Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar

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1 1155 AARRAALLI IIKK SSAALLI II SSAAYYI II: : Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar Özdemir, Cumhur Sinan. Yargıtay kararları ile açıklamalı güncellenmiş iş kanunu. Ankara: Yaklaşım Yayıncılık, İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 1

2 Resmi Gazete YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ MİLLETLERARASI ANDLAŞMA 2009/15638 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti, İslam Konferansı Örgütü ve İslam Konferansı Diyalog ve İşbirliği Gençlik Forumu Arasında İmzalanan "İslam Konferansı Diyalog ve İşbirliği Gençlik Forumu nun İstanbul da Kurulması Hakkında Anlaşma nın Onaylanmasına Dair Karar BAKANLAR KURULU KARARLARI 2009/15630 Tarım ve Köyişleri Bakanlığının Taşra Teşkilatında Yer Alan Edremit Zeytincilik Üretme İstasyonu Müdürlüğünün Adının Edremit Zeytincilik Üretim, Eğitim ve Gen Merkezi Müdürlüğü Olarak Değiştirilmesi ve Söz Konusu Müdürlüğün Doğrudan Merkeze Bağlı Taşra Teşkilatına Dönüştürülmesi Hakkında Karar 2009/15637 Rize Üniversitesi Rektörlüğüne Bağlı Olarak Güneysu Fizik Tedavi ve Rehabilitasyon Yüksekokulu Kurulması Hakkında Karar BAKANLIĞA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ Ulaştırma Bakanlığına, Sağlık Bakanı Recep AKDAĞ ın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere YÖNETMELİKLER 4046 Sayılı Kanun Kapsamında Danışmanlık Hizmetleri İhalelerinde Uygulanacak Esas ve Usullere İlişkin Yönetmelikte Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hastahanesi (Sağlık Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi) Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik Düzce Üniversitesi Dil, Tarih ve Kültürel Zenginlikleri Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi Yönetmeliği Hitit Üniversitesi Sürekli Eğitim Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi Yönetmeliği TEBLİĞLER Yurt Dışı Tebligat ve İstinabe Taleplerinde Uyulması Gereken Usul ve Esaslara Dair Tebliğ Hava Aromatize Edici Ürünlerin Üretimine, İthalatına, Piyasa Gözetimi ve Denetimine ve Bildirim Esaslarına Dair Tebliğ İşkolu Tespit Kararı (No: 2009/58) Zorunlu Karşılıklar Hakkında Tebliğde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Tebliğ (Sayı: 2009/8) YARGI BÖLÜMÜ İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 2

3 YARGITAY KARARI Yargıtay 18. Hukuk Dairesine Ait Karar Yabancı Süreli Yayınlar Journal of Financial Economics Volume 95, Issue 1, Pages (January 2010) Activist arbitrage: A study of open ending attempts of closed end funds Pages 1 19 Michael Bradley, Alon Brav, Itay Goldstein, Wei Jiang This paper documents frequent attempts by activist arbitrageurs to open end discounted closed end funds, particularly after the 1992 proxy reform which reduced the costs of communication among shareholders. Open ending attempts have a substantial effect on discounts, reducing them, on average, to half of their original level. The size of the discount is a major determinant of whether a fund gets attacked. Other important factors include the costs of communication among shareholders and the governance structure of the targeted fund. Our study contributes to the understanding of the actions undertaken by arbitrageurs in financial markets beyond just pure trading. Article Outline 2. Background 2.1. SEC regulation of the proxy process and the 1992 reform 2.2. Activism in the closed end fund industry 3. Data 4. Empirical results 4.1. Determinants of CEF discounts 4.2. Analysis of open ending attempts Closed end fund discounts around open ending attempts: overview Determinants of open ending attempts: dual relation between attempts and discounts Determinants of open ending attempts: communication and governance Determinants of successes of open ending attempts 5. Concluding remarks Appendix A. Appendix İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 3

