1 Building an Ethical Public Life: Case Studies in Transformational Leadership Anser Ali Grover Jamie Jones Jacqueline Klopp Roshana Nabi Prepared for the World Ethics Forum 2006 The Joint Conference of the: The International Institute for Public Ethics (IIPE), The Global Integrity Alliance, and the World Bank Leadership, Ethics and Integrity in Public Life 9-11 April 2006, Keble College, University of Oxford, UK
2 Building an Ethical Public Life: Case Studies in Transformational Leadership TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary... 3 Introduction/Rationale... 4 Case Study #1: Mayors Antanas Markus and Enrique Penalosa (Bogota, Columbia)... 6 Case Study #2: Mayor Selim Belsagic (Tuzla, Bosnia)... 9 Case Study #3: Mayor Goh Kun (Seoul, Korea) Case Study #4: Activist Zackie Achmat (South Africa) Case Study #5: CEO Titus Naikuni (Kenya Airways) Case Study #6: Mayor Jan Kasl (Prague, Czech Republic) Common Threads: Reasons for Success Re-imaging Public Life: Ethical Visions Practicing what you Preach: Personal Ethics Wandering-Around and Opening Channels for Communication The Road Ahead: Questions for Future Research References Appendix A: Additional Cases for Further Research...Error! Bookmark not defined. Bangladesh Cyclone Preparedness Programme...Error! Bookmark not defined. Jody Williams (International Campaign to Ban Landmines)... Error! Bookmark not defined. Norway Petroleum Fund...Error! Bookmark not defined. Porto Alegre Participatory Budgeting...Error! Bookmark not defined. South Africa s Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi...Error! Bookmark not defined.
3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper seeks to explore the role of ethical leadership in the positive transformation of public life whether this means a reduction of corruption, spearheading urban renewal or fostering cross-cultural harmony in the midst of violence. We examine five different case studies of leaders and their reforms that have been widely acknowledged as leading to change: Mayors Antanas Markus and Enrique Penalosa (Bogota, Columbia), Mayor Selim Belsagic (Tuzla, Bosnia), Mayor Goh Kun (Seoul, Korea), Treatment Action Campaign leader Zackie Achmat (South Africa), and Mayor Jan Kasl (Prague, Czech Republic). After a condensed discussion of each case, we offer a critical analysis of the common threads that help explain how change occurred. We isolate 5 dimensions that appear to contribute to the success of transformational and ethical leadership: 1) Articulation of a strong ethical vision that involves a strong sense of an inclusive public realm and interest 2) a personal ethics of practicing what you preach, that is becoming the personal embodiment of the new ethical vision 3) A wandering management style that emphasizes getting out of the office and into the streets as well as opening lines of communication between leaders and citizens 4) Overcoming resistance and shaping public opinion through creative use of public dissemination of information and use of the media (and in some cases new technology like the internet) and 5) Facilitating and building coalitions of support and advocacy networks through skilled mediation and communication between societal actors as well as a participatory leadership style. Comments and critiques are encouraged, and should be ed to Grover Jamie Jones Jacqueline Klopp Roshana Nabi or Anser Ali
4 INTRODUCTION/RATIONALE Many citizens view politics and public life as an immoral or at best, amoral realm. This perception is reinforced by the fact that many politicians put private interests above the public good and play a central role in corruption, violence, and environmental degradation. Critical scholarship on the public sector has reinforced this view. Indeed, in the 1980s the dominance of neo-classical economics and its emphasis on the economic man (and woman), self-interested and concerned with material gain, became the lens for viewing the public service. While this work drew an important theoretical focus on public sector failings, it did not leave much room for a way out. Since the rise of a Post Washington Consensus, the importance for material, environmental and social progress of a well-functioning and ethical public sector is once again clear. At the core of an ethical public sector is a well-functioning and equitable representative government as well as a vibrant public associational life with spaces for dialogue including a free press. However, the question of how to promote and sustain an ethical and effective public sector, especially in contexts characterized by poverty, deep conflict, corruption and clientelism, remains insufficiently answered. Part of the reason for this is that our views on public sector reforms are largely informed by our understanding of why governments so often do badly (Tendler 1997, 2). In addition, the leadership component of change has been poorly explored and most work on transformational leadership has focused on business or military leaders, and the majority of this work does not touch on what constitutes ethical leadership in the public realm (Ciulla 1998, Resick et. al. 2006). One important step then in learning how to foster and encourage ethical public life is to move beyond simply looking at what went wrong with certain