1 Labour Market Responses to the Abolition of Compulsory Superannuation by Louise Carter 1 Economics Program School of Economics and Commerce University of Western Australia Abstract: This paper aims to compare the labour market effects of two alternative retirement income polices: the superannuation guarantee; and the higher income taxes that would be required to fund the greater pension expenditure that would be incurred if the superannuation guarantee was removed. The labour market effects of the superannuation guarantee have already been modelled by Freebairn (1998) by undertaking comparative static analysis of a partial equilibrium model. A similar approach is used to examine the labour market effects of higher taxes. The paper sets out both theoretical models, and then considers a numerical example to compare the policy alternatives. It is concluded that the superannuation guarantee is less distortional than an equivalent tax increase as long as workers do not completely discount the future value of future income derived from compulsory superannuation contributions. Keywords: Aging Population, Labour Market, Superannuation, Taxation 1. Introduction The effects of compulsory superannuation on labour markets have been established by Freebairn (1998). Using a partial equilibrium model, he demonstrated that the long run labour market impact of the Government s compulsory superannuation levy was reductions in wages, effective wages (defined as wages and superannuation benefits) and employment. A limitation of this approach is that removal of the superannuation guarantee would not undo the labour market effects identified by Freebairn, because such an abolition would result in increased pension payments. The increase in taxes required to fund these pension payments would then distort the labour market. From a labour market policy perspective, the central issue is whether the adverse effects resulting from the superannuation guarantee are greater or less than the effects of increased taxes that would result from the abolition of the superannuation guarantee. This study compares Freebairn s findings on the labour market effects of the superannuation guarantee with the labour market effects of increased taxation 1 address: This paper was prepared with the support of a UWA School of Economics and Commerce Honours grant, and has been submitted to the Australian Journal of Labour Economics. I would like to acknowledge the assistance and advice of Dr Michael McLure. I would also like to acknowledge the comments of participants at the 2004 UNSW National Honours Colloquium. 1
2 resulting from the removal of the guarantee. Section 2 outlines the Freebairn model. Section 3 outlines a model of the labour market consequences of increasing income taxes on the current working generation to fund increased pension payments. Section 4 contains a numeric illustration that facilitates ready comparison of the labour market effects of the superannuation guarantee and taxation in the absence of the guarantee. It is concluded, in section 5, that the superannuation guarantee is less distortional than tax increases, as long as workers do not completely discount the future value of superannuation income derived from current compulsory contributions. 2. The Freebairn Model: Labour Market Effects of Compulsory Superannuation When the Superannuation Guarantee was first introduced in Australia, it was the intention of Parliament that it would not affect employment: There will be no increase in unemployment as a result of this legislation (ACCI, 2003, p.14-5, citing Senator Sherry, on the Superannuation Guarantee Act 1992). However, superannuation does have a distortional impact, as it is a labour on-cost for employers, whilst for employees it is a form of future income (Freebairn, 2004, p.191). Freebairn (1998) models the resulting distortions as a net tax on the labour market. He considers a demand and supply model of the labour market, using a comparative static approach to determine the effects of the superannuation guarantee. He considers both a flexible and rigid wage model, and examines three situations, where the employer, the employee or the Government pays the contribution. The situation in which the employer pays is most appropriate to Australia. This paper only considers the long run, flexible case, as this is the most relevant from a policy perspective. The formal specification is shown in Appendix A. When the employer is responsible for the contributions, superannuation is a direct addition to labour costs, and thus the demand curve shifts down by the amount of the levy (Freebairn, 1998, p.61). As the superannuation payment is an additional benefit to workers, the labour supply curve also shifts down, by the present value of superannuation contributions (labelled R(S) 2 ) (Freebairn, 1998, p.61). This is shown in Figure 1. Due to compulsion, liquidity constraints, and interactions with eligibility for the age pension, the employees valuation of the contribution may be less than the levy itself (Freebairn, 2004, p.194). In this situation the labour supply curve will fall by less than the demand curve (Freebairn, 2004, p.194) In the flexible wage situation shown in Figure 1, the introduction of the superannuation guarantee results in both a drop in wages, from W to W 1, and a fall in employment, from E to E 1. Employer labour costs increase from W to C, which is less than the full cost of the levy. Effective employee income (the market wage plus the present value of the superannuation levy) falls from W to Y (Freebairn, 1998, p.67). 2 See Appendix A for full specifications. 2