4 References First passage probability, jump models, and intra horizon risk Pages Gurdip Bakshi, George Panayotov This paper proposes a risk measure, based on first passage probability, which reflects intra horizon risk in jump models with finite or infinite jump activity. Our empirical investigation shows, first, that the proposed risk measure consistently exceeds the benchmark value at risk (VaR). Second, jump risk tends to amplify intra horizon risk. Third, we find large variation in our risk measure across jump models, indicative of model risk. Fourth, among the jump models we consider, the finite moment log stable model provides the most conservative risk estimates. Fifth, imposing more stringent VaR levels accentuates the impact of intra horizon risk in jump models. Finally, using an alternative benchmark VaR does not dilute the role of intra horizon risk. Overall, we contribute by showing that ignoring intra horizon risk can lead to underestimation of risk exposures. Article Outline 2. Rationale and definition of an intra horizon risk measure 3. General treatment of first passage probability for Lévy jump models 4. Models of asset returns 4.1. Merton's jump diffusion (JD) model 4.2. Exponentially dampened power law model of CGMY 4.3. Finite moment log stable model (FMLS) 5. Maximum likelihood estimation 6. Empirical design and assessment of intra horizon risk in jump models 6.1. Universe of risk exposures 6.2. Accounting for jumps alone can increase benchmark VaR up to 1.68 times 6.3. Accounting for intra horizon risk in jump models can increase benchmark VaR up to 2.6 times 6.4. Jump risk increases the probability of large losses and amplifies intra horizon risk 6.5. Time scaling strongly impacts the calculation of risk measures in jump models 6.6. Jump models yield similar performance yet they produce vastly different VaR I multiples Model fits are similar and do not account for the consistent differences in VaR I multiples Sensitivity analysis shows that risk measures reflect model attributes İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 4

5 6.7. Imposing more stringent VaR levels accentuates the impact of intra horizon risk 6.8. Filtered historical simulation based benchmark VaR does not dilute intra horizon risk 7. Concluding remarks and summary Appendix A. Appendix Appendix B. Appendix B.1. Discretization of the PIDE for the CGMY first passage density B.2. Discretization of the PIDE for the FMLS first passage density References Are family firms more tax aggressive than non family firms? Pages Shuping Chen, Xia Chen, Qiang Cheng, Terry Shevlin Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and shareholders, and it is generally expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness. However, this argument ignores potential non tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency problems. Firms owned/run by founding family members are characterized by a unique agency conflict between dominant and small shareholders. Using multiple measures to capture tax aggressiveness and founding family presence, we find that family firms are less tax aggressive than their non family counterparts, ceteris paribus. This result suggests that family owners are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid the non tax cost of a potential price discount, which can arise from minority shareholders concern with family rent seeking masked by tax avoidance activities [Desai and Dharmapala, Corporate tax avoidance and high powered incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79, ]. Our result is also consistent with family owners being more concerned with the potential penalty and reputation damage from an IRS audit than non family firms. We obtain similar inferences when using a small sample of tax shelter cases. Article Outline 2. Related literature and hypothesis development 2.1. Costs and benefits of being tax aggressive 2.2. Implications of ownership characteristics and agency conflicts for family firms tax aggressiveness 3. Sample and research design 3.1. Sample İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 5

6 3.2. Tax aggressiveness measures 3.3. Research design 4. Primary empirical analyses 5. Corroborating analyses 5.1. The effect of outside monitoring 5.2. The effect of external financing 6. Additional analyses 6.1. The effect of CEO type 6.2. The effect of outside blockholder and CEO equity ownership 6.3. Differences in firm sophistication as an alternative explanation 6.4. Tax sheltering analysis 6.5. Private banks vs. public family banks and public non family banks 6.6. Sensitivity checks One common factor as a measure of tax aggressiveness Use firm level measures to capture tax aggressiveness S&P 500 versus S&P 1000 firms 7. Conclusion Appendix A. Variable measurement A.1. Measurement of tax aggressiveness A.2. Definition of family firm proxies and control variables References Asset liquidity and financial contracts: Evidence from aircraft leases Pages Alessandro Gavazza Financial contracting theories agree that more liquid assets decrease the expected cost of external financing, thus making leasing more attractive and reducing lessors equilibrium return. However, the literature has ambiguous predictions about the effect of liquidity on the maturity of leases. These predictions are further complicated by the existence of two types of lease contracts operating and capital that differ in whether asset ownership transfers to the lessee at the end of the contract. Using data from commercial aircraft, I find that more liquid assets (1) make leasing, operating leasing in particular, more likely; (2) have shorter operating leases; (3) have longer capital leases; and (4) command lower markups of operating lease rates. İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 6