public sector reform initiatives to critically explore cases of successful transformation and the ethical leaders behind the reforms. To assist in addressing this gap, this study explores five different cases of effective reformist leaders from different parts of the world in some detail: Mayors Antanas Markus and Enrique Penalosa (Bogota, Columbia), Mayor Selim Belsagic (Tuzla, Bosnia), Mayor Goh Kun (Seoul, Korea), Treatment Action Campaign leader Zackie Achmat (South Africa) and Mayor Jan Kasl (Prague). We recognize that all public figures have their supporters and detractors and have tried as much as possible to find a variety of unique cases in which a substantial consensus and overwhelming evidence exists that these leaders were key players in important ethical transformations of their societies (or at least in the case of Beslagic, protectors of the ethical fabric of society from violence and war-generated hatred). Our project here is to understand the processes and creativity behind their reforms. It is important to note that the leaders we profile were not the only key players in reform but were part of larger coalitions and support networks supporting reform. However, they often played a key role in facilitating and fostering if not building these reform networks. Thus our approach to the study of leadership also gives insight into broader transformative processes. We begin by introducing our case studies. These case studies briefly touch on the main challenges facing the leadership at the time and then focus on the basic outline of the
5 transformation and the key elements of reforms. In the second section of the paper, we undertake a more substantial analysis of the common threads that help to explain the underlying processes of transformation in the diverse cases selected.
6 CASE STUDY #1 Mayor Antanas Mockus and Mayor Enrique Penalosa In Bogotá, our goal was to make the city for all the children. The measure of a good city is one where a child on a tricycle or bicycle can safely go anywhere. If a city is good for children, it will be good for everybody else. (Enrique Penalosa interviewed by Walljasper 2004) In the 1980s and early 1990s Bogotá had a reputation for violence, pollution and corruption. The fear of kidnapping caused the wealthy to hire armed guards and install bullet-proof windows inside their homes. The city was infamous for its high murder rate. At one point, a half-dozen people were killed on average every day in Bogotá. (Santos 2005) The city suffered from a 38-year-old civil war, the War on Drugs, paralyzing traffic jams, and unbearable smog. To add to the problem, the municipal government let what little public services that existed deteriorate. Bogotá s transportation system was especially dismal. The city simply did not have enough adequate public thoroughfares to handle the ever increasing swell of vehicles. Problems were compounded by a bus system which was extremely inefficient and disorganized. There were no set bus schedules, stops or routes, and buses were always filled to capacity. In the late 90s and early 2000s, voters were fed up with these conditions and voted for two non-traditional mayors who initiated programs to bring about social, political and environmental change and created a model of progressive urban development. In stark contrast to preceding governments, these leaders had the personal skill and vision to champion the public good and make Bogotá a model city of reform. Antanas Mockus: On October 30, 1994, Antanas Mockus was elected Mayor of Bogotá with 64% of the vote (beating Enrique Penalosa from the Columbian Liberal Party) on a platform called No P meaning No Publicity, No Politics, No Money and No Party. (Montezuma, 2005) A mathematician and philosopher, Mockus had been a professor at the Colombian National University and did not have any experience in politics. He was elected because people in Bogotá saw him as an honest person. (Harvard Gazette, 2004) His District Development Plan for Forming a City, called for investment in: citizen education, public space, the environment, social progress, urban productivity, and institutional legitimacy. The focus of his administration was on citizen education. More than $100 million was allocated to the Citizen Education Program for 4 years starting in 1995 and it was carried out by the District Institute of Culture and Tourism. (Montezuma, 2005) Mockus goal through this program was to instill in the city s people a sense of responsibility for their everyday actions and to create a sense of urban co-existence. Entertainment was the hallmark of the program. The idea was to teach people by encouraging them to learn by