3 Figure 1: Employer Pays Compulsory Levy: Flexible Wage Wages S S 1 =S-R(S) C W Y W 1 D D 1 =D-L E 1 E Employment Freebairn, J., 1998, Compulsory Superannuation and Labour Market Responses, Australian Economic Papers, Vol.37, No.1, p Labour Market Effects of Increased Taxation Following the Abolition of Compulsory Superannuation Freebairn s analysis is confined to the current labour market effects of the superannuation guarantee. The intergenerational transfer of resources from the working generation to the retired generation through the fiscal system is implicitly assumed to be constant. However, one policy relevant feature of an ageing population is that the intergenerational fiscal transfer increases with time. The superannuation guarantee is, to some extent, the policy instrument designed to reduce such (ongoing and increasing) transfers. Consequently, the insight of Freebairn s model can be usefully complemented by a comparative static analysis of an alternative policy regime where there is no superannuation guarantee, but higher taxes to fund the higher cost of pensions because of the aging population. In carrying out this exercise, two issues need to be considered. First, as ageing is a once only phenomenon (McDonald & Kippen, 1999, p.54), to calculate the appropriate tax increase we need to consider when the population and the economy will reach their new equilibria. This is clearly dependent on the mortality assumptions used. Under the ABS assumption that life expectations at birth will increase by 10 years over the next century, the majority of adjustments to the population structure should be completed by around 2040 (McDonald & Kippen, 1999, p.54). This coincides with 2041/41 end point of the forecasting period of The Intergenerational 3
4 Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002), and hence is best for the purposes of this analysis. Second, we should consider only the social expenditures that will be avoided by the creation of the superannuation guarantee that is, expenditure on pensions. It is appropriate to put aside the changes in expenditure on health and aged care, as well as those on all social security payments except the age pension, as they will occur regardless of whether the superannuation guarantee is in place or not. It should also be recognised that the superannuation guarantee would not remove all increases in age pension expenditure. Expenditure on the age pension is still predicted to increase from 2.9% of GDP in to 4.6% of GDP by (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p.44). Superannuation was first introduced in 1986 as award superannuation. In ,334,300 people, or 67.2% of people of pension age, received the age pension (Winter, 2000). In the same year expenditure on the pension was 2.7% of GDP (Whiteford & Bond, 1999, p.188). In order to estimate age pension expenditure in in a situation without the superannuation guarantee, it is assumed that both the pension rate (an individual pension as a share of GDP) and the share of the aged population receiving the pension would remain constant, at their 1985 levels. It is estimated that there will be 6.2 million people over 65 in Australia by (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p.22). Under the above assumptions, without the superannuation guarantee roughly 4,166,400 people would receive the pension. Age pension expenditure in would therefore be expected to reach 8.43% of GDP, 3.83% of GDP above that predicted by The Intergenerational Report. It is this amount that needs to be considered in a comparison with the superannuation guarantee. In order to cover this increase in pension expenditure, Commonwealth revenue would need to rise by 3.83% of GDP. In , revenue from income taxation was 11.23% of GDP (ABS, 2004). Assuming the entire fiscal adjustment was to come from an increase in income taxes, tax revenue would need to rise to 15.06% of GDP by , an increase of 34.10%. This would bring the average tax rate of 23.43% in up to 31.42% 3. To illustrate the effects of this increase on taxes on the labour market, a demand and supply model similar to that in Freebairn (1998) can be used, which has been formally specified in Appendix B1. The outcome can be seen in Figure 2. Because it had been assumed that the entire tax increase would come from personal income tax, the labour demand curve is unaffected. However, the labour supply curve shifts up by the amount of the additional tax. As a result, wages increase to W1 and employment falls to E1. Effective employee income falls to Y. 3 In , net income tax collected was 23.43% of total taxable income (ATO, 2004, p.15). 4