7 Article Outline 2. Institutional characteristics 2.1. Equipment leasing 2.2. Liquidity of commercial aircraft 3. Main hypotheses 4. Empirical analysis 4.1. Data Measuring aircraft liquidity Calculating markups Descriptive statistics 4.2. An illustrative comparison: Mc Donnell Douglas 80 versus Airbus Testing the hypotheses Fraction of leased aircraft Operating lease versus capital lease Maturity of operating and capital leases Operating lease rate markups 4.4. Robustness checks and alternative hypotheses Mismeasurement of liquidity A finer measure of liquidity Exogeneity of liquidity: instrumental variables The role of taxation 5. Related literature 6. Conclusion Appendix A. Leasing commercial aircraft 23 References Informed trading before analyst downgrades: Evidence from short sellers Pages Stephen E. Christophe, Michael G. Ferri, Jim Hsieh This paper studies short selling prior to the release of analyst downgrades in a sample of 670 downgrades of Nasdaq stocks between 2000 and We find abnormal levels of short selling in İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 7

8 the three days before downgrades are publicly announced. Further, we show that this preannouncement abnormal short selling is significantly related to the subsequent share price reaction to the downgrade, and especially so for downgrades that prompt the most substantial price declines. Our findings are robust to various controls that might also affect short selling such as preannouncement momentum, three day pre announcement returns, and announcement day share price. In addition, the results are independent of scheduled earnings announcements, analyst herding, and non routine events near downgrades. Further evidence suggests that tipping is more consistent with the data than the prediction explanation which posits that short sellers successfully predict downgrades on the basis of public information about firms financial health. Finally, we present evidence that downgraded stocks with high abnormal short selling perform poorly over the subsequent six months by comparison with those with low abnormal short selling. Overall, our results support the hypothesis that short sellers are informed traders and exploit profitable opportunities provided by downgrade announcements. Article Outline 2. Sampling procedure and distribution of downgraded firms 2.1. Formation of the sample 2.2. Data on trades and short sales of Nasdaq stocks 2.3. Features of the sample 2.4. Financial characteristics of the downgraded firms 3. Market reaction to downgrades and the behavior of short sellers 3.1. Estimation of normal short selling 3.2. A univariate analysis of abnormal returns and short selling around downgrades 3.3. Analyzing abnormal pre announcement short selling using the matching portfolio approach to estimate normal short selling 3.4. Analyzing abnormal pre announcement short selling using the trading pattern approach to estimate normal short selling 4. Additional robustness tests and extensions 4.1. Are large downgrades associated with more abnormal short selling? 4.2. Are the results driven by confounding events? 4.3. Evaluating the tipping versus the prediction hypotheses 5. Subsequent stock performance of downgraded firms 5.1. Average monthly abnormal returns İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 8

9 5.2. Characteristic benchmark abnormal returns 6. Conclusions References Market liquidity, asset prices, and welfare Pages Jennifer Huang, Jiang Wang This paper represents an equilibrium model for the demand and supply of liquidity and its impact on asset prices and welfare. We show that, when constant market presence is costly, purely idiosyncratic shocks lead to endogenous demand of liquidity and large price deviations from fundamentals. Moreover, market forces fail to lead to efficient supply of liquidity, which calls for potential policy interventions. However, we demonstrate that different policy tools can yield different efficiency consequences. For example, lowering the cost of supplying liquidity on the spot (e.g., through direct injection of liquidity or relaxation of ex post margin constraints) can decrease welfare while forcing more liquidity supply (e.g., through coordination of market participants) can improve welfare. Article Outline 2. The model 2.1. Securities market 2.2. Agents 2.3. Participation costs 2.4. Time line 2.5. Discussions of the model 3. Equilibrium 3.1. Equilibrium with costless participation 3.2. Stock market equilibrium at date Traders optimal participation decisions at date Participation equilibrium for traders at date Participation equilibrium for market makers at date Properties of the equilibrium 4. Price and volume İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 9

10 5. Equilibrium liquidity 5.1. Supply of liquidity 5.2. Two market structures: dealer market and trader market 5.3. Demand of liquidity 6. Externality and welfare of liquidity 7. Policy implications 8. Related literature 9. Conclusion Appendix A. Appendix References İİ SS MM MM MM OO BB i l gg i yy ee EE rr i şş im i MM ee rr kk ee zz i 10