebelling against. Next comes the building of the argument and justification for a humanitarian intervention in the presence of a threat to a particular, for example, ethnic group, putting forward concrete examples of attacks preferably with images and witness statements and arguing based on legal references that breaches of obligations under International Law on the part of the regime oppressing the ethnic group are occurring. Furthermore, the oppressors are portrayed as violating International Humanitarian Law, and finally there s the argument that negotiations have failed or that negotiations are assessed to be inadequate in order to protect the ethnic group in question. Left open are other viable options than the use of military force to intervene in the conflict, perhaps with reference to arguably emerging normative principles as those put forward in the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) pact. It can be argued that this pattern can be recognized in NATO s rhetoric, or strategic narrative, on the justification for Operation Allied Force against Serbia & Montenegro in 1999 during the Kosovo crisis. Besides putting the Kosovo crisis in the context of the other wars in the former Yugoslavia, drawing upon the unfortunate inability of the international community to decisively intervene in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina earlier in the 1990s, NATO portrayed Serbia & Montenegro as continuing their policies from, especially, Bosnia, and as posing a threat to both the Kosovo Albanians and to international Peace and Security due to the spillover to other countries in the region, through the continuing attacks - or ethnic cleansing - of the Kosovo Albanians. This was proofed via international media coverage of the up to 800,000 Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPREs) flowing into Albania and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FRYOM) and from there into European mainland. Reports of atrocities, most notably the alleged Racak massacre on the 16 th of January 1999, also painted a picture of the inhumane policy of Belgrade. After several rounds of international negotiations, concurrent NATO military activity in the area to put pressure on Belgrade, and an inability to obtain an UN Security Council mandate due to a Russian and Chinese veto, NATO launched air strikes against Serbia on the 24 th of March 1999 after the last attempt to negotiate a peace settlement in the French city of Rambouillet had failed when Serbia walked out on the signing ceremony. NATO s strategic objectives with Operation Allied Force were 1) the halt of all Serbian operations in Kosovo, 2) a verifiable withdrawal of

7 all Serbian forces from Kosovo, 3) an international security presence, 4) return of all DPRE and humanitarian organisations and 5) an international interim administration of Kosovo based on the Rambouillet accord. All in all, this outlined a NATO strategic narrative based on the past events of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the situation at the time in Kosovo, and the desired future state, rhetorically drawing on Knightly s four elements as an integral part of the narrative. Also the United Kingdom s position in the UN, stated by its permanent representative on the 24 th of March 1999, aligns closely with the strategic narrative outlined above. Although not directly referring to the UN Charter or other sources of international law, the statement still draws on associations to legal justification. The action being taken is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. Under present circumstances in Kosovo there is convincing evidence that such a catastrophe is imminent. Renewed acts of repression by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) would cause further loss of civilian life and would lead to displacement of the civilian population on a large scale and in hostile conditions. Every means short of force had been tried to avert this situation. In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable. The force now proposed is directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, and is the minimum judged necessary for that purpose. 160 Conversely, rebel groups or others can also use the same methodology through international communication in news media and on social network media to entrap the international community into acting by playing on elements that they know the international community cannot ignore. Basically, they can create a strategic narrative to support an entrapment strategy. The fact that there are many actors in a conflict trying to influence some of the same audiences perceptions and behaviours leads to the presence of multiple narratives that inherently will be competing and contradictory. The Battle of Narratives States or coalitions, their military forces, and other actors do not, however, have a monopoly on creating and projecting narratives. Through the telling of interlinked stories that together form the strategic narrative, their opponents, local and domestic audiences, the media and, for that matter, their own soldiers all create and project narratives, saturating the information environment with competing and often conflicting narratives - a competition that has been labelled the Battle of Narratives. In recent years, the Battle of Narratives has been used as a term Quoted in James Crawford, Brownlie s Principles of Public International Law (8 th ed.), Page 753.