5 Figure 2: Increase in Income Taxes Wages S 1 =S+T S W 1 W Y D E 1 E Employment 4. Numeric Illustration of Labour Market Effects for the two options The previous sections lay the theoretical framework to analyse the effects of both the superannuation guarantee, and an equivalent tax increase, on the labour market. The purpose of this section of the paper is to carry out a quantitative analysis to allow a comparison of these policy alternatives. In his paper, Freebairn (1998) constructs a numerical example of the labour market effects of the superannuation guarantee using the demand and supply model discussed in Section 2. The formulae used by Freebairn for this example are available in appendix B.2. He assumes labour demand has an elasticity of -0.7, and labour supply has an elasticity of 0.2 (Freebairn, 1998, p.64). The more elastic either curve, the greater the fall in employment resulting from the superannuation guarantee (Freebairn, 1998, p.64). He considers four situations, in which the present value of the superannuation contributions to the employee are 0%, 33%, 67% or 100% of the levy. A valuation of 100% means compulsory superannuation is a perfect substitute for wages, whilst a valuation of 0% implies superannuation has no present value (Freebairn, 1998, p.64). The results for each valuation are shown in Table In Freebairn s paper, the employee effective income figure for a present value of 33% was incorrectly inserted in the original table as
6 Table 1: Labour Market Effects of 9% Employer Contributions Present value of superannuation as a percentage of levy Percentage change of: Employee effective income Employer Market wage labour cost Employment Freebairn, J., 1998, Compulsory Superannuation and Labour Market Responses, Australian Economic Papers, Vol.37, No.1, p.65. The effects of the superannuation guarantee on the labour market depend largely on how employees value the superannuation payment (Freebairn 1998 & 2004). In the situation where compulsory superannuation is a perfect substitute for wages, the labour supply curve shifts down by the same amount as the demand curve. As a result wages fall by 9%, but employment, effective employee income and employer labour costs are not affected (Freebairn, 2004, p.193). Alternatively, when, as expected, employees value superannuation at less than 100% of the levy, the distortions to the labour market are more obvious. As demand is more elastic than supply, the cost of these distortions is bourn mainly by the employee (Freebairn, 2004, p.194). Similarly, the demand and supply model set out in section 3 has been used to estimate the labour market impact of an increase in taxes. An increase in taxes by the amount estimated in section 3 will lead to wages increasing by approximately 1.78% and employment dropping by 1.24%. Effective employee income 5 falls by roughly 6.20%. The formulae used to calculate these changes are available in Appendix B.1. The effects of the superannuation guarantee and the equivalent increase in taxes are compared in Table 2. Whilst the superannuation guarantee and the tax change have opposing effects on the market wage, their effect on both employment and effective employee income is in the same direction 6. The distortional effect on employment from the tax change is between that from the superannuation guarantee when its present value is between 0% and 33%. 5 The change in wages of 1.78% is inclusive of the additional taxes. The effective income figure of 6.20% shows the percentage change in wages net of the new tax. 6 The superannuation guarantee will reduce the market wage because it increases labour supply. It will also reduce effective employee income (when the present value of the levy is less than 100%) because the benefit of the levy is less than the reduction in market wages. However, when taxes are increased, labour supply falls and therefore the market wage rises. In this situation, effective employee will income fall, because the increase in the market wage is less than the cost of the additional taxes. 6
7 Percentage Change Table 2: Labour Market Distortions from Superannuation vs a Tax Change Superannuation Levy of 9% Percentage Present Value of the Levy No Superannuation in: Employment Market Wage Effective Income Freebairn (1998, p.60) argues that for those on high incomes with large voluntary private savings, compulsory superannuation is non-binding, as they are able to substitute some of their private savings for the compulsory superannuation payments. For these people the present value of the superannuation levy is close to 100% (Freebairn, 1998, p.64). On the other hand, for those with low incomes or broken careers, the present value of the levy is likely to be closer to 0% (Freebairn, 1998, p.64). These people are likely to find the lack of liquidity of superannuation constraining, and may lose part of the means-tested age pension due to their superannuation savings (Freebairn, 1998, p.60). Guest and McDonald (2002, p.30) assume that the average present value of superannuation is 50% of the levy. Whilst this is not an empirical estimate, they argue that it seems to be a ball-park figure (Guest & McDonald, 2002, p.30). The are two obvious policy options for dealing with increased pressure from growing intergenerational fiscal transfers resulting from the