7 having fun. Skits were staged using street mimes and actors to teach people to use pedestrian crosswalks, to wear safety belts, and to minimize car honking. He distributed thumbs-up and thumbs-down cards to citizens, asking them to flash the cards whenever they saw an example of good or bad behavior on the streets. He organized peaceful rallies against terrorism and crime, trained 5,500 community leaders in conflict resolution, and held seminars on domestic violence. Mockus won admiration from the public with his refreshing and eccentric style. During his first term, he strolled down the streets in red and blue tights as a "Super Citizen," giving tips on civility. In an effort to highlight the problem of gender inequality, he also organized Women s Night. (Harvard Gazette, 2004) During this night men were encouraged to stay at home and take care of kids while their wives had a fun time out. Unpopular programs were also initiated such as the anti-gun campaign that prohibited the production, sale and use of gunpowder for recreational purposes. The semi-dry law known as the carrot hour was created to force nighttime establishments to close at 1:00 am. A series of broader based programs were initiated such as: Bogotá s Charm, the Capital Card, the Rule of the Game, Bogotá is to be Won or Lost and, We All Chip In. An Observatory of Urban Culture was created in 1996 to foster the study the city s transformation and to create alliances between academics and politicians on urban renewal. In 2001 he was re-elected for another term. (Montezuma, 2005) Enrique Penalosa: In 1998 Bogotá elected another dynamic leader Enrique Penalosa who in many ways built on Mockus achievements. Enrique Penalosa had studied economics, history, and public administration. His political background included representing the Liberal party in the assembly of Cundinamarca (Bogotá s province); serving as an economic secretary to Colombia s President Virgilio Barco ( ); serving as a congressman (1990); and running for mayor in He had worked both as an academic and as a director in the US consulting firm of Arthur D. Little. His District Development Plan for was called For the Bogotá We Want. The plan focused on poverty eradication, social integration, urban planning and services, and security and co-existence. Transportation and public space were the main priorities of the Penalosa administration. Convinced that cars were ruining the environment and quality of life in Bogotá and also that the dominance of cars reflected the deep inequalities in Colombia society, Penalosa created policies to reduce their use. The Pico y Placa program restricted traffic during peak hours to reduce rush hour traffic by 40 percent. He instituted Car Free Sundays and Car Free Days. On 29 February 2000, Bogotá held its first Without My Car in Bogotá day; during which the city functioned for one working day without the use of cars. The event was intended to encourage people to think about a more humane and sustainable city. Citizens supported the event and voted in a referendum for it to take place annually. Penalosa also created an Office to Defend Public Space with a mandate to recover land that had been illegally occupied or seized. Furthermore, large public spaces were set aside for pedestrians through the establishment of formal and technical standards
8 governing the placement of promenades, park benches and fences, picnic tables, bus stops, public phones, and other fixtures; tree planting and landscaping; signposts; and lighting. Almost 70,000 trees and 183,651 garden plants were planted; and 202 km of thoroughfares and 280 ha of parks were protected. All of this was done at an approximate cost of US$ 100 million. The Bicycle Path Master Plan proposed the construction of 450 km of paths exclusively for bicycles. It is the largest in Latin America and one of the largest in the developing world. (Montezuma, 2005) Finally, Penalosa s most spectacular achievement was successfully negotiating political opposition to initiate the TransMilenio, the highest capacity bus transit system in the world. The concept behind the system is to give buses their own lanes, to have passengers pay at the station and to have them enter the bus from a station that is the same height as the entrance of the bus, leading to substantial time efficiency gains. (Ardila-Gómez 2004; 369) With an extensive network of feeder roads, this system has drastically improved accessibility of transportation to the poor linking them to their places of employment, while reducing congestion and pollution. It also drew wealthier habitual car users who were able to save time by taking the BRT, raised property values and lowered crime along the BRT pathways (Ardila-Gómez 2004: ). By October 2002, the system was moving 790,000 passengers a day and a poll taken the same year suggested 78% of users found the bus service good or very good. Accidents along the bus corridor declined dramatically; deaths decreased by 89% and injuries by 83% (Diaz 2003). It is now being extensively studied as a global model. As a result of close to a decade of reforms, Bogotá is a new city. Whereas in the mid- 1990s traffic moved at a speed of well below 10 kph during rush hour, by mid it had increased to 18 kph. More than one-third of the total number of private vehicles driven during rush hour has been reduced. There has also been a rise in the number of trips on foot and by bicycle, from 7% to 11% and 2% to 4%, respectively. (Montezuma, 2005) Bogotá is now statistically safer than Caracas and Rio de Janiero, not to mention Washington, D.C., and Baltimore. Bogotá's murder rate dropped 52 percent from the time Mockus. It is now one of the lowest among big cities in Latin America. (Montezuma, 2005) In 2000, Penalosa was honored with the Stockholm Challenge Award for creating Bogotá s car-free day - the largest and most successful event of its kind in the world.