8 80 referring to this extended competition. The battle is marked by the efforts of competing nations, coalitions, entities or ideologies to frame the context of a conflict in a manner that influences key audiences to foster support for their actions and political objectives at all levels. 161 The underlying assumption is that complex warfare, or the concept New War, is fought not only in the physical dimension of the battlefield but also in the cognitive, moral and, for that matter, legal dimension. 162 The dimensions are interlinked and mutually supportive when it comes to the creation of perceptions. It can be summed up in a punch line: What the population (audience) thinks, says and how it acts (behaviour) is more important than how many tanks and airplanes they have. 163 Shaping the virtual battlefield and subsequently affecting the physical battlefield and thereby diverse audiences and actors decision-making processes is therefore of the outmost importance in modern conflicts. This was seen not only in Kosovo during Operation Allied Force, but can also be found in the on-going information war between NATO and the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the case of Kosovo, Serbia was also very active in information warfare by trying to establish a competing narrative. Serbia constructed and projected a strategic narrative portraying NATO military activities as being in line with the Nazi-German bombing of Belgrade during World War II, aimed at civilian targets with subsequent collateral damage. This was done by controlling the flow of information out of Serbia and Kosovo, only allowing pictures and media reports substantiating this narrative to get out. Of course, this was in 1999 in an age when social network media had not yet become as pervasive as they are today. Realizing that he could not prevent NATO from bombing militarily, Slobodan Milosevic waged a media war instead - something handled poorly by NATO. 164 In the case of Afghanistan, where the population is broadly accepted as being the prize, there is also an ongoing battle of narratives between the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Taliban, directed at both internal and external audiences. Both try to influence international public opinion about the conflict in order to gain support for their objectives, and both try to influence the local population in Afghanistan into believing that it is either the internationally supported Afghan government or the Taliban that will be in power when major ISAF forces leave in The perception of who will be in power after 2014, to a high degree, informs local behaviour. 165 As the situation develops and 161 David Sadowski, The Battle of Narratives A Proposal. IOShere, December Page In respect to the legal dimension, this is also known as Lawfare. See Charles Dunlap; Lawfare Today (2008). 163 David Sadowski, The Battle of Narratives A Proposal. IOShere, December Page Andrew MacKay and Steve Tatham (2011): Behavioral Conflict Why understanding people and their behavior will prove decisive in future conflicts. Military Studies Press, UK. Page 29.

9 changes in a conflict, so do the narratives. Both the actors own narratives about their actions and intentions, and diverse groups narratives about the other actors in a conflict can change. A state actor might adjust its narrative during a military intervention as the situation on the ground changes or if the initial strategic objectives of the intervention become unattainable and lead to the need for adjustments. This is, amongst other examples, the case for the UK Strategic Narrative for Afghanistan, which changed from 2005 to 2011 as the situation on ground developed and the political ambitions were adjusted: : A stable and secure Afghanistan returned to its rightful place in the community of nations and enjoying mature relations with its neighbours: with a self-sustaining economy, strong institutions and a broad-based, multi-ethnic regime committed to eradicating terrorism and eliminating opium production; reducing poverty; respecting human rights, especially those of women and minority groups; and honouring Afghanistan s other international obligations. 2011: British Forces are in Afghanistan to prevent Afghan territory from again being used by Al Qaeda as a base from which to plan attacks on the UK and its allies. The presence of NATO forces is preventing AQ or the Taliban regime from returning while Afghanistan s security forces are trained to take over the tasks for themselves. We do not seek a perfect Afghanistan, but a stable Afghanistan, able to maintain its own security and prevent AQ from returning. The change in the UK s strategic narrative moves from a very normative one driven by domestic politics to a more practically-orientated one focusing on the exit from Afghanistan, perhaps in the realization of not being able to achieve the first one. Nevertheless, changing narratives can have an impact on the further development of a conflict and different actors policies towards it, and thereby alter the outcome. In other words, Perceptions become Reality and can either encourage or discourage audiences from taking up a particular behaviour or opinion. They can give hope and strengthen the will to continue fighting, or perhaps the opposite. The changing narratives also have relevance for the story told after conflicts, when actors, of course, want to position themselves in history. The victor writes the narrative or does he/she? Even though a narrative ideally should be the same through a conflict, it often changes, as the UK example above shows. What initiated a conflict and its root causes and Thomas Elkjer Nissen (2007): Taliban Information Warfare. Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen. 166 Briefing by UK Ministry of Defence at the Royal Danish Defence College Seminar on Strategic Communication 20. June 2012.