aging of the population: maintain the current superannuation guarantee; or abolish the superannuation guarantee and increase taxes to fund future pension increases. If the present value of compulsory superannuation payments to the employee is as low as 33% of the levy, it appears that the superannuation guarantee has a less distortional effect on employment than increasing taxes. Therefore, from a labour market perspective, the decision to introduce the superannuation guarantee appears to have been appropriate. However, this comparison only applies in the new equilibrium that applies from It does not consider the transitional period before this equilibrium is reached. The increase in taxes would occur gradually over this period, and as such, at the start of the transition, the distortional effect of the tax change would be less than that from the superannuation guarantee. However, as the taxes continued to rise over the period, their distortional impact would become more significant. A discounted analysis is not considered in this paper because, among other things, information on the elasticities of labour supply and demand for different wages and labour quantities is not available. 5. Conclusion, Policy Considerations & Further Research Freebairn (1998) demonstrates the distortional impact of the superannuation guarantee on the labour market. However, as shown in this study, these labour market distortions need to be compared to the longer-term distortions in the absence of the superannuation guarantee. That is, the labour market effects of the superannuation guarantee should be compared to those from an equivalent change in taxes that would be required to cover the extra expenditure on the age pension, had the 7
8 superannuation guarantee not been introduced. Although the result does depend on what valuation employees place on their superannuation payments, it is clear that superannuation will generally have a less distortional effect on employment than the alternative of an equivalent tax increase. Therefore from a labour market perspective, it is provisionally concluded that the decision to introduce the superannuation guarantee should be maintained as government policy. However, in fully evaluating the suitability of a policy, other issues must also be considered. When evaluating the retirement income system, one of those issues is the impact of the system on the savings rates. There is still some debate in the literature regarding the impact of the superannuation guarantee on household savings. The vertical and horizontal equity of the system must also be taken into account. Appendix A: Full Specification of Freebairn s Partial Equilibrium Model In considering the compulsory superannuation guarantee as a tax, Freebairn (1998) defines the after-tax values of wages used for current consumption, the aftertax value of wages used for saving and the after-tax value of superannuation. His full specifications are as follows 7 : i) the after tax value of wages used for current consumption: R(W,C) = W(1 - t y ) ii) the after tax value of wages used for saving and then spent for pre-retirement purposes: R(W,S) = W(1 - t y )(1+r(1-t i )) m /(1 + d) m iii) the after tax present value of voluntary and compulsory superannuation: R(S) = W(1 t e )(1 + r(1-0.15)) n (1 t x )(1 t r )/(1 + d) n where: W = wages allocated to either consumption, saving or superannuation t y = income tax rate r = pre-tax return on savings t i = effective tax rate on savings d = time preference rate m = number of saving periods t e = tax rate on funds entering superannuation t x = tax rate on fund withdrawals t r = effective tax rate associated with withdrawal of aged pension benefits n = number of periods to retirement 0.15 = the flat 15% tax rate on fund earnings 7 These specifications are from Freebairn (1998), pp
9 Appendix B: Formulae and Calculations B.1 Labour Market Effects of a Tax Change to Fund Increased Pensions The formulae used to calculate the labour market effects of the tax change that may be necessary had the superannuation guarantee not been introduced are similar to those used above. The required increase in taxes necessary to cover the reduction in pension expenditure from the superannuation guarantee is 34.10%, as calculated in section The elasticity values used were 0.2 for labour supply and 0.7 for labour demand, as in Freebairn (1998). Before the tax change: Employer labour demand: Employee labour supply: Where: After the tax change: Employer labour demand: Employee labour supply: Q = a bw Q = c + d(w-t) T = the original tax paid t = the original tax rate (23.43%) Q = a bw Q = c + d(w T) Using these formulas, the change in wages due to the tax change is: and the change in employment is: (W W) = 0.341dt/(b + d) (Q Q) = bdt/(b + d) B.2 Labour Market Effects of the Superannuation Guarantee The effects of the 9% employer superannuation contribution on employment and wages were calculated by Freebairn using the following formulae. 8 Employer labour demand: Employee labour supply: Q = a bc Q = c + dr Where: C = cost of labour to the employer R = effective return to the employee b = absolute value of elasticity of labour demand d = elasticity of labour supply. W = wages L = the superannuation levy g = the value employees put on future income provided by superannuation (0, 0.33 etc) 8 The formulae in section B.1 were provided by Professor Freebairn in personal correspondence. 9