9 CASE STUDY #2 Fighting Corruption: Mayor Goh Kun My vision of the 21 st century Seoul is as the City of Hope. A city that takes its place among the world s great cities, one where the environment and population work together in harmony (Interview with Mayor Goh by 1StopKorea February 25, 2001) South Korea has experienced rapid and relatively equitable economic growth over the last decades. However, until 1993 the country did not enjoy political freedoms. Korea was under military rule with political power concentrated in the president s office. It was common practice for businesses to give funds to the President in return for favors. The first democratically elected president Kim Young Sam began a process of reform targeting the high levels of bribery by requiring government and military officials to publish their financial records. This move led to the resignation of several high-ranking officers and cabinet members. New political space and the new fight against campaign led to the revelations of a number of scandals which shocked Koreans. In the Slush Fund scandal for example it came to light that former President General Roh Tae-Woo was had been receiving about 10 million dollars a month from business conglomerates (Blechinger 2000, Koh 1996). Kim Young Sam subsequently had Mr. Roh arrested on charges of corruption and treason. This spate of scandals has seriously eroded the faith Koreans have in the country s leadership. Mr. Clean gets elected: The prevalence of bribery was not only at national levels. The city government of Seoul was rife with corruption. Bribes were most often necessary to get service and such fees would allow preferential treatment. This changed in 1999 when Goh Kun won the Mayoral election in Seoul. Having joined the civil service in the 1960s, he held a series of positions in the government in the 1980s (Governor of Jeonnam Province, Minister of Transportation, Minister of Home Affairs) and then appointed Mayor of Seoul from 1988 to The central government had dismissed him for his anti-corruption initiatives. He rose to become Prime Minister from , and then again from 2003 to When he won the Mayoral election in 1998, he was determined to carry through his anticorruption reforms and enacted a substantive and innovative anti-corruption initiative that involved citizen participation. Nicknamed Mr. Clean for his reforms, his innovative ideas increased the transparency of the Seoul municipal government. Empowered by the precedent set by Kim Young Sam s anti-corruption initiatives, Mayor Goh made fighting corruption his fist priority and, unlike previous municipal governments, approached the campaign systematically to address its root cause. The idea was to create an administrative system that eliminated the causes of corruption and prevented unethical behavior. To this end, the administration introduced preventive measures, established punitive measures, increased transparency in administration, and enhanced public-private partnership. These measures were carried out through
10 deregulation programs, rotating of duties and firing officials for any involvement in corruption no matter how small. Once every month, return postcards are sent to those who have business with the city government in those fields prone to corruption. They are asked to mail the cards directly back to the mayor with any information of corruption they have witnessed. Within two years the number of city employees was reduced by 20 percent and outside professionals were brought in to increase expertise. Some privatization and outsourcing were also implemented. In order to prevent corruption during the processing of applications, the Mayor created The Seoul Metropolitan Government's Online Procedures Enhancement for Civil Applications referred to as the OPEN system. When a reporter asked him where he had gotten the idea to make the government more transparent by using the Internet he responded that Benjamin Franklin stressed the significance of transparency in eradicating corruption by saying that ``sunlight is the best disinfectant.'' Nearly half of all Koreans use the Internet at any convenient time and place. I thought the Internet would be the best tool to take the role of the sunlight. (Korea Times, 2001). The Audits & Inspection Bureau was put in charge of the overall development process and the Information System Planning Bureau was to support the informatics system development. Through this system 26 categories of civil applications are published on the Web and are the ones that most frequently cause irregularities, cause inconvenience to citizens due to the complexity of the processing procedure, and those whose publication is expected to curb requests for concessions. The system publishes a variety of information related to the services, permits and licenses issued by the local government. People can get civil applications through the internet and avoid having to go to a government office. Free access to the status of an application makes applicants feel no need to contact officials or to provide a bribe to complete the process. Whether a citizen applies for a permit to build an office building or to start a trash-removal service, citizens can find out the date the applications were received, the status of the application, the final result, the department and the staff in charge of the civil application as well as their telephone numbers and addresses. In a recent article in The Korea Times Mr. Goh