10 82 what was necessary to communicate in order to mobilize might not necessarily be what sustains, prolongs or resolves a conflict. Interests and strategic objectives change underway for various reasons and so do the narratives. This also applies when talking about conflict resolution, and not least how the conflict is described in historical terms. There is often talk of the truism that the victor writes the history. And that might be true, but it is not necessarily the one winning the physical victory who ends up being able to portray himself as having won not least when talking about the moral or political victory. In the summer of 2006, Israel launched an attack on Lebanon in order to take back two Israeli Defence Force (IDF) soldiers who were captured by Hezbollah and held hostage. The IDF quickly occupied parts of South Lebanon from the Israeli border up to the Litani River. The Hezbollah fighters were driven from their positions and pushed north of the river. When IDF withdrew from Lebanon, however, it was without the two soldiers who had been the original cause for attacking Hezbollah in Lebanon in the first place, and Hezbollah quickly regained control of the southern part of Lebanon. Even though IDF was able to conquer the southern part of Lebanon fairly easily, they did not achieve any of their strategic goals with the military intervention. Hezbollah could thereby argue that they had won over the mighty Israeli military, giving Hezbollah the opportunity to write the post-conflict narrative in their favour, and thereby gain even more popular support in Lebanon. This illustrates an example of how the strategic narrative, post-conflict, plays a role for both states and coalitions and for diverse former warring factions. As noted above, the strategic narrative can very well change over time, especially in prolonged conflicts, along with changes in strategy. But even after conflicts, there might be a need or desire to focus the strategic narrative about the war or conflict on specific elements, both for reasons of legitimacy and positioning. As noted by Kalyvas, collective and individual preferences, strategies, values, and identities are continuously shaped and reshaped in the course of a war leading to a tendency for strategic narratives to be continuously shaped and reshaped in order to simplify the complexity of the war. Not least afterwards. The narrative of postwar is therefore likely to be contaminated by the war s outcome and by how the victor wants to be viewed, as well as judged, afterwards. The conduct of the war will therefore be distorted and its ambiguity and contradictions will be erased, all in order to paint a positive picture. Often, the hegemony of such narratives is so powerful that even researchers who collect detailed accounts tend to disregard or downplay their findings because they do not fit into existing and broadly recognized frames Stathis N. Kalyvas: Civil Wars, chapter 18, in Boix and Stokes: The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. Page

11 Conclusion The creation and projection of strategic narratives in news media as well as through social network media in order to gain support for a cause or policy and to mobilize particular behaviours supportive of ones objectives is increasingly important in contemporary conflicts and wars. This is not only because actors in these conflicts - non-state, state or organisations - have an increasing need for legitimisation of their choices and actions, but also because the information environment and new media technology, especially as it pertains to social network media, are becoming ever more pervasive in both politics and military affairs. Strategic narratives can be difficult to create, but when they are done so successfully, they can have a great impact. However, they often change as situations develop. Ideally, an actor should stick to a strategic narrative throughout a conflict, but what motivates a particular behaviour when mobilizing support in the beginning of a conflict is not necessarily what needs be communicated to resolve a conflict or to position oneself post-conflict. This tendency to increasingly focus on the informational parts of warfare has been ever more clear within the last 15 to 20 years as the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, particularly Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria have shown. But also in other conflicts, such as in Iraq, Somalia and elsewhere, this tendency can be clearly identified. As a result, the emphasis on creation and projection of strategic narratives has increased exponentially within the last two to three years, both in NATO countries and in NATO itself in relation to Strategic Communication and planning of operations. In addition to NATO, warring factions and NATO opponents in diverse conflicts have also seen the value of fighting as much, if not more, in the information domain as on the physical battlefield. 83

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