10 Without superannuation: C = W R = W Therefore: W = (a - c)/(b + d) When superannuation is introduced: C = W + L R = W + gl Therefore: W = (a - c)/(b + d) ((b + dg)l)/(b + d) The change in wages is due to the introduction of the superannuation guarantee is: (W W) = -((b + dg)l)/(b + d) The change in employment can be calculated using the same formulae: (Q Q) = -bdl(1 g)/(b + d) References Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2004), Taxation Revenue, Australia (5506.0), [Online]. Available from: <http://www.abs.gov.au>; accessed 31 July Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) (2003), ACCI Safety Net Submission, , [Online]. Available from: <http://www.acci.asn.au/submissionsmain.htm>; accessed 13 July Australian Taxation Office (ATO) (2004), Chapter 3: Personal Tax, Taxation Statistics : A summary of taxation, superannuation and industry benchmark statistics and , 15-80, [Online]. Available from: <http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/2002per1.pdf>; accessed 31 July Commonwealth of Australia (2002), The Intergenerational Report , Budget Paper No. 5, Canberra, [Online]. Available from: <http://www.budget.gov.au/ /bp_index.html>; accessed 11 October Freebairn, J. (1998), Compulsory Superannuation and Labour Market Responses, Australian Economic Papers, 37, Freebairn, J. (2004), Some Long Run Labour Market Effects of the Superannuation Guarantee, Australian Economic Review, 37, Guest, R. & McDonald, I. (2002), Superannuation, Population Ageing and Living Standards in Australia, Economic Analysis & Policy, 32, McDonald, P. & Kippen, R. (1999), Ageing: The Social and Demographic Dimensions, Policy Implications of the Ageing of Australia s Population, Productivity Commission Conference Proceedings, AusInfo, Canberra,
11 Whiteford, P., & Bond, K. (1999), Income support, retirement incomes and the living standards of older people in Australia: trends and comparisons, Policy Implications of the Ageing of Australia s Population, Productivity Commission Conference Proceedings, AusInfo, Canberra, Winter, G. (2000), Social Security Recipients , Department of Parliamentary Library Research Note No.15, , [Online]. Available from: <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/rn00-01.htm>; accessed 11 October
2 Voluntary retirement module specification As part of its research on Superannuation Policy for Post-Retirement the Commission has developed a model referred to as the Productivity Commission Retirement
FISCAL INCENTIVES AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS Project Outline 2014-2015 The OECD argues in favour of complementary private pension savings to boost overall saving for retirement. Financial incentives may be
OECD PROJECT ON FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS Project Outline 2014-2016 The OECD argues in favour of complementary private pension savings to boost overall saving for retirement. Financial
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD COUNTRIES Online Country Profiles, including personal income tax and social security contributions AUSTRALIA Australia: pension system in 2008
The government s economic objective of equity in the distribution personal income basically means that it is striving for a fair, but not necessarily equal, share of income to be distributed to all members
ASFA Research and Resource Centre Superannuation and high account balances April 2015 Ross Clare Direcr of Research The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia Limited (ASFA) Level 6, 66 Clarence
Retirement incomes Submission to the Tax White Paper Task Force July 2015 Executive summary 2015 1 Background The Australian retirement income system comprises three pillars: a publicly funded means tested
SUPERANNUATION FACT SHEET 1 A superannuation system that is sustainable, flexible and has integrity In the 216-17 Budget, the Government announced a package of reforms designed to improve the sustainability,
Effective marginal tax rates on savings 1 This working document outlines some preliminary research undertaken as part of the Tax and Transfer Incidence in Australia project completed in October 2015. This
The Elasticity of Taxable Income: A Non-Technical Summary John Creedy The University of Melbourne Abstract This paper provides a non-technical summary of the concept of the elasticity of taxable income,
Notes - Gruber, Public Finance Chapter 20.3 A calculation that finds the optimal income tax in a simple model: Gruber and Saez (2002). Description of the model. This is a special case of a Mirrlees model.
LC Paper No. CB(1)259/01-02(06) Comparison of Provisions and Schemes of Employees Protection in Hong Kong and other Jurisdictions Severance payment/ 1 Hong Kong Severance payment (for dismissal by reason
A super waste of money Redesigning super tax concessions April 2015 ISSN 1836-9014 Matt Grudnoff Policy Brief About TAI The Australia Institute is an independent public policy think tank based in Canberra.
