IP investing for mainstream money.

Transcription

1 Beyond Litigation Finance: IP investing for mainstream money. IP Deal Makers Forum November 2014 Auckland San Diego London

2 Market Size, Scale and Scope

3 IP in an investment context Global AUM Hedge Funds Intellectual Property (WIPO) Global Securities

4 Another cut Global AUM Royalty Securitisation Public NPE s Global Licensing Revenues Global R&D Spend

5 IP Litigation Overview Litigation finance can be VERY profitable Often fully collateralized at low LTV Significant expected money multiples Pathfinder success stories from the smartphone wars But the fundamentals are changing ú Supply side: Migration to Privateer model ú Time to money: defendant mindset, regulation ú Regulation: Patent Reform continues

6 Being public is a mixed bag

7 Prospects for growth & diversification? Convergence in technologies: new markets Corporate restructuring/activism: supply side Outside Tech ú Life Sciences Forward Pharma/Biogen ú Automotive Orion/Hyundai, Paice/Toyota, Tesla ú Financial Services UBI Progressive/Telematics New markets 3D printing, ecigarettes, Clean Tech New business loan to own

8 IP as an asset class.

9 Asset Class? Why do we care? Asset allocation drives investment returns Global asset classes ú Equities ú Bonds ú FX Alternatives as a diversifier Correlation Efficient frontier

10 Illustrative trajectory of a new asset class Billions Hedge Funds AUM - Prequin Billions Life Settlements Issued Billions Billions Private Equity AUM - Prequin Catastrophe Bonds Issued

11 Historic IP investment strategies Royalty investing ú Music & Pharma ú Crowded & migrating to structured deals Venture Capital ú Highest returns in secondaries (discount) ú Linkage to IP weak Litigation Finance ú Financing patent disputes primarily

12 Technically how does IP stack up? Qualitatively uncorrelated Relatively illiquid and not fungible Primary value driver is context/situation specific Patents: option-like but not options Copyrights: bond like but not bonds Jursidictional differences in value

13 Let s face it, IP is not an asset class.

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15 So what is it then? IP is a situation and industry specific catalyst or indicator of opportunity. And it's HARD TO VALUE Which is good (if you are smart you can buy it cheap)

16 IP as an investment catalyst.

17 Wall Street Perspective A January 2014 study of 184 analyst reports of IP heavy companies (copyright) showed that 81% fail to identify IP as an investment risk. A 2014 study reveals IP drives outliers on the Alternative Investment Market. Leading Wall Street research house analysis of aggregate impact on EPS of all smartphone litigation is not meaningful.

18 But IP does matter To match [their patent licensing] revenue stream, IBM would have to sell roughly $20 billion worth of additional products each year, or an amount equal to one-fourth its worldwide sales Harvard Business Review. Our intellectual property portfolio determines our value as a company Gerard Kleisterlee, CEO, Philips.

19 Industry impact

20 What is the real investment opportunity?

21 What is the real investment opportunity? IP underpins many investment opportunities which may be executed using traditional investment disciplines. These are scalable. These move the needle.

22 Passive investment is not the answer

23 Special Situations: Distressed investing Nortel bancruptcy resulted in bond values falling below par Senior traded >20% below par Subordinated traded >70% below par IP value was critical to bond value After auction senior bondholders made full value plus accrued coupon. Junior made multiple of pre-auction value.

24 Special situations: shareholder activism In 2012 Starboard (activist hedge fund) lobbies AOL to disgorge patent portfolio Patents sold to MSFT for $1.1bn Immediate increase in market value of AOL by 43% making Starboard a 100% gain IP value was intrinsic and informational (value plus signal of focused management) AOL stock now 3x the 2012 level

25 Telling the story also makes sense Serko s stock price after Investor Release prompted by IP research revealed SKO technology reads across new smartphone technology % bump.

26 IP impact Price pre /post presentation of IP research 38% sell off approx $2 billion movement

27 Migration towards risk sharing in PE Co-investing in R&D IP creation (in-sourcing innovation) Precedent in Film (co-financing) Exploration in Music (publishing) Software Forge Pharmaceutical joint venture (Axon-TPG) Partnering with Corporations

28 Putting on the IP Glasses IP investing for mainstream money

29 Take a new look at your portfolio IP analysis does not yet form a substantive part of investment research Relatively straightforward screen can identify significant value catalysts or risks Information is not quantitatively rigorous but directionally invaluable This is not a generalist skill, industry knowledge is required to interpret output No exotic, illiquid investments, are required to act - just traditional execution This approach scales across the entire portfolio, layering on traditional analysis and providing the opportunity for a multiplayer

30 Long only case study In September/October 2013 Nokia entered into negotiations to sell its handset business to Microsoft. Nokia stock was trading below our view of fair value based on industry analysis overlay with a rigorous analysis of its intellectual property portfolio and licensing income. As a consequence we developed a simple, scalable risk reversal (zero cost collar) to invest.

31 Pricing the trade We sell the 4.40 March 2014 Put and buy the 6.00 March 2014 Call. We assume a premium of EUR 150,000 at zero cost.

32 Scenario Analysis Scenario 1: Worst Case Scenario: Microsoft Deal is Rejected Estimated Probability: 5% In the event that the deal with Microsoft is rejected, we assume in our model that the underlying Nokia stock would fall back to EUR 3 per share which was the level prior to the deal being announce Scenario 2: Bear Case Scenario: Microsoft Deal is delayed / general market sell-off occurs Estimated Probability: 15% In the event that the deal with Microsoft is delayed, we assume in our model that the underlying Nokia stock would fall back to EUR 4 per share. Other factors which could lead to the stock falling back to this level could also include a general market sell-off in the upcoming months. Scenario 3: Base Case Scenario: Microsoft Deal is completed Estimated Probability: 80% In the event that the deal with Microsoft is completed, we assume in our model that the underlying Nokia stock would rise to EUR 6 per share. This level also agrees with our Conservative DCF Equity valuation target price.

33 Probability weighted returns

34 The strategy started to pay off in Oct 2013

35 The result? We closed the trade out in Jan 2014 for a 100% profit

36 Take home messages IP is not an asset class, but a better understanding of the IP of a company, and its industry can provide investment insights that no other avenue offers. Whilst IP litigation finance is a profitable niche strategy it is not scalable for mainstream money. IP overlays do not require any new, illiquid or expensive execution tools, and so they are simple to execute.

37 EverEdgeIP EverEdgeIP is a global strategic management consulting firm focused on IP as a source of competitive advantage. EverEdgeIP works with companies, investors and analysts to identify, quantify and unlock value from IP. In 6 years EveredgeIP has worked with over 800 clients in almost every industry sector to conceive, execute and finance IP strategy in the USA, Europe and Asia. IAM300 Six IAM300 Global Strategists Winner - Outstanding IP Leader - IP Focus Awards, Shanghai, China, 2012 UK Affiliate: Winner UK IP Strategist of the Year 2014, Acquisition Finance