reflected upon his term as Mayor of South Korea and said that The most important thing, however, is that I eradicated corruption among Seoul city government officials. I also set up an online administration system, which could be seen by the public in real time.' With the new transparent system, nobody needs to bribe city officials for expediting the city government's permission process or other similar affairs. (Korea Times, 2001) The cost of developing the OPEN system was a mere $320,000. Moreover, the government did not incur additional costs for training in implementing the system since all such needs were met by ongoing staff. (The Korea Society Quarterly, 2001) Given OPEN s success, the central government introduced the system to the central organizations and local self-governing bodies. In addition, in 2001, Seoul and the United Nations hosted the Seoul Anticorruption Symposium which made the OPEN system an internationally approved anti-
11 corruption system. As a result, the manual for the OPEN system has been printed in 6 different official languages of the United Nations. The city's product is used throughout the nation, and now Seoul is making plans to export the software. In addition, various channels of direct dialogue are available between citizens and the mayor. The "Mayor's Saturday Date with Citizens" program was an unprecedented program and demonstrated Mr. Goh s commitment to increasing citizen participation in the government. Through the Saturday Date program any citizen of Seoul can apply for a meeting with the mayor using the method most convenient method to the person- by personal visit, phone, fax, mail or the Internet. Meetings take place every Saturday between 10am and 12pm and are attended by around 15 people including the Mayor, experts from the private sector such as professors and lawyers, representatives of civic organizations, media representatives, and the 4-6 citizens whose applications are to be discussed. The participants discussed the issue and at the end of the date the Mayor suggests the best solution. The dates usually lasted approximately one hour. The relevant government department came up with an implementation plan and reported it to the citizen who could then check on the status of projects. Of the 1,509 cases filed from July of 1998 through December of 2000, 867 were civil applications (379 civil applications filed by groups and 488 filed by individuals). Of the 1,273 cases processed, 329 were accommodated. Resolution was reached in 62.3% of the cases. (Kim, Ik-sik)
12 CASE STUDY #3 Zachie Achmat and the Treatment Action Campaign Our lives matter, the 5 million people in South Africa with HIV matter, and the millions of people throughout the world already with HIV, their lives matter. (14 th International Aids Conference, Barcelona 2002) South Africa has the largest number of HIV-infected people in the world, about 5 million, or over 11 percent of its population of 43.8 million. Unfortunately, in the mid 1990s the newly elected African National Congress (ANC) government of South Africa took the position that access to AIDS drugs was dangerous because of the toxicity of these drugs. Instead or providing treatment and prevention strategies for HIV/AIDS the government decided to focus on nutrition and poverty alleviation, in essence banning highly effective anti-retrovirals At the same time, wealthier and more influential people found ways to access the drugs which meant this policy was in many ways a condemnation to death for the average poorer person in society with this horrible disease. In response, in 1998 Zackie Achmat co-founded and became chairperson of the Treatment Action Campaign which aimed at providing all HIV positive South Africans with access to critical drugs. Achmat felt that the South African government s decision not to provide antiretroviral drugs to HIV-infected people was unethical. However, as a loyal ANC member and veteran of the anti-apartheid struggle he was initially loathe to take on the new government. Instead, he started by focusing on the pharmaceutical companies and the global patent protection that made these critical drugs so expensive. Even at the most reduced price there was almost a three times difference between the brand name drug and the generic. The initial objective of TAC s campaign was to bring the prices down to an affordable level for people both in the private sector and the government, so that the government could afford purchasing the drugs The primary aim of his campaign was to get cooperation from individuals, government and civil society to get everyone, to ensure that the four to five million people in the country infected with HIV, who would die prematurely from an avoidable death, get treatment. Zachie Achmat, himself HIV positive, relied heavily on publicity to galvanize public opinion in TAC s favor. This often meant facing the silence and stigma associated with AIDS within South African society and educating people on the extent, seriousness and human side of the problem. In a dramatic gesture of solidarity with the poor, in 1999, Zackie HIV positive himself, started the first ever drug strike and refused to take antiretroviral medication until it was available to all South Africans, declaring I will not take expensive treatment until all ordinary South Africans can get it on the public health system (Power 2003, 2). Another strategy was to focus on babies born to HIV positive mothers; in ,000 babies a year were born to HIV positive mothers and doses of the drug AZT given to these pregnant women could reduce by half the likelihood that children would be HIV