FSC Deloitte Future Leaders Award 2013 Australia s ageing population What existing policy settings could be changed, or new polices implemented, to better insulate Australia from the future economic impacts
National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS): Funding the Unfunded Commitment prepared for the Insurance Council of Australia April 2012 NDIS is currently a $6.5 billion per annum unfunded commitment this
Justification for Superannuation Wellard Superannuation Better Tax Submission It is well documented that Australia has an aging population and consequently less workers will be available to support the
SECURING RETIREMENT INCOMES TAX & SUPERANNUATION: BENCHMARKING AUSTRALIA AGAINST THE WORLD S BEST RETIREMENT SAVINGS SYSTEMS FEBRUARY 2013 CONTENTS 1 Executive Summary 2 Introduction 3 The variety of retirement
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 29: RETIREMENT INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD COUNTRIES Online Country Profiles, including personal income tax and social security contributions UNITED STATES United States: pension system
RBA ECONOMICS COMPETITION 2007 The consequences of an ageing population for Australia's future productivity and economic growth, and the associated economic policy challenges Best Essay from a First Year
For Official Use STD/NA(99)20 Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques OLIS : 19-Aug-1999 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Dist. : 20-Aug-1999 Or. Eng. STATISTICS
Private Health Insurance (PHI) Proposed means testing not consistent with Community Rating 12 July 2011 On 7 July 2011, the Commonwealth government introduced legislation into Parliament to establish a
Submission to the Commonwealth Parliament, Standing Committee on Tax and Revenue Inquiry into the Tax Expenditures Statement (TES) Dr Julie P Smith, A/Professor Julie P Smith ARC Future Fellow, Regulatory
Keywords: longevity risk, ageing, retirement, annuity, regulation. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LIFE ANNUITY MARKET IN AUSTRALIA: AN ANALYSIS OF SUPPLIER RISKS AND THEIR MITIGATION The significant accumulation
Super contributions - too much super can mean extra tax Introduction There are caps on the amount you can contribute to your superannuation each financial year that are taxed at lower rates. If you contribute
Economic Analysis of the Impacts of Using GST to Reform Taxes This report was prepared for Disclaimers Inherent Limitations This report has been prepared as outlined in the engagement letter of July 2011
ATTACHMENT 10 STATEMENT OF REFORM PRIORITIES, CHALLENGER SUBMISSION TO TAX FORUM, OCTOBER 2011 Ik A tax plan for our future Stronger. Fairer.Simpler TAX FORD 4-5 October 2011 -qq STATEMENT OF REFORM PRIORITIES
Member Booklet: RBF Tasmanian Accumulation Scheme Information in this booklet is current as at 1 July 2015 Table of contents About the RBF Tasmanian 2 Accumulation Scheme How super works Benefits of investing
21 October 2008 AFTS Secretariat The Treasury Langton Crescent PARKES ACT 2600 Email: AFTS@treasury.gov.au Dear Sir/Madam Purpose Australia s Future Tax System Preliminary Submission from the Institute
Garry Barrett UNSW Yi-Ping Tseng University of Melbourne November 2006 Overview Outline of Presentation 1 Introduction 2 Social Security in Australia 3 Voluntary private retirement saving 4 Mandated private
OECD/EU PROJECT ON TAXATION, FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND Pablo Antolin OECD DAF/FIN Pension Unit RETIREMENT SAVINGS OECD objectives and EC White Paper Developing complementary private/ funded retirement savings
Notes on indifference curve analysis of the choice between leisure and labor, and the deadweight loss of taxation Jon Bakija This example shows how to use a budget constraint and indifference curve diagram
Good Super Reply Paid 3528 Tingalpa DC QLD 4173 Phone: 1300 788 658 firstname.lastname@example.org www.goodsuper.com.au 31 March 2015 Senior Adviser Financial System and Services Division The Treasury Langton Crescent
CLIENT FACT SHEET July 2010 Understanding superannuation and superannuation contributions Superannuation is an investment vehicle designed to assist Australians in saving for their retirement. The Government
Chapter 2 The Temporary Budget Repair Levy 2.1 This chapter discusses the legislation introduced by the package of Temporary Budget Repair Levy (the Levy) bills. 2.2 The committee first gives a brief overview
THE IRA PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN S. 1682: EFFECTS ON LONG-TERM REVENUES AND ON INCENTIVES FOR SAVING Staff Memorandum November 2, 1989 The Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office This mcmorandura
Overview - State Tax Review Discussion Paper FEBRUARY 2015 WWW.YOURSAY.SA.GOV.AU Why Are We Reviewing Our State Tax System? South Australia is already a great place to live and we value that as a community.
Australia Exchange rate: US$1.00 equals 1.32 Australian dollars (A$). Old Age, Disability, and Survivors First laws: 1908 (old-age and disability) and 1942 (widows). Current laws: 1991 (social security),
CGT main residence exemption Why removing the tax concession for homes over $2 million is good for the budget, the economy and fairness Policy Brief Matt Grudnoff January 2016 i ABOUT THE AUSTRALIA INSTITUTE
Submission by to the Labour Market Policy Group, Department of Labour on the Annual Review of the Minimum Wage 18 October 2002 PO Box 1925 Wellington Ph: 04 496 6555 Fax: 04 496 6550 Annual Review of the
Submission to the Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee on the Social Services Legislation Amendment (Fair and Sustainable Pensions) Bill 2015 12 June 2015. 102/55 Holt St, Surry Hills NSW 2010.
e-brief March 1, 2010 PENSION PAPERS I N D E P E N D E N T R E A S O N E D R E L E V A N T The Piggy Bank Index: Matching Canadians Saving s to Their Dreams By David A. Dodge, Alexandre Laurin and Colin
SUBMISSION TO THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN STATE TAX REVIEW 1 April 2015 INTRODUCTION The Insurance Council of Australia (ICA) welcomes the opportunity of providing a submission to the Inquiry into the South Australian
National Disability Insurance Scheme. May 2012 Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia (Inc) Contents Executive summary 3 Background 4 Western Australia current disability services 6 Funding
Policy Brief June 2010 Pension Tension: Understanding Arizona s Public Employee Retirement Plans The Arizona Chamber Foundation (501(c)3) is a non-partisan, objective educational and research foundation.
Income Tax Reform: Base Broadening to Fund Lower Rates John Freebairn University of Melbourne Broadening the income tax base, or taxable sum, by removing special exemptions and deductions has been a characteristic
The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia Limited ABN 29 002 786 290 ASFA Secretariat PO Box 1485, Sydney NSW 2001 p: 02 9264 9300 (1800 812 798 outside Sydney) f: 1300 926 484 w: www.superannuation.asn.au
Microeconomic reform in Australia An introduction Jeff Borland Department of Economics University of Melbourne July, 2001 * I am grateful for very helpful comments from John Freebairn and Ian McDonald.
Chapter 4: Elasticity Objectives After studying this chapter, you will be able to: Define, calculate, and explain the factors that influence the price elasticity of demand Define, calculate, and explain
Housing Reserve Equity Bank of Australia Bulletin February 23 Housing Equity The increase in housing prices in recent years has contributed to rising household wealth and has helped to underpin continued
The Treatment of Insurance in the SNA Peter Hill Statistical Division, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe April 1998 Introduction The treatment of insurance is one of the more complicated parts
Project LINK Meeting New York, - October 1 Country Report: Australia Prepared by Peter Brain: National Institute of Economic and Industry Research, and Duncan Ironmonger: Department of Economics, University
CONCEPT OF MACROECONOMICS Macroeconomics is the branch of economics that studies economic aggregates (grand totals):e.g. the overall level of prices, output and employment in the economy. If you want to
Superannuation and the economy June 2015 The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia Limited (ASFA) Level 6, 66 Clarence Street Sydney
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD COUNTRIES Online Country Profiles, including personal income tax and social security contributions BELGIUM Belgium: pension system in 2008 The
Product Disclosure Statement MYSUPER AUTHORISATION NUMBER 72229227691044 1 July 2014 NESS Super, the industry fund to power your financial future inside 1 About NESS Super 2 2 How super works 2 3 Benefits
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ISA welcomes the opportunity to comment on the Government s Commission of Audit. Australia s superannuation system, which is a key pillar of our retirement income architecture, serves
South Australian Tax Review Response to Discussion Paper APRIL 2015 Page 1 RESTAURANT & CATERING AUSTRALIA Restaurant & Catering Australia (R&CA) is the national industry association representing the interests
M e d i a R e l e a s e Under embargo until 12.15 am, Friday 22 November 2013 This release and its content are not to be provided to anyone outside your agency. Third parties should not be approached for
Re:think Response to the tax discussion paper MAY 2015 Page 1 RESTAURANT & CATERING AUSTRALIA Restaurant & Catering Australia (R&CA) is the national industry association representing the interests of 35,000
METLIFE Group Life (INCLUDING FLEXIBLE BENEFITS) Technical Guide 1 MetLife Group Life Policies Technical Guide MetLife has a range of policies aimed to meet your life cover needs in respect of your employees
Maximise your superannuation & tax benefits Strategies for 30 June 2010 Like my old mate Kerry Packer used to say, "Pay your tax, but don't tip them. they're not doing that good a job. Paul Hogan 60 Minutes
Review of PIRSA s Cost Recovery Policy and practices, including their application to the Fisheries and Aquaculture Industries Primary Industries and Regions SA 29 July 2015 Contents Executive Summary...