13 positive themselves. This focus on babies was a deliberate attempt to shame the manufacturer Glaxo into lowering the price (Power 2003, 7). However, even when a similar drug Nevirapine was offered free from its manufacturer, the government refused to administer it and TAC took the government to court which ruled that this was a violation of the constitution. Pregnant mothers gained access to the drug to protect their unborn babies. TAC has worked to build literacy in the disease and its treatment. This included printing hundreds of HIV positive shirts for supporters to defy societal silence on the issue. Their work has helped to de-stigmatize HIV and AIDS. They also launched a defiance campaign and imported generic substitutes. It was dilemma to decide whether to obey what was perceived as an unjust law or to act. When the government decided to prosecute for the illegal importation, Achmat turned himself in to police. As a result of this campaign Glaxo SmithKline and other Pharmaceutical companies agreed to allow production of low-cost generic versions of their drugs. Faced with continued resistance from the South African government, even in light of victories in reducing drug prices, Zackie and TAC turned their attention more fully on the government. In March 2003 TAC laid culpable homicide charges against the Health Minister and her trade and industry colleague. TAC claimed the pair was responsible for the deaths of 600 HIV-positive people a day in South Africa who had no access to antiretroviral drugs. Feeling pressured the government ordered the health department to develop a detailed operational plan to provide antiretroviral drugs to people living with HIV / AIDS. Through mass mobilization, civil disobedience, legal action, extraordinary personal sacrifice, and visionary leadership, Zackie Achmat and the TAC have helped to galvanize a global movement to provide hope and gain access to treatment for those with HIV/Aids. As a result of these new policies increasing access to critical drugs, Achmat and TAC have in effect saved thousands of lives and dramatically improved the quality of those lives. Time magazine voted Achmat one of the 35 heroes of 2003 and in 2004, TAC and Zackie Achmat were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize
14 CASE STUDY #4 Promoting Unity in the Face of War: Tuzla s Selim Beslagic You must remember that your citizens are your customers and you represent them all, whatever their ethnicity. In Yugoslavia in the 1990s, national and local leaders encouraged the disintegration of their country by fostering ethnic resentment for political gain. The result was a horrific war and genocide against Muslims in multi-ethnic Bosnia. Pressures were intense for multi-ethnic communities to break apart and disperse into ethnically pure enclaves protected by militias. One local leader, the Mayor of Tuzla however, offered a model of effective and ethical leadership that promoted peace among his disparate citizens and supported unity rather than conflict. He led a multi-ethnic resistance against Serb militias and also defied the Bosnian leadership by refusing to allow any retaliation against innocent Serb or Croatian citizens in Tuzla. A director of a cement factory, Selim Beslagic entered politics in the early 1990s when the former Yugoslavia s liberal prime minister asked him to organize what was to eventually become the Social Democrat Party (SDP) in his home city of Tuzla. During the first multi-party elections in Yugoslavia, Beslagic was elected the mayor of Tuzla. The city of Tuzla, the fourth largest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was noted for its mix of ethnicities that have existed peacefully together for centuries- half Muslim, a quarter Serb and Croat. To give a voice to the different ethnic components of his city, the Beslagic and his SDP created a city government that included members of the different ethnic groups present in Tuzla. In the early 1990s, when a horrific war of disintegration occurred with militias fighting for control of Bosnian territory and creating ethnically pure enclaves through killings and displacement, tensions in Tuzla began to splinter people that had until then lived in peace. Mayor Beslagic took an active role in combating the exclusionary nationalism that encouraged violence in Tuzla. He called upon the underlying common bonds that would keep his city together, saying We are all, unfortunately, endangered, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. We are under threat as a people, as citizens regardless of our ethnic background (Post-Conflict Foundation, 2006). Beslagic remained steadfastly committed to this idea of unity, highlighting the citizens common interest in peace. In a speech in January 1992, Beslagic expressed this theme, declaring with respect to Tuzla s citizens, During the course of the war they have been through trials which could so easily have poisoned them with the powers of darkness and cut the holy umbilical cord tying them to the anti-fascist roots and traditions of this area. In fact, they demonstrated remarkable maturity, rising above the fascist consciousness that surrounded them on every side, and not allowing themselves to sink to that same level of destruction, nihilism, and darkness. (Post-Conflict Foundation, 2006). To