Submission to the National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission (nhhrc). A New Health Savings Based System for Australia. A new health savings based system is proposed based on the best aspects of the
Business priorities for the 2015-16 Federal Budget May 2015 Federal Budget priorities for Australian business A survey of Australian Industry Group members reveal the top three priorities for Australian
AustChoice Super general reference guide (ACH.02) Issued: 28 May 2015 This guide contains important information not included in the AustChoice Super PDS. We recommend you read this entire guide. The information
ACOSS Submission February 2009 Submission to the Taxation Review Panel Adequate, fair, sustainable, and simple: ACOSS, February 2009 Table of Contents Summary... 1 Directions for reform... 2 1. Adequate...
Technical Employment Status Guidance Tax, National Insurance and Superannuation implications for GPs involved in Clinical Commissioning Group roles It is important to establish the correct employment status
MONASH BUSINESS POLICY FORUM What is the objective of the Australian Superannuation System? April 7, 2016 Rodney Maddock, Monash University and Victoria University This paper considers the relevant objective(s)
11 August 2014 Review of Australia s Welfare System CANBERRA ACT 2600 Dear Sir/Madam Welfare Review Submission The Financial Services Council (FSC) represents Australia's retail and wholesale funds management
Career transition guide We empower you. westernpacific.com.au Contents Introduction 3 Coming to terms with redundancy 3 Assessing your financial position 4 Securing employer payments 5 Redundancy and your
We analyze the multiplier effect of fiscal policy changes in government expenditure and taxation. The key result is that an increase in the government budget deficit causes a proportional increase in consumption.
Preparing for Your Retirement: An IRA Review How much of your earning power will be available for your use when you retire? What will happen to your standard of living when your income ceases at retirement?
FEDERAL BUDGET 2009 SUMMARY 13 May 2009 As widely expected, last nightʼs Federal Budget contained a number of proposals that will affect clients. Importantly, the proposals will require passage of legislation
Version 4.0 Preparation Date: 2 November 2009 This document provides some additional information to help you understand the financial planning concepts discussed in the SOA in relation to retirement planning.
1 A Brief Comparison of the WA Rail Access Code approach to calculating ceiling cost with the conventional Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost methodology 18 July 2002 Contents 1. Purpose Of Paper 2.
CHAPTER 5: NET FINANCIAL LIABILITIES Net Financial Liabilities of the General Government Sector are estimated to fall by $6,456 million over the four years to June 2001 and reduce by a further $1,209 million
Ottawa, Canada 17 March 215 www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca The mandate of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) is to provide independent analysis to Parliament on the state of the nation s finances, the government
The Auditor-General Audit Report No.47 2011 12 Performance Audit Department of the Treasury Department of Human Services Australian Taxation Office Australian National Audit Office Commonwealth of Australia
Social Security Social Security Payments and the Taxation System Technical Series Number One Social Security Payments and the Taxation System Technical Series No.1 Josh Polette (revised by Kate Chan) Social
MARCH 2002 Actuarial Standard 4.02 MINIMUM SURRENDER VALUES AND PAID-UP VALUES Life Insurance Actuarial Standards Board TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION PAGE The Standard 2 Application of the Surrender Value
30 September 2014 Senator The Hon. Mathias Cormann Minister for Finance & Acting Assistant Treasurer PO Box 6100 Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600 Dear Senator Cormann Division 293 Tax Recommendations
EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, XXX COM(2012) 322 PROVISIONAL VERSION Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the Netherlands 2012 national reform programme and delivering a Council opinion on the
Practice Problems on the Capital Market 1- Define marginal product of capital (i.e., MPK). How can the MPK be shown graphically? The marginal product of capital (MPK) is the output produced per unit of
EC306 Labour Economics Chapter 3" Labour Supply and Public Policy 1 Objectives Income/payroll Taxes Income Maintenance Schemes Demogrant Social assistance/welfare Programs Negative Income Tax Wage